Month: April 2021

[Editor’s Note:  In continuing the Mad Scientist Initiative’s recent focus on climate change and its implications for the U.S. Army, we are pleased to feature proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Richard G. Kidd IV, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment & Energy Resilience, in this latest episode of The Convergence podcast, addressing threats to the force from climate change, operating conditions in a worsening climate, and how the Department of Defense (DoD) can be proactive in this existential fight — Enjoy! (Please note that this podcast and several of the embedded links below are best accessed via a non-DoD network due to network priorities for teleworking)]

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Mr. Richard G. Kidd IV, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment & Energy Resilience, provides policy and governance for programs and activities that enable resilience and cyber-secure energy for weapon systems and installations. This includes budgetary, policy, and management oversight of programs related to climate change, compliance with environmental laws, prevention of pollution, management of natural and cultural resources, and cleanup of contaminated sites, as well as energy resilience, risk, and performance. Prior to his current position, Mr. Kidd served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Strategic Integration where he led the strategy development, resource requirements, and overall business transformation processes for the Office within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment. He was responsible for developing and monitoring performance metrics for the Army’s installation management community as well as leading a strategic effort to examine options for future Army installations.

In today’s podcast, Mr. Kidd addresses threats to the force from climate change, operating conditions in a worsening climate, and how the DoD can be proactive in this existential fight.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our discussion:

• • • Climate change presents an inevitable threat to world peace, economic prosperity, and capital investment.  It is likely to impact the U.S. military in three major ways:

• • • • Increased Operational Requirements:  Climate change will overwhelm the governing capacity of weak states, increasing conflict and extremism abroad and subsequently increasing foreign threats. Domestically, demand for the Army National Guard, the Corps of Engineers, and civil authorities will increase in responding to and preventing damage from severe weather.

• • • • Increased Vulnerability of Installations:  Prevalence and intensity of floods, erosion, drought, fires, wind shear, and sea level rise will grow as a result of climate change, threatening military installations.

• • • • Degradation of Performance:  Performance parameters of both people and equipment will be challenged as they are forced to operate in extreme temperatures. Keeping Soldiers alive in an increasingly hostile climate will challenge the U.S. Army.

• • • U.S. adversaries will craft strategic narratives to criticize U.S. action, or inaction, on climate change.  China has heralded, and indeed, ‘weaponized’ its own prioritization of climate change policy and technology development, highlighting its actions in contrast to previous U.S. failures to engage in the Paris Accords. Despite this element of competition, the United States should cooperate with China on climate change policy, given the two nations’ significant impact on the environment.

• • • Through a series of executive orders, and specifically via EO14008, the Biden administration has established climate change as a priority, putting the climate crisis at the center of U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security. Policies such as setting a goal of net zero carbon emissions by 2050 will require the DoD to plan to reduce emissions and build climate awareness into every level of the Joint force. Finding innovative solutions to address legacy weapons systems’ emissions will be an on-going challenge. Creating solutions by leveraging experts and relevant data will be essential to DoD’s success in addressing this challenge.

• • • In order to manage the existential threat posed by climate change, the U.S. Army and DoD must prepare strategies for both adaptation and mitigation.  Adapting to climate change will focus on ‘managing the unavoidable’ aspects of climate change, such as building sea walls, developing new land use patterns, and moving vulnerable power lines underground. On the other hand, mitigating climate change will focus on ‘avoiding the unmanageable’ by reducing current greenhouse gas emissions.

• • • Adaptation and mitigation strategies can overlap. The development of cyber-secure micro grids with on-site power generation can protect against a range of threats, whether from adversarial cyber-attacks or extreme weather events, enhancing overall installation resiliency, while reducing carbon emissions.

• • • Short term solutions will focus on increased efficiencies, while long term solutions will dramatically reduce fuel consumption via promising new technologies and innovation. These include: incorporation of winglets on fixed wing aircraft, hybridization of vehicles, on-site solar power generation, super efficient solar cell technologies capable of beaming power from point-to-point, and small modular nuclear reactors — “You can’t be concerned about climate change and be opposed to nuclear power.”

• • • The U.S. military should prioritize ways to ‘own the heat,’ mirroring former initiatives to develop advanced night vision technology. Technology development in this arena will involve creating tactical cooling systems, increasing vehicle performance, developing individual Soldier cooling solutions, and increasing their medical monitoring.

• • • Advanced technology for operating in extreme temperatures could provide the United States with a strategic advantage in conflict. Emphasizing DoD climate awareness and efforts to mitigate military environmental impacts will help the Army recruit the next generation of Soldiers, who are increasingly impacted by climate change and interested in climate solutions. Conversely, “If we as a military are not addressing climate change, if we’re not serious about this, we’re going to lose appeal to many future Soldiers… They’re going to say, ‘If the military is not onboard with climate change, I don’t want to serve.’“

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of “The Convergence,” featuring an interview with bestselling author Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, discussing writing about disruptors, the emergence of female fighters and military leaders, and the future of women on the battlefield.

The DoD’s Tackling the Climate Crisis web page, referred to by Mr. Kidd at the end of the podcast, may be accessed here.  If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

Mad Scientist’s Climate Change – Threats, Resilience, and Adaptation webinar guest panelists’ biographies and their slide decks here, and watch the entire video of the event here [access via a non-DoD network]

The Inevitable Threat: Climate Change and the Operational Environment

Deepening Climate Emergency

“The Heat is On” in “The Queue” Redux!

Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier, by LTCOL Nathan Pierpoint, Australian Army

Climate Change: Destroyer of World, by CPT Kyle Hallowell, U.S. Army

Climate Change Laid Bare: Why We Need To Act Now, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Sage Miller

Water: A Fluid Challenge for the Future, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth

>>>REMINDER 1: Mad Scientist’s next virtual event — Through the Eyes of Gen Z: National Security Challenges and Solutions in the 21st Century — is this afternoon, Thursday, 29 April 2021 (starting at 1300 EDT). Join us as we collaborate again with The College of William and Mary’s Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) Program to broaden our aperture on the Operational Environment (OE). We will host two moderated discussion panels where PIPS Research fellows discuss the ramifications of their respective research topics on the OE and the changing character of competition, conflict, and U.S. strategy.

Check out the event flyer here, then register here NOW [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

In the meantime, check out what we learned from last year’s event in GEN Z and the OE: 2020 Final Findings to whet your appetite for our upcoming event!

>>>REMINDER 2:  Young Minds on Competition and Conflict, the next webinar in our continuing series of Are We Doing Enough, Fast Enough? virtual events – explores our adversaries’ views on Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change on Thursday, 6 May 2021 (starting at 1000 EDT). Join our panel of prominent young minds from the national security arena as they share their ideas about the future of competition and conflict for the next decade. Register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

[Editor’s Note:  Climate Change and Environmental Degradation has been recognized as a Transnational Threat in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence‘s Annual Threat Assessment for the U.S. Intelligence Community —

“We assess that the effects of a changing climate and environmental degradation will create a mix of direct and indirect threats, including risks to the economy, heightened political volatility, human displacement, and new venues for geopolitical competition that will play out during the next decade and beyond.”

In keeping with the current administration’s renewed focus on climate change, Mad Scientist facilitated its Climate Change – Threats, Resilience, and Adaptation webinar on 13 April 2021 to continue exploring the impacts of climate change on the Operational Environment (OE). Today’s post captures what we have learned and the associated implications for the U.S. Army from this recent event, this Thursday’s upcoming podcast with Mr. Richard G. Kidd IV, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment and Energy Resilience at United States Department of Defense (see more about this, below), and previous blog posts  — Read on!]

In order to effectively compete, deter aggression, and failing that, decisively defeat all potential adversaries in the OE, the U.S. Army will need to understand the deepening climate emergency and how it will impact U.S. security in order to adapt accordingly. Climate change will influence migration, disease, installation security, and resource accessibility.  Potential solutions to tackle this phenomenon, such as those found in the field of geoengineering, could also present an inherent threat if used for nefarious purposes. Thus, a robust understanding of the intersection of climate change and national security is essential for an effective and resilient Army.

Insights on Climate Change and Migration

Per the NIC’s Global Trends 2040 – A More Contested World, “Continued pressure for global migration—as of 2020 more than 270 million persons were living in a country to which they have migrated, 100 million more than in 2000—will strain both origin and destination countries to manage the flow and effects.”  Climate change will contribute to both temporary and permanent migration of vulnerable populations, particularly in regions with low government capacity.  Mass migration will further burden destination resources and could induce new hotspots for conflict. The U.S. Army may be required to support and intervene in these areas, and thus the United States needs to both understand and prepare for this trend.

1. Climate change will join a list of many ‘push factors’ that will encourage migration. An increase in natural disasters as a result of climate change will increase the number of short-term refugees. However, it will be more difficult to discern an increase in permanent migration as a result of climate change. In many cases, climate change will both combine with, and contribute to, other migration incentives, such as economic and conflict factors. Thus, while climate change will certainly contribute to migration, it will be difficult to identify it as a sole reason for movement. Importantly, most migration occurs internally before it becomes international.

2. Migration itself could contribute to further environmental degradation, creating a vicious cycle between climate change and human migration. In the short term, migration is likely to increase resource scarcity in destinations, leading to increased pressure on both recipient governments and environments to support displaced populations. However, in the long term, international cooperation and technology development could ameliorate this consequence.

3. Government capacity to address climate change will be linked to climate migration. A government’s ability to adapt and support its citizens facing climate change challenges will be essential to managing climate migration. Should origin governments be unable to support their populations facing climate change, neighboring and destination governments will be further strained by an influx of climate migrants.

4. Migration as a result of climate change has become politicized globally, complicating international responses and cooperation on this issue. Data collection and analysis will be critical to addressing the threat of climate change, and to tackling migration crises it facilitates.

Implications for the Army:   Climate change and mass migration are the conflict drivers of most concern, as we learned from Mad Scientist’s Global Perspectives in the Operational Environment Virtual Conference.  Due to European geography and proximity to affected regions in northern Africa and the Middle East, climate change driven migration seemed to be of greater concern to our NATO partners than our focus on great power conflict.  Indeed, mass migration events may threaten regional stability, undermine governments, and strain U.S. military and civilian responses.  The Army will be increasingly called upon to provide humanitarian assistance, both abroad and in support of our own border security forces in handling increased migration from Central America and beyond, displaced by the effects of climate change. These operations will be conducted in an environment with the potential for increased heat casualties among our Soldiers and the need to transport water for use by the force and for humanitarian purposes. Consequently, the Army should continue to build resiliency across the force to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Insights on Climate Change and the Future of Disease

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that international response to airborne disease is insufficient. Climate change is likely to increase the rate at which airborne viruses are introduced to the global population.  Implementing cost-effective prevention solutions will be essential to limiting the impact of disease outbreaks, which would otherwise distract from U.S. interests and Army missions. Many of these solutions, such as high filtration masks, already exist, and should be adopted and stockpiled to protect our Soldiers.

1. Climate change is likely to introduce new diseases, many of which will be airborne. Climate change will force people into close contact with new diseases vectors, thaw viruses previously frozen in the permafrost in now melting regions, and increase population densities in urban centers where displaced populations often congregate, further facilitating the spread of disease.

2. The “Aerosolized Internet,” a global network connecting people across the world via bio-aerosols transmitted by breathing, will continue to present a pandemic threat. When combined with an increase in disease as a result of climate change, the aerosolized internet will become an increasingly important element of global interconnectedness. Bad actors could attempt to harness the power of this network to create intentional pandemics.

3. Existing technology, such as specialty masks and air filtration systems, are cost-efficient solutions to addressing future airborne diseases. High filtration masks and HEPA filtration systems are already readily available and could help slow the spread of future disease if adopted. Such a solution would be analogous to installing anti-virus software on computers, and should be employed in military installations, government buildings, office spaces, and even homes.

Implications for the Army:  COVID-19 sidelined the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) for almost two months in Guam, depriving its Carrier Strike Group, the Seventh Fleet, and Indo-Pacific Command of its considerable “Big Stick” deterrence and combat power in the western Pacific, and revealing our armed forces’ vulnerability to natural or weaponized novel pathogens.  Our adversaries around the globe watched and learned that a considerable portion of the U.S.’s forward presence in that Combatant Command could be neutralized via exposure to a novel virus.  To mitigate this potential threat vector, the Army and its Sister services should stockpile enough high filtration masks for all of its Warfighters and start to retroactively install HEPA filtration systems within all key military infrastructure.

Insights on Climate Change and Army Installations

Climate change will have a significant impact on military infrastructure, particularly the security of U.S. installations. Anticipated water stress, natural disasters, and changes in energy requirements of bases will necessitate early investment in mitigation strategies. While the Army is already adapting to this threat, the United States should continue to invest more in infrastructure modernization in order to mitigate the effects of climate change and ensure resiliency and future mission success.

1. Climate change will threaten Army installations. Increased frequency of natural disasters, changes in ground and soil consistency, stress on cooling systems, higher energy requirements, and reduced access to maneuver training areas and ranges will all affect Army readiness as climate change progresses.

2. Significant investment in and adaptation of Army installations will be necessary to sustain critical missions. Military installations will need to be adapted in the short term, despite budgetary constraints. The Army is currently addressing these conditions via Installation Energy and Water Plans (IEWP) to create a roadmap for improving systems at each installation.

3. Water stress will be a particularly challenging impact of climate change on military bases. Increased prevalence and duration of droughts throughout the United States will decrease the availability of water for Soldiers, training exercises, cooling systems, etc. Installations will need to develop innovative ways to conserve existing resources, reduce losses of water via advanced leak detection and repair, increase on-site storage, and explore new reclamation, rainwater, groundwater, and water treatment solutions.

Implications for the Army:  Climate change poses significant infrastructure and readiness issues for the U.S. Army.   Increased incidences of wildfires and desertification limit the availability of land for training, potentially impacting units’ readiness and driving up programming requirements for the Army’s Sustainable Range Program (SRP) and the Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) Program. Of the 21 Army installations assessed in the Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense, 15 were subject to recurrent flooding, five were subject to drought, two were subject to desertification, four were subject to wildfires, and one was subject to thawing permafrost.  The risk of wildfires has led to the conservative use of live fire training ranges, resulting in decreased weapons proficiency. Fires also threaten ranges and maneuver training areas that rely on both terrain and instrumentation to emulate battlefield conditions.  The Army should begin planning mitigation measures now to offset the impact of climate change on its infrastructure in the coming years, as Military Construction (MILCON) should be programmed five years in advance of the year of execution.  Installations that cannot be mitigated cost effectively may be considered candidates for future Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions.

Insights on Climate Change and Geoengineering

It is in every nation’s core national interest to preserve and regenerate the natural environment. As a result, many countries are focused on developing novel ways to reverse the impact of climate change, such as geoengineering (i.e., deliberately changing the environment through large-scale intervention in the climate system). However, such technologies present a dual use capability and are potentially dangerous and inherently difficult to test at-scale. As a result, they are of concern to national security themselves. The United States should proactively engage in international conversations regarding the use and regulation of these capabilities.

1. Immediate adjustment in human behavior will be essential to avoid extreme future change in climate. Although climate change is inevitable, reduction in the use of fossil fuels can still be beneficial. International cooperation will be essential to this effort, given that the environment can be considered a common good. However, such collaboration may actually increase tensions internationally, given that more developed countries are largely responsible for the climate crisis, yet attempting to enforce more difficult standards of development on less developed countries.

2. Geoengineering has been identified as a potential mechanism to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Several methods of geoengineering are being explored by researchers, but problems scaling experimentation is limiting their adoption. This strategy will also be questioned under international law, as it deliberately changes a common good without certainty of positive impact.

3. Geoengineering practices will require significant regulation. Given their potential for great impact, misuse of geoengineering strategies could have dramatic consequences (i.e., the weaponization of weather). As a result, such technologies should be regulated internationally, perhaps in a manner similar to nuclear weapons.

Implications for the Army:  The United States Government and the Army should seek to understand the various ways in which geoengineering could be weaponized, in order to prepare for potential future threats of its use by our adversaries and to stand ready to convincingly refute false anti-American narratives promulgated by them that we are employing geoengineering unilaterally around the globe, exacerbating the effects of climate change on non-aligned nations.

Conclusion

Climate change presents a clear and existential threat to global security. The U.S. Government and the Army need to prioritize immediate action to limit this threat, including infrastructure investment and adoption of cost-effective disease mitigation technology. Additional actions could include the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) taking into account the associated carbon footprints when considering required capability alternatives, and the Services exploring how to lower the carbon footprint associated with their legacy weapons systems.  The United States also needs to engage globally on this issue in order to create proactive policies to address climate migration and geoengineering.

If you enjoyed this post, be sure to check out this Thursday’s (29 April 2021) The Convergence podcast — with Mr. Richard G. Kidd IV, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment and Energy Resilience at United States Department of Defense, addressing the climate change resiliency challenges and opportunities facing the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army in particular…

… and peruse the following related content:

Mad Scientist’s Climate Change – Threats, Resilience, and Adaptation webinar guest panelists’ biographies and their slide decks here, and watch the entire video of the event here [access via a non-DoD network]

Deepening Climate Emergency

“The Heat is On” in “The Queue” Redux!

Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier, by LTCOL Nathan Pierpoint, Australian Army

Climate Change: Destroyer of World, by CPT Kyle Hallowell, U.S. Army

Climate Change Laid Bare: Why We Need To Act Now, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Sage Miller

Future Threats: Climate Change and Islamic Terror, by Matthew Ader

Water: A Fluid Challenge for the Future, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth

On Thin Ice…, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Seth Gnesin

Takeaways from the Mad Scientist Global Perspectives in the Operational Environment Virtual Conference 

Emergent Global Trends Impacting on the Future Operational Environment

>>>REMINDER 1: Mad Scientist’s next virtual event — Through the Eyes of Gen Z: National Security Challenges and Solutions in the 21st Century — is this Thursday, 29 April 2021 (starting at 1300 EDT). Join us as we collaborate again with The College of William and Mary’s Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) Program to broaden our aperture on the Operational Environment (OE). We will host two moderated discussion panels where PIPS Research fellows discuss the ramifications of their respective research topics on the OE and the changing character of competition, conflict, and U.S. strategy.

Check out the event flyer here, then register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

In the meantime, check out what we learned from last year’s event in GEN Z and the OE: 2020 Final Findings to whet your appetite for our upcoming event!

>>>REMINDER 2:  Young Minds on Competition and Conflict, the next webinar in our continuing series of Are We Doing Enough, Fast Enough? virtual events – explores our adversaries’ views on Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change on Thursday, 6 May 2021 (starting at 1000 EDT). Join our panel of prominent young minds from the national security arena as they share their ideas about the future of competition and conflict for the next decade. Register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to feature today’s post by 1LT Carlin Keally, whose submission was one of the semi-finalists in our Mad Scientist Writing Contest on the 4C’s:  Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change.  1LT Keally’s entry addressed the first of our contest’s writing prompts:

How will our competitors deny the U.S. Joint Force’s tactical, operational, and strategic advantages to achieve their objectives (i.e., win without fighting) in the Competition and Crisis Phases?

Our adversaries have identified seams across American society and are ready to exploit them.  The deluge of social media over the past two decades has provided them with vast amounts of personalized data from which to profile behaviors and vulnerabilities and to target individuals.  “Informational, economic, and social warfare are our next battlefields; the Soldiers of the enemy are American citizens.  Data harvesting, digital blackmail, behavioral manipulation, misinformation, microtargeting, and tribalizing are our enemy’s weapons in the next war.”  Read on!]

“A great civilization is not conquered from without until it has destroyed itself from within.”  Ariel Durant

American foreign adversaries understand our mass, our creativity, our adaptability.  The last century has witnessed continuous American conflict, and our antagonists have observed our strengths and weaknesses.  Our greatest triumphs are born of a united homeland, our failures, likewise, from domestic disunion and strife.  Those players who would see the American empire fall have observed, analyzed, and understood: the only way to crush America is to turn it against itself from within.

In the next war, boots on the ground will be tangential.  The next war will take place within the minds of our Soldiers and our citizens.  Disinformation will be the weapon, reality the battlefield.  Microtargeting — manipulating individuals based on data driven behavioral insights — is the next weapon of mass destruction aimed at the United States.  Cognitive domain warfare based on data harvesting, algorithm manipulation, disregarding the truth, and exacerbating internal social divides could cripple America before we can even put one pair of boots on the ground in our next war.  A house divided cannot stand; they will come for us where we think, where we live, where we fight each other.

Every year, all service members are required to certify in operational security, to include identifying indicators on “insider threats.”  An insider threat is considered a threat that an employee or contractor will use his or her authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States.  This concept is not new; blackmail and manipulation are well-worn methods of adversaries looking for information advantages.

What happens if Soldiers remain unware that each of their decisions, their likes, their behavior, are valuable pieces of information?  Further, what if it is their “human experience,” their “behavioral data”¹  that is in fact offering our adversaries insight into US military operations?

In 2018, the world discovered that Cambridge Analytica had acquired the personal data of up to 87 million Facebook users without their explicit consent.  Analysis of these data sets allowed the company to create psychological profiles of humans, whom they could then manipulate based on statistical variables introduced to their created models.  Soldiers have social media; the logical conclusion is that the enemy is collecting our data to gain an advantage in a future fight.  Should American adversaries begin to gather, analyze, and manipulate a Soldier’s open source (OSINT) behavioral data, the operational impacts could be severe.

Beyond blackmail, which is often postured as one of the more insidious motivators of insider threats, pure behavioral manipulation is now a viable option for American enemies.  Dr. Jessica Dawson, Assistant Professor and Research Scientist at the Army Cyber Institute, in her article “Microtargeting as Information Warfare,” asks readers to “consider if China is successful in convincing key US military officers that it poses no threat in the Pacific, leading to changes in the force posture that work in China’s benefit.”  If the psychological profile of a Soldier (again, based on open source data) is assessed to be prone to questioning orders, sympathetic to the cause of the enemy, the enemy could employ an informational variable aimed at turning a Soldier against his cause, unit, or nation.  This is already happening.  ISIS, Proud Boys, and the Oath Keepers, to name a few, have successfully exercised specific informational campaigns to draw their followers into their worldviews.  It is not illogical to think that Russia, China, and other near peer rivals could do this in either a targeted sense of important decision-makers or to scale in the citizenry.

Digital privacy, the safeguarding of personal data on open source sites, is the first erection of defenses needed for the new wars.  If we do not protect our Soldiers’ (and our civilians’) behavioral raw material, America opens itself to mass manipulation, to waging war not necessarily on a traditional battlefield, but rather within the actions and reactions of average Americans.

Microtargeting: “Medicating” Mass Behavior and the War on Trust

Like any good seasonal metaphor, after the harvesting comes the sowing.  From data comes order, and the potential for chaos.  Data reveals people’s attachments, their values, their tendencies;²  weaponizing variables to manipulate behavior based on these data sets is known as “microtargeting.”

Analyzing patterns from data allows our enemies to effectively “medicate mass behavior.”³  Applying informational algorithms, affecting and influencing what certain people see can destabilize the American citizen’s relationship with their institutions, with their Government, with the very concept of truth itself.  This is intended to destabilize our democracy, the institutions, and the checks and balances that serve to protect it.

This is not a new concept; information warfare and psychological operations are as old as war itself.  As defined in  Joint Publication 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, information warfare is “planned operations to convey selected information indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.”  It’s a question of triggering a loss of confidence in those who are supposed to lead the country and protect its citizens.

There are a few different ways that microtargeting will be a weapon of mass destruction in the next conflict.  Understanding American socio-political rifts, foreign adversaries could capitalize on the American citizen’s distrust in their neighbor by further tribalizing the country.  For groups who tend towards identity politics, consuming specific propaganda that dehumanizes their fellow countrymen can catalyze violence.

A secondary effect is exacerbating sympathy events.  Consider Dr. Dawson’s hypothetical regarding a US officer changing military posture to benefit China.  Not only does this advantage our enemy, it also creates a propaganda opportunity; publicizing this action undermines the legitimacy of US decision-making.  In the foreign policy realm, much of American power rests on the civilian trust in the choices and strategy of our experts.  Sympathy events and their ensuing advertisement begin to dissolve the trust between those who are not foreign policy subject matter experts, and those who are supposed to be considered thus.

Further, as the events compound and trust disintegrates, the more informational ammunition our enemies have to target people with anti-institutional behavioral profiles.  Without defenses against truth targeting, America remains open to a homefront attack against our own hearts and minds, designed to sow misinformation and distrust.

Within the military specifically, the war on trust has operational impacts.  Consider a Soldier who has been enemy-educated to believe the US should not have a presence in a certain place, and he is then deployed there.  What happens if a Soldier believes he cannot trust who is sending him to war?  What happens if a politician has seen images and videos of American Soldiers not doing their jobs, dismissing their authorities, badmouthing their superiors?  What happens if American leadership feels they cannot trust those they send to war to effectively prosecute it?  If leaders cannot trust their subordinates and vice versa, a war is lost before it’s even considered.

Lastly, consider American individuals who perpetuate our way of life:  bankers, water maintenance technicians, network servicemen, and the like.  These individuals are present online, on social media, offering their data on open sources.  Once profiled, these individuals can be behaviorally targeted to change affect their spheres.  This warfront is economic.  Disrupting normal processes draws attention to domestic issues, further erasing the US presence around the world.  If a US citizen is conditioned to believe her actions are not only bettering her country, but also disempowering her nation’s enemies, she will be inclined to act accordingly; America’s economy powers her wars.  If our economy begins to stumble because citizens are convinced their actions are righteous, America’s enemies would not need to expend any conventional warfighting to inflict casualties.  Americans would be disrupting America.

Malevolent Algorithms: Info loops and the war on reality

One of the US military’s greatest strengths is the ability to create cohesive units from diverse Americans.  Before the advent of social media, recruits would attend basic, lose superfluous individualism, and learn to be a Soldier, Marine, Airman, or Sailor.  From the 1980s onward, everyone wore the suit, everyone lived by the “Army” values, and everyone grew into the unit, not away from each other.  After the disunion during and following the Vietnam war, social indoctrination allowed the culture of the military to become more tribal; being a Soldier offered its own identity.  Part of this cultural decline is the constant access Soldiers have to previous value systems, communities, and information sources.  Often, Soldiers who hail from a troubled adolescence find success in the Army when they are posted far from their hometown and these defining environments.  Social media no longer allows for a fresh start and a clean character development.  Instead of coalescing into a national fighting force, the pervasive access of social media has allowed networks of like-minded people (Soldiers included) to maintain connections, valuing and elevating racial, gender, or political identities to trump, and thus weaken, national identity.  This is not just an issue within our formation; recognizing a national identity within our diverse citizenry (many of whom find issue with said diversity) has challenged our coalition as a people.  Rifts beget rifts, and such schisms are only exacerbated by distrust in our information streams.  Our enemies can harness this.

For the moment and the foreseeable future, the United States operates on a goodwill blindspot based on accepted exceptionalism and our freedoms; enemies understand that American leadership is unwilling or unable to inhibit abusive algorithms designed to pull individuals into the depths of misinformation loops.  As such, adversaries who have a grasp of American social divisions need only fan the embers that warm identity politics.  Understanding gaps in our informational landscape and the real-life implications of propagating falsities is our only way forward.  The threat from this front is two pronged: Soldiers and civilians.

Soldiers have access to informational sources.  Just a month ago, a Fort Stewart Soldier was charged in an FBI sting for allegedly trying to help an “ISIS operative” blow up New York’s 9/11 memorial.  Similarly, according to an Associated Press story, GEN Daniel R. Hokanson, Chief, National Guard Bureau, said two National Guard Soldiers were removed from inauguration duty in January due to their inappropriate comments or texts related to the inauguration.  Consider this at scale; if our near peer adversaries have a grasp on who our Soldiers are, they have harvested their data, can assess what will drive them to distrust the Government, and are willing to radicalize them with misinformation — this is not only an undeployable force, this is the foundation of a military coup.

Civilians are also targets of misinformation campaigns.  During the protests in the spring of 2020, some called for the deployment of active duty troops in the streets of American cities to quell violence and rioting.  During this administration’s inauguration, there were 25,000 National Guard troops deployed in our Capitol to protect the peaceful transfer of power.  It is worth asking the question, what happens if there are civilian protests, riots, and uprisings based on disinformation diffused and disseminated by foreign enemies that are too widespread and numerous for simply the National Guard to handle?  Are active duty troops deployed?  This too sets a dangerous precipice for military power, destined to be discussed and made precedent in Washington.  Caught up at home, our forces would not challenge near peer adversaries anywhere else in the world.  They would have won a bloodless war, simply by understanding and exploiting domestic rifts through malignant information environments.

Our foreign adversaries understand our national identity (or lack thereof) and our weaknesses better than we do, or better than we are willing to admit.  Understanding our informational landscape will allow us to erect intellectual firewalls to protect our educationally disadvantaged from informational loops designed to sow violence against institutions.  Right now, our adversaries manipulate our relationship with the truth; until we can effectively combat our war on reality at home, we will have no chance of winning a conventional war; all they need is a baseless accusation born out of fear, playing on our expectations of each other.

Conclusion

Durant’s assertion is above all a prophecy.  Our enemies understand our weaknesses and how to exploit them.  Our open source information offers foreign adversaries nearly unlimited data from which to profile behaviors and target individuals.  Propagating misinformation and specific truths foments distrust, disunity, and instability.  Informational, economic, and social warfare are our next battlefields; the Soldiers of the enemy are American citizens.  Data harvesting, digital blackmail, behavioral manipulation, misinformation, microtargeting, and tribalizing are our enemy’s weapons in the next war.  This is a war without uniform, without clarity, without rules of engagement.  It is a conflict fostered between institutions and individuals, between neighbors and between citizens.  Against an America united in a respect for veracity, no enemy can prevail from without; against an American that rots from within, we are lost.  A divided house cannot stand.  A divided America is no longer a threat; a divided America is no longer an adversary.  If we offer our human experience as bullets to our enemy, we have lost before we have even begun.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following content:

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events and all of the series’ associated content and videos [access via a non-DoD network]

Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette and Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes

The Information Environment:  Competition and Conflict anthology

The Convergence: Political Tribalism and Cultural Disinformation with Samantha North and the associated podcast

The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security, by Dr. Russell Glenn

The Convergence: Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare with Dr. David Kilcullen and listen to the associated podcast

>>>REMINDER 1:  Mad Scientist’s next virtual event — Through the Eyes of Gen Z: National Security Challenges and Solutions in the 21st Century — is on Thursday, 29 April 2021 (starting at 1300 EDT). Join us as we collaborate again with The College of William and Mary’s Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) Program to broaden our aperture on the Operational Environment (OE). We will host two moderated discussion panels where PIPS Research fellows discuss the ramifications of their respective research topics on the OE and the changing character of competition, conflict, and U.S. strategy.

Check out the event flyer here, then register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

In the meantime, check out what we learned from last year’s event in GEN Z and the OE: 2020 Final Findings to whet your appetite for our upcoming event!

>>>REMINDER 2: Young Minds on Competition and Conflict, the next webinar in our continuing series of Are We Doing Enough, Fast Enough? virtual events – explores our adversaries’ views on Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change on Thursday, 6 May 2021 (starting at 1000 EDT). Join our panel of prominent young minds from the national security arena as they share their ideas about the future of competition and conflict for the next decade. Register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

About the Author:  An active duty Armor Officer, 1LT Carlin Keally currently serves as the Aide-de-Camp of the Deputy Commanding General of Readiness of the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. She completed her Platoon Leader time on tanks in 3-69 AR, also in 3ID.

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

---

¹ Christopher Wylie, Mindf*ck: Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America (New York: Random House, 2019)

² Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 20.

³ The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, 1st edition (PublicAffairs, 2019), 8.

[Editor’s Note:  The Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to feature today’s post — the winning entry in our Mad Scientist Writing Contest on the 4C’s: Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change.  CPT Anjanay Kumar‘s winning entry tackles both of our contest’s writing prompts:

• • • How will our competitors deny the U.S. Joint Force’s tactical, operational, and strategic advantages to achieve their objectives (i.e., win without fighting) in the Competition and Crisis Phases?

• • • How will our adversaries seek to overmatch or counter U.S. Joint Force strengths in future Large Scale Combat Operations?

… plausibly laying out a scenario where China could reunite Taiwan with the mainland under the mantle of the CCP, while operationally and tactically immobilizing the U.S. Joint Force in a lightning fast strike lasting perhaps no longer than a three day weekend — fait accompli — and achieving a stranglehold over the global economy.  Read on!]

Purpose

This essay examines how a peer competitor, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), will deny the US Joint Force’s (USJF) tactical, operational, and strategic advantages to achieve their objectives in the Competition and Crisis phases of the Competition Continuum. The PRC’s stated goal of reunification with Taiwan serves as an objective, and the US objective, under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), has been to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion…of the people of Taiwan.”¹ After orienting the reader in time and space to our current operational environment, this essay explores the grand strategy through which the PRC will defeat the USJF without fighting and conclude with recommendations to avoid such a defeat.

Today’s Context: The PRC as a Regional Hegemon

Over the past year, COVID-19’s spread from the PRC has shifted global attention to the PRC’s actions. With the consolidation of rare-earth mines across the world, the creation and militarization of islands throughout the waters of the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea, and the political costs implicitly associated with the Belt Road Initiative investments, the PRC has spread its economic tendrils across the world.^2,3,4 Simultaneously, the PRC has purposefully shaped the overseas perception of the Chinese people and deliberately exported culture: growing PRC influence in Hollywood, shipping of medical supplies to countries in need, and attempts to influence Australian politics are three recent examples.^5,6,7 The PRC’s curtailing of rights in Hong Kong serves as an indication that the PRC’s leaders understand the scrutiny their actions across the world are now facing. Perhaps the greatest example of this is the rise of “The Quad”, an ongoing security dialogue between the US, Japan, India, and Australia.⁸ With the PRC set to become the world’s largest economy by as early as 2028, when the USJF seeks to be Multi-Domain Operation-capable, we must understand that the seeds of their success in extending influence across the world today began decades ago.⁹

The PRC’s Grand Strategy and Goal

Beginning in 1980, under the “Three Reforms” of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC sought to end the “century of humiliation” and realize the PRC as the “Middle Kingdom.”^10,11,12 Published in 1999 by two PRC colonels, Unrestricted Warfare describes in detail how the PRC would execute their vision of a world subservient to the superior Chinese people and culture. Contrary to Western views, the PRC’s approach to war involves all facets of a government, economic system, culture, and people. They correctly identified Western individualism as contradictory to their Confucian, Maoist collectivism and beliefs. Therefore, to achieve the PRC’s grand vision of their culture as the dominant force in the world, the PRC must defeat Western culture and ideology.

The radical economic reforms under Deng set the stage for the PRC’s ability to extend influence today. With their rapidly growing prosperity, the PRC realized that they would need to assert economic control on the oil of the future—rare earth metals. The PRC established a near-total monopoly on mines and a massive manufacturing industrial base to refine these metals into usable products. Not content with dominating the lower tiers of the market, the PRC has also begun creating the higher tier industries that turn refined rare earth  metals into semiconductor chips vital to the production of everything from cars to cell phones, to military communications equipment. The situation is in their favor to such a degree that even the US sends rare earth metals to the PRC for refinement, and the US continues to lose ground in the manufacturing arena.^13,14 Fundamental to the purpose of this essay and long-term PRC goals, Taiwan is the largest producer of semiconductor chips.¹⁵ To achieve the stranglehold they desire, reunification with Taiwan must occur.

The Operational Environment Today

The PRC has been shaping the operational environment since before 2000. As previously described, they have achieved considerable progress in shaping the economic frontline by gaining control of vital economic assets. They have also created significant stand-off with perhaps the most formidable anti-access/area denial (A2AD) bubble anywhere in the world, in the South China Sea. The PRC seeks to use the A2AD bubble to not only deny the USJF freedom of maneuver, but also to control the highly trafficked shipping lanes and rare earth deposits on the sea floor across the region.

In the sociocultural and political domains, the US has practically ceded the fight altogether. Social media has created areas of vulnerability across American society; for example, social media has highlighted racism against Asian people across the US, vilifying the American people.¹⁶  Ongoing violence and protests across the country serve the narrative that American democracy is fundamentally racist and hypocritical.¹⁷ Americans on social media enter echo chambers that radicalize their beliefs, and the extremes of American society dominate the news cycle. Our adversaries’ ability to manipulate social media using bots and manpower creates a situation in which American is pitted against American, unlike anything the US has seen since the Civil War.¹⁸ Additionally, as previously mentioned, the PRC has run a global campaign to improve the perception of the Chinese people, their culture, and their products.^19,20

Across Southeast Asia, the PRC’s “Tiger Diplomats” and “Wolf Warriors” have made significant headway, seizing opportunities to increase reliance on the PRC and defeat US interests.²¹ In the Philippines, for example, with a PRC-bankrolled populist authoritarian in Rodrigo Duterte, the PRC has made significant strides to subserviate the Philippines.^22,23 Thailand, through the Chinese construction of the Kra Canal across the Thai isthmus, stands to benefit greatly from acquiescence to the PRC.²⁴ The Kra Canal would also undermine and economically weaken Singapore, perhaps the staunchest US ally in the region outside of Australia. Vietnam has been consistently bullied by the PRC’s incursions into their exclusive economic zones but has found itself further distanced from the US, like other countries in the region, by harsh language and trade actions under the Trump administration.²⁵ Myanmar’s recent political instability has necessitated a reduction of US military contact, and Cambodia razed and replaced a US-built facility with plans for a new PRC naval base.²⁶ Throughout Southeast Asia, the PRC continues to economically invest in nations.²⁷

Japan, South Korea, and Australia hazard antagonizing the PRC and face economic sanctions and cultural backlash when supporting US policies and positions. India, with strong anti-Chinese sentiment over border clashes sensationalized by their populist authoritarian, Narendra Modi, continues to have a complicated relationship with the US due to American support for Pakistan — a necessity for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. [Note: this essay was submitted before the Biden Administration announced its intention to completely withdraw US troops from Afghanistan.] The US finds itself pushed out economically and losing influence daily. Summarily, the USJF will find itself at a severe strategic disadvantage because of decades of shaping operations by the PRC in the political, economic, and sociocultural domains.

Competition to Crisis

With tensions across the region slowly building, Taiwan’s status as a separate state becomes a focal point between the US and the PRC. The TRA compels the US to commit the USJF to support Taiwan against an invasion from the mainland. If Taiwanese politics radicalize against the PRC as political asylum seekers from Hong Kong flood Taiwan, it is feasible that the “red line” of a declaration of Taiwanese independence is crossed and hostilities initiated.²⁸ If the PRC invades Taiwan, they will act against the US and her allies to obfuscate their operational and tactical actions, delay a political reaction, and deny the USJF the chance to engage with PRC forces. The PRC would understand that a victory in Taiwan equates to a failure of American deterrence and would substantially degrade American influence in the region, earning a political victory they desire as much as reintegration. The PRC would also consider the galvanizing effect of US casualties; they will not blunder into Pearl Harbor 2.0.

US treaties with Japan and South Korea would necessitate non-kinetic operations there as well. With that understanding, the PRC would not substantially target American, Japanese, and South Korean bases and forces with kinetic strikes, instead employing non-kinetic effects to isolate Taiwan. As operations begin against Taiwan, PRC planners will seek to give themselves 72 hours of operations against Taiwan’s military without outside interference. Chinese information operations across social media will overwhelm opposing messages. Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks will target pro-Taiwanese websites while bots will amplify anti-Taiwanese sentiment by creating social media echo chambers. For 72 hours, the PRC will inundate social media and news agencies with hyperbole and falsities friendly to the PRC’s narrative. Cyber attacks targeting the unprotected physical servers and electrical infrastructure supporting allied intelligence communities will delay the ability to generate a clear picture of the PRC’s actions. As the US Congress convenes in an emergency session to discuss a declaration of war against the PRC, many congressmen and women would find their connections to the PRC highlighted across social media and news channels. The PRC would seek to reduce Congress to finger-pointing as they freely invade Taiwan.

At an operational level, the PRC will level cyber and electromagnetic warfare capabilities against American carrier strike groups (CSGs). The possible effects CSGs can expect are the hacking of GPS systems causing collisions between vessels, loss of communications, and significant sensor jamming.²⁹

The PRC priority will be to use the defensive capabilities of their A2AD bubbles to create stand-off and threaten the USJF from 4,000 kilometers away.^30,31 Furthermore, the extensive use of radars on the “distant water fleet” — civilian ships equipped with military equipment with identical electronic emissions to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships — will add significant breadth and depth to their intelligence gathering apparatus throughout the seas around Taiwan while also disguising the location of PLAN ships.

The degradation of systems, the constant threat of ballistic missile attack, blinding across the electromagnetic spectrum, and a lack of unambiguous guidance from higher headquarters would paralyze the USJF on a tactical level. The PRC would further conduct tactical information operations against individual USJF service members. Learning from Russian operations against Ukraine, the PRC will target those in leadership positions and those with personal vulnerabilities.³² A ship captain can expect to receive a fake phone call stating his family died in a car crash. A surface warfare officer may receive notification that her house foreclosed, and her family evicted. On the domestic front, families may hear that their loved ones died in accidents.

The PRC would be prepared to use the “Assassin’s Mace” family of weaponry to defeat the USJF’s tactical advantages.³³ These weapons serve as a way to “offset” American technological advantages and supplement stand-off. Currently, there are indications that the PRC has heavily invested in railgun technology, with the precision to target small, quick targets at ranges exceeding 200 km.³⁴ Using real-time intelligence from the Yaogan-31 satellite network over the Pacific, the PRC would add substantial depth to their A2AD bubbles.

The PRC would also stonewall US attempts at intelligence gathering and analysis. The PRC will target the Sentient program, an AI system capable of digesting vast quantities of data to simplify pattern and trend analysis for human analysts at organizations like the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office.³⁵ While the Sentient program itself may be secure, the contractors and infrastructure associated with its hardware are not and present a weak point for the PRC to exploit. Before the data moves from the servers, malicious software will attack the servers and causes their physical destruction.

The PRC would achieve a strategic and national advantage over the US and the USJF. They would operationally and tactically immobilize the USJF and maintain sufficient stand-off to win the 72 hours they needed. Taiwan would fall, in this scenario, before Congress declared war on China. From the Chinese perspective, Taiwan’s fall despite American indirect support and a failed attempt at direct support serves as a victory twice over. The US loses total credibility with countries across the western Pacific as a deterrent to the PRC. Worldwide, China’s domination of the semiconductor industry, with control of the next tier of manufacturers in Taiwan, creates a stranglehold over the global economy.

Conclusions

The chief determining factor in the conflict is the PRC’s unity of command—their ability to focus all elements of national power on their objective. Stability in leadership ensured stability in mission and resources, a stark contrast to America’s radical strategic swings from administration to administration. The luxury of having decades to bring a plan to fruition enables greater depth and breadth than largely reactionary US policy can counter.

For the US to prevent the defeat of the USJF before the conflict, the US must go even further than it has in recent years to address Chinese expansion and aggression. First, the US must deepen roots and alliances within the region. “The Quad” presents an opportunity to multilaterally counter the PRC’s moves. India in particular stands to serve as a significant counterbalance, with its substantial population and strong opposition to the PRC’s territorial claims. The US must continue to deepen defense and economic ties with India through favorable trade terms and inclusion in multilateral military exercises. Luckily, domestic US support for “The Quad” and its implicit objectives of containing and countering China is extremely bipartisan, as are other actions to counter the PRC, such as trade policies under both the Trump and Biden administrations. The next step for the US is to explicitly frame actions against China as the US framed actions against the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany: the PRC’s current regime’s values and beliefs are antithetical to American values and beliefs. This must be an important distinction, as it was when discussing other foes; the enemy is not the people, it is the government.

The US must also seek to reduce the Chinese monopoly of rare earth metal mining and refinement by creating strong economic and sociocultural incentives to side against the PRC and with the US. The US must vilify Chinese economic imperialism while subsidizing domestic industry and delivering aid and investment to metal-rich nations. Lastly, the PRC’s greatest strength, the mentality under the Middle Kingdom Complex that China is at the center of the world, is also their greatest weakness. Information operations attacking Chinese credibility and legitimacy, such as highlighting the inhumane oppression of the Uighurs, must saturate the information domain. These actions must persist over time, as the US has significant ground to retake. The US must recognize that the PRC has considered itself at war with the US and Western ideology for decades, and it may take a decade or more to realize advances across the economic, sociocultural, and political domains. If hostilities arise, there must be no question that the USJF must deploy expeditiously to give a country such as Taiwan a fighting chance. Without unity of command and belief, the USJF may find itself sidelined altogether, watching helplessly as the PRC realizes its objectives.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related ones:

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China and explore all of the additional content on our emergent pacing threat via the embedded links contained therein.

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security, by Dr. Russell Glenn

The Convergence: Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare with Dr. David Kilcullen, the associated podcast, and the video [access via a non-DoD network] and notes from Mad Scientist’s Operational Environment and Conflict over the Next Decade webinar on 19 January 2021, featuring Dr. T.X. Hammes. Dr. David Kilcullen, and Dr. Sean McFate

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

The Convergence: The Future of Ground Warfare with COL Scott Shaw, and associated podcast

Character of Warfare 2035

Why the Next “Cuban Missile Crisis” Might Not End Well: Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis Management, by Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala

>>>REMINDER 1:  Mad Scientist’s next virtual event — Through the Eyes of Gen Z: National Security Challenges and Solutions in the 21st Century — is on Thursday, 29 April 2021 (starting at 1300 EDT). Join us as we collaborate again with The College of William and Mary’s Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) Program to broaden our aperture on the Operational Environment (OE). We will host two moderated discussion panels where PIPS Research fellows discuss the ramifications of their respective research topics on the OE and the changing character of competition, conflict, and U.S. strategy.

Register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

In the meantime, check out what we learned from last year’s event in GEN Z and the OE: 2020 Final Findings to whet your appetite for our upcoming event!

>>>REMINDER 2: Young Minds on Competition and Conflict, the next webinar in our continuing series of Are We Doing Enough, Fast Enough? virtual events – explores our adversaries’ views on Competition, Crisis, Conflict, and Change on Thursday, 6 May 2021 (starting at 1000 EDT). Join our panel of prominent young minds from the national security arena as they share their ideas about the future of competition and conflict for the next decade. Register here now [via a non-DoD network] to participate in this informative event.

CPT Anjanay Kumar is currently a member of the Harvard Kennedy School masters of public policy class of 2023. His previous assignments include Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Deputy Intelligence Officer, Joint Task Force Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course and holds a bachelor of arts in economics from University of California, Berkeley.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

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¹ U.S. Congress, House, Taiwan Relations Act, HR 2479, 96^th Cong., introduced in House Feb 28, 1979, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479

² China Power Team. “Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply Chains?” China Power, July 17, 2020. Updated September 4, 2020. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-rare-earths/

³ Beech, Hannah “Just Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From?” Time Magazine, July 19, 2016. https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/

⁴ Chatzky, Andrew and James McBride. “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative” Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

⁵ Doescher, Tim. “How China is Taking Control of Hollywood” Heritage Explains. December 13, 2018. https://www.heritage.org/asia/heritage-explains/how-china-taking-control-hollywood

⁶ Australian Associated Press. “China is Seeking to ‘Take Over’ Australia’s Politic System, Former Asio Chief Claims” November 21, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/22/china-is-seeking-to-take-over-australias-political-system-former-asio-chief-claims

⁷ Searight, Amy. “China Influence Activities with U.S. Allies and Partners in Southeast Asia” Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 8, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-influence-activities-us-allies-and-partners-southeast-asia

⁸ Chanlett-Avery, Emma et al. “The ‘Quad’: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia” Congressional Research Service, November 2, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11678

⁹ Wass de Czege, Huba. “Commentary on ‘The US Army in Mutli-Domain Operations 2028” U.S. Army War College, April 2020. https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3726.pdf

¹⁰ Kobayashi, Shigeo et al. “The ‘Three Reforms’ in China: Progress and Outlook” Sakura Institute of Research, Inc September 1999. https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/

¹¹ Schiavenza, Matt. “How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History” The Atlantic, October 25, 2013. https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-history/280878/

¹² Ljunggren, Börje. “Under Xi, China Aims to Be the World’s Middle Kingdom.” YaleGlobal Online, October 31, 2017. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/under-xi-china-aims-be-worlds-middle-kingdom

¹³ Scheyder, Ernest. “China Set to Control Rare Earth Supply for Years due to Processing Dominance” Reuters, May 29, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-rareearth-refining/china-set-to-control-rare-earth-supply-for-years-due-to-processing-dominance-idUSKCN1T004J

¹⁴ Reuters Staff. “Chine Explores Rare Earth Export curbs to Target U.S. Defence Industry” Reuters, February 15, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-defence/china-explores-rare-earth-export-curbs-to-target-u-s-defence-industry-ft-idUSKBN2AG0C1

¹⁵ Crawford, Alan et al. “The World is Dangerously Dependent on Taiwan for Semiconductors” Bloomberg, January 25, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-25/the-world-is-dangerously-dependent-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors

¹⁶ Abdollat, Tami and Trevor Hughes. “Hate Crimes Against Asian Americans Are on the Rise” USA Today, February 27, 2021. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/02/27/asian-hate-crimes-attacks-fueled-covid-19-racism-threaten-asians/4566376001/

¹⁷ Blebnikov, Sergei. “China, Russia and Iran Mock U.S. Handling of Protests” Forbes, June 8, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/06/08/china-russia-and-iran-mock-us-handling-of-protests-i-have-a-dream-but-i-cant-breathe/?sh=7de8e2ba3629

¹⁸ Stapleton, Shannon. “FBI Probing if Foreign Governments, Groups Funded Extremists Who Helped Execute Capitol Attack” NBC News, January 16, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/fbi-probing-if-foreign-governments-groups-funded-extremists-who-helped-n1254525

¹⁹ Waterson, Jim and Lily Kuo. “China Steps up Western Media Campaign over Coronavirus Crisis” The Guardian, April 3, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/03/china-steps-up-western-media-campaign-over-coronavirus-crisis

²⁰ Zeneli, Valbona and Federia Santoro. “China’s Disinformation Campaign in Italy” The Diplomat, June 9, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/chinas-disinformation-campaign-in-italy/

²¹ Landale, James. “Coronavirus: China’s New Army of Tough-Talking Diplomats” BBC News, May 13, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52562549

²² Rowand, Michael. “Duterte Will Fight Anyone but Beijing” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/19/duterte-philippines-china-interests/

²³ Westcott, Ben and Steven Jiang. “China is Embracing a New Brand of Foreign Policy” CNN World, May 29, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html

²⁴ Menon, Rhea. “Thailand’s Kra Canal: China’s Way Around the Malacca Strait” The Diplomat, April 6, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/thailands-kra-canal-chinas-way-around-the-malacca-strait/

²⁵ Thu, Houng Le. “Rough Waters Ahead for Vietnam-China Relations” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 30, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/30/rough-waters-ahead-for-vietnam-china-relations-pub-82826

²⁶ Davidson, Philip. “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture” March 9, 2021. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_03-09-21.pdf

²⁷ Lima, Guanie and Alvin Camba. “China Investment in Southeast Asia is Nothing to Fear” Nikkei Asia, August 4, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Chinese-investment-in-Southeast-Asia-is-nothing-to-fear

²⁸ Murphy, Colum. “China Diplomat’s ‘Red Line’ Warning Points to U.S. Tensions.” Bloomberg, February 3, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-02/china-s-top-diplomat-warns-biden-not-to-touch-internal-affairs

²⁹ Pomerleau, Mark. “Breaking Down China’s Electronic Warfare Tactics” C4ISR Net, March 22, 2017. https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2017/03/22/breaking-down-chinas-electronic-warfare-tactics/

³⁰ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea. Last modified February 28, 2021. https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/

³¹ Kristensen, Hans. “China’s New DF-26 Missile Shows Up At Base In Eastern China.” Federation of American Scientists, January 21, 2020.

³² Scarasso, Lucas. “Text Messages from Hell: Restraint and Information Warfare” Modern War Institute, April 21, 2020. https://mwi.usma.edu/text-messages-hell-restraint-information-warfare/

³³ Work, Robert O., and Greg Grant. “Beating the Americans at their Own Game.” Center for a New American Security: 4-10.

³⁴ Macias, Amanda. “China Just Tested the World’s Most Powerful naval Gun and U.S. Intelligence Says it will be ready for Warfare by 2025” CNBC, January 30, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/30/cnbcs-amanda-macias-china-just-tested-the-worlds-most-powerful-naval-gun-and-us-intelligence-says-it-will-be-ready-for-warfare-by-2025.html

³⁵ Scoles, Sarah. “Meet the US’s spy system of the future – It’s Sentient.” The Verge, July 31, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/31/20746926/sentient-national-reconnaissance-office-spy-satellites-artificial-intelligence-ai

 

[Editor’s Note:  Mad Scientist is pleased to announce our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring the Undersecretary of the Navy (and proclaimed Mad Scientist) James F. “Hondo” Geurts and Dr. Zachary S. Davis, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, discussing Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Force and how to think radically about the future, capitalize on talent, and unleash technological convergences to out-compete our adversaries, and when necessary, defeat them decisively in conflict —  Enjoy! (Please note that this podcast and several of the embedded links below are best accessed via a non-DoD network due to network priorities for teleworking)]

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James F. “Hondo” Geurts was designated as performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Navy, effective February 4, 2021. In this position, he serves as the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, as well as the Chief Operating Officer and Chief Management Officer for the Department of the Navy. Additionally, he oversees intelligence activities, intelligence-related activities, special access programs, critical infrastructure, and sensitive activities within the department.  Secretary Geurts previously served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)), from December 2017 to January 2021, and as the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Acquisition Executive, at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, where he was responsible for all special operations forces acquisition, technology and logistics. He has over 30 years of extensive Joint acquisition experience and served in all levels of acquisition leadership positions including Acquisition Executive, Program Executive Officer, and Program Manager of Major Defense Acquisition Programs.  Secretary Geurts penned the Foreword to Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Force.

Dr. Zachary S. Davis is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he teaches courses on counterproliferation. He has broad experience in intelligence and national security policy and has held senior positions in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government. Dr. Davis began his career at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress and has served with the State Department, congressional committees, and the National Security Council. Dr. Davis was group leader for proliferation networks in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Z Program and in 2007 was senior advisor at the National Counterproliferation Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He leads the project addressing the national security implications of advanced technologies, focusing on special operations forces; authored the Introduction to Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Force; and co-edited said document.

In today’s podcast, the Undersecretary of the Navy James F. “Hondo” Geurts and Dr. Zachary S. Davis discuss Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Force and how to think radically about the future, capitalize on talent, and unleash technological convergences to out-compete and defeat our adversaries.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview with them:

• • • The U.S. Army should identify emerging technologies with “strategic latency,” or technologies that will change the balance of power once fully developed and deployed. While many technologies could fit this description alone (i.e., biotechnology, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, cyber), convergences could also emerge between them that multiply their impact.

• • • Novel applications of technology by creative operators will amplify the disruption caused by technology with strategic latency. Thus, identifying operators with diverse experiences and teaming them with technologists will enable better technology development, and will be essential to solving complex security problems.

• • • Attracting, connecting, and leveraging divergent perspectives will be critical to successful and rapid technological development.  Creating flexible platforms where these perspectives can engage safely and creatively will be essential to solving non-linear problems.

• • • Creating strategic relationships among U.S. talent before they are needed will facilitate the development of multiple possible solutions for each technological problem encountered.

• • • The U.S. Army needs to adopt an abundance mindset. While budgetary constraints are present and persistent, the United States has an abundance of disruptive thinkers both inside and outside of the security sphere that can be accessed and leveraged to solve complex problems.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of “The Convergence,” featuring our interview with proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Richard G. Kidd IV, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment and Energy Resilience at United States Department of Defense, addressing the climate change resiliency challenges and opportunities facing the DoD, and the U.S. Army in particular.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following:

Strategic Latency Unleashed! by Dr. Zachary S. Davis

The Convergence: Innovating Innovation with Molly Cain and associated podcast

Estimation of Technological Convergence by 2035, and the associated final report and briefing slides, by Lt Col Nicholas Delcour (USAF), Lt Col Louis Duncan (USAF), Mr. Stephen Frahm (DOS), CDR Patrick Lancaster (USN), and Lt Col Lance Vann (USAF), collectively known as the Army War College’s Mad Scientist Fellows of 2020, under the direction of Prof. Kristan Wheaton, U.S. Army War College

Dense Urban Hackathon – Virtual Innovation

The Convergence: The Future of Talent and Soldiers with MAJ Delaney Brown, CPT Jay Long, and 1LT Richard Kuzma, and associated podcast

Innovation Isn’t Enough: How Creativity Enables Disruptive Strategic Thinking, by Heather Venable

The Convergence: Changing Mindsets for the Future with Dr. Lydia Kostopoulos and associated podcast

>>>ANNOUNCEMENT:   Through the Eyes of Gen Z:  National Security Challenges and Solutions in the 21st Century — on Thursday, 29 April 2021 (starting at 1300 EDT). Join us as we collaborate again with The College of William and Mary’s Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) Program to broaden our aperture on the Operational Environment (OE). We will host two moderated discussion panels where PIPS Research fellows discuss the ramifications of their respective research topics on the OE and the changing character of competition, conflict, and U.S. strategy.

Register here now to participate in this informative event.

In the meantime, check out what we learned from last year’s event in GEN Z and the OE: 2020 Final Findings to whet your appetite for our upcoming event!