Mad Scientist Laboratory

[Editor’s Note:   As Russia enters the 141st day of its “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine, Mad Scientist Laboratory reviews previous posts and podcasts to synopsize what this conflict is telling us about the Operational Environment and the changing character of warfare.  This is especially timely, given that the U.S. Army is finalizing its draft FM 3-0, Operations, laying out our future multidomain operations warfighting doctrine, and preparing to implement the Army’s greatest modernization effort since the Big Five four decades ago.

Much as the Russo-Japanese War augured the Great War, and the Spanish Civil War foreshadowed the Second World War, lessons from the current Russia-Ukraine Conflict can inform us how future conflicts in the mid-twenty first century may be fought and won (or lost!).  Regular readers will recall our Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts post and  podcast last fall with Dr. Brent L. Sterling, who reminded us that learning from foreign wars can be a challenging endeavor.  Findings frequently run counter to deeply-rooted institutional biases, and Services’ culture and bureaucratic politics can limit the implementation of lessons learned from other nations’ conflicts. Dr. Sterling admonishes us, however, to remember that other powers are also observing and learning from foreign conflicts.  We ignore these “sign posts to the future” at our future peril — Read on!]

In Through Soldiers’ Eyes: The Future of Ground Combat and its associated podcast, Army Mad Scientist assembled six subject matter experts to discuss their experiences in modern warfare from the “bleeding edge” of battle, the future of conflict, and the requirements and challenges facing future ground warfighters.  [Note:  One of our panelists, Lieutenant Denys Antipov, served as a platoon leader and reconnaissance drone operator with the 81st Airborne Brigade, Ukrainian Army, fighting Russian paramilitary groups and anti-government separatists in the Donbas in 2015-2016.  Sadly, Lt. Antipov was KIA on 11 May 2022 near Izium in Kharkiv, defending his homeland from the latest Russian invasion.]  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are becoming increasingly commonplace on the battlefield for reconnaissance, direct strike, and area denial missions — these comparatively low cost systems have democratized air power, enabling lesser states and non-state actors to execute air domain operations.  Information Operations will allow our adversaries to weaponize information against Soldiers and their families, our allies and partners, and local populations — such messaging could attempt to persuade Soldiers of their battlefield failures, contradict orders they are given, or convince domestic populations of their force’s imminent defeat.  Adaptable, innovative leadership will be critical in a rapidly changing Operational Environment — Leaders will need to quickly adopt and integrate technological advancements with their Soldiers and be open to constant force reorganization to maintain dominance on the battlefield.  Problem solving, understanding technological capabilities, and the initiative to fill leadership positions attrited through combat are key skillsets for Soldiers on the future battlefield.  

In Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), Kate Kilgore, TRADOC G-2 Intern, explored three sign posts for the future:  the advent of a digital levée en masse, battlefield transparency, and narrative warfare; and addressed the public and private nature of war.  The digital levée en masse blurs the line between decentralized digital activism and state-sponsored hacking, with a trend of non-state involvement in the conflict information sphere by noncombatants unaffiliated with the belligerents. Technology is creating a transparent battlefield, enabling militaries to source information from individual civilians and private commercial entities, then target and strike high value targets. Russia’s domestic narrative and Ukraine’s international narrative have resulted in a dual information domain — the U.S. may have to redefine information advantage to simultaneously engage and shape the international public domain while penetrating an adversary’s stranglehold on its domestic information domain.

Ms. Kilgore also addressed how Democratized Intelligence is transforming the twenty-first century battlespace — making it increasingly transparent and enabling everyone to be a potential sensor and intelligence asset — while also blurring the distinction between combatant and non-combatant. This democratization of intelligence also has the potential to erode our Nation’s Information Advantage — enabling adversaries, non-state actors, and hostile individuals alike to challenge our narrative regarding future operations.  Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and reporting have aided Ukraine’s quick response to the fast-paced modern news-cycle, enabling them to bolster international support, despite the absence of formal information sharing agreements.  Ukraine’s unprecedented decision to invite private citizens from all over the globe to take part in the fight against Russia has tied its intelligence architecture to the public — individuals’ capacity to informally volunteer their services to influence the conflict signal future conflicts where such civilian capabilities could complicate Service members’ ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.  While Ukraine’s open dialogue with the global commons demonstrates crowdsourcing opportunities for intelligence gathering and promoting favorable narratives in a future conflict, it conversely illustrates that the Army may not be able to limit or control non-military actors’ extensive documentation of future battlefield operations.  Deciding whether to operationalize greater amounts of privately collected and shared information also begs the legal question of whether using such information transforms sources into direct participants in the conflict, potentially making them combatants.  In future conflicts, a U.S. Soldier’s every move could potentially be documented in theater – accurately or not – and posted online, then used nefariously by an adversary to gain information advantage and erode both domestic and international trust in our operational narrative.

In War in Ukraine: The Urban Fight is Happening Now and its associated podcast, MAJ John Spencer (USA-Ret.), Chair of Urban Warfare Studies with the Madison Policy Forum, addressed the on-going war in Ukraine, urban warfare strategies employed by both Russian and Ukrainian military forces, and what this portends for the future of conflict.  Despite Russia’s initial plans falling in line with traditional invasions, characterized by a large mass of forces that are then rapidly deployed in a “shock and awe” campaign, Ukraine’s combined arms approach to defense has prevented Russia from quickly gaining control of critical areas. ATGMs and MANPADS have been very effective in this conflict due to Russia trading combined arms operations for speed — Russia’s rush to seize ground objectives in convoy without effectively establishing and utilizing their air superiority has led to attrition of their ground assets. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a clear reminder that many of the lessons we’ve learned in the past — using combined arms in urban warfare, the dangers of emitting large EW signatures, and the importance of Command and Control — are all still relevant on the battlefield today.  Information from around the world is being received in the combat zone and directly influencing on-going kinetic operations, demonstrating that the information age is changing the character of war.  Ukraine is capable of winning in urban warfare because they do not have to actually defeat the enemy’s military power, they must only hold out long enough for the political situation to change in their favor; in this situation, not losing is winning.

In Ukraine: All Roads Lead to Urban and its associated podcast, MAJ Spencer returned to explore what we’ve learned about Large Scale Combat Operations and urban conflict over the last four-plus months. Modern technology forces our societies, and those of our adversaries, to be more connected to the battlefield — enabling actors outside of the conflict zone to leverage OSINT and possibly influence the conflict.  The Battle for Kyiv demonstrated that terrain still matters — Ukrainians flooded rivers and destroyed bridges to canalize Russian invaders into chokepoints and kill zones, demonstrating a superior indigenous understanding of their environment.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the importance of civilians in urban conflict, as volunteers collaborated to establish defenses in depth, targeting and ambushing attackers.  The Army is not learning the lessons of modern war — future conflict will happen in urban areas; the Army still doesn’t have a major school for urban warfare nor a unit focused on fighting in the urban environment — we now have the 11th Arctic Division — where is our Urban Division?

In The Pivotal Role of Small and Middle Powers in Conflict: Poland and the War in Ukraine , Collin Meisel and Tim Sweijs addressed the strategic importance small and middle powers play in competition, crisis, and conflict. From Poland’s pivotal role in the continuing conflict in Ukraine, Messrs. Meisel and Sweijs extrapolated the roles similarly-sized powers could play in the China-US competition in Southeast Asia.  In the event of heightened competition and even the lead-up to conflict with China, small and middle powers have the ability to implement potent deterrence by denial strategies.  These powers can transform difficult-to-defend, island territories into “poison frogs” — where the military, diplomatic, and economic cost of taking and holding such territory is high.  Alternatively, small powers can also be spoilers for international stability for a variety of reasons, transforming into “poisonous friends” — their geographic position and inability to fend for themselves can make them a stepping stone in great powers’ expansionist strategies.  Great powers may consider them indispensable, fearing their loss will lead to regional cascading domino-effects; and their reckless behavior could drag great power partners and allies into a wider conflict.  Small and middle powers’ influence capacity plays an important stabilizing role, both globally and regionally.

In How will the RUS-UKR Conflict Impact Russia’s Military Modernization?  Dr. Jacob Barton, Director, Future Operational Environment (FOE), Army Futures Command, explores how this conflict could affect Russian military modernization, given its extensive munitions expenditures and combat losses, the international trade sanctions that have been implemented, and the resultant economic constraints. Russia will need to make radical adjustments to training, recruiting, and retention to recover from the troop losses sustained over the past four plus months — Russia is already experiencing challenges in its recruiting efforts and will almost certainly see lower numbers of enlistments in the coming years. Based on historical weapon system production rates and current Western sanctions, the Russian defense industry will probably not be able to replace its combat losses in the next five years. If Russia replaces its destroyed equipment with its vast inventory of legacy equipment, the sustainment costs associated with these systems will adversely affect resources available for modernization. Russia has expended a tremendous amount of ammunition and ordnance; supply chain disruptions from the resulting sanctions will further hinder its ability to acquire external sources of ammunition and discreet supplies like microchips needed for its precision missiles and artillery — specifically, those Russia wants available for any potential conflict with NATO.  Russia will be faced with calls for dialing back its foreign policy goals, a smaller military structure, and reduced deployed footprints, with more prominent use of private military contractors and proxies and a greater reliance on its nuclear deterrents.

Well before the current conflict and the associated international sanctions were emplaced, Ray Finch, Eurasian Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, TRADOC G-2,  addressed the inherent challenges facing innovation in an autocratic society and why it’s doubtful that Russia’s military innovation center — Era Military Innovation Technopark, near the city of Anapa (Krasnodar Region) on the northern coast of the Black Sea — will ever usher in a new era of Russian military innovation. While Russian scientists have often been at the forefront of technological innovations, the country’s poor legal system prevents these discoveries from ever bearing fruit. Stifling bureaucracy and a broken legal system prevent Russian scientists and innovators from profiting from their discoveries. Additionally, many smart, young Russians believe that their country is headed in the wrong direction and are looking for opportunities elsewhere — young and talented Russians are “voting with their feet” and pursuing careers abroad.  While it is famous for its tanks, artillery, and rocket systems, Russia has struggled to create anything which might be qualified as a technological marvel in the civilian sector. As some Russian observers have put it, “no matter what the state tries to develop, it ends up being a Kalashnikov.” Despite the façade of a uniformed, law-governed state, Russia continues to rank near the bottom on the global corruption index.  Private Russian companies will likely think twice before deciding to invest in the Era Technopark, unless of course, the Kremlin makes them an offer they cannot refuse. Moreover, Era scientists may not be fully committed, understanding that the “milk” of their technological discoveries will likely by expropriated by their uniformed bosses.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following additional related content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, its comprehensive source document, and the Threats to 2030 video

Russia Landing Zone content on the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page — including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

 

 

 

 

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring MAJ John Spencer (USA-Ret.), returning to discuss what has been learned about Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), urban conflict, and the changing character of warfare from the last four plus months of Russia’s “special military operation” in eastern Ukraine — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

MAJ John Spencer (USA-Ret.) is the Chair of Urban Warfare Studies with the Madison Policy Forum. He served over twenty-five years in the U.S. Army as an infantry Soldier, with two combat tours in Iraq as both an Infantry Platoon Leader and Company Commander. He has also served as a Ranger Instructor with the Army’s Ranger School, a Joint Chief of Staff and Army Staff intern, fellow with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group, and Strategic Planner and Deputy Director of the Modern War Institute, where he was instrumental in the design and formation of the institute.

In today’s interview, MAJ Spencer returns to discuss what we’ve learned about LSCO, urban conflict, and the changing character of warfare from the last four plus months of Russia’s “special military operation” in eastern Ukraine.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Modern technology forces our societies, and those of our adversaries, to be more connected to the battlefield. As the Ukrainian “Tik-Tok” war demonstrates, such connectedness can allow actors outside of the war to leverage open-source intelligence to influence the conflict by providing either side with logistical support and operational advice.

• • • It is important to study wars firsthand to understand how they are evolving to the modern context; the U.S. military used to employ appointed observers for this mission. Given that the battle for Kyiv is a truly urban fight, there is much the Army can learn from the conflict.

• • • 

      The battle for Kyiv demonstrates that, especially in an urban environment, terrain still matters. Ukrainians flooded rivers and destroyed bridges to canalize Russian invaders into chokepoints and kill zones, demonstrating an understanding of their environment unthinkable to non-natives.

• • • The Russian invasion also demonstrates the importance of civilian involvement in urban conflict, as volunteers collaborated to establish defenses in depth, targeting and ambushing their attackers. Here, too, technology played an important role. Images and messages from the Ukrainian government and their fellow citizens helped strengthen citizens’ resolve to defend their country.

• • • Today, Soldiers and their families are more connected by technology than ever, allowing them to live with a foot in each world. This feature of modern warfare is important as it prevents Soldiers from feeling isolated, but also gives civilian families a clearer understanding of the realities of warfare.

• • • What are we missing?  The Army is not learning the lessons of modern war.  Future conflict will happen in urban areas.  The Army still doesn’t have a major school for urban warfare; and it still doesn’t have a unit focused on fighting in the urban environment.  We now have the 11th Arctic Division — where is our Urban Division?

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence — How Russia Fights, Part 2 — to be published in a fortnight on 21 July 2022.  To whet your appetite, read the highlights from Part 1 and listen to the associated podcast.

 

If you enjoyed today’s post, check out our previous post and podcast with MAJ Spencer — War in Ukraine: The Urban Fight is Happening Now and the associated podcast

… as well as the following related content:

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

Waterworld: How Ukraine Flooded Three Rivers to Help Save Kyiv, by John Spencer and Liam Collins, published by our colleagues at Modern War Institute

Through Soldiers’ Eyes: The Future of Ground Combat, and associated podcast

Dense Urban Environments (DUE): Now through 2050

Dense Urban Hackathon – Virtual Innovation

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1) and Democratized Intelligence, by Kate Kilgore

Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts and associated podcast, with Dr. Brent L. Sterling

Russia Landing Zone content on the Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page

How will the RUS-UKR Conflict Impact Russia’s Military Modernization? by Dr. Jacob Barton

The Bear is Still There: Four Insights on Competition with Russia

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist welcomes back guest blogger Kate Kilgore with another insightful signpost to the future from the on-going conflict in Ukraine — Democratized Intelligence.  Until recently, the ability to Process, Exploit, and Disseminate (PED) meaningful intelligence in a timely manner to directly influence combat operations was the purview of only a finite number of nations with access to Low Earth Orbit providing the requisite imagery and direct link communications capabilities.

No more!  Within the past decade or so, access to the Space domain has been democratized, with the advent of a host of commercial enterprises (e.g., SpaceX) willing to boost payloads into LEO.  And with this capability, other commercial entities (e.g., MAXAR) now provide high resolution imagery services of virtually the entire Earth’s surface (down to 30 cm!) with great accuracy (90% confidence that the identified feature is within a 4 meter radius of where the image suggests it is!) on demand.  With the emergence of Big Data, the Internet of Things, and the proliferation of sensors, global Information Technology (IT) giants like Microsoft and Google are positioned to process many zettabytes of data, enabling them to glean and publicly share insights about the global DataSphere.

Smart phones and commercial drones have harnessed and converged this awesome power into the hands of ordinary citizens.  In transforming the twenty-first century battlespace — making it increasingly transparent and enabling everyone to be a potential sensor and intelligence asset — it has also blurred the distinction between combatant and non-combatant.  This democratization of intelligence also has the potential to erode our Nation’s Information Advantage — enabling adversaries, non-state actors, and hostile individuals alike to challenge our narrative regarding future operations — Read on!]

The reduced cost and increased sophistication and access to private technology is facilitating a democratization of intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities, empowering smaller nations and non-state actors, and ushering in an Operational Environment where battlefields are transparent to all.  This exponentially increases the amount of data and information available and the number of entities to whom it is available. Russia’s on-going “special military operation” in Ukraine serves as a proving ground — testing the limits of this emergent, democratized PED capability and showcasing non-government entities’ growing ability to impact conflicts around the globe. Ukraine’s willingness to integrate democratically-sourced information, data, and analysis provides a blueprint, allowing nations and non-state actors alike to develop and maintain a capable intelligence enterprise, and possibly increasing the ability of states without formal intelligence sharing agreements to collaborate more effectively.  The impact of democratized intelligence on the Operational Environment presents important operational and legal questions for consideration as the U.S. Army continues to successfully compete, deter aggression, and failing that, fight and decisively win future conflicts.

Following Russia’s invasion, Ukraine openly solicited commercial imagery, handheld video, voice intercepts and Artificial Intelligence (AI) translation, and satellite imaging to bolster their intelligence capability. In April, for example, Ukrainian law enforcement submitted a cell phone conversation to Radio Free Europe’s Russian Language Service between a Russian soldier and his wife where she reportedly gave him permission to rape Ukrainian women — “Just wear protection.” Not only did RFE journalists use social media to identify the couple, but the conversation’s publication allowed social media users to apply AI language translation for access by wider audiences. Primer, a private AI company, similarly identified Russia’s widespread use of unencrypted communications, and used its translation programs to create a searchable database of audio transcripts which highlight operationally relevant information. The Institute for the Study of War, a private think tank, uses the commercial WGS 84 Web Mercator tool to display MAXAR satellite imagery and Ukrainian government reports of military activity on maps shared to social media that depict frequently-updated areas of fighting and control in Ukraine. Posts on Telegram and other social media platforms show photos claiming many Russian aircraft are equipped with insecure, commercial GPS systems instead of military navigation equipment. There are also allegations that Russian military commanders used cell phones to issue commands and communications, as opposed to secured radio or communications systems. Ukrainian sources also claimed Russian intelligence agencies are using shell-corporations to purchase private satellite imagery that is formally unavailable to the Russian government in order to aid targeting efforts. Ukraine’s approach to open-source and publicly collected information exemplifies the ways democratized intelligence can allow any country to establish a capable intelligence enterprise in times of conflict. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) and reporting have aided Ukraine’s quick response to the fast-paced modern news-cycle, which has bolstered international support regardless of many nations’ lack of formal information sharing agreements with Ukraine.

Intelligence production capabilities have also extended beyond well-funded entities in industry and academia. Ukraine’s unprecedented decision to invite private citizens from all over the globe to take part in the fight against Russia has tied its intelligence architecture to the public. Tech savvy individuals are leveraging technology’s dependence on the internet to target infrastructure and impact the conflict on Ukraine’s behalf.  Unidentified activists were reportedly able to locate and flip “kill switches” on 27 tractors stolen by Russian troops and shipped to Chechnya by tracking their embedded GPS signatures through the dealership’s database. Similarly, a 15-year old drone hobbyist in Ukraine used his own drone to help Ukrainian artillery target and destroy a Russian column headed towards Kyiv — an example of the larger Facebook-coordinated effort of Ukrainians with private drones submitting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) information to the defense effort.  Ukrainian app developers and programmers have created ad hoc digital infrastructures that allow civilians to document war crimes, contribute to cyber attacks on Russian military websites, and report location-tagged photos and videos of Russian troops directly to Ukrainian intelligence agencies. According to Ukraine’s Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, these sites receive tens of thousands of submissions per day and are used by Ukrainian intelligence officials to coordinate defense and counterstrikes. Crowdsourced information has also aided in the development of Ukraine’s “Book of Torturers” database, which publishes the identities and alleged war crimes of individual Russian soldiers. These individuals’ capacity to informally volunteer their services to influence the conflict signal future conflicts where such civilian capabilities will continue to expand with technology and complicate Service members’ ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.

Examples of democratized intelligence capabilities from the Russia-Ukraine conflict indicate both opportunities and challenges for the U.S. Army.  Individuals’ growing ability to influence and even disrupt technology may jeopardize the integrity of the information gathering infrastructure that the U.S. Army depends on.  Such capabilities may also blur the lines between combatant and non-combatant actions on the battlefield.  The remote disabling of stolen tractors and similar reports presage a future where “hactivists” can target and disrupt a nation’s vital infrastructure (e.g., power grid, water, and hospitals) or even impact its ability to produce and distribute key commodities (e.g., fuel and food). While Ukraine’s open dialogue with the global commons demonstrates crowdsourcing opportunities for intelligence gathering and promoting favorable narratives in a future conflict, it conversely illustrates that the U.S. Army may not be able to limit non-military actors’ extensive documentation of future battlefield operations. Similarly, social media platforms could be used to support deception efforts, like posting misleading information about the potential destination of troops and equipment. Conversely, good-faith independent fact-checkers could investigate and publicly counter the authenticity of attempts to misdirect or deceive an enemy’s detection of U.S. troop movements or intent.

The recent war crimes trial of a Russian soldier in Ukraine could set precedent for individual soldiers’ liability for actions on the battlefield and begs the question regarding whether current definitions of direct participation adequately address the capability technology grants individuals. Deciding whether to operationalize greater amounts of privately collected and shared information also begs the legal question of whether using such information makes the source a direct participant in the conflict. Testimony in the trial established that the Russian soldier shot and killed a civilian on his commander’s orders because the commander believed that the civilian was using a cell phone to give away Russian troop locations.  According to the 2009 Red Cross Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, “an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an attacking air force would probably have to be regarded as directly participating in hostilities.”  There may have been reasonable belief that the civilian constituted a legitimate target.

Military use of civilian-sourced imagery or data is a logical continuation of this definition, which means that the sources’ legal status could potentially change to combatant, whether they are aware of this or not. This is especially relevant when considering the Ukrainian military’s use and publication of information collected and submitted by individuals like drone hobbyists, regardless of the good-faith reasons for these actions. For corporations whose infrastructure collects information for a military, this could mean that an adversary may argue that this infrastructure is a legitimate target. A military’s choice to operationalize democratically produced and shared information also indicates a clear moral obligation to inform those information sources that they may potentially lose their protections as noncombatants. The war crimes investigations occurring in Ukraine largely depend on private investigators’ collection of battlefield information and facial recognition technology, which demonstrates the high level of scrutiny already possible. Efforts like the Ukrainian government’s “Book of Torturers” are powerful in promoting Ukraine’s narrative about the brutality of Russian troops, and could reinforce an expectation for similar public databases in the future, whether by a government or private entities with lower standards for accuracy.  In a future conflict, a U.S. Army Soldier’s every move could potentially be documented in theater – accurately or not – and posted by bystanders, which could then be nefariously used by an adversary to gain information advantage and erode both domestic and international trust in our operational narrative.

Because modern technology allows non-military actors entry into a military’s intelligence process, an adversary could potentially argue that this implicates these entities in the kill-chain, possibly making them legitimate targets. Conversely, the U.S. Army may find it difficult to determine what is and is not a legitimate target during hostilities. Examining the on-going conflict in Ukraine could aid in developing standard practices for mitigating threats from non-military actors collecting or disseminating information without reacting to them as formal combatants.   Defining the role and limits of democratized intelligence capabilities can produce clear operational and legal definitions that strike a balance between protected action and direct participation. Adapting to the opportunities and addressing the challenges posed by democratized intelligence well before the U.S. Army’s next conflict can facilitate policy development that protects both Soldiers and private entities, while preserving the spectrum of responses to possible adversarial actions in the Operational Environment — where any and everyone has the potential to influence future conflicts.

If you enjoyed this post, check out Kate Kilgore’s previous post — Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1)

… as well as the following related content:

Space: Challenges and Opportunities

Nowhere to Hide: Information Exploitation and Sanitization and War Laid Bare, by Matthew Ader

Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare, by Dr. Richard Nabors

Warfare in the Parallel Cambrian Age, by Chris O’Connor

The Future of War is Cyber! by CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley

In the Crosshairs: U.S. Homeland Infrastructure Threats

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage by Ian Sullivan, along with the comprehensive paper from which it was excerpted

The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella

About the Author:   Kate Kilgore is a TRADOC G-2 Intern and recent graduate of Indiana University, where she studied Law and Public Policy, Comparative International Politics, Soviet History, and Russian and Eastern European Studies. Kate has been greatly influenced by her father’s Army career, and she grew up all over the United States and in Germany, which influenced her passion for Eastern European history. Much of her undergraduate research focused on analyzing the path dependence and modern social implications of Soviet laws and in the former Eastern Bloc, with a focus on Hungary. When she’s not reading about culture and politics of the former Warsaw Pact States, she enjoys baking and antiquing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring Shubhi Mishra, founder and CEO of Raft, a data-intensive digital engineering consultancy, discussing wicked problems in national security; finding creative, mission-focused solutions; and equipping the DoD with sustainable, emerging technology — Enjoy!]

If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

While Shubhi Mishra, founder and CEO of Raft, is a lawyer and data scientist by training, she’s better known as an intentional government technology (GovTech) disruptor at heart.  She loves solving complex problems, even the kind that give you a headache while you’re working through them. But that process of discovery, of realization, and coming to a solution makes it all worthwhile.  Her passion is working with bleeding-edge technology focused on the defense sector.  Raft provides an innovation space for people who are similarly mission-focused, tackling vexing challenges with passion and enthusiasm.  Ms. Mishra seeks to inspire other women in and out of the GovTech space and excite them enough to join the movement of providing better solutions and services to the defense industry through sustainable, emerging technology.

In today’s interview, Ms. Mishra discusses wicked problems in national security; finding creative, mission-focused solutions; and equipping the DoD with sustainable, emerging technology.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Raft’s strategy seeks to build a data fabric, or mesh, on top of data lakes, to reduce silos and increase communication among data resources. This enables faster decision making, which ultimately benefits our warfighters.

• • • When delivering a data product, it is important to maintain a human-centered design which considers for whom you are building the product. It is critical to experiment with the project and obtain user feedback.

• • • When working with historical datasets, one must consider: [1] If the full data is present. Can other datasets be integrated to get a better picture? [2] How will we measure the success of the algorithm we are using the data to build? Will we obtain a new result, or are we simply pattern matching? [3] Who can we get comments from to ensure we have a beneficial feedback loop?

• • • Warfare data presents unique challenges, as [thankfully] there is not high repetition. However, you do not necessarily need high volumes of data to get useful information. Being cautious about what outcome is being measured, using algorithms to pattern match, and enabling different values to be introduced for fair and non-biased outcomes can produce beneficial and informative results.

• • • The Department of Defense (DoD), working with external partners, helps illuminate fresh perspectives and challenge assumptions, as well as pull new talent. There is an appetite among private sector companies to work with the DoD, but many times companies are not aware of such opportunities.

 

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence, to be published in a fortnight on 7 July 2022.

 

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

Algorithms of Armageddon and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist CAPT (Ret.) George Galdorisi

Going on the Offensive in the Fight for the Future and associated podcast with former Undersecretary of the Navy (and proclaimed Mad Scientist) James F. “Hondo” Geurts and Dr. Zachary S. Davis, and Strategic Latency Unleashed!

Achieving an AI-era Workforce by 2025: A Modern, Scalable Approach to Retooling the United States (and its Army!) by Ted Hallum

The Language of AI and associated podcast with Michael Kanaan

AI Across the Enterprise and associated podcast, with Rob Albritton

Bringing AI to the Joint Force and associated podcast, with Jacqueline Tame, Alka Patel, and Dr. Jane Pinelis

Artificial Intelligence: An Emerging Game-changer

Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas

Setting the Army for the Future (Parts II and III)

Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield

“Own the Night” and the associated Modern War Institute podcast with proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Bob Work

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist welcomes back returning guest blogger Dr. Jacob Barton with today’s insightful post, exploring how Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine could affect Russian military modernization, given its extensive munitions expenditures and combat losses, the international trade sanctions that have been implemented, and the resultant economic constraints.  Will this conflict so thoroughly exhaust the traditional might of the Russian military that it forces a national revolution in military affairs — prompting a wholesale transformation to a smaller, more professional, and modernized Russian army?  And even if they have the will to reform, who will provide them with the sine qua non chips ubiquitous to modern weapons systems, given international sanctions?  Or will Russian “culture devour strategy for breakfast,” with entrenched hardliners doubling down on maintaining Mother Russia’s military status quo, maintaining large inventories of legacy ground combat systems (albeit in battle-attrited quantities); sustaining costly Naval, Aerospace, and Rocket Forces; and continuing their tradition of large but inefficient conscript / contract forces?

There are a host of second and third order effects rippling out from this conflict as well.  NATO is more united than ever, with member nations increasing their defense spending and formerly neutral Finland and Sweden seeking to join the alliance.  Traditional foreign military sales clients are watching Ukraine’s David continued bloodening of Russia’s Goliath — will once reliable customers turn to the West for future weapons systems purchases?  And will former Soviet republics feel emboldened by Ukraine’s continued resistance to a weakened Moscow, thawing previously frozen conflicts and igniting new ones in the near abroad ?  Closer to home, will U.S. Army modernization efforts heed the painful lessons learned from Russia’s current modernization conundrum?  Read on!]

The flawed Russian invasion of Ukraine has had wide ranging effects on its forces. However, the most critical impact may yet be realized. The current conflict will have long-term ramifications on Russia’s military modernization and its ability to prepare for or sustain a conflict with NATO and the West. Observations from the invasion suggest that Russia may find itself without the personnel, weapons, or ammunition it believes it needs for a war with the West.

The amount of Russian Armed Forces casualties from the conflict is staggering. According to independent estimates from last month, approximately 15,000 Russian troops have been killed in the war. Considering the investment required to produce these soldiers, Russia cannot afford to lose the volume of soldiers its leaders appear willing to sacrifice. Consider that an infantry lieutenant costs Russia $10,000 to train over five years, with other officers costing up to $60,000 each. An experienced fighter pilot can cost up to $14 million to train over a period of 14 years.¹  Given the years of training and the hundreds of millions of dollars lost, Russian Armed Forces’ will need to make radical adjustments to training, recruiting, and retention to recover. Russia is already experiencing challenges in its recruiting efforts. Although official statistics are unavailable, several leading Russia watchers highlight the difficulty Russian Armed Forces are having contracting enough forces to refit operational units in Ukraine. It has even reduced the minimum contract period to four months to accommodate. Prior to the conflict, Russia recognized the demographic stresses on its military and its diminished ability to recruit candidates from urban areas. To overcome these challenges, it established over 80 new recruiting centers in rural areas where the standard of living among young adults is significantly lower and the attractiveness of a military lifestyle is higher. Yet, even with this initiative, Russia is having difficulty countering the negative public sentiment broadcast on social media, particularly from Russian troops deployed to the front lines. With morale amongst its forces at its lowest in recent history, the Russian Armed Forces will almost certainly see lower numbers of enlistments in the coming years. With that in mind, if Russia decides it must retain a consistent force size, it will be forced to adjust the mix of contract to conscript troops, relying more heavily on conscripts that have minimal training. Furthermore, Russian military training institutions will need to make concessions to decrease training time or increase throughout, putting more stress on a widely considered underperforming force.

Russia has lost more equipment than it can afford. According to data provided by the Ukrainian Land Forces last month, a total of 2,238 armored vehicles, 873 tanks, 408 artillery systems, 179 aircraft, and 154 helicopters have been destroyed.^{2 3}   According to Russian Defense industry figures⁴, the approximate cost of a Russian armored vehicle is at least $70,000, a T-72 Main Battle Tank (MBT) is at least $500,000, a T-90 MBT is between $2.5 – $4.5 million, a TOS-1 220mm Heavy Flamethrower System is $6 million, a 2S19 152mm Self-propelled Howitzer is at least $2 million, an Su-27 Multirole Fighter Aircraft at least $26 million, an Su-25 Close Air Support Aircraft is at least $11 million, and an Mi-28 Attack Helicopter at least $15 million. For only the first two days of Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian forces estimate the material cost from the destruction of Russian tanks, aircraft, and weapons at $3 billion.⁵  When the material costs are extrapolated to other economic impacts, the daily cost of war for Russia likely exceeded $20 billion at the height of the conflict with current estimates at over $4 billion per day, according to figures from the Consultancy.⁶  At 113 days into this conflict, that equates to $452 billion.

While some of these figures may be inflated, Russia has undoubtedly lost far more equipment than they expected. Even a conservative estimate of only their equipment losses exceeds $6.2 billion. Russia likely does not have the resources to replace this equipment because it would cost more than it allocates for the procurement of new equipment in a given year. Based on historical production and the current impact of Western sanctions, the Russian defense industry almost certainly could not produce new equipment to replace these destroyed systems in the next five years. Notably, Russia retains a surplus of legacy equipment with as many as 7,000 tanks and they have already taken many of them out of warehouses and vehicle graveyards to refit frontline units. This likely means that if Russia replaces its destroyed equipment with legacy equipment, it will be forced to outlay significantly more resources for its operations and maintenance budgets to keep these systems in use, a consequence that would have second-order impacts on its modernization budgets.

Russia’s future modernization and quickly decreasing stockpile could imply they will rely more on other countries for military assistance. In keeping with its traditional tactical doctrine, Russia has expended a tremendous amount of ammunition and ordnance, attempting to destroy its enemy and take Ukrainian territory during the three plus months of conflict. Open-source estimates suggest that Russian Armed Forces are down to 30 percent of its total ammunition stockpiles. This figure is questionable, but calculations derived from known Russian ammunition sources indicate that it has no more than 70 percent of it remaining. Coupled with a high failure rate –between 10 and 40 percent– among its ballistic missiles, and it explains why some Russian units are losing confidence in their ability to maintain this level of operational tempo. Equally as important, successful Ukrainian targeting of Russian logistics is limiting Russia’s ability to get ordnance to its forces in need. As the fight continues, supply chain disruptions from the resulting sanctions will further hinder Russia’s ability to bring in external sources of ammunition and discreet supplies like microchips needed for its precision missiles and artillery — specifically, those Russia wants available for a war with NATO. These problems portend a situation where Russia would be forced to rely on other countries, like China, for more military resources. A future in which Russia relies on Chinese-made equipment may make for a more capable Russian force, but also on increasingly subservient to its southern neighbor. Most signs suggest that Russia’s leaders would be unwilling to accept a role that makes Russia a “junior partner” to China.

Based on Russia’s defense spending trends and the weakening of its economy, Russia will likely be unable to meet its modernization goals for at least the next five to ten years. According to the Bank of Russia’s economic forecast, its gross domestic product (GDP) will decrease by 8–10 percent in 2022.⁷  Russia’s Economic Ministry sees its GDP contracting by 12.4%, while Western economists say the drop could be over 15 percent. Meanwhile, Russia’s official military spending in 2021 increased by 2.9% to $65.9 billion, or just over 4% of Russia’s GDP, according to SIPRI.⁸  This equates to less than 8 percent of the U.S. Defense budget for fiscal year 2022. In 2021, Russia repeatedly revised its defense budget to allocate funds for arms procurement and modernization, making a 14 percent increase over its 2020 budget. Relatedly, Russia’s 10-year defense priorities highlighted in their State Armament Plans (GPVs) demonstrate its desire for more arms procurement and modernization. GPV 2020, which ran from 2011 to 2020, focused on increasing the overall share of modernized equipment to 70%. The newest publicly available plan, GPV 2027, calls for total spending of about $330 billion and 3%-4% of GDP from 2018 to 2027. However, the allocation among its services leaves its ground forces — those suffering the majority of combat losses in this conflict — under-resourced. According to Congressional Research Service reports, Aerospace Forces and the Russian Navy received top priority during GPV 2020, allowing for the introduction of new and upgraded legacy systems, including improved missiles and precision-guided munitions.⁹  Russia’s ground forces have been the lowest funding priority in its modernization plans, and most allocated funds went towards upgrading existing platforms. Upgrading small amounts of its total platforms negatively affected modernization by decreased standardization across units and increased maintenance costs. Still, these funding priorities are likely to continue. Unbalanced modernization funding combined with decreased buying power means Russia will be forced to make sacrifices in modernization or force structure and readiness over the next decade.

The combination of these factors most likely means Russia will be unable to modernize enough equipment to remain near parity with the U.S.  Currently, the United States remains the world’s biggest military spender by a significant margin, making up 38 percent of the global share. Looking ahead, Russia will be faced with calls for dialing back foreign policy goals, a smaller military structure, and reduced deployed footprints, with more prominent use of private military contractors and proxies and a greater reliance on its nuclear deterrents.

If you enjoyed this post, check out Dr. Barton’s previous post, China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens

… as well as the following related content:

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

The Pivotal Role of Small and Middle Powers in Conflict: Poland and the War in Ukraine, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Collin Meisel and Tim Sweijs

War in Ukraine: The Urban Fight is Happening Now and associated podcast with John Spencer

“The Tenth Man” — Russia’s Era Military Innovation Technopark, by Ray Finch

The Bear is Still There: Four Insights on Competition with Russia

How Russia Fights and associated podcast

Russia Landing Zone content on the Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page

About the Author:  Dr. Jacob Barton is currently the Director, Future Operational Environment (FOE), Army Futures Command, in Austin, Texas.  He previously served as the senior contract intelligence analyst for the TRADOC G-2’s Operational Environment Integration element. He is also an Army Reserve Intelligence Officer and previously worked for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

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¹ Mia Jankowicz, “Russia’s losses in Ukraine include many elite troops that take years and millions of dollars to train, BBC investigation finds,” April 12, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-has-lost-expensive-time-consuming-soldiers-to-train-bbc-2022-4.

² David Averre, “Putin’s mighty war machine on the SCRAPHEAP,” MAILONLINE, April 24, 2022, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10747991/Russia-lost-873-tanks-179-aircraft-21-800-troops-just-two-months-fighting.html.

³ Gandharv Walia, “Ukrainian army damaged 1,000 tanks, 200 aircraft, 2,500 armored vehicles of Russian forces, claims Zelensky,” WION, May 01, 2022, https://www.wionews.com/world/ukrainian-army-damaged-1000-tanks-200-aircraft-2500-armored-vehicles-of-russian-forces-claims-zelensky-475357.

⁴ Costs projected in U.S. dollars.

⁵ Renaud Foucart, “The cost of war: how Russia’s economy will struggle to pay the price of invading Ukraine,” March 11, 2022, https://theconversation.com/the-cost-of-war-how-russias-economy-will-struggle-to-pay-the-price-of-invading-ukraine-178826.

⁶ Research: ‘Ukraine war costs Russian military €20 billion per day’, March 2, 2022, https://www.consultancy.eu/news/7433/research-ukraine-war-costs-russian-military-20-billion-per-day.

⁷ https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/keypr/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Bank%20of%20Russia’s%20baseline% 20forecast%2C%20GDP%20will,the%20same%20period%20in%202022

⁸ Miriam Berger, “Russia boosted military spending ahead of Ukraine war, report says,” April 25, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/ukraine-russia-global-military-spending-2021/.

⁹ Andrew S. Bowen, “Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities,” June 30, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11589.