Mad Scientist Laboratory

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring guest panelists Ian Sullivan, Mitchell Land, LTC Peter Soendergaard, Jennifer McArdle, Becca Wasser, Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Sebastian Bae, Dan Mahoney, and Jeff Hodges discussing how wargaming enhances Professional Military Education (PME), hones cognitive warfighting skills, and broadens our understanding of future Operational Environment possibilities — Enjoy!]

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Army Mad Scientist interviewed the following world-class SMEs to explore how wargaming can enhance traditional training and education methods to help build better Leaders:

Ian Sullivan serves as the Senior Advisor for Analysis and ISR to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC G-2). This is a Tier One Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) position. He is responsible for the analysis that defines and the narrative that explains the Army’s Operational Environment, which supports integration across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. Mr. Sullivan is a career civilian intelligence officer who has served with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (USAREUR G-2); and as an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) cadre member at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Prior to assuming his position at the TRADOC G-2, Mr. Sullivan led a joint NCTC Directorate of Intelligence/Central Intelligence Agency Counterterrorism Mission Center unit responsible for Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism issues, where he provided direct intelligence support to the White House, senior policymakers, Congress, and other senior customers throughout the Government. He was promoted into the Senior Executive ranks in June 2013 as a member of the ODNI’s Senior National Intelligence Service, and transferred to the Army as a DISL employee in January 2017. Mr. Sullivan is also a frequent and valued contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory.

Mitchell Land has spent time in both the Navy and the Army National Guard, and has a life-long love affair with gaming war.  He is the designer of GMT’s Next War games. The series currently consists of five games (two of which are 2^nd Editions) and three supplements, with more on the way.  In addition, Mr. Land was the developer for GMT’s Silver Bayonet: The First Team in Vietnam (25^th Anniversary Edition) and Caesar:  Rome vs Gaul. When not playing or working on games, you can find him cycling — most often on the Katy Trail.

LTC Peter Soendergaard is an Infantry officer in the Royal Danish Army. He has served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last ten years, he has worked in various force development positions, from the Danish Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence to the Army Staff.  For the past four years, LTC Soendergaard has served as the Danish Army’s liaison officer to U.S. Army TRADOC.  He is currently serving in the strategic development section of the Danish Defense Command.

Jennifer McArdle is the Head of Research at Improbable U.S. Defense & National Security, a commercial start-up that is bringing innovative distributed simulation technology to defense. She also serves as an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Center for a New American Security’s defense program and wargaming lab and as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. A former professor, Ms. McArdle has served on Congressman Langevin’s cyber advisory committee and as an expert member of a NATO technical group that developed cyber effects for the military alliance’s mission and campaign simulations. Ms. McArdle is a PhD candidate at King’s College London in War Studies, is the recipient of the RADM Fred Lewis (I/ITSEC) doctoral scholarship in modeling and simulation, and is a Certified Modeling and Simulation Professional (CMSP). She is a term member with the Council on Foreign Relations. Ms. McArdle is also a frequent and valued contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory and The Convergence podcast.

Becca Wasser is a Fellow in the Defense Program and lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security. Her research areas include defense strategy, force design, strategic and operational planning, force posture and employment, and wargaming. Prior to joining CNAS, Ms. Wasser was a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she led research projects and wargames for the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government entities. She holds a BA from Brandeis University and an MS in foreign service from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. Her areas of expertise include defense strategy, posture, force planning, the defense budget, and wargaming. Prior to joining CNAS, Dr. Pettyjohn spent over 10 years at the RAND Corporation as a political scientist. Between 2019–2021, she was the director of the strategy and doctrine program in Project Air Force. From 2014–2020, she served as the co-director of the Center for Gaming. In 2020, she was a volunteer on the Biden administration’s defense transition team. She has designed and led strategic and operational games that have assessed new operational concepts, tested the impacts of new technology, examined nuclear escalation and warfighting, and explored unclear phenomena, such as gray zone tactics and information warfare. Previously, she was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, a peace scholar at the United States Institute of Peace, and a TAPIR fellow at the RAND Corporation. Dr. Pettyjohn holds a PhD and an MA in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia and a BA in history and political science from the Ohio State University.

Sebastian Bae is a research analyst and game designer at CNA’s Gaming & Integration program, and works in wargaming, emerging technologies, the future of warfare, and strategy and doctrine for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. He also serves as an adjunct assistant professor at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, where he teaches a graduate course on designing educational wargames. He has taught similar courses at the U.S. Naval Academy and the U.S. Marine Corps Command & Staff College. He is also the faculty advisor to the Georgetown University Wargaming Society, the Co-Chair of the Military Operations Research Society Wargaming Community of Practice, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity. Previously, he served six years in the Marine Corps Infantry, leaving as a Sergeant. He deployed to Iraq in 2009.

Dan Mahoney is the Chief of the Campaign Wargaming Division at the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). Mr. Mahoney was an ROTC Cadet at Lehigh University and spent 23 years as an Infantry officer in the Army, retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel. He taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point before attending the School of Advanced Military Studies, becoming the Chief of Plans for the 1st Cavalry Division, and eventually founding the Campaign Wargaming Division at CAA.

Jeff Hodges is the educational lead at the U.S. Army Modeling and Simulation School (AMSS) at Ft. Belvoir, VA. He designs and implements courses at AMSS to ensure that the FA57 and CP36 workforce can fully support the Commander’s readiness objectives by building awareness, building a Common Operating Picture (COP), and building tough and realistic simulations, tabletop exercises, and wargames that facilitate staff understanding, education, and training.

In today’s podcast, our panel of SMEs address how wargaming can enhance Professional Military Education (PME), hone cognitive warfighting skills, and broaden our understanding of future Operational Environment possibilities.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Learning from Wargaming can be broken down into two categories: discovery/analytic and experiential. Both categories are important but have different end-goals. Discovery/analytic wargaming helps one develop new insights or better understand some type of phenomena (e.g., concept or capability development). Experiential wargaming supports training and education and is designed to instill best practices, lessons learned, and develop creativity and agility among future leaders. Wargaming allows players to transcend their current realities and build cognitive warfighting proficiencies.

• • • Experiential learning leads to far higher learning retention than traditional passive methods of instruction, such as classroom-based lectures. It allows individuals to follow their ideas, work through problems as they arise, experience failure in a safe environment, and ultimately learn how to overcome challenges.

• • • The key to a successful wargame is an informed, accurate, and thinking adversary. It is vital that the Red Cell depicts an adversary as close to reality as possible, providing players with the best opportunities to learn about adversarial tactics and capabilities, decision-making, and thought-processes.

• • • Wargaming is used extensively at different levels in the Army — to explore ideas, look at alternatives, and think about the future, but also to test concepts and capabilities. Wargaming formats range from traditional table top board games, to discussion-based exercises, to computerized simulations that provide players with a realistic, immersive environment to visualize the fight.

• • • Designing an effective and successful wargame is dependent on one’s focus and learning demands. Designers should start the process by identifying the goal(s) that they want to accomplish and then work backwards.  Carefully selecting the correct tools and technology to support players achieving the end-goal(s) is pivotal to eliciting the desired learning outcome.

• • • While wargaming can provide an accurate and realistic representation of a real-world adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, it can also uncover unexpected TTPs that our forces may not have anticipated.  Encountering these actions in the game allows players to develop and implement courses of action in a consequence-free environment, helping them to avoid operational surprise on the battlefield, while building confidence in their ability to successfully overcome it when it inevitably occurs. 

• • • The future of wargaming will likely be more technology-heavy, interactive, distributed, and realistic while still having a significant amount of traditional and manual games. Learning goals can be achieved via both conventional (e.g., table top) wargaming and immersive simulations employing emergent technologies. Regardless of the media, some posit that the golden age of wargaming is coming to an end, as there is a dearth of young talent in the pipeline to replace the old guard.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence, featuring Zach Schonbrun, journalist and author of The Performance Cortex: How Neuroscience is Redefining Athletic Genius .  We’ll talk with Zach about his book, how the brain — not the body — may be responsible for athletic prowess, and the implications for future Soldiers.

If you enjoyed this post, explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with information on the Operational Environment and our how our adversaries fight to enhance the reality of your wargaming experience…

…. and check out the following Army Mad Scientist wargaming-related content:

Would You Like to Play a Game? Wargaming as a Learning Experience and Key Assumptions Check and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan

Using Wargames to Reconceptualize Military Power, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth

A New American Way of Training and associated podcast, with Jennifer McArdle

From Legos to Modular Simulation Architectures: Enabling the Power of Future (War) Play, by Jennifer McArdle and Caitlin Dohrman

The Storm After the Flood virtual wargame scenario, video, notes, and Lessons Learned presentation and video, presented by proclaimed Mad Scientists Dr. Gary Ackerman and Doug Clifford, The Center for Advanced Red Teaming, University at Albany, SUNY

The Metaverse: Blurring Reality and Digital Lives with Cathy Hackl and associated podcast

Gamers Building the Future Force  and associated podcast

Fight Club Prepares Lt Col Maddie Novák for Cross-Dimension Manoeuvre, by now COL Arnel David, U.S. Army, and Major Aaron Moore, British Army, along with their interview in The Convergence: UK Fight Club – Gaming the Future Army and associated podcast

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist welcomes back returning guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth with another insightful post, this time addressing the limitations of traditional net assessment in accurately predicting combat operations’ outcomes.  Using the on-going conflict in Ukraine as a use case, Ms. Duckworth explores aspects of this conflict that have yielded today’s unanticipated David versus Goliath standoff.  In identifying these “intangibles,” she then posits how the Army could leverage experts in qualitative strengths game design to allocate weighted measures and incorporate them into wargaming.  These effects could then be re-evaluated after each round of gameplay, enabling fine tuning to better reflect real world realities — Read on!]

While challenging to capture, measuring a military’s power historically relies heavily on quantitative measurements. The number of weapons, troops, and transport vessels all indicate how capable an adversary might be in battle. However, as illustrated in the Ukrainian defense against the Russian invasion, materiel size only tells part of the story.

Researchers have long called for a reinvention of the way we conceptualize military power. Several new indices have been developed that include modern metrics from equipment age to intelligence capabilities and recent combat experience. And yet, despite recognizing the importance of these qualitative metrics, the success of Ukrainian resistance still defied expectations. Such a failure of prediction is particularly surprising given efforts to adjust for recent gross miscalculation of Afghan military strength. In this case, too, the United States misjudged a foreign military because it failed to take into consideration important qualitative metrics. Senator Angus King said, “Within 12 months … we overestimated the Afghans’ will to fight, underestimated the Ukrainians’ will to fight.” As the United States monitors an increasingly assertive and advanced China, these miscalculations become particularly dangerous.

How can the Army, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the national security architecture as a whole better understand the power of foreign militaries? The answer lies in wargames.

A Case Study:  Ukraine

Indices and assessments of military capability tend to capture numerical metrics—like spending, force size, and weapons counts—first. By these assessments, Ukraine should not have been able to withstand the Russian invasion. For instance, Global Fire Power estimates that Ukraine has only 500,000 total military personnel compared to Russia’s 1,350,000. The Ukrainian military was also outmatched in numbers of armored fighting vehicles and combat aircraft, having just 20.9% and 9.5% of the Russian force’s assets, respectively. By these measures, the fall of Ukraine seemed inevitable; as U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley said, “The math problem is very difficult for the Ukrainians.”

Despite this bleak outlook, the war in Ukraine is now in its fifth month. Ukraine has shown surprising strength, leveraging its home field advantage and technologically savvy leadership to boost its citizens’ morale and slow Russia’s advance into the country. While smaller in size, the Ukrainian military has been largely successful in targeting the Russian military’s logistics. It has taken aim at ammunition storage sites and destroyed key bridges, helping to offset Russia’s numerical advantage and complicating its ability to sustain continued offensive operations. Ukraine’s civilian population has mobilized, too, demonstrating a level of resilience, determination, and tenacity not seen in Russia’s military.

It’s unclear how this quantity versus quality disparity will play out as the war progresses. What is certain, however, is that we could have better understood both the strengths of the Ukrainian force and key weaknesses underlying Russia’s invasion. To avoid this mistake in the future, assessments of military capability should address both human elements, like troop morale, training, and experience, and the resilience of logistical support systems, in addition to traditional quantitative evaluations.

A new framework for military power

The U.S. military clearly recognizes the importance of qualitative factors when considering its own strength. Its leaders have long heralded the importance of personnel quality to achieving victory. The Army specifically highlighted this feature of success in its Army People Strategy, published in 2019. Training, healthcare, and support for civilian families are all frequently lauded to significantly contribute to U.S. mission success. Historically, too, the U.S. military has had the advantage in logistics, working to ensure that each branch has stable supply chains and ensuring interoperability between the forces. Thus, it is evident that the U.S. military values the qualitative elements of its own force strength. These measurements must now be applied to foreign forces as well.

While a holistic measure of an adversary’s strength may be less concrete, it will also be more accurate. In addition to statistics on number, type, and age of weapons, assessments should include:

• • • Logistical Strength:  Experts predicted Russia would be able to take over Ukraine in a matter of days. However, the Russians’ logistical support system to its troops has undermined its ability to operate effectively. Its trucks are “poorly maintained, poorly led, and too few in number,” preventing resupply at the frontlines. Thus, evaluations of military power should examine how logistical systems are designed and maintained — weapons mean little if they can’t be sustained, and manpower is undermined if soldiers lack essentials, like food and cold-weather gear.  U.S. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley‘s often quoted adage holds true for today’s conflict in Ukraine — “Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.”

• • • The Human Element:

• • • • 

        Leadership:  On the civilian side, countless articles have described the outstanding leadership of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He has been described as “Churchillian,” displaying intense vulnerability and solidarity with the Ukrainian people by refusing to flee his country. Instead, he filmed videos of himself in Ukraine, reassuring people that he was standing up for them. His leadership mobilized Ukrainians and international support (thus increasing military assistance to Ukraine) — stiffening national resistance to Russian aggression. Such leadership from key civilian authorities cannot be taken for granted, and should be considered in calculations of military strength as it contributes to both troop morale and sustained societal support for conflict.

Ukrainian military leadership has been strong, as well. General Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, Ukraine’s Commander-In-Chief, has been described as a representation “of the new generation of Ukrainian military — senior, middle level and even low level officers.” While he has avoided public appearances and interviews since the beginning of the invasion, he has, according to General Milley, “[been] the man behind [the Ukrainian resistance], bearing the immense burden of leading in combat. His work will be remembered by history.” Thus, Zelensky’s civilian leadership is complemented by strong military leadership, creating a feature of the Ukrainian military that is not captured by today’s measurements of strength.

• • • • Morale:  As the war progresses, both Ukrainian and Russian soldiers are faltering. However, the situation seems more severe for the Russian army; entire units have disobeyed orders, resulting in armed standoffs between leaders and soldiers. Morale among the Russian forces has been low since early in the invasion, with some officers saying they felt “tricked” into the invasion. The U.S. Army already recognizes the importance of maintaining morale to secure mission success — this evaluation must now be implemented in efforts to evaluate the strength of potential adversaries. In the case of Russia’s war in Ukraine, such consideration does not bode well for the success of the invasion going forward.

• • • • 

        Preparation:  Both training and experience in an operational environment contributes to the strength of a military. While Ukraine employed its untrained civilians to resist the Russian invasion, they also had a far greater understanding of the vast urban terrain in Kyiv, using their knowledge of the city to their advantage. The Russian military was untested and poorly trained in this area, contributing to failure in its assault on the Ukrainian capital. Adversaries like Russia may also be deploying conscripts, who are generally less trained and unprepared for battle.

• Implementation: Wargames

• Evaluating the strength of foreign militaries holistically will require a more iterative process than simply counting main battle tanks and combat aircraft. To inspire this type of discussion and better understand the strength of potential adversaries, the U.S. military should host experts on the qualitative natures of foreign forces —  professors, think-tank analysts, and military leaders who possess cultural expertise — in the development of future wargames. More specifically, these designers should consider translating qualitative metrics into quantitative weights that frame wargame operations.

• Wargames are designed to let players explore conflict scenarios and practice decision-making in a controlled environment. Yet, they are critiqued for simply reinforcing existing knowledge of their players. By seeking out experts of the qualitative strengths game design, U.S. military leaders can better understand the human and logistical factors underlying and complicating the battlefield.

• Instead of allowing teams to make decisions based on what a leader might command, cultural experts could evaluate relevant qualitative measures and assign them numerical values on a predetermined scale. The measurements would then serve as “weights” that impact the success of team decisions during gameplay. Weights would be re-evaluated by the game designers after each round of gameplay, given that either team’s decision could impact these measures (for instance, a successful attack may boost measures of one team’s morale, while reducing the morale and logistical prowess of the other team).

• In a wargame simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, for instance, the Chinese team may choose to attack a certain location. However, the number of personnel and materiel lost by each team during the move would be affected by weights previously determined by the cultural expert ‘team.’ At that point, morale might be weighted to a degree to cause more troop loss on one side than expected, or logistical support weights could decrease the
• 
• number of functional units to carry out the mission. Relevant weights could even be severe enough to cause an operation to fail altogether.

• By translating qualitative measures into quantitative weights, wargames will be better equipped to incorporate the real impacts of less tangible measures of military strength.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence — addressing how wargaming can broaden our understanding of future Operational Environment possibilities — to be published next week on 18 August 2022.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following wargaming-related content:

Would You Like to Play a Game? Wargaming as a Learning Experience and Key Assumptions Check and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan

A New American Way of Training and associated podcast, with Jennifer McArdle

From Legos to Modular Simulation Architectures: Enabling the Power of Future (War) Play, by Jennifer McArdle and Caitlin Dohrman

The Storm After the Flood virtual wargame scenario, video, notes, and Lessons Learned presentation and video, presented by proclaimed Mad Scientists Dr. Gary Ackerman and Doug Clifford, The Center for Advanced Red Teaming, University at Albany, SUNY

The Metaverse: Blurring Reality and Digital Lives with Cathy Hackl and associated podcast

Gamers Building the Future Force  and associated podcast

Fight Club Prepares Lt Col Maddie Novák for Cross-Dimension Manoeuvre, by LTC(P) Arnel David, U.S. Army, and Major Aaron Moore, British Army, along with their interview in The Convergence: UK Fight Club – Gaming the Future Army and associated podcast

About the Author:  Caroline Duckworth is a proclaimed Mad Scientist, former Army Mad Scientist Consultant, and former Gaither Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She graduated summa cum laude from The College of William and Mary in Virginia in 2021, with a BA in International Relations and Data Science. Ms. Duckworth previously interned with the Mad Scientist Initiative through the Army Futures and Concepts Center, and is a frequent contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory.

• The author would like to thank Matthew Santaspirt for his significant assistance in completing this post, as well as Kate Kilgore, Raechel Melling, Charles Raymond, and Ian Sullivan for their insightful feedback.

• Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring returning guest COL John Antal (USA-Ret.), addressing the challenges facing our Army in executing continuous and uninterrupted mission command in the contemporary battlespace, ensuring command post survivability, and achieving the Joint Force’s requirement for an All Domain Common Operational Picture — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

COL John Antal (USA, Ret.) is a lifelong student of leadership and the art of war. His purpose in life is “to develop leaders and inspire service.” Today, he is an Amazon best-selling author, a defense analyst, a military correspondent, and a galvanic speaker. COL Antal has appeared on radio, podcast, and television shows and is the author of 16 books and hundreds of magazine articles on military and leadership subjects. His latest books are Leadership Rising (July 2021); and 7 Seconds to Die, A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting (February 2022). In the past year, based on his in-depth study of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, COL Antal has made over 108 presentations on the “changing methods of warfare” to U.S. military and national security leaders. He offers these presentations to the U.S. military at no charge and as a “Soldier for Life.” His previous The Convergence podcast — Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh War — and its associated blog post remain Army Mad Scientist’s “best-selling” listens and reads to date!

In today’s podcast, COL Antal returns to discuss the challenges facing our Army in executing continuous and uninterrupted mission command in the contemporary battlespace, ensuring command post survivability, and achieving the Joint Force’s requirement for an All Domain Common Operational Picture.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Modern conflict is increasingly transparent; it is impossible to hide on the battlefield.  Consequently, it is imperative that the Army adopt and practice “masking” — a full spectrum, multi-domain effort to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt targeting.  Our Joint Force must obscure its optical, thermal, electronic, acoustic, and quantum signatures — or die!

• • • Today’s centralized command posts are incredibly vulnerable to enemy fire, while “Command Posts-in-Sanctuary” — those out of reach of adversary strikes — are limited by communications capabilities. To find an appropriate middle ground, we should adopt decentralized, mobile command posts that can support command and control and mask their locations and communications.

• • • It is unlikely that the United States will initiate the first strike in a conflict. Therefore, the U.S. military must consider how it will respond to a first strike by our adversaries. We should ask what we could do to prepare for a bolt from the blue attack, then make those changes now.

• • • Like our adversaries, we must assimilate the lessons learned from the on-going war in Ukraine.  China, for instance, has learned that any potential invasion of Taiwan requires the rapid application of overwhelmingly devastating military strength.

• • • The tempo of war is accelerating. The Joint Force should adapt its mission command to operate in this space.  Integration with Artificial Intelligence (AI) will facilitate the creation of a Kill Web, replacing our current human-centric, and slower, Kill Chain.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence — addressing how wargaming can broaden our understanding of future Operational Environment possibilities — to be published in a fortnight on 18 August 2022.  To whet your appetite, read Ian Sullivan‘s informative post entitled Would You Like to Play a Game? Wargaming as a Learning Experience and Key Assumptions Check.

If you enjoyed this post, check out COL Antal’s associated paper — 21 Command Post Rules To Live By — and his previous insights on battlefield transparency and masking in Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the associated podcast…

… as well as the following related content:

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

Nowhere to Hide: Information Exploitation and Sanitization

War Laid Bare and Decision in the 21st Century, by Matthew Ader

On Surprise Attacks Below the “Bolt from the Blue” Threshold, by Lesley Kucharski

Battlefield sensing and AI discussions in The Future of Ground Warfare with COL Scott Shaw and associated podcast

Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield

Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  The Army’s Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to feature today’s post by the United States Army War College (USAWC) student team “Forecastica” — excerpted from their final report:  China 2049: The Flight of a Particle Board Dragon.  This report documents the findings from their group Strategic Research Requirement that occurred over eight months (October 2021 to May 2022).  The Forecastica Team consisted of COL Paul M. Bonano (USA), COL Johannes E. Castro (USA), COL Eric P. Magistad (USA), Lt. Col. Stacy N. Slate (USAF), and LTC Andrew J. Wiker (USA).  Their requirement synthesized and analyzed open-source documents to answer the following question:  How can China meet its national objectives to become the world’s dominant power by 2049?  Read on to learn what our most recently proclaimed Mad Scientists say about how our pacing threat is building regional hegemony!]

China will likely^* focus on three areas to establish itself as the regional hegemon. By increasing its regional influence to promote stability and self-interest, the country can extend its reach and economic influence across the region. The PRC is likely to continue using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to establish regional dependencies. The global network of railroads, ports, highways, and infrastructure projects Beijing develops and funds primarily through loans to other nations expands its economic and geopolitical influence over regional countries through debt and trade, while providing access to export markets and resources. Most Asian countries participate in the BRI (Figure 1).

However, China faces three obstacles to becoming the regional hegemon. First, continued BRI expansion and overseas investments will strain China’s corporate debt and public debt levels. The Atlantic Council estimates the potential slowdown from deleveraging overseas lending and real estate debt reduction could cut its GDP growth by one percentage point per year until 2025. The number of loans from the PRC’s two biggest policy banks has already fallen drastically from their 2016 highs (Figure 2). Reductions in regional investment are likely to limit China’s ability to increase dependencies within the region.

Second, while Chinese firms excel at “adaptive innovation” based on theft or forced technology transfer, they lack many advantages of an open economic system maximizing competition. Innovation is a product of flexible financing and trust in government institutions, and the PRC lacks these structural advantages for the foreseeable future. The CCP’s centralized decision-making helps drive whole-of-government resource mobilization, but centrally driven models ultimately inhibit true innovation. Over the long term, the PRC’s manufacturing productivity and economic health are questionable, but its regional dominance may go unchallenged.

Finally, following China’s border dispute with India in 2020, China built alliances through the BRI, effectively surrounding India with ports capable of supporting the PLA-Navy. This move pushed India into strengthened relations with their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) partners (Figure 3) and increased naval partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific to counter Sino influence. The QUAD will likely continue to hinder Chinese regional dominance unless they amend their relationship with India.

Despite the likely reduction in its regional investments, China is likely to achieve a significant degree of regional influence based on the regional dependencies it has already established.

To reduce the Western influence in the region, China is likely to position itself as the regional economic and security partner of choice. Economically, Beijing is highly likely to use BRI-like infrastructure development initiatives to foster economic dependencies and develop influence in neighboring countries through trade agreements. Its trade with Asian countries accounts for half of China’s exports, while key U.S. Allies (e.g., Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) have trade surpluses (Figure 4). Decisions on who can access its growing domestic market will shape regional trade.

If Beijing maintains its regional export and economic power, its partnership opportunities will likely increase. Chinese financial and export strength provides natural conduits to the rest of the region through signed agreements like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and an agreement between ASEAN and China to officially upgrade their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The economic dependencies are likely to complicate international consensus on economic sanctions directed towards China.

China is also likely to increase participation in UN peacekeeping missions and disaster relief and participate in combined training exercises throughout the South China Sea to demonstrate its reliability as a security partner. Foreign Military Sales, including with U.S. partners such as Thailand, increase opportunities for the PLA to engage with regional militaries and strengthen relationships.

Finally, Xi Jinping is highly likely to continue building alliances in the Indian Ocean through the BRI. Dual civil/military port projects in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka allow the PLA-Navy to isolate its regional geopolitical competitor, India, militarily. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, connecting western China directly to the Indian Ocean shipping lanes through Pakistan’s Gwadar Port with pipelines, railroads, and roads, is likely economically unviable. Still, the geopolitical benefit outweighs the cost if the isolation forces India to reach an accommodation with China and downgrade its relationship with the US.

Beijing faces challenges in becoming the economic and security partner of choice. As discussed earlier, the continued expansion of the BRI strains China’s corporate debt and public debt levels, likely threatening financing for future infrastructure development projects. Its claims to disputed islands in their near seas and continued aggression toward Taiwan continue to cause friction, increase tension, and erode trust. The disputes are certain to push their SE Asian neighbors further toward security cooperation with the US, regardless of their economic ties.

Overall, China’s chances are a little less likely to earn the required trust from its neighbors and drive the US out of the region, primarily due to the tension between their regional neighbors’ economic ties to China, but also due to security relationships with the US.

China must build an effective PLA and A2AD capability (Figure 5) to develop a credible threat of hard power and deter intervention. Modernization through the development of precision-guided munitions, hypersonic glide vehicles, UAVs, cyber-warfare, and intelligentization enabling complex thinking and decision-making will likely provide an A2AD advantage. To this end, the PRC has invested billions of dollars in military modernization and reorganized the PLA into joint commands while increasing joint exercises with Russia and Iran. The modernization mainly focuses on deterring Western military interventions in the region.

The PLA faces significant modernization challenges due to its deep-seated culture of over-centralization of command authority, top-down control of military assets, and failure to incorporate the style of decentralized mission command demanded by technology-driven future warfare. They currently lack a plan to prioritize incorporating new technologies into their training strategy to challenge their soldiers to fight and win in a complex multi-domain environment.

Still, China is likely to achieve this goal due to its ambitions to reach parity with the West and its ability to radiate sharp power regionally.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the comprehensive report — China 2049: The Flight of a Particle Board Dragon — from which it was excerpted…

… as well as the following related TRADOC G-2 and Mad Scientist content:

China Landing Zone content on the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page — including the BiteSize China weekly topics, ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and more!

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

How China Fights and associated podcast

The Most Consequential Adversaries and associated podcast, with

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

“Intelligentization” and a Chinese Vision of Future War

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Disinformation, Revisionism, and China with Doowan Lee and associated podcast

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training

A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations

China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare

The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

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^* Forcastica’s analysts used Kesselman’s List of Estimative Words (below) to express estimative probability in deciding the likelihood of China’s success across a spectrum of actions they determined necessary to become the world’s dominant power by 2049.

[Editor’s Note:   Last November, Army Mad Scientist’s The Convergence podcast interviewed a panel of four world class Russian military subject matter experts (SMEs) to discuss How Russia Fights. Now, almost five months into Russia’s “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine, Army Mad Scientist revisits this topic to explore what we’ve learned with returning panelists Ian Sullivan, Samuel Bendett, and Katerina Sedova, joined by BG Peter B. Zwack (USA-Ret.), BG Peter L. Jones (USA-Ret.), and Dr. Mica Hall — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Army Mad Scientist interviewed the following world-class SMEs to address what we’ve learned about How Russia Fights 2.0:

Ian Sullivan serves as the Senior Advisor for Analysis and ISR to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC G-2). This is a Tier One Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) position. He is responsible for the analysis that defines and the narrative that explains the Army’s Operational Environment, which supports integration across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. Mr. Sullivan is a career civilian intelligence officer who has served with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (USAREUR G-2); and as an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) cadre member at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Prior to assuming his position at the TRADOC G-2, Mr. Sullivan led a joint NCTC Directorate of Intelligence /Central Intelligence Agency Counterterrorism Mission Center unit responsible for Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism issues, where he provided direct intelligence support to the White House, senior policymakers, Congress, and other senior customers throughout the Government. He was promoted into the Senior Executive ranks in June 2013 as a member of the ODNI’s Senior National Intelligence Service, and transferred to the Army as a Defense Intelligence Senior Level employee in January 2017. Mr. Sullivan is also a frequent and valued contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory.

Sam Bendett is an Adviser with CNA‘s Strategy, Policy, Plans and Programs Center (SP3), where he is a member of the Russia Studies Program. He is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. His work involves research on Russian defense and technology developments, unmanned and autonomous military systems and artificial intelligence, as well as Russian military capabilities and decision-making during crises. He is a Member of CNA’s Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence, and a proclaimed Mad Scientist, having contributed multiple insightful blog posts to the Mad Scientist Laboratory addressing Russian autonomous weapons and presented informative topics during a number of Army Mad Scientist webinars and conferences. He is also a Russian military autonomy and AI SME for the DoD’s Defense Systems Information Analysis Center.

Katerina Sedova  currently serves at the Global Engagement Center in the U.S. Department of State. Formerly a Research Fellow at the Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Ms. Sedova helps coordinate efforts at the GEC’s Russia Division to analyze, expose, and counter Russia’s disinformation, including about its war in Ukraine. Following the 2016 election, the U.S. Government greatly increased its efforts to protect future elections from foreign influence. As part of that effort, the GEC’s mission was significantly expanded to fill a critical gap:  the need to expose and counter the disinformation that foreign adversaries spread overseas. More specifically, the GEC’s mission is to lead and coordinate U.S. Government efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign disinformation aimed at undermining the stability of the United States, our allies, and our partners.  Ms. Sedova is a proclaimed Mad Scientist, having participated in our AI Speeding up Disinformation panel discussion during the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events in 2020.

BG Peter B. Zwack is a non-resident Wilson Center Global Fellow focusing on Russian-Eurasian challenges and opportunities at The Kennan Institute. This follows almost fours years at the National Defense University (2015-2019) and 34 years in the U.S. Army.  BG Zwack concluded 25 months (2012-2014) as the Senior Defense Official/ Defense Attaché to Russia where he witnessed tumultuous events and troubling changes involving Russia and our security relationship. Having joined the private sector, BG Zwack consults, speaks, teaches, and writes on a broad range of topics ranging from Russia and Eurasia to leadership lessons-learned. He has a wide range of experience, including command, staff, and managerial positions at every echelon from tactical to strategic, military to diplomatic, supporting 4-star commanders and Ambassadors. BG Zwack has taught international security studies at the Masters level and lectures regularly within numerous government and private venues.

BG Peter L. Jones  served as the Director, Russian New Generation Warfare (RNGW) Study Group in 2016-7, tasked with analyzing Russian disruptive technologies and methods in support of the Army Capabilities Integration Center at Ft. Eustis, Virginia.  BG Jones coordinated with Combatant Commands, DoD, the Joint Staff, academia, and the Intelligence Community to determine implications for future force and capability development.  Leading the review and analysis of critical intelligence reports and studies; participating in Army, EUCOM and USAREUR CONPLAN scenario analysis and wargames; and developing Army and Joint Staff operating concepts — BG Jones integrated findings into the development of the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Battle and supporting functional concepts.  BG Jones also served as the Chief of Infantry for the U.S. Army and Commandant of the Infantry School, responsible for all generating aspects of the Army’s Infantry force, to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.  He is a decorated combat leader with over 48 months of combat deployments. BG Jones currently serves as the President and Chief Operating Officer for the National Infantry Museum Foundation.

Dr. Mica Hall serves as Devil’s Advocate Red Team, TRADOC G-2, where she develops innovative strategies to attract, educate, and train intelligence and non-intelligence professionals for the DoD.  Dr. Hall coordinates activities with senior leaders within the DoD to gain support for new strategies and Army initiatives, and supports efforts to implement new programs throughout the Intelligence Community and influence applicable DoD-wide programs. Prior to joining the TRADOC G-2, Dr. Hall served over two decades at the Defense Language Institute in a number of leadership positions, including    Associate Provost, Directorate of Continuing Education; Dean, Persian Farsi School; Academic Specialist, Middle East I; Associate Dean, Extension Programs; Branch Chief, Russian Intermediate/ Advanced; and Assistant Professor, Russian Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced Courses.  Dr. Hall has also contributed insightful blog posts to the Mad Scientist Laboratory exploring Russia’s move to adopt and weaponize the cryptoruble as a means of asserting its digital sovereignty and ensuring national security.

In today’s post and podcast, our panel of SMEs discuss what we’ve learned during the last five months of Russia’s “Special Military Operation” in eastern Ukraine.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • The conflict with Ukraine has not gone the way Russia expected. Early underestimation of the Ukrainian military to combat a peer adversary has led to minimal successes and slow acquisition of territory. However, the conflict has reached a rhythm now, with a pace that more closely resembles the slog of the western front in WWI, instead of the quick and decisive campaign Russia envisioned.

• • • Russia conducted a number of exercises to prepare for this conflict, but they didn’t exercise the critical webs and hubs of logistics, long road marches, and frontal operations efficiently. Their invasion started with an assumption of little to no resistance and a disdain in their planning for the professionalism and tenacity of Ukrainian fighters.

• • • Russian modernization is an evolving concept. Some advanced technology was adopted and integrated into the forces well, and some was not. Many weapons and systems in the research and development stages, never made it past the testing stage. At the same time, Russian peers and adversaries were developing many of the same technologies.

• • • Russia is now getting back to basics. Their strength is fires and that approach is evident in the Donbas area where they are employing fires effectively and en masse. “Magazine depth” may be the ultimate decider in this conflict, as mass is still important and Russia has vast resources.

• • • Prior to the war, the Russian Military was discussing the use of UAVs for ISR, targeting, and electronic warfare. We’re now seeing that use in Ukraine, with unmanned systems guiding rocket and artillery forces to Ukrainian targets. The Russian military lacked this capability in large numbers prior to the war, but observed its effectiveness in Nagorno-Karabakh.

• • • The core of the Russian invasion was built on poor assumptions and faulty intelligence and therefore was not designed as a full-scale war with full-scale mobilization. The Russian officer corps performed as well as it could under the circumstances, but an over reliance on them may have attributed to early failures and the deaths of many General Officers.

• • • Combat experience is helpful, but it must be the right kind of experience. In Syria, the Russian military wasn’t fighting the same fight it is now against a peer adversary with similar capabilities. If Russia had initially invaded Ukraine with the same tactics and concepts that they are employing at this point in the war, it may have been a very different conflict.

• • • It is too early to learn lessons. We are still observing and contextualizing this conflict and we may not actually learn anything until well after it is over. We can’t dismiss the Russian military because it had a bad start. Consequently, we can’t expect that what we’re seeing in Ukraine would be what we might see from Russia if they confronted NATO in a conflict.

• • • Despite their failures, Russia may, at some point, try to claim victory by creating conditions on the ground and then looking for an off-ramp — freezing the conflict, putting a broad peace agreement in place, or making a deal directly with Ukraine. Ukraine can only hope to keep fending them off, however they have already lost a large swathes of territory.

• • • Russia has a specific and targeted goal with its information operations — divide the West and sow distrust amongst democratic institutions. It aims to break down our existing orders and put pressure on partner governments to reverse course and limit support to Ukraine.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence — Mask and Move, or Die! — with proclaimed Mad Scientist and returning guest COL John Antal (USA-Ret.), to be published in a fortnight on 4 August 2022.  To whet your appetite, read the highlights from COL Antal‘s previous podcast and then listen to it directly here.

If you enjoyed this post and podcast, check out the following related content:

Our initial How Russia Fights post and associated podcast

Russia Landing Zone content on the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page — including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

Ukraine: All Roads Lead to Urban and associated podcast; and War in Ukraine: The Urban Fight is Happening Now and the associated podcast with MAJ John Spencer (USA-Ret.)

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1) and Democratized Intelligence, by Kate Kilgore

How will the RUS-UKR Conflict Impact Russia’s Military Modernization?, by Dr. Jacob Barton

The Bear is Still There: Four Insights on Competition with Russia

Major Trends in Russian Military Unmanned Systems Development for the Next Decade, Russian Ground Battlefield Robots: A Candid Evaluation and Ways Forward, and Autonomous Robotic Systems in the Russian Ground Forces, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Sam Bendett

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

Russian Private Military Companies: Their Use and How to Consider Them in Operations, Competition, and Conflict

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).