172. Splinternets

[Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist Laboratory welcomes returning guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Howard R. Simkin with his submission to our Mad Scientist Crowdsourcing topic from earlier this summer on The Operational Environment: What Will Change and What Will Drive It – Today to 2035?  Mr. Simkin’s post addresses the military challenges posed by Splinternets.  Competition during Multi-Domain Operations is predicated on our Forces’ capability to conduct cyber and influence operations against and inside our strategic competitors’ networks.  In a world of splinternets, our flexibility to conduct and respond to non-kinetic engagements is challenged by this new reality in the operational environment. (Note:  Some of the embedded links in this post are best accessed using non-DoD networks.)]

Purpose.
This paper discusses the splintering of the Internet that is currently underway – the creation of what are commonly being called splinternets. Most versions of the future operational environment assume an Internet that is largely accessible to all. Recent trends point to a splintering effect as various nation states or multi-state entities seek to regulate access to or isolate their portion of the Internet.1, 2  This paper will briefly discuss the impacts of those tendencies and propose an operational response.

The Problem.
What are the impacts of a future operational environment in which the Internet has fractured into a number of mutually exclusive subsets, referred to as splinternets?

Background.
Splinternets threaten both access to data and the exponential growth of the Internet as a global commons. There are two main drivers fracturing the Internet. One is regulation and the other is isolationism. Rooted in politics, the Internet is being fractured by regulation and isolationism. Counterbalancing this fracturing is the Distributed Web (DWeb).

Regulation.
Regulation usually involves revenue or internal security. While admirable in intent, regulations cast a chill over the growth and health of the Internet.3  Even well-intentioned regulations become a burden which forces smaller operators to go out of business or to ignore the regulations. Depending on the country involved, activity which was perfectly legal can become illegal by bureaucratic fiat. This acts as a further impetus to drive users to alternative platforms. An example is the European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect on 25 May 2018. It includes a number of provisions which make it far more difficult to collect data. The GDPR covers not only entities based in the EU but also those who have users in the EU.4  U.S. companies such as Facebook have scrambled to comply so as to maintain access to the EU virtual space.5

Isolation.
China is the leader in efforts to isolate their portion of the internet from outside influence.6  To accomplish this, they have received help from their own tech giants as well as U.S. companies such as Google.7  The Chinese have made it very difficult for outside entities to penetrate the “Great Firewall” while maintaining the ability of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct malign activities across the Internet.8  Recently, Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google opined that China would succeed in splitting the Internet in the not too distant future.9

Russia has also proposed a similar strategy, which they would extend to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The reason given is the “dominance of the US and a few EU states concerning Internet regulation” which Russia sees as a “serious danger” to its safety, RosBiznesKonsalting (RBK)10  quotes from minutes taken at a meeting of the Russian Security Council. Having its own root servers would make Russia independent of monitors like the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and protect the country in the event of “outages or deliberate interference.” “Putin sees [the] Internet as [a] CIA tool.”11

Distributed Web (DWeb).
The DWeb is “a peer-to-peer Internet that is free from firewalls, government regulation, and spying.” Admittedly, the DWeb is a difficult problem. However, both the University of Michigan and a private firm, Maidsafe claim to be close to a solution.12  Brewster Kahle, founder of the Internet Archive and organizer of the first Decentralized Web Summit two years ago, recently advocated a “DWeb Camp.” Should a DWeb become a reality, many of the current efforts by governments to control or regulate the Internet would founder.

Operational Response.
Our operational response should involve Special Operations Forces (SOF), Space, and Cyber forces. The creation of splinternets places a premium on the ability to gain physical access to the splinternet’s internal networks. SOF is an ideal force to perform this operation because of their ability to work in politically sensitive and denied environments with or through indigenous populations. Once SOF gains physical access, Space would be the most logical means to send and receive data. Cyber forces would then perform operations within the splinternet.

Conclusion.
Most versions of the future operational environment assume an Internet that is largely accessible to all. Therefore, splinternets are an important ‘alternative future’ to consider. In conjunction with Space and Cyber forces, SOF can play a key role in the operational response to allow the Joint Force to continue to operate against splinternet capable adversaries.

If you enjoyed this post, please see:

– Mr. Simkin‘s previous Mad Scientist Laboratory posts:

Keeping the Edge, and

Sine Pari,

… as well as his winning Call for Ideas presentation The Future ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) 2035-2050, delivered at the Mad Scientist Bio Convergence and Soldier 2050 Conference, co-hosted with SRI International on 8–9 March 2018 at their Menlo Park campus in California.

– LtCol Jennifer “JJ” Snow‘s blog post Alternet: What Happens When the Internet is No Longer Trusted?

– Dr. Mica Hall‘s blog post The Cryptoruble as a Stepping Stone to Digital Sovereignty

Howard R. Simkin is a Senior Concept Developer in the DCS, G-9 Capability Development & Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He has over 40 years of combined military, law enforcement, defense contractor, and government experience. He is a retired Special Forces officer with a wide variety of special operations experience. He is also a proclaimed Mad Scientist.

References:
Baker, Dr. Jessica. “What Does GDPR Mean For You?” Digital Guardian. July 11, 2018. https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-does-gdpr-mean-for-you (accessed September 14, 2018).

Hoffer, Eric. Reflections on the Human Condition. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

L.S. “The Economist explains, “What is the splinternet”?” The Economist. November 22, 2016. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/11/22/what-is-the-splinternet (accessed September 14, 2018).

Nash, Charlie. “The Google Tapes: Employees Applauded Company for Taking Bold Stance Against China.” Breitbart. September 13, 2018. https://www.breitbart.com/tech/2018/09/13/the-google-tape-employees-applauded-company-for-taking-bold-stance-against-china/ (accessed September 14, 2018).

Sanger, David E. The Perfect Weapon, War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age. New York: Crown (Kindle Edition), 2018.

Sterling, Bruce. “The China Splinternet Model is Winning.” Wired. July 2, 2016. https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2016/07/china-splinternet-model-winning/ (accessed September 2018, 2018).

Tangermann, Victor. “With GDPR Decision, Zuckerberg Proves Yet Again He Has Learned Absolutely Nothing From the Cambridge Analytica Scandal.” Futurism. April 4, 2018. https://futurism.com/zuckerberg-gdpr-cambridge-analytica/ (accessed September 14, 2018).

Tanguay, Pierre, Sabrina Dubé-Morneau, and Gaëlle Engelberts. “Splinternets: How Online Balkanization is Creating a Headache for Digital Content Distribution.” CMF Trends. January 31, 2018. https://trends.cmf-fmc.ca/splinternets-how-online-balkanization-is-creating-a-headache-for-digital-content-distribution/ (accessed September 2018, 2018).

End Notes:

1 Tanguay, Pierre, Sabrina Dubé-Morneau, and Gaëlle Engelberts. “Splinternets: How Online Balkanization is Creating a Headache for Digital Content Distribution.” CMF Trends. January 31, 2018. https://trends.cmf-fmc.ca/splinternets-how-online-balkanization-is-creating-a-headache-for-digital-content-distribution/ (accessed September 2018, 2018).

2 L.S. “The Economist explains, “What is the splinternet”?” The Economist. November 22, 2016. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/11/22/what-is-the-splinternet (accessed September 14, 2018).

3 Duckett, Chris. “The race to ruin the internet is upon us”. ZDNet. 23 September 2018. https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-race-to-ruin-the-internet-is-upon-us/ (accessed November 13, 2018).

4 Baker, Dr. Jessica. “What Does GDPR Mean For You?” Digital Guardian. July 11, 2018. https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-does-gdpr-mean-for-you (accessed September 14, 2018).

5 Tangermann, Victor. “With GDPR Decision, Zuckerberg Proves Yet Again He Has Learned Absolutely Nothing From the Cambridge Analytica Scandal.” Futurism. April 4, 2018. https://futurism.com/zuckerberg-gdpr-cambridge-analytica/ (accessed September 14, 2018).

6 Sterling, Bruce. “The China Splinternet Model is Winning.” Wired. July 2, 2016. https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2016/07/china-splinternet-model-winning/ (accessed September 2018, 2018).

7 Nash, Charlie. “The Google Tapes: Employees Applauded Company for Taking Bold Stance Against China.” Breitbart. September 13, 2018. https://www.breitbart.com/tech/2018/09/13/the-google-tape-employees-applauded-company-for-taking-bold-stance-against-china/ (accessed September 14, 2018).

8 Chan, Edward. “Quick Take: The Great Firewall.” Bloomberg News. November 5, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/great-firewall-of-china (accessed November 13, 2018).

9 Kolodny, Lora. “Former Google CEO predicts the internet will split in two — and one part will be led by China.” CNBC. September 20, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/20/eric-schmidt-ex-google-ceo-predicts-internet-split-china.html (accessed November 13, 2018).

10 The RBK Group or RosBiznesKonsalting is a large Russian media group headquartered in Moscow.

11 “Russia Will Create Its Own Internet.” Cyber Security Intelligence Newsletter. January 26, 2018. https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/russia-will-create-its-own-internet-3082.html (accessed November 13, 2018).

12 Perry, Tekla. “The Decentralized Internet of HBO’s “Silicon Valley”? Real-World Teams Say They’ve Already Invented It.” IEEE Spectrum. June 9, 2017. https://spectrum.ieee.org/view-from-the-valley/telecom/internet/hbo-silicon-valleys-decentralized-internet-realworld-teams-say-they-already-invented-it (accessed November 13, 2018).

Disclaimer: This is a USASOC G9 Gray Paper that has already been cleared for unlimited release. Distribution is unlimited.  The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

171. Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back!

[Editor’s Note:  Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to publish today’s post by guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown, addressing how the advent of swarming networked weapon systems will facilitate the renaissance of the 19th Century strategist Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini‘s concept of mass, enabling future battle commanders to disperse their combat assets for maneuver and then concentrate them for massed attacks at critical and decisive points.  Enjoy! (Note:  Some of the embedded links in this post are best accessed using non-DoD networks.)]

Quantity has a quality all its own.”

– attributed to Joseph Stalin

 

 

There’s a great scene in the otherwise unremarkable (Sorry, but it’s just #NotMyStarTrek) film Star Trek Beyond where—spoiler alert!—the USS Enterprise is annihilated by a swarm of thousands of tiny alien ships. As the swarm approaches, Captain Kirk orders defensive measures, while his stoic science officer Spock warns, “Captain, we are not equipped for this manner of engagement.

Swarming concepts draw heavily from other fields such as biomechanics and complexity science to recreate the emergent cooperation that flocks of birds and insect swarms exhibit naturally / Source: Wikimedia Commons

Spock’s analysis is right, as usual. The Enterprise’s advanced phaser weapons and photon torpedoes prove useless against the swarm, and its energy shields—designed to deflect energy blasts, not kinetic projectiles—irrelevant. The swarm tears the Enterprise to pieces.

Science fiction, right?

Star Trek Beyond premiered in the summer of 2016, at the height of the U.S.-led campaign to destroy the terrorist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria. At the time, coalition forces were practically paralyzed by just the perception of a threat from ISIS’s fleet of do-it-yourself drones armed with grenades dropped like bombs or munitions rigged to explode on impact in kamikaze-style attacks. I say perception because while the number of casualties produced by these systems was relatively few, the angst they caused vulnerable coalition forces made them U.S. Central Command’s top priority.

Source:  USAF AFRL

Predicting the future is fraught with risk, and lethal drone swarms may be a stretch—for the moment. One kamikaze drone, as I said, might not do that much damage. But what about thirteen, thirty, or three hundred? Make no mistake: the weaponized drone swarm is coming. So is the missile swarm, the robot swarm, and the submarine swarm.

You don’t have to be Nostradamus to foresee the marriage of swarming technology with the many loitering, semi-autonomous weapons systems that already exist. Parallel advances in diverse fields like semiconductor miniaturization, computer vision, energy storage, and highly energetic materials might combine to make systems like these the most powerful tactical weapons ever deployed.

Source:  DARPA

In the near future, enormous collectives of small, cheap weapons will clash on a grand scale, like medieval armies charging into one another. The actor who exploits these new weapons’ ability to outmaneuver and overwhelm their opponent’s combat formations will gain a tremendous advantage on an increasingly fast-paced and fluid battlefield by being able to effect sudden attacks on narrow fronts that will smash traditional formations.

The legal and moral implications of such capabilities are one concern that has already drawn the attention of ethicists. Here, I’m more interested in how these weapons conform to what we think we understand about warfare. We’ve entered a period of discontinuous change, when the rate of technological development exceeds that of institutions’ ability to adapt. In such periods, competitors experiment widely with emerging technologies because we don’t yet know their best uses.

The great powers, including the United States, China, and Russia, have different strategic cultures informed by unique histories concomitant with varied approaches to research & development, acquisition, and doctrine-writing. Lesser powers are also experimenting with networked weapons, however, and are in some ways advantaged. Today’s open research architecture has rapidly leveled the playing field and gives almost anyone—including ISIS—access to data, algorithms, and commercial systems that can be quickly militarized. These factors will work together to form an unpredictable battlefield over the next quarter-century.

Portrait of Jomini in 1859,
by Marc-Charles-Gabriel Gleyre

For all its novelty, the logic of the drone swarm reminds me of a tenet, until recently out of style, proposed by the doyen of modern war himself—Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini. Jomini and his contemporaries—including rival Carl von Clausewitz—were infatuated with the scientism of the era and adorned their studies with the cutting-edge terms of the day—force, friction, gravity, and more. Jomini took it much farther, though, professing in his Art of War (published 1838), what he claimed were timeless principles of war—formulaic maxims that if followed, would provide a commander the greatest chance of success in battle.

The purpose of Jomini’s principle of mass was to concentrate units at the most advantageous time and place, which should prove decisive. In the Napoleonic Wars, this meant concentrating large numbers of soldiers to assail the weakest or most vulnerable portion of an enemy’s line with overwhelming force.

Jomini’s ideas held sway for a century or more, particularly in America. It was Jomini that American generals on both sides of the Civil War were taught at West Point. They were said to have marched off to war with “sword in one hand and their copy of Jomini in the other.”

Lancashire Fusiliers trench at Beaumont Hamel in 1916 / Source: Wikimedia Commons

Ironically, this period was also the apogee of Jomini’s influence, precisely because of its commanders’ adherence to the maxim of mass.  What they didn’t immediately grasp was how the acceleration of the industrial revolution had turned Jomini’s formula for victory into a recipe for wholesale slaughter. Taken to its logical extreme fifty years later during the First World War, massed assaults resulted in unprecedented carnage.

Afterward, armies began to experiment with dispersed formations who could more nimbly maneuver and seek cover and concealment from the mechanized fires of the industrial age. The Second World War and the Korean War certainly had mass engagements, but even in these the trend in combat was towards the application of combat power rather than mass per se, as the lethality of individual weapon systems disproportionately increased.

By the time the United States developed its ‘Second Offset’ strategy in the 1980s, precision and economy of force became the apex of military art. Militaries came to rely upon small numbers of exquisitely sophisticated and exorbitantly expensive capabilities that were also hard to replace—but this didn’t bother us too much at the time. Jomini’s mass—at least in terms of concentrating forces—was decidedly out of style.

The advent of drone swarming will mark its return, albeit in a different form. The near-instant synchronization of these networked weapons will allow them to disperse for maneuver and concentrate for attacks at critical locations—Jomini’s ‘decisive points’—which is itself reflective of another contemporary, Prussian General Gerhard von Scharnhorst’s maxim to ‘march divided, fight concentrated.’

Small units will be augmented with the ability to employ tens or hundreds of integrated weapons, providing them with far more relative combat power than in the past. They’ll be able to use these small, cheap, and individually expendable platforms to almost continuously gather real-time intelligence and choose the time and place to overwhelm an adversary’s defenses through sheer volume.

Source: USAF AFRL

These weapon swarms will require planners and operators to design new operating concepts that effectively employ their strengths and mitigate their own vulnerability to counterattack. Commanders will need to be able to conceptualize operations in multiple dimensions and embrace distribution and autonomy. Smaller units vulnerable to saturation attack will need to maintain and employ organic electronic warfare and air defense systems on a large scale, but these may prove limited thanks to the inherent resilience of a networked swarm.

Of course, prognostication is kind of like discerning the shape of a distant mountain shrouded in fog. While it’s impossible to know the path to the summit before we get there, and there will undoubtedly be obstacles and detours along the way, as we draw nearer, we can roughly guess its contours.

The future battlespace will be fluid and dynamic. It will be transformed by the application of novel technologies powered by unprecedented advances in artificial intelligence, automation, human-machine teaming, and robotics that adapt at speeds beyond human comprehension—a concept some have called hyperwar.

But age-old truisms endure; there is strength in numbers.

If you enjoyed this post, please read:

Ground Warfare in 2050: How It Might Look, and

The Democratization of Dual Use Technology

Zachery Tyson Brown is a strategic intelligence analyst and U.S. Army veteran who consults for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a member of the Military Writers Guild and his writing has appeared at The Strategy Bridge, War on the Rocks, Defense One, and West Point’s Modern Warfare Institute. He can be found on Twitter @ZaknafienDC

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

170. “Own the Night”

[Editor’s Note:  The U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) co-sponsored the Mad Scientist Disruption and the Operational Environment Conference with the Cockrell School of Engineering at The University of Texas at Austin on 24-25 April 2019 in Austin, Texas.  Today’s post is excerpted from this conference’s Final Report (see link at the end of this post), addressing how the Army must embrace and rapidly incorporate autonomy, robotics, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) into our force modernization efforts.  In the words of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. Bob Work, this is an “Own the Night Moment for the United States Army” — enjoy!].

“When you’re bogged down in war it will naturally limit your ability to think about the future.”

In the late 1970s, following the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. operational planners started to ponder how to “Fight Outnumbered and Win.” Toward this end, the Army vowed to “Own the Night” – to leverage technology and training to successfully conduct offensive night operations with a level of familiarity and comfort commensurate with daytime operations. Further, nighttime defensive capabilities of other nations were 10 percent of what they would be during the day.1

Today, the Army is facing a similar “Own the Night” moment. To ensure future battlefield overmatch, the Army has a unique opportunity to seize the initiative in an openly competitive technological space — Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics — rather than succumb to forced modernization from a point of strategic disadvantage. There are four conditions underpinning this new “Own the Night” imperative:

1. The proliferation of miniaturized guided munitions and democratization of other military technologies will make the battlefield increasingly lethal for humans, hastening the development of unmanned autonomous systems to take on the most deadly combat tasks – dull, dirty, and dangerous.

2. Humans are becoming more expensive to recruit, train, and retain, hastening the move to unmanned and robotic systems to replace them, especially for ground forces.

3. Land warfare involves fighting amongst the people, requiring the most demanding performance for autonomous systems in terms of ethics, Law of Armed Conflict – distinction and proportionality –, and trust.

4. Future combat operations may occur in dense urban settings, where combat operations will rely heavily on human-machine combat teams. The pervasive presence of the Internet of Things (IoT) provides a bevy of information to both the robotic agents as well as their human counterparts.2

Gaps in the global competition for development of AI and robotics are quickly narrowing. Strategic competitors recognize the importance of AI, particularly to match and overtake the superior military capabilities that the United States and its allies have held for the past several decades. Highlighting this importance, Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2017 stated that “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”3   Russian military forces have already combat tested unmanned combat ground vehicles in Syria, applying lessons learned to future iterations of unmanned and autonomous combat systems.4  Within the past decade, China has invested heavily in government-funded AI initiatives. Military thinkers within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) embrace AI’s prospects as “leapfrog technology” that would allow China to skip technological development stages and rapidly overmatch U.S. capabilities.5

U.S. success in this competition is dependent upon focus (R&D dollars and manpower concentration), adaptability (organizational flexibility and external partnerships), and innovation (creativity, integration, and cultural awareness). While the U.S. pursues its next iteration of “Owning the Night,” it will need a more defined strategy that focuses beyond developing and purchasing new generations of technology. Emerging technologies such as AI and robotics will require a continued investment by the Army and Department of Defense with clear strategic guidance for all stakeholders. As with the first “Own the Night” moment, the Army will also need to include development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and intense, sustained training.

The Army can gain multiple advantages by developing unmanned, optionally tele-operated systems rather than optionally manned systems, such as:

Leader Follower suite of robotic applique sensors and vehicle by-wire upgrades provide an unmanned capability to the Palletized Load System A1 Fleet of vehicles / Source: U.S. Army photo; https://asc.army.mil
      • Moving to the right side of the cost curve by avoiding investment in expensive armor and other human protection features.
      • Achieving greater performance – speed, agility, maneuverability – and energy efficiency without humans on board.
      • Creating greater warfighter effectiveness through increased man-machine teaming.

Robotic and unmanned systems are prevalent throughout the six Army modernization priorities – Long-Range Precision Fires; Next Generation Combat Vehicle; Soldier Lethality; Future Vertical Lift; Army Network; and Air and Missile Defense.6 Integration of unmanned robotic systems into all of these priorities is an opportunity for the Army to “Own the Night” and gain overmatch in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).

If you enjoyed this post, please also see:

– The entire Mad Scientist Disruption and the Operational Environment Conference Final Report, dated 25 July 2019.

– Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Bob Work‘s presentation from the aforementioned conference on AI and Future Warfare: The Rise of the Robots (and Army Futures Command), as well as his Modern War Institute podcast assessing the future battlefield.

– Our Crowdsourcing the Future of the AI Battlefield #AIBattlefield information paper.

The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Mr. Brady Moore and Mr. Chris Sauceda.

Autonomous Robotic Systems in the Russian Ground Forces, by Mr. Samuel Bendett.


1 Adam K. Raymond “‘We Own the Night’: The Rise And Fall Of The US Military’s Night-Vision Dominance,” Task & Purpose, https://taskandpurpose.com/night-rise-fall-us-militarys-night-vision-dominance

2 Work, Robert O., Mad Scientist Conference: Disruption and the Future Operational Environment, University of Texas at Austin, 24 April 2019.

3 James Vincent, “Putin Says the Nation that Leads in AI ‘Will be the Ruler of the World,’” The Verge, https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world

4 Kendrick Foster, “The Modern Pen and the AI Sword,” Harvard Politics Review, https://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/pen-ai-sword/

5 Gregory C. Allen “Understanding China’s AI Strategy,” Center for a New American Security, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/understanding-chinas-ai-strategy

6 “Modernization Priorities for the United States Army,” 3 Oct. 2017, https://admin.govexec.com/media/untitled.pdf

169. Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier: Part 1

[Editor’s Note:  In the first of a two part series exploring climate change as a threat multiplier, guest blogger LTCOL Nathan Pierpoint, Australian Army, examines the climate challenges facing civil and military leaders around the world.  Exploring the geo-political implications of rising sea levels, extreme heat, desertification, and water and food shortages, LTCOL Pierpoint’s post addresses how these environmental issues will exacerbate competition, social instability, and the potential for violence and conflict.]

There is one issue that will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other, and that is the urgent threat of a changing climate.” — President Barack Obama

I was recently taken by the great piece written by Ms. Sage Miller on climate change.  I pushed hard to meet the Mad Scientist deadline for their recent crowdsourcing exercise on the Operational Environment – Today to 2035:  What Will Change and What Will Drive it, but came to the conclusion that this issue deserved more than 1000 words. Similarly, I felt it was such a pressing issue that it deserved regular, and continuous, discussion and debate. This is because climate change is one of the most significant drivers of global instability our militaries will face to 2035. This paper is part one of a two part discussion on climate change and the wars of the future.

I might have said in a recent tweet about the Mad Scientist Challenge that I would talk about climate change, violent extremism, and political warfare. However it became evident after a little more research that two of these issues quite often manifested from the adverse impacts of climate change. This is because climate change, to coin a term from the most recent  Global Peace Index report, acts as a threat multiplier.  While climate change doesn’t automatically lead to higher levels of violence, the Global Peace Index described it best as its ability to exacerbate security threats when they stated that “climate pressures adversely impact resource availability, affect population dynamics, and strain societal institutions, which directly affects security and stability.”1

It’s important to note the impact climate change is now having on national security decision making, particularly in the U.S.  On June 5, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held a hearing on the National Security Implications of Climate Change. This hearing was unique in that it called witnesses Peter Kiemel from the National Intelligence Council, Rod Schoonover from the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Jeffrey Ringhausen from the Office of Naval Intelligence. Chairman Schiff commenced the hearing by stating that climate change was the “greatest long-term national security threat to the U.S.2 and quoted the most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment published by the Director of National Intelligence by stating, “Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond.”  The key point Chairman Schiff tries to make here is that national stability needs to be underpinned by the protection and trade of national resources. A pessimist’s view would also suggest he indicates that adverse impacts to these resources directly increase the chance of conflict with others to protect or secure these resources.

GEN Angus J. Campbell, AO, DSC, Chief of the Defence Force / Source:  http://www.defence.gov.au/CDF/

I think it’s worth mentioning at this point the emerging threat of political warfare. This issue was best explained by Australian Defence Force (ADF) Chief, GEN Angus Campbell’s recent speech during ASPI’s War in 2025 conference.”4  His stark comments that “democracies risk being out-manoeuvred by totalitarian powers unrestrained by rules, and willing to use information campaigns, cyber operations, theft of intellectual property, coercion and propaganda to weaken them,” are an indication that large power competition has risen to the fore once more.5  However, the desire for totalitarian powers to conduct these types of activities are usually driven by a threat to their own existence. In many cases, it is access to the resources that western democracies and their economies have thrived upon and use to exert their own power over the international trading landscape. In this respect, I felt the impacts of climate change were a more pressing issue due to its ability to act as a threat multiplier. As the latest Global Peace Index suggests, environmental risks of climate change and resource scarcity had the highest likelihood of triggering or exacerbating conflict through its effects on livelihood security and resource availability.6  I’ll attempt to highlight the most significant climate challenges our world faces to 2035.

Jakarta / Source: pxhere

Indonesia is sinking. Since the 1970’s, parts of its capital city Jakarta have seen sea levels rise more than four meters. Scientists predict that more than a quarter of the city could be swamped by the sea by 2025.7   Jakarta is home to more than 34 million people, and one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Jakarta has also seen a rise in violent extremism, with Al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliated groups conducting a number bombings in recent years, killing hundreds.

Rising sea levels was also one example two recent King’s College Podcasts highlighted as they discussed the challenges of climate change on global security. A panel of experts also highlighted the growing concerns over air pollution, rising global temperatures, and environmental degradation as significant influences on security policies over the next century. Such examples they cited were periods of drought in Sub-Saharan Africa that sparked clashes over water, and water shortages in India that were intensifying conflicts between neighboring states.8

During training, U.S. Army Soldiers immerse their arms in a cooler of ice cold water for 15 seconds  to lower their core temperatures and prevent heat casualties / Source:  Army.mil, photo by Jeff Crawley

Rising global temperatures have also meant that deadly heat conditions, and heat related injuries, are now a regular occurrence for Soldiers. As recently as late July, there was further talk about the U.S. military recognising the threat climate change and rising temperatures were having on Soldiers across both operational and training areas. A recent report from the Pentagon highlighted that rising temperatures were exacerbating challenges the military is facing in some of the world’s most destabilized regions, and endangered individual troops and, by extension, U.S. security and preparedness. Further, the report stated that health impacts from heat have already cost the military as much as nearly $1 billion from 2008 to 2018.9  The reduced presence of Soldiers on a future battlefield, operating amongst the people, shaping and influencing the human terrain, would surely impact the decisiveness of future campaigns, and inadvertently prolong wars in the future.

As a result of rising temperatures, the world faces a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events. Food production is quickly approaching the point where there are inadequate supplies to feed the global population. This is a consequence of a decline in crop yields, desertification, monsoon failure, chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. As a result, significant portions of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila, have been abandoned.10

Desertification and water shortages have meant that the livelihoods of more than five million farmers in Mexico were impacted by the drought from 2002 to 2012. The response was both internal migration to the slums of Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey and international migration to the United States.11   In the fastest growing megacity in the world according to the U.N, Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka has seen mass migration into the city’s slums. While slums have existed in Dhaka City for a long time, their growth accelerated after the liberation of the country in 1971, mainly due to mass migration by the rural poor. The first significant survey of the slums and squatter population in Dhaka was conducted by the Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) in 1974 and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees which indicated the slum population was 275,000.12   According to the latest census conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in 2015, 2.23 million people live in slums across the country.13  Eighty-one percent of migrants cited a climate-related cause as a main reason for their move, with most of those relocating to cities to earn their livelihood after losing their land and houses to river erosion.14  High levels of resource scarcity and strained public resources contributed to violence in these slums, with climate refugees intensifying already present social stress.15

UN refugee camp in Jordan / Source: Flickr

Bangladesh is not the only country facing mass migration due to the adverse effects of climate change. A recent New York Times article also highlighted the stark reality of population migration and displacement across the world. According to the article, the United Nations Refugee Agency stated that the global population of people displaced reached 70.8 million, up from 43 million a decade ago, 26 million fled across borders, and 3.5 million were seeking asylum in third countries.16   Evidence suggests that people living in less developed countries without the ability to mitigate these problems are those most likely to migrate, and that this migration has been a significant factor in increased violence in receiving areas.17

This is especially true in countries that are already low or declining in peacefulness. The drivers behind the Syrian civil war, according to some researchers, indicate that human-induced climate change was a contributing factor in the extreme drought experienced within Syria prior to its civil war. This drought lead to large scale migration, and this migration exacerbated the socio-economic stresses that underpinned Syria’s decent into war.18

NZ Defence Capability Plan 2019 / Source:  https://defence.govt.nz

Similar research has shown that climate change will impose significant stress on societies into the future. The recent New Zealand (NZ) Defence Capability Plan has a whole chapter dedicated to responding to the climate crisis in their region. In the plan they highlight that the “effects of climate change can be significant contributors to both low-level and more violent conflict.”19  Such is their concern, they have sought to increase the size of their Defence Force in order to contend with concurrent humanitarian assistance and stability operations in the region brought about through climate change.20

The influence of climate change has often taken a back seat to the threat of international terrorism and large power competition, but it is deeply intertwined with our security and stability. Violence and unrest brought about by terrorism and political warfare can weaken institutions, making society more vulnerable to climate shocks. This cycle suggests that political and socio-economic factors will continue to be the primary sources of internal strife and that climate change will continue to serve as a risk multiplier.21

I mentioned earlier that this is only Part 1 of this discussion. In this paper I sought only to highlight the growing security concerns exacerbated by climate change, not offer solutions. Part two of this discussion will employ story telling to imagine a future war influenced by the effects of climate change, resource competition, and unlikely adversaries.

If you enjoyed this post, please see:

Future Threats: Climate Change and Islamic Terror by Mr. Matthew Ader.

Climate Change Laid Bare: Why We Need To Act Now by Ms. Sage Miller, as well as her “The Implications of Climate Change for the U.S. Military” Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Speaker Session presentation

Our Arctic—The World’s Pink Flamingo and Black Swan Bird Sanctuary by Mr. Frank Prautzsch

LTCOL Nathan Pierpoint is a career Military Police Officer, having recently completed Battalion Command prior to his appointment as the Australian Army Liaison Officer to HQ TRADOC in 2019. He has also spent time as an instructor, served regularly as a staff officer in the Australian Army Headquarters, and has completed tours of Timor Leste, Iraq, and Afghanistan. LTCOL Pierpoint has a BA in Politics through the University of New South Wales, and a Masters in Defence and Strategic Studies through the Australian National University.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).


1 Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2019. http://visionofhumanity.org/reports (20 Jul 2019). p.49

2 Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia, Intelligence Officials Highlight Security Risks of Climate Change in Important House Hearing, The Centre for Climate and Security, 06 June 2019, https://climateandsecurity.org/2019/06/06/intelligence-officials-highlight-security-risks-of-climate-change-in-important-house-hearing/

3 Ibid

4 Brendan Nicholson, ADF Chief: West Faces a New Threat from ‘Political Warfare’, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 14 June 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/adf-chief-west-faces-a-new-threat-from-political-warfare/

5 Ibid

6 Global Peace Index p.43

7 Mark Doman, David Lipson and Ari Wu, Jakarta is Running Out of Time to Stop Itself Sinking, ABC News Australia, June 23 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-24/jakarta-is-running-out-of-time-to-stop-itself-sinking/11190928?pfmredir=sm

8 Ian Dunlop, David Spratt, Existential Climate Related Security Risk. Breakthrough – National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, May 2019, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_a1406e0143ac4c469196d3003bc1e687.pdf, p.9

9 David Hasemyer, Military Fights a Deadly Enemy: Heat, InsideClimate News, NBC News, 23 Jul 19 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/military-s-climate-change-problem-blistering-heat-killing-soldiers-during-n1032546

10 Ibid.

11 Existential Climate Related Security Risk p.54

12 Professor Nazrul Islam, Dr. AQM Mahbub, Dr. Nurul Islam Nazem, Urban Slums of Bangladesh, The Daily Star Bangladesh, 20 June 2009, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-93293

13 Staff Correspondent, The Number of slum dwellers in Bangladesh increases by 60.43 percent in 17 years https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/06/29/number-of-slum-dwellers-in-bangladesh-increases-by-60.43-percent-in-17-years, 29 Jun 2015

14 Ibid.

15 Existential Climate Related Security Risk p.54

16 Nick Cumming-Bruce, Number of People Fleeing Conflict Is Highest Since World War II, U.N. Says, June 19 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/world/refugees-record-un.html

17 Global Peace Index p.54

18 Jan Selby, Omar Dahi, Christiane Frolich, Mike Holme, Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited, Elsevier: Political Geography. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629813000188

19 NZ Ministry of Defence, NZ Capability Plan 2019, Ministry of Defence June 2019, https://defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Defence-Capability-Plan-2019.pdf , p.17

20 Ibid

21 Global Peace Index p.49

Bibliography

1. Ms. Sage Miller, Climate Change Laid Bare: Why We Need to Act Now, US Army Mad Science Laboratory Blog Post, 8 Jul 19, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/159-climate-change-laid-bare-why-we-need-to-act-now/

2. Jurgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans Gunter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, Janpeter Schilling, Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, Springer, 2012.

3. Jan Selby, Omar Dahi, Christiane Frolich, Mike Holme, Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited, Elsevier: Political Geography, 2016, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629813000188

4. NZ Ministry of Defence, NZ Capability Plan 2019, Ministry of Defence June 2019, https://defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Defence-Capability-Plan-2019.pdf

5. Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2019, http://visionofhumanity.org/reports, 20 Jul 2019.

6. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Number of People Fleeing Conflict Is Highest Since World War II, U.N. Says, June 19 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/world/refugees-record-un.html

7. Ian Dunlop, David Spratt, Existential Climate Related Security Risk. Breakthrough – National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, May 2019, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_a1406e0143ac4c469196d3003bc1e687.pdf

8. Mark Doman, David Lipson and Ari Wu, Jakarta is Running Out of Time to Stop Itself Sinking, ABC News Australia, June 23 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-24/jakarta-is-running-out-of-time-to-stop-itself-sinking/11190928?pfmredir=sm

9. Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia, Intelligence Officials Highlight Security Risks of Climate Change in Important House Hearing, The Centre for Climate and Security, 06 June 2019, https://climateandsecurity.org/2019/06/06/intelligence-officials-highlight-security-risks-of-climate-change-in-important-house-hearing/

10. Global Challenges Foundation, Global Catastrophic Risk 2018: Global Challenges Annual Report 2018, https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/files/GCF-Annual-report-2018.pdf

11. King, D. et al., 2015. Climate Change–a Risk Assessment, Centre for Science and Policy, Cambridge University UK, June 2019, http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/1/climate-change–a-risk-assessment-v11.pdf

12. King’s College War Studies Podcast https://soundcloud.com/warstudies/event-pathways-to-climate-security-i and https://soundcloud.com/warstudies/is-nuclear-energy-the-answer-to-the-climate-crisis

13. Professor Nazrul IslamDr. AQM MahbubDr. Nurul Islam Nazem, Urban Slums of Bangladesh, The Daily Star Bangladesh, 20 June 2009, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-93293

14. Staff Correspondent, The Number of Slum Dwellers in Bangladesh increases by 60.43 percent in 17 years, BD News Bangladesh 29 Jun 2015, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/06/29/number-of-slum-dwellers-in-bangladesh-increases-by-60.43-percent-in-17-years

15. David Hasemyer, Military Fights a Deadly Enemy: Heat, Inside Climate News, NBC News, 23 Jul 19 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/military-s-climate-change-problem-blistering-heat-killing-soldiers-during-n1032546

16. Brendan Nicholson, ADF Chief: West Faces a New Threat from ‘Political Warfare’, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 14 June 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/adf-chief-west-faces-a-new-threat-from-political-warfare/

168. Linking Brains to Machines, and Use of Neurotechnology to the Cultural and Ethical Perspectives of the Current Global Stage

[Editor’s Note:  In today’s post, returning guest bloggers Mr. Joseph DeFranco and Dr. James Giordano examine the ramifications of Neuralink moving forward with Brain-Machine Interfaces, posing five tough questions on what the crossing of this neuroscience frontier means from medical, ethical, legal, and geo-political perspectives.  Read their compelling post — will “neuro-modified human actors be considered weaponized biological agents?”]

On July 16th, Elon Musk announced that his company Neuralink will move to advance clinical translation of a novel brain-machine interface (BMI) that he claims holds “…promise for the restoration of sensory and motor function and the treatment of neurological disorders.” 1  Although the company’s efforts to develop such a BMI has only been underway for 28 months,2  it has already created an innovative, functioning application in an in vivo rat model. Musk seeks to begin clinical trials in 2020 for treatment of particular neurological disorders. Musk also asserts that this technology could and should be available to any individual who wishes to achieve “better access” and “better connections” to “the world, each other, and ourselves.”3

The BMI involves implantation of microelectrodes (as many as 3,072 per array) to record neurological activity in the brain. These electrodes convey signals to sensors that can be detected by an external device (e.g., a smart phone).4  The intricacies and complex nature of the brain’s neural architecture and vasculature demand precision of the implantation procedure, and to this end Neuralink will employ a newly developed robotic system for inserting the electrodes. This system will be monitored and managed by a neurosurgeon who can manually adjust the robotic system as needed during the procedure.

Indubitably, this emerging technology is noteworthy and could foster understanding and treatments of a number of neuro-psychiatric conditions. Yet, there are several questions that we believe must be addressed and answered before Neuralink – or any related technology – is offered and made available to the public.

First, who will receive this BMI? Presentations by Musk assert that a main goal is to make the procedure “… as simple and automated as LASIK”.5  We also advocate the importance of, and need for safe and reliable procedures; in this light, it should be borne in mind that the methods described require neurosurgical intervention to insert the electrodes. And although the level of invasiveness may be reduced, and perhaps increasingly minimized with iterative developments of technology and protocols, inherent neurosurgical risks (e.g., intracranial bleeding; infection) must be recognized. It may well be that the relative benefit-to-burden / risk calculus may support the use of a novel procedure if and when other, extant, and prior interventions are ineffective. Still, we advocate that any such consideration should appreciate and engage questions and contingencies relative to mitigating risks (see Table 1). To wit, what conditions will be treated using this approach; or perhaps more specifically, which patients will receive such treatments?

Table 1: Preparatory Neuroethics Paradigms 6, 7


Second, who will perform this procedure and where will it take place? And, if Musk’s invitation to any individual who seeks “better access” and “better connections” to “the world, each other, and ourselves” is indicative of a broader interest in, and market for receiving this BMI technology, the question of “who will receive the interventions” becomes even more pressing. Given current attitudes (in the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia) regarding medical interventions intended for “non-therapeutic” (i.e., optimization / enhancement) purposes,8 will surgeons in these countries be amenable to implanting the Neuralink BMI for such ends? If not, then we query where these procedures might be provided. Further, we ask how (and to what extent) these procedures will be funded.

Third, if, as Musk has stated this technology is to remain implanted and function for “years to decades” (and possibly a “lifetime”), will – and where will – ongoing research be performed to prospectively assess the benefit, burdens and/or harms incurred?9

Fourth, given this proposed durability, it is likely that:  (1) newer versions of the technology will be developed; and (2) older versions of the technology will require maintenance and updating. Therefore, we ask if and how issues and problems of obsolescence will be addressed and resolved?10  Will (and how will) device maintenance and upgrades be covered under some remunerative plan (e.g., insurance; corporate sponsorship)?

Fifth; as this technology becomes available to the public, will there be a time when the majority of a society has a BMI? If this were to occur, what about the minority who don’t? Or, if only a select few can acquire a BMI, how will society regard and treat these individuals? Here, scenarios such as that posed in Daniel Wilson’s novel, Amped, come to the fore.11  And what of the gap between the neuro-capabilized “haves” and those who “have not”? Such questions should not be limited to concerns about intranational distributive justice:  What does the use of this technology portend for the schism between developed, developing, and un-developed nations?

We applaud Neuralink’s strivings to develop cutting-edged therapeutics and respect their view toward neurological optimization. These developments prompt – if not mandate – recognition and acknowledgment of varying cultural needs, values, philosophies, and ethics, as each and all influence receptivity to this and other forms of BMI research and uses-in-practice.12 Some nations, based upon their views, ethos, and ethics, may be more willing, if not eager to provide this technology to their citizens, and possibly to Warfare, Intelligence, and National Security (WINS) personnel.13

At present, BMIs are not addressed by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. However, if Neuralink-type BMIs, and other neurotechnologies14 are used to augment WINS operators, it begs the question of whether neuro-modified human actors should be considered “weaponized biological agents?”15  And if so, how should they be regarded and treated (both during their tenure in service, and afterward)?

To be sure, neurotechnology is rapidly advancing toward ever greater capabilities. Will global civic (and WINS) institutions remain apace?16  Given the distinctions in the socio-cultural and political values, aims, and ethics that shape research and its applications, what discourses and dialectic will be needed – or accepted – to guide, govern, and constrain acting with such haste, so as to avoid repenting in leisure? As we are fond of saying – and as every neurosurgeon knows well – it is wisest to “measure twice; cut once” whether opening a skull, a vista of new capabilities and possibilities, or a can of worms.

If you enjoyed this post, please also see:

China’s Brain Trust: Will the U.S. Have the Nerve to Compete? by Mr. Joseph DeFranco, CAPT (USN – Ret.) L. R. Bremseth , and Dr. James Giordano

Neuroscience and the Weapons of War podcast, with Dr. Giordano

Connected Warfare by COL James K. Greer (USA-Ret.)

Sine Pari by Mr. Howard R. Simkin

Author Biographies:
Joseph DeFranco is J5 Donovan Group Fellow in Biowarfare and Biosecurity, at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). He is currently studying neuroscience in the College of Arts and Sciences, and biodefense at the Schar School of Policy and Government of George Mason University, VA, and formerly served on the staff of Congressman Donald S. Beyer (VA-08). His current research focuses upon the possible use of novel microbiological agents and big data as force-multiplying elements in non-kinetic, hybrid, and kinetic engagements, and the role of global agencies in biosecurity.

Mad Scientist James Giordano, PhD, is Professor of Neurology and Biochemistry, Chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program, and Co-Director of the O’Neill-Pellegrino Program in Brain Science and Global Law and Policy at Georgetown University Medical Center. He currently serves as J5 Donovan Group Senior Fellow, Biowarfare and Biosecurity, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and as an appointed member of the Neuroethics, Legal, and Social Issues (NELSI) Advisory Panel of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Previously, Dr. Giordano served as Senior Science Advisory Fellow of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Group of the Joint Staff of the Pentagon; and was Senior Research Fellow and Task Leader for the EU Human Brain Project Subproject on Dual Use Brain Science.

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Acknowledgments:  This blog was adapted from the authors’ forthcoming work appearing in the Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine. JG is supported by funding from CSCI and Leadership Initiatives.


References:
1 Musk E. An integrated brain-machine interface platform with thousands of channels. bioRxiv, 703801 (2019).

2 Winkler R. Elon Musk Launches Neuralink to Connect Brains with Computers. (2017, March 27). Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-launches-neuralink-to-connect-brains-with-computers-1490642652

3 CNET. (2019, July 17). Watch Elon Musk’s Neuralink presentation. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lA77zsJ31nA; accessed 24. July, 2019.

4 Ibid. ref. 2.

5 Ibid. ref. 3.

6 Giordano J. Toward an operational neuroethical risk analysis and mitigation paradigm for emerging neuroscience and technology (neuroS/T). Exp Neurol 287 (4): 492-495 (2017).

7 Giordano J. A preparatory neuroethical approach to assessing developments in neurotechnology. AMA J Ethics 17(1): 56-61 (2015).

8 For overviews, see:
Jotterand F, Dubljevic V. (eds.) Cognitive Enhancement: Ethical and Policy Implications in International Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Berger TW, Glanzman DL. (eds.) Toward Replacement Parts for the Brain: Implantable Biomimetic Electronics as Neural Prostheses. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005.

9 Giordano J. Conditions for consent to the use of neurotechnology: A preparatory neuroethical approach to risk assessment and reduction. AJOB-Neuroscience 6(4): 12-14 (2015).

10 Shook JR, Giordano J. Neuroethics beyond normal: Performance enablement and self-transformative technologies. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25.1 (2016): 121-140 (2016).

11 Wilson DH. Amped. NY: Doubleday, 2012.

12 For more information, see:
Shook JR, Giordano J. A principled, cosmopolitan neuroethics: Considerations for international relevance. Phil Ethics Humanities in Med 9 (1); (2014).
Lanzilao E, Shook, J, Benedikter R, Giordano J. Advancing neuroscience on the 21st century world stage: The need for – and proposed structure of – an internationally relevant neuroethics. Ethics Biol Engineer Med 4(3): 211-229 (2013).

13 Palchik G, Chen C, Giordano J. Monkey business? Development, influence and ethics of potentially dual-use brain science on the world stage. Neuroethics, 10:1-4 (2017).

14 Giordano J, Wurzman, R. Neurotechnology as weapons in national intelligence and defense. Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics and Policy, 2, 138-151 (2011).

15 Liivoja R, Chircop, L. Are enhanced warfighters weapons, means, or methods of warfare? International Law Studies, 94(1), 7 (2018).

16 Shook JR, Giordano J. Moral bioenhancement for social welfare: Are civic institutions ready? Front Sociol 2(21): 1-5 (2017).