[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring a provocative conversation with Amy Webb, futurist, author, and founder and CEO of the Future Today Institute, addressing strategic foresight, emerging technologies like synthetic biology, and what she sees as vital implications for the U.S. Army — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Amy Webb advises Chief eXperience Officers (CXOs) of the world’s most-admired companies, three-star admirals and generals, and the senior leadership of central banks and intergovernmental organizations. Founder of the Future Today Institute, a leading foresight and strategy firm that helps leaders and their organizations prepare for complex futures, Amy pioneered a data-driven, technology-led foresight methodology that is now used within hundreds of organizations. Forbes called Amy “one of the five women changing the world.” She was honored as one of the BBC’s 100 Women of 2020 and is ranked on the Thinkers50 list of the 50 most influential management thinkers globally.  Amy is the best-selling author of several books. Her latest book, The Genesis Machine (PublicAffairs / Hachette 2022) examines the futures of gene editing, biotech, and synthetic biology. Synthetic biology is the promising and controversial technology platform that combines biology and artificial intelligence, opening up the potential to program biological systems much as we program computers. 

In today’s podcast, we talk with Amy about strategic foresight, emerging technologies like synthetic biology, and what she sees as vital implications for the U.S. Army.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • There are always three stages of work, whether in government or private sector, when it comes to foresight:  Inputs (forces, signals, and trends), outcomes (scenarios describing plausible futures), and some form of action or backcasting (reverse engineering a preferred future).

• • • Synthetic or engineered biology consists of modifying or manipulating biological code to give it new or enhanced purposes. In the “read, edit, write” analogy, synthetic biology gives the user the “write” function to make sweeping changes with more control. This is not limited to human biology as it can be applied to plants, viruses, and any other biological material.

• • • Access to synthetic or designer biology may create a new class of genetic haves and have-nots.  Wealth will be a restricting factor, but religious beliefs may also prove to be less tolerant of these manipulations and changes, thus hard-coding specific social values into the DNA of the future.

• • • Policy and regulation do not adequately address the synthetic biology issue in a cohesive way. In some countries, genetic screening for certain types of diseases is employed, but it is generally unfavorable to screen for attributes that correlate to higher intelligence.  However, in some countries it is not illegal, and there are commercial entities offering to screen for cognitive ability.

• • • There are many implications borne out of a democratization of synthetic biology technology that will affect the U.S. Army in the future. Researchers are developing a device similar in size to a mobile phone that, in a battlefield environment, could screen for and sequence a novel pathogen. This will allow Soldiers to identify which genetic material and re-agents to use as an antidote or mix for a vaccine in the field. This could potentially increase battlefield readiness.

• • • The brain-machine computer known as “dishbrain”– containing human cells — was able to learn the video game “pong” more quickly than any artificial intelligence ever.  In the future, this type of technology could be used for hyper-real time, high-frequency strategy creation by the Army or, conversely, an adversary.

• • • The ethical considerations for “dishbrain” must also be taken into account.  Would it be considered a war-crime to torture an organic entity that’s not, by definition, a human?  Will our adversaries come to the same conclusion as the U.S., or will we be disadvantaged by an asymmetry in ethics?

• • • Generative Artificial Intelligence is the next big societal disruptor. New open-source tools are scraping publicly available information for content, data, and potential decisions for investors. It could also be used to amplify misinformation and allow a foreign actor to sow distrust in a way that is harder to detect and more effective overall.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence — featuring Force Multiplier innovators from this year’s on-going Fed Supernova conference in Austin, Texas — coming to you on 13 October 2022!

 

If you enjoyed this podcast, check out the following related content:

Cyborg Soldier 2050: Human/Machine Fusion and the Implications for the Future of the DOD, and the comprehensive report from which it was sourced

The Last Frontier, by PFC Peter Brenner

Linking Brains to Machines, and Use of Neurotechnology to the Cultural and Ethical Perspectives of the Current Global Stage, by Mr. Joseph DeFranco and Dr. James Giordano.

China’s Brain Trust: Will the U.S. Have the Nerve to Compete? by Mr. Joseph DeFranco, CAPT (USN – Ret.) L. R. Bremseth, and Dr. James Giordano

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Connected Warfare by COL James K. Greer (USA-Ret.)

Benefits, Vulnerabilities, and the Ethics of Soldier Enhancement

Proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano‘s presentation and video on Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense, from the Mad Scientist Visioning Multi Domain Battle in 2030-2050 Conference, at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, on 25 & 26 July 2017; and his Neuroscience and the Weapons of War podcast, hosted by our colleagues at Modern War Institute (MWI), 2 August 2017

Top Ten Bio Convergence Trends Impacting the Future Operational Environment, Bio Convergence and Soldier 2050 Conference Final Report, and the comprehensive Final Report from the Mad Scientist Bio Convergence and Soldier 2050 Conference with SRI International at their Menlo Park campus in California on 8–9 March 2018

Ethics and the Future of War panel discussion, facilitated by proclaimed Mad Scientist LTG Jim Dubik (USA-Ret.) from the Mad Scientist Visualizing Multi Domain Battle in 2030-2050 Conference at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. on 25-26 July 2017

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far… and Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events

The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling

SAVE THE DATE:  Join Army Mad Scientist and the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) for the Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast conference on 08-09 November 2022, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This event will feature world-renowned expert speakers and panelists from industry, tech, academia, and the U.S. military and other government agencies discussing how history and experience inform and shape our future thinking and decision-making on critical issues. These historians, futurists, and thought leaders will converge backcasting with futurecasting to provide penetrating insights on Army people, materiel, readiness, and doctrine and concepts initiatives. Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for more information on our first in-person conference since 2019!

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Mad Scientist Laboratory welcomes back returning blogger Kate Kilgore with today’s post addressing a key, but heretofore neglected (at least within these pages!) instrument of our pacing threat’s power and influence.  This post complements our previous content addressing China’s capabilities spanning the Operational Environment (find links to these resources at the bottom of this post).  China’s emergence as the United States’ foremost competitor and adversary has been underpinned by its economic ascendency.  Read on to learn how demographic stressors, pressure from COVID-19 lockdowns, and China’s shift from a manufacturing to service economy may ultimately slow its economic growth, impacting the People’s Liberation Army’s efforts to recruit, modernize, and produce equipment!]

China’s Economic Rise Likely to Continue Through 2040, but Demographic Stress and Political Realities Could Slow Growth

China is predicted to complete its transition to a high-income country with an average Gross National Income of over $13,205 by 2023 – a feat accomplished by only Taiwan and South Korea since World War II – and its Gross Domestic Product will likely overtake the U.S. economy by 2030.¹ Factors like restrictive COVID-19 lockdowns, an aging population, and the transition from a manufacturing to service economy are forecasted to slow China’s annual GDP growth to around 2 percent by 2040.²  China’s centralized command economy enables the Chinese Communist Party to implement broad economic policies – like the “Made in China 2025” plan which hopes to achieve a dominant position in global high-tech markets by 2049 and keep the most valuable manufacturing domestic,³  and the 2021 Common Prosperity Program which aims to “regulate excessively high incomes” and “encourage high-income groups and enterprises to return more to society”⁴ – to try and offset this slowdown.

• • • In 2015, China’s service sector began to contribute over half of its total GDP. This transition to a service economy means it will operate primarily on a domestic cycle of supply and demand instead of manufacturing and export.⁵  While the service industry will most likely grow,⁶  the “Made in China 2025” plan – which will shift manufacturing inland, subsidize domestic production, and favor indigenous innovation⁷ – prioritizes high-value manufacturing to maintain GDP growth rates. To increase demand and consumption of Chinese products – and strengthen its manufacturing base⁸ – the Common Prosperity Project mandates fiscal transfers from the super wealthy to middle and lower income workers.⁹ However, this policy is unlikely to bolster Chinese workers’ relatively small share of its GDP, and will most likely only reduce wealth accumulation and influence among the ultra-rich.¹⁰

• • • Recent lockdowns due to China’s restrictive “zero-COVID” policy have, in the short term, reduced domestic consumption and manufacturing.¹¹ While production exceeded expectations after the 2020 lockdowns were lifted, the real estate sector – where most private wealth is invested in China – is facing plummeting property values which are sparking social unrest and reducing consumer spending.¹²  While China’s economy will likely face lasting effects¹³ – with its predicted 2022 GDP growth shrinking to 3.3 percent – China’s growth over the next two decades will likely still be relatively high and could still rebound close to pre-COVID estimates.

China’s working age population (16-59 year olds) dropped from 70 percent of the total population in 2010 to 63 percent in 2020,¹⁴ and is predicted to fall by more than 130 million between now and 2040.¹⁵ China’s fertility rate will likely remain near the 2021 rate of 1.15 children per woman¹⁶ – well below the 2.1 children per woman needed to replace annual deaths.¹⁷ Restrictive immigration policies and millions of highly educated emigrants pose more challenges to China’s working-age numbers.¹⁸ By 2040, China’s over-65 demographic is expected to nearly double, while its working-age population will likely shrink to 860 million – and drop close to 1 percent each year after.¹⁹

• • • China replaced its previous one-child policy with a three-child policy in 2016, hoping to reverse its population decline. However, birth rates have not risen and are not expected to rebound.²⁰ In the unlikely event that China’s fertility rates increase, female labor participation would likely decrease between now and 2040, and any increase in working-age population would not be seen until after 2040.²¹

• • • Assuming China’s population reaches the predicted 1.4 billion in 2040,²²  its dependency ratio – the sum of those under age 15 and the elderly over age 65, relative to the working-age population – will be around 61.3 percent.²³ The cost of supporting social spending for an aging population would fall on less than two-thirds of China’s total population at most – potentially reducing future consumer spending and investments.²⁴

While it already has the world’s second largest middle class of workers earning close to or above the country’s median income by number, over 70% of the Chinese population²⁵ – one quarter of the world’s projected total population – will likely be middle class by 2030. About 480 million Chinese consumers – more than the total population of the United States – are expected to reach upper-middle and high-income status by 2030.²⁶ While the Common Prosperity policy may slow the growth of China’s highest earners, it does not attempt to shrink the middle class, meaning Chinese consumers will more than likely exercise significant influence over global commerce and market trends.

• • • As per-capita buying power increases, China’s labor costs are rising – and have already driven many Chinese manufacturers to countries with cheaper labor.²⁷   China is pursuing ways to replace human workers with Artificial Intelligence in sectors like technology, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals by 2025, which could present a solution for rising wages and an aging population – and help China keep many of its most valuable manufacturing firms domestic. ²⁸

• • • During the 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns, China ranked first in in the world for middle-class expenditures and accounted for nearly 40 percent of global e-commerce transactions. ²⁹  Middle-class consumers in China are more frequently moving to more affordable second and third tier cities, and while the Chinese real estate sector is facing increasing pressure from plummeting values and mortgage boycotts,³⁰  Chinese consumers are still likely to exert significant and growing influence on global consumption trends through 2040. ³¹

Implications:  Between now and 2040, demographic stressors, pressure from COVID-19 lockdowns, and the shift from a manufacturing to a service economy signal that China is more than likely to face reduced annual GDP growth numbers and slowed economic growth. These stressors will likely affect the People’s Liberation Army – especially in its efforts to recruit, modernize, and produce equipment. However, efforts to increase foreign influence through investment and acquisitions while maintaining a heavy focus on increasing domestic productivity in high-value sectors mean that China will most likely remain a major regional and global economic influencer through 2040.

• • • Because China’s 2022 defense spending was announced at 7.1 percent of its GDP – far exceeding any expected growth figures – slower economic growth may not signal a significantly reduction to the PLA’s budget in the future.³²  China more than likely recognizes that the trade-off for a more sustainable model based on a service economy means lower overall productivity numbers.

• • • Though its increasing elderly population presents clear challenges to China’s working-age demographic, successful integration of AI into the manufacturing sector in the future may soften the impact of increased social spending. Faced with these same demographic stressors, the PLA will likely continue efforts to leverage AI to reduce manning requirements and transition from informationized warfare to intelligentized warfare.³³

• • • China will still likely lead the global digital economy by 2030, its middle class will remain influential consumers, and its efforts to retain domestic high-value manufacturing could slow the overall reduction in its forecasted GDP. Not only would this benefit the PLA’s modernization and equipping efforts, but China may leverage domestically manufactured arms³⁴ and technology infrastructure³⁵ exports to further project power and influence both regionally and globally.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related TRADOC G-2 and Mad Scientist content addressing our pacing threat:

China Landing Zone content on the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page — including the BiteSize China weekly topics, ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and more!

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

China Issues New Plan to Address Aging Population

The Inexorable Role of Demographics, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth

How China Fights and associated podcast

China: Building Regional Hegemony and China 2049: The Flight of a Particle Board Dragon, the comprehensive report from which this post was excerpted

The Most Consequential Adversaries and associated podcast, with General Charles A. Flynn

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

“Intelligentization” and a Chinese Vision of Future War

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training

A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations

China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare

The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

REMINDER:  Join Army Mad Scientist and the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) for the Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast conference on 08-09 November 2022, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This event will feature world-renowned expert speakers and panelists from industry, tech, academia, and the U.S. military and other government agencies discussing how history and experience inform and shape our future thinking and decision-making on critical issues. These historians, futurists, and thought leaders will converge backcasting with futurecasting to provide penetrating insights on Army people, materiel, readiness, and doctrine and concepts initiatives. Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for more information on our first in-person conference since 2019!

About the Author:   Kate Kilgore is a TRADOC G-2 Intern and recent graduate of Indiana University, where she studied Law and Public Policy, Comparative International Politics, Soviet History, and Russian and Eastern European Studies. Kate has been greatly influenced by her father’s Army career, and she grew up all over the United States and in Germany, which influenced her passion for Eastern European history. Much of her undergraduate research focused on analyzing the path dependence and modern social implications of Soviet laws and in the former Eastern Bloc, with a focus on Hungary. When she’s not reading about culture and politics of the former Warsaw Pact States, she enjoys baking and antiquing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

---

¹ Ilbo – China’s  Economy Could Overtake Overtake U.S. Economy by 2030. The Centre for Economics and Business Research: https://cebr.com/reports/chosun-ilbo-chinas-economy-could-overtake-u-s-economy-by-2030/

² Revising down the rise of China. Roland Rajah, Alyssa Leng.  The Lowy Institute:  https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/revising-down-rise-china

³ Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade? James McBride. Council on Foreign Relations:  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade#chapter-title-0-1

⁴ Chinese President Vows to “Adjust Excessive Incomes” of Super Rich. Phillip Inman. The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/18/chinese-president-xi-jinping-vows-to-adjust-excessive-incomes-of-super-rich

⁵ Dual Circulation and China’s New Hedged Integration Strategy. Jude Blanchette and Andrew Polk. Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/dual-circulation-and-chinas-new-hedged-integration-strategy

⁶ China’s GDP Examined: A Service-Sector Surge. Prableen Bajpai. Investopedia: https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/103114/chinas-gdp-examined-servicesector-surge.asp

⁷ New China Guidelines Promote Transfer of Manufacturing to Inland Regions. Alexander Chipman Koty. China Briefing:  https://www.china-briefing.com/news/new-china-guidelines-promote-transfer-of-manufacturing-to-inland-regions/

⁸ Will China’s Common Prosperity Upgrade Dual Circulation? Michael Pettis. The Carnegie Endowment: https://www.carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/85571

⁹ The Only Five Paths China’s Economy Can Follow. Michael Pettis. The Carnegie Endowment: https://www.carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarket/87007

¹⁰ China’s Common Prosperity Program: Causes, Challenges, and Implications. Asia Society Policy Institute:  https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-common-prosperity-program-causes-challenges-and-implications

¹¹ As China Buckles Under “Zero Covid,” Xi Bets Big on Bloat. Ben Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca.  Council on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-buckles-under-zero-covid-xi-bets-big-bloat

¹² Avoiding the Pain of China’s Housing Crisis Risks Infecting Wider Economy. William R. Rhodes and Stuart P.M. Mackintosh. South China Morning Post: https://amp.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3189015/avoiding-pain-chinas-housing-crisis-risks-infecting-wider-economy

¹³ China Is Still the World’s Factory – And It’s Designing the Future with AI. Kai-Fu Lee. Time:  https://time.com/6084158/china-ai-factory-future/

¹⁴ China’s Population on Track to Peak Before 2025 as Births Drop. James Mayger, Lin Zhu, Tom Hancock, Yuko Takeo, Sam Kim, Yinan Zhao, Yujing Liu, and Jing Li. Bloomberg News: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-11/china-s-population-continues-to-grow-even-as-births-plummet#xj4y7vzkg

¹⁵ China’s Demographics and Growth Potential in an Age of Machine Knowledge Capital. Dan Ciuriak. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/chinas-demographics-and-growth-potential-age-machine

¹⁶ China Population to Shrink for 1^st Time in 60 Years. Xiujian Peng. Business Standard:  https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-population-to-shrink-for-1st-time-in-60-yrs-what-it-means-for-world-122053000429_1.html

¹⁷ Why did Beijing Opt for a Three-Child Policy When it Could Scrap Birth Caps Altogether? Cissy Zhou. China Macro Economy: https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3136061/china-population-why-did-beijing-opt-three-child-policy-when?module=inline&pgtype=article

¹⁸ The U.S. Is Still Beating China in Human Capital – For Now. Ryan Hass. Foreign Policy:  https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/china-human-capital-stem-graduates-competition/

¹⁹ China Isn’t That Strategic. Michael Schuman. The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/07/china-communists-demographics/619312/

²⁰ China’s Population Crisis: The Country Might Grow Old Before it Grows Rich. Mengni Chen and Paul Yip. China Macro Economy: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3124139/chinas-population-crisis-country-might-grow-old-it-grows-rich

²¹ China’s Demographics and Growth Potential in an Age of Machine Knowledge Capital. Dan Ciuriak. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/chinas-demographics-and-growth-potential-age-machine

²² The China Challenge: A Demographic Predicament Will Plague the Mainland for Decades. Nicholas Eberstadt. Discourse: https://www.discoursemagazine.com/culture-and-society/2021/06/09/the-china-challenge-a-demographic-predicament-will-plague-the-mainland-for-decades/

²³ China’s Demographics and Growth Potential in an Age of Machine Knowledge Capital. Dan Ciuriak. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/chinas-demographics-and-growth-potential-age-machine

²⁴ Can China’s Communist Party Defuse its Demographic Time Bomb? Dexter Tiff Roberts. The Atlantic Council:  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-chinas-communist-party-defuse-its-demographic-time-bomb/

²⁵ Developments and Forecasts of Growing Consumerism. European Commission:  https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/topic/growing-consumerism/more-developments-relevant-growing-consumerism_en

²⁶ Age of Asia: Rise of a Multipolar World. Jeffrey Ding. Economist Impact Report: https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN2DAEB7E205672516cf0551c76cccb0cdf42618b2b6e4e7f9b5073767919a6a63dce77ead2201

²⁷ Subcontract Manufacturing in China: The Rusks and Alternative Options. Doug Donahue. Forbes Business Council: https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/06/18/subcontract-manufacturing-in-china-the-risks-and-alternative-options/?sh=1bf9cab27de7

²⁸ China Is Still the World’s Factory – And It’s Designing the Future with AI. Kai-Fu Lee. Time:  https://time.com/6084158/china-ai-factory-future/

²⁹ The Pandemic Stalls Growth in the Global Middle Class, Pushes Poverty Up Sharply. Rakesh Kochhar. Pew Research Center: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/18/the-pandemic-stalls-growth-in-the-global-middle-class-pushes-poverty-up-sharply/

³⁰ Avoiding the Pain of China’s Housing Crisis Risks Infecting Wider Economy. William R. Rhodes and Stuart P.M. Mackintosh. South China Morning Post: https://amp.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3189015/avoiding-pain-chinas-housing-crisis-risks-infecting-wider-economy

³¹ China’s Influence on the Global Middle Class. Homi Kharas and Megan Dooley. Brookings Institute:  https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-influence-on-the-global-middle-class/

³² China Plans 7.1% Defence Spending Rise This Year, Outpacing GDP Target. Yew Lun Tian. Reuters:  https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-defence-spending-rise-outpace-gdp-target-this-year-2022-03-05/

³³ China’s Demography and its Implications. Financial Express:  https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/chinas-demography-and-its-implications/2243549/

³⁴ China Emerges as an Arms Supplier of Choice for Many Middle East Countries. Paul Iddon. Middle East Eye:  https://middleeasteye.net/news/china-emerges-major-exporter-weapons-middle-east-north-africa

³⁵ China’s Digital Silk Road and Africa’s Technological Future. Motolani Agbebi. Council on Foreign Relations:  https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-digital-silk-road-and-africas-technological-future

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring Karen Kaya — Senior Turkey/Middle East Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), within the TRADOC G-2 — discussing the Bayraktar TB-2 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), its employment in recent conflicts including Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia-Ukraine, as well as the implications of Turkey becoming a global drone manufacturer and distributor — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Karen Kaya specializes in Middle Eastern affairs with a particular focus on Turkey for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) within the TRADOC G-2.  She has worked on numerous projects in national security as a defense and security policy analyst.  Ms. Kaya has a BA from Boğaziçi University (in Istanbul, Turkey), and an MA from Brandeis University.

In today’s podcast, we talk with Ms. Kaya about the Bayraktar TB-2 UAV, its employment in recent conflicts including Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia-Ukraine, as well as the implications of Turkey becoming a global drone manufacturer and distributor.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • The Bayraktar TB-2 is a Turkish medium altitude, long endurance UAV capable of remotely controlled or autonomous flight operations. Because of its inexpensive price point and ease of use, it has been dubbed the “Kalashnikov of the 21st century.”

• • • 

      The TB-2 is unique amongst combat drones in that it has a low radar cross-section and flight speed, thus making it difficult for air defense radar to detect. This allows the TB-2 to engage and destroy systems designed to provide short to medium  range air defense. It can deliver laser guided munitions that can adjust their trajectories in mid-flight to target.

• • • Turkey has been training the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on how to effectively employ the TB-2 in combat. The Azeris used them systematically in the 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenia’s Soviet and Russian-made air defense systems to breach the line of contact and take territory before the cease-fire agreement was signed.

• • • Their use and employment in Ukraine is different from that of Nagorno-Karabakh, as Ukraine is on the defensive and has not trained with Turkey previously. However, it is important to note that this is the first time that the TB-2 has been used against Russian systems manned by Russian soldiers.

• • • In the last few years, Turkey has emerged as a drone superpower. It is one of the four leading countries in the world to produce, use, and export armed drones. The quality and relative low cost of the TB-2 has allowed Turkey to sell significant quantities to medium-sized countries without large defense budgets in Europe, Asia, and Africa. This, in turn, expands Turkey’s geopolitical influence.

• • • The other powers are watching. China is taking note and seeing the importance of the relationship between drones and artillery while Russia is uneasy because the TB-2 has now been employed successfully against its own forces, its allies, and its equipment.

• • • The U.S. is witnessing these technologies’ costs falling, lowering the ‘entrance fee’ to combined arms operations and granting even non-state actors the ability to procure air domain capabilities.  As medium powers with limited defense budgets acquire these specific capabilities, they can significantly enhance their overall military capability at a relatively low cost. This could precipitate geopolitical competitions and inter-state rivalries transitioning into open conflict, complicating the operational environment.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence, featuring Amy Webb, futurist, author, and founder and CEO of the Future Today Institute. We’ll talk with Amy about strategic foresight, emerging technologies like synthetic biology, and what she sees as vital implications for the U.S. Army.

If you enjoyed Karen Kaya‘s podcast, check out her related monograph —  Turkey as a Drone Superpower:  A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment

… as well as the following related Mad Scientist content:

The Dawn of the Loitering Munitions Era, by proclaimed Mad Scientist SGM Daniel S. Nasereddine

Through Soldiers’ Eyes: The Future of Ground Combat and its associated podcast

Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with COL John Antal (USA-Ret.) and its associated podcast

Insights from the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 2020 (Part I and II)

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

“Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel, by Ian Sullivan.

The Future of Ground Warfare with COL Scott Shaw and its associated podcast

Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events, as well as all of the associated webinar content (presenter biographies, slide decks, and notes) and associated videos

Character of Warfare 2035

Ground Warfare in 2050: How It Might Look, The Intelligent Battlefield of the Future, and its associated podcast with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Alexander Kott

SAVE THE DATE:  Join Army Mad Scientist and the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) for the Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast conference on 08-09 November 2022, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This event will feature world-renowned expert speakers and panelists from industry, tech, academia, and the U.S. military and other government agencies discussing how history and experience inform and shape our future thinking and decision-making on critical issues. These historians, futurists, and thought leaders will converge backcasting with futurecasting to provide penetrating insights on Army people, materiel, readiness, and doctrine and concepts initiatives. Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for more information on our first in-person conference since 2019!

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

 

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring Zach Schonbrun, author of The Performance Cortex:  How Neuroscience is Redefining Athletic Genius, discussing his book, how the brain — not the body — may be responsible for athletic prowess, and the implications for future Soldiers — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Zach Schonbrun is a senior editor covering business and technology at The Week. His work has also appeared in The New York Times, Bloomberg Businessweek, Fast Company, ESPN the Magazine, SB Nation Longform, Vice, The Athletic, and Yahoo! Sports, among other publications.  Zach is the author of The Performance Cortex, which explores the neuroscience of motor skills, and was published by Dutton/Penguin Books in April 2018.  Before joining The Week, Zach covered five Final Fours, the Super Bowl, the World Series, the NBA postseason, US Open tennis and championship golf — among numerous other events — for the Times, as well as other business and sports features. Six of his articles have appeared on the front page of The New York Times. Zach received a B.A. in Economics from Syracuse in 2009 and an M.S. in Journalism from Columbia in 2011.

In today’s podcast, we talk with Zach about his book, how the brain — not the body — may be responsible for athletic prowess, and the implications for future Soldiers.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Soldiers share many characteristics with performance athletes, and researchers have identified ways to chart and measure brain activations when performing athletic tasks. These brain activations provide insights into who can accomplish these tasks quicker and more accurately, helping to identify standout athletes, and possibly standout Soldiers, before they ever “take the field.”

• • • Movement is a very complicated system and it’s all controlled by the brain. Artificial Intelligence researchers have created computers that can beat humans in chess and Jeopardy, but roboticists still struggle with replicating motions and movements. Those who are adept at skilled movement, like star athletes, should be considered geniuses. They are using their brains in ways that challenge their decision-making, processing, understanding, and memory. 

• • • Emerging and current technology utilizing electroencephalogram (EEG) headsets for measuring brain activations is only the starting point. More sophisticated monitoring equipment and realistic simulation software will allow more in-depth tests to be conducted and more accurate readings to be collected.

• • • Neuroplasticity — the brain’s ability to reorganize itself by forming new neural connections throughout life — is much more active at a younger age, as the brain is much more pliable. Practice and training in these younger years is vital to adequately learning required tasks and completing them successfully. New recruits should get much of their complex training early in their careers. 

• • • Accurately re-creating real world conditions — all real world conditions — in a training environment is absolutely essential to learning the desired task. Batting practice in baseball has little value to the player as the pitches are slower and have less movement than the pitches they will face in a live game — in essence, players are not practicing the skill they will need. Are our Soldiers practicing in conditions that they won’t see in the real world? 

• • • We often prescribe very strict motor patterns when coaching or teaching. The better approach is understanding the constraints of the task and working within those constraints. Over- prescribing is a recipe for disaster.  

• • • Future technology may include more immersive virtual reality settings with increased sensory feedback. Fidelity to the task is paramount, and tactile feedback in a virtual environment where athletes can feel the ball in their hands — or Soldiers feel the recoil of their weapons — may enhance the learning output and resulting data to be analyzed. 

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence, featuring Karen Kaya, Senior Turkey/Middle East Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), within the TRADOC G-2. Karen will be discussing the Bayraktar TB-2 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, its employment in recent conflicts including Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia-Ukraine, as well as the implications of Turkey becoming a global drone manufacturer and distributor.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

The Future of Learning: Personalized, Continuous, and Accelerated, as well as proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Tristan McClure-Begley‘s presentation and video on Targeted Neuroplasticity Training. from the Mad Scientist Learning in 2050 Conference, at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, on 8-9 August 2018

Proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano‘s presentation and video on Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense, from the Mad Scientist Visioning Multi Domain Battle in 2030-2050 Conference, at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, on 25 & 26 July 2017; and his Neuroscience and the Weapons of War podcast, hosted by our colleagues at Modern War Institute (MWI), 2 August 2017

Top Ten Bio Convergence Trends Impacting the Future Operational Environment, Bio Convergence and Soldier 2050 Conference Final Report, and the comprehensive Final Report from the Mad Scientist Bio Convergence and Soldier 2050 Conference with SRI International at their Menlo Park campus in California on 8–9 March 2018

A New American Way of Training and associated podcast, with Jennifer McArdle

The Metaverse: Blurring Reality and Digital Lives and associated podcast, with Cathy Hackl

Fight Club Prepares Lt Col Maddie Novák for Cross-Dimension Manoeuvre, by COL Arnel David, U.S. Army, and Major Aaron Moore, British Army, along with their interview in The Convergence: UK Fight Club – Gaming the Future Army and associated podcast

The Last Frontier, by PFC Peter Brenner

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist welcomes back returning guest blogger Ian Sullivan with today’s guest post, addressing the recent resurgence in the use of chemical weapons in the Operational Environment.  A number of adversaries have employed chemical agents during the past decade, including the use of traditional choking, blistering, blood, and nerve agents as area weapons, as well as toxic industrial chemicals.  New agents have been developed and used as targeted assassination weapons.  The possible release of industrial agents, either through accidental collateral damage due to kinetic operations or the direct targeting of plant storage sites is an additional consideration.  The possibility of a chemically-contaminated battlespace only gets worse with the power of Artificial Intelligence potentially yielding tens of thousands of novel lethal agents, some of which may fall outside the scope of the current Chemical Warfare Convention.  Add to this the weaponization of aerosolized fentanyl, ungoverned by any convention, and The Great War’s scourge is resurgent — Read on!]

Chemical Warfare (CW) has had something of a resurgence over the past decade, and as we contemplate an Operational Environment (OE) that will include a range of potential adversaries, and everything from large-scale combat operations through a persistent threat from terrorist and extremist organizations, we must conclude that the Army will face a battlespace in which it will encounter chemical weapons.

Paradoxically, the use of chemical agents has increased dramatically over the past decade, even though the International Community agreed to ban these weapons under the terms of the 1997 Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC).  There are 193 nations which have ratified this treaty, and of our key threat actors, only North Korea has neither signed nor ratified the agreement.

Nevertheless, there has been a massive spike in the use of these weapons, particularly since 2013, when there was relative widespread use of both chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) as weapons during the Syrian Civil War.  For example:

• • • Syrian government forces have used the nerve agent sarin and crude chlorine bombs dozens of times since 2013 during its brutal civil war.

• • • Islamic State extremists used TICs and mustard gas in northern Iraq in 2015 and 2016.

• • • North Korean agents used the nerve agent VX to assassinate Kim Jong Il’s half-brother at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in 2017.

• • • Russian agents likely used advanced new nerve agents as assassination weapons. They unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate former Russian intelligence operative Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018 with a Novichok agent, and likely attempted to assassinate opposition leader Alexei Navalny with a similar weapon in 2020.

Prior to this dramatic increase in chemical weapon usage, there had been no recorded use of chemical agents since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

So, what does this all mean for the OE?  It is clear that in spite of international efforts to control these weapons, nations and non-state actors are still using chemical weapons, and there is a very real threat that they will be used as battlefield weapons.  The threats we will face will include a variety of weapons, including traditional chemical warfare agents like nerve agents (sarin or VX), blister agents (mustard, lewisite), blood agents (hydrogen cyanide or cyanogen chloride), or choking agents (chlorine, phosgene), to TICs which are released purposefully as weapons (as we have seen in Syria and Iraq) or as a secondary result of a military operation (where a chemical facility is destroyed and an accidental release occurs).

We may also encounter new types of threats.  We already have mentioned the new types of nerve agents that Russia has developed and used.  We also must be prepared for new and novel uses of CW agents.  For example, a team of European AI/machine learning experts who work in the drug industry recently ran an artificial intelligence (AI) application to see how easy it would be for “bad actors” to use this revolutionary technology to create novel CW agents.  A six-hour run of the AI application resulted in 40,000 potentially lethal new substances, many of which were somehow related to VX.  Because they are novel, it is unclear whether all, any, or some of these would be covered under the CWC.

A further new CW “growth area” can be found in the use of pharmaceutical agents as CW weapons.  Fentanyl, for example, has been researched as a potential incapacitating agent by a number of nations, and it has been used operationally by Russia in the infamous counter-terrorist action at Moscow’s Dubrovaka Theater in 2002.  During that incident, 40 Chechen terrorists held 800 hostages in the theater, and after several days of negotiations failed, Russian security forces pumped aerosolized fentanyl into the theater to incapacitate the occupants.  It backfired, and instead left all of the terrorists and 130 of the hostages dead from lethal doses.  This operation demonstrates the potential of fentanyl as a military weapon.  These types of agents are not covered under the terms of the CWC.

In terms of threat actors, Russia, China, and Iran all claim to ascribe to the terms of the CWC, and have officially declared that any stockpile of CW agents they once possessed are now destroyed.  It is, however, likely that each of these restates retains some level of covert stockpile of CW agents:

• • • Russia once had the world’s largest stockpile of CW agents, with 40,000 metric tons of agents like VX, sarin, soman, mustard, lewisite, and phosgene. CWC observers confirmed that the Russian stockpile was completely destroyed by 2017.  However, their recent use of advanced nerve agents and their continued focus on CW operations within their Army’s NBC Defense troops indicate that Russia likely maintains a credible CW capability, and likely can deliver CW weapons in multiple ways.

• • • China declared that its offensive CW stockpile was dismantled by 2016, and this has been verified by over 400 CWC inspections. However, as of 2003, the United States alleged that China retained an advanced chemical weapons research and development effort.  As noted above, China’s fentanyl effort is not covered under the CWC.

• • • Iran has always publicly denounced the use of CW agents, particularly as it was heavily targeted by these weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. However, Iran is believed to have created a stockpile that included blister, blood, and choking agents, and potentially even nerve agents.  As late as 2021, the U.S. accused Iran of being non-compliant with the CWC and indicated that Iran likely is pursuing pharmaceutical agents for military use.

Of all of our potential adversaries, North Korea remains the only one to have never signed the CWC.  It is assessed to possess a robust chemical stockpile of somewhere between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of CW agent, and it may be capable of producing up to 12,000 metric tons of CW agent.  Much of its stockpile likely includes the nerve agents sarin and VX, but it also likely incorporates blister, blood, and choking agents.  North Korea has a variety of delivery mechanisms for its CW agents, including ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and by special operations forces.  A full-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula almost certainly would see these weapons used.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows us that large-scale combat operations are not a thing of the past, and likely will be a defining feature of the OE in which the Army will have to operate.  This shows us the importance of being prepared for a chemical battlefield.  Chemical weapons have been used with more frequency in the last decade, and almost certainly will continue to be used by state and non-state actors alike. Our Army must remain vigilant and prepared to fight and win in a chemically-contaminated battlespace.

If you enjoyed this post, explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with information on the Operational Environment and our how our adversaries fight…

…. and check out the following Army Mad Scientist content:

A New Age of Terror: New Mass Casualty Terrorism Threats and A New Age of Terror: The Future of CBRN Terrorism by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zak Kallenborn

Dead Deer, and Mad Cows, and Humans (?) … Oh My! by proclaimed Mad Scientists LtCol Jennifer Snow and Dr. James Giordano, and Joseph DeFranco

Heeding Breaches in Biosecurity: Navigating the New Normality of the Post-COVID Future, by John Wallbank and Dr. James Giordano 

Ian Sullivan is the Assistant G-2, ISR and Futures, at Headquarters, TRADOC.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).