Mad Scientist Laboratory

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, welcoming back COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.), Director, Army Management Staff College, to discuss non-terrestrial war, weapons of mass deception, and why we are at a pivotal point in the defense of our country — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.) is a Distinguished Member of the 75th Ranger Regiment and served in that organization for nine years, culminating with command of the 3rd Ranger Battalion from 2001-2003. He led U.S. Army Rangers during a historic night combat parachute assault into Afghanistan on October 19, 2001, as the “spearhead” for the Global War on Terror. Steve subsequently led U.S. Army Rangers in a second combat parachute assault into Al Anbar Province in western Iraq in 2003.  He served with distinction in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 2010. Since then, he has provided executive consulting services to a diverse range of clients at a number of prestigious institutions.  Steve Banach also serves as the Director, Army Management Staff College, an element of Army University responsible for “igniting the leadership potential for every Army civilian.”

In today’s interview with COL Banach, we explore non-terrestrial war, weapons of mass deception, and why we are at a pivotal point in the defense of our country.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • The United States is experiencing a new form of conflict known as “non-terrestrial warfare.”  Our adversaries no longer seek to confront us on the traditional battlefield. Instead, they will use non-tangible capabilities in cyber, big data, space, and the information space to influence entire societies and create tangible results, the effects of which may remain invisible for weeks, months, or even years. It is an unbounded, global, strategic form of maneuver, performed by nation and non-state actors that is an enduring, new approach to warfare.

• • • Non-terrestrial warfare encompasses strategies like mis- and disinformation — weapons of mass deception — where social media has emerged as a tool that can influence the behavior of entire populations.  Data collected on human behavior while operating in this space creates new opportunities for actors to understand, exploit, and manipulate collective behaviors. This is a pre-meditated and well-orchestrated campaign that we are seeing implemented in algorithmic warfare today, dividing populations and creating dis-equilibrium and systemic shock in our society — it is a brilliant, elegant, strategic form of maneuver that is being levied against us.  It is not by accident, and it is pervasive and growing!

• • • As witnessed in the on-going conflict in Ukraine, the role of non-state actors is increasingly important.  Elon Musk maneuvered Spacex satellites and provided Starlink ground stations to the Ukrainian government to ensure continued satellite internet communications in the face of Russian cyberattacks.  Hackers targeted Russian communications infrastructure, while Ukrainian citizens engaged in hybrid warfare in the defense of their homeland.  In non-terrestrial war, the lines between civilians and combatants will continue to blur, with “hacktivists” and influential individuals exerting power to damage state infrastructure and alter the behaviors of entire populations.

• • • The U.S. Department of Defense should not wait for a catalyst event to begin adapting to this new style of warfare.  Non-terrestrial war is a complex, adaptive challenge that requires our leadership to mobilize adaptive work acumen across the enterprise.  It requires a whole-of-nation, whole-of-coalition response — a Manhattan Project 2.0.  We should focus on bringing together subject matter experts to redesign and create a new learning ecosystem to conceptualize this reality, craft an enduring global non-terrestrial maneuver strategy, acquire a new synthesized and weaponized “Technology Palette,” and prepare to engage in and win this fight!

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence — featuring Shubhi Mishra, founder and CEO of Raft, a data-intensive digital consultancy, discussing wicked problems in national security; finding creative, mission-focused solutions; and equipping the DoD with sustainable, emerging technology.

If you enjoyed this post and podcast, check out its companion essay The “Convergence” and Non-Terrestrial War, as well as the following previous posts and podcasts by COL Banach:

Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare, and associated podcast

Virtual War – A Revolution in Human Affairs (Parts I and II)

… and the following related content:

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security and Is Ours a Nation at War? U.S. National Security in an Evolved — and Evolving — Operational Environment, by Dr. Russell Glenn

Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare with Dr. David Kilcullen, and associated podcast

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling

A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat, by 1LT Carlin Keally

The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far… and Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to welcome back returning guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Collin Meisel and newcomer Tim Sweijs with their post addressing the strategic importance small and middle powers play in competition, crisis, and conflict. As General Charles A. Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), sagely observed in his podcast and blog post last month, “Building strong relationships between individuals, organizations, and countries is vital for deterrence by denial.” From Poland’s pivotal role in the continuing conflict in Ukraine, Messrs. Meisel and Sweijs extrapolate the roles similarly-sized powers could play in the China-US competition in Southeast Asia, both as effective allies and partners, as well as “poison frogs” — whose potential occupation could present our pacing threat with exorbitant and untenable military, diplomatic, and economic costs.  In recognizing these small and middle powers’ capacity for regional influence, pursuing opportunities for collaboration, and strengthening bilateral ties, the U.S. can help ensure future global stability — Read on!]

The Russo-Ukraine war of 2022 — a bloody conflict broadcast live from thousands of cellphones from thousands more angles in near-real-time — is one of countless stories that often do not fit neatly into a single narrative. Among many narratives that have surfaced amid Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine are those of a return of great power politics, declining US hegemony, and a crossroads for China’s position in the world — and indeed, each of these stories is important. At the same time, they have, until recently, often overshadowed another important story:  that of Poland’s influence and pivotal role in Ukraine.

It is a role that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy movingly acknowledged in a recent virtual appearance in front of Poland’s legislature:  “I feel that we have already formed an extremely strong alliance with Poland. Let it be informal. But a union that grew out of reality, not words on paper. If God wills and we win this war, we will share the victory with our brothers and sisters. ”

To date, Poland has accepted the plurality of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict in their homeland. As of 31 March 2022, more than 2.3 million out of 4 million Ukrainian refugees had fled to Poland. These numbers have exceeded even United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees analysts’ worst-case-scenario estimates. Of the millions who have fled (even including those who have not settled in Poland), the majority have passed through Polish territory before continuing onward.

Meanwhile, the lion’s share of NATO-provided military equipment flowing in the opposite direction has passed through or been provided by Poland prior to its final destination in Ukraine. Poland even expressed willingness to donate its 28 MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine’s cause.

While remarkable, Poland’s outsized role is in some sense a natural consequence of its structural connections to Ukraine. The Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures’ Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index shows Poland’s importance in Ukraine’s network of diplomatic, economic, and security relationships. According to our most recent data prior to the further Russian invasion, Poland had the single most influence capacity in Ukraine, outpacing even Russia, China, and the United States.

Importantly, a country’s relational power is its capacity to influence another state through economic, political, and/or security measures -- whether a country chooses to leverage that capacity is often a case-dependent political choice. Today, we are seeing Poland leverage this capacity toward positive ends rather than via “weaponized interdependence” often associated with great powers, where countries exploit asymmetric trade, aid, and arms relationships, among others.

Poland’s rise to become the top influencer in Ukraine has resulted from the vacuum left by Russia since the start of its war with Ukraine in 2014. As Russo-Ukrainian bilateral goods trade in particular plummeted, Poland has stepped in to partially fill the gap. This helped boost Poland’s influence capacity in Ukraine, leapfrogging traditional regional and global power players, including the United States, China, and Germany.

Poland’s role in the current crisis has extended beyond government, becoming a society-wide effort, including citizen initiatives for refugee transportation inward, and body armor and food rations, amongst others, outward. Even the Polish diaspora appears to be taking the lead in communities abroad, sparking a grassroots aid effort to assist fleeing Ukrainians. These person-to-person connections -- including personal connections among government leaders -- highlight Poland’s deep ties to Ukraine despite scars of decades past.

Adding in this last layer -- connections at the leader level -- to the logic of structural connections between societies, we again see Poland’s important role in Ukrainian international relations, alongside more traditional power players in Europe.

With these connections and Poles’ strong support for Ukraine in recent days, Poland is illustrating the crucial role that small and middle powers continue to play, even in this new era of great power politics. This advances our conversations regarding such powers beyond the logic of “pivot states," or countries within which great powers vie for influence, or geostrategic footholds, where commercial, political, and military ties provide a means for great powers to extend or maintain what to some amount to modern day empires. Rather, small and middle powers play strategically important roles in their own right, with the ability to make important international contributions both in times of peace and in times of crisis and conflict.

In the midst of important conversations about great powers’ spheres of influence and what they can tell us about the war in Ukraine -- the outcomes of which are crucial, to be sure -- spare a thought for the Poles and the Polands of the world. They will continue to be important in influencing the trajectory of the current crisis, and will likely play an important role in the next one as well. Great powers ignore or dismiss the role of small and middle powers at their own peril.

China-US competition in Southeast Asia comes to mind. Both China and the US have the opportunity to further ratchet up bilateral tensions, or eschew conflict for managed competition that accommodates rather than coerces the aims and interests of smaller regional powers.

In the event of heightened competition and even the lead-up to conflict in East and Southeast Asia, a plausible outcome of both the “New Cold War” and “Ascending Powers” scenarios posited by the U.S. Army Futures Command’s Future Operational Environment 2035-2050 pamphlet, small and middle powers will likely have the ability to play both the role of effective contributor and enabler but also of spoiler.

In the lead-up to conflict, small and middle powers will have the ability to implement potent deterrence by denial strategies. In Poland, for example, this would be expected to manifest in the form of increased investments in anti-ship missiles and submarines, long-range precision fires and theater ballistic missile defense, and improved intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, such as those provided by the PIAST (Polish ImAging SaTellites) nanosatellites project. In East and Southeast Asia, small and middle powers such as Taiwan are investing in similar capabilities. Additionally, they can transform difficult-to-defend, island territories into “poison frogs,” where the military, diplomatic, and economic cost of taking and holding such territory is high. Collectively, such strategies will greatly strengthen the position of any great power with which countries may choose to align themselves and reduce the defense burden for the great power.

Alternatively, small and middle powers possess the ability to destabilize the international system and increase the likelihood of great power conflict. In an unstable international hierarchy with tight alliance systems -- think a “New Cold War” with a rising China and affiliated illiberal actors contesting the US’s position as the world’s leading power -- small powers can also be spoilers for international stability for a variety of reasons. Their geographic position and inability to fend for themselves can make them a stepping stone in expansionist strategies of great powers. Their role can be considered indispensable by great powers for fear that their loss will lead to domino-effects. And reckless behavior on the part of the small and middle power themselves can make them a moral hazard that can drag great power partners and allies into a wider conflict, and even lead to the outbreak of great power war. Here the “poison frog” transforms into the poisonous friend.

Although US influence in Southeast Asia -- and the attendant likelihood of gaining additional small and middle power regional partners -- has been on the decline, the future outcome of competition in the region is still very much an open question. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army will need to “get comfortable with contestation and get comfortable with collaboration.”

To the extent that great powers can recognize the important role that small and middle powers play in the international system, and are able to leverage their influence capacity, the world may become a more stable place.

Fortunately, Poland’s support for Ukraine thus far is substantially advancing its partners and allies interests in Ukraine’s conflict with Russia, facilitated by the US, which is keeping a close watch on escalatory actions that could drag NATO into the war. Whether other small and middle powers will act similarly in potential future conflicts will depend in part on how they are engaged by great powers today.

If you liked this post, check out Collin Meisel's previous post, co-authored with fellow proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Jonathan D. Moyer -- On Hype and Hyperwar

.. and review the following related content:

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

The Most Consequential Adversaries, and associated podcast, with General Charles A. Flynn

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, its source document, and Threats to 2030 video

The Future Operational Environment: The Four Worlds of 2035-2050, the complete AFC Pamphlet 525-2, Future Operational Environment: Forging the Future in an Uncertain World 2035-2050, and associated video

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

About the Authors:

Collin Meisel is a Senior Research Associate and Diplometrics Program lead with the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures and a subject matter expert with The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a senior research fellow at the War Studies Research Centre at the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist hits another milestone with today’s 400th post, featuring an insightful guest submission by Kate Kilgore — the first in a series of posts addressing what the on-going conflict in Ukraine can tell us about the Operational Environment (OE) and the changing character of warfare. Today’s post explores three sign posts emerging from this conflict that are broadening our understanding of the OE:  the advent of a digital levée en masse, battlefield transparency, and questions concerning the public or private nature of war.  What can the U.S. Army learn from these sign posts to successfully compete with and deter our adversaries, and when necessary, fight and win decisively against them in future conflicts?  Read on!]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 sparked intense international discussion about conducting and analyzing conflict. Some signposts to the future include the advent of a digital levée en masse, a highly transparent battlefield, and questions concerning the public or private nature of war. The ongoing conflict has seen individuals from both within the conflict zone and half a world away becoming involved and engaged virtually via the internet.  This, in conjunction with advances in geo-sensing and image sharing in the private sector, facilitates actionable intelligence for both military and auxiliary forces and individual citizens.  In addition, Ukraine’s efforts in the information domain have led to the first truly public war, where intimate details regarding the battlefield are transparent to the international community. While this creates opportunities for flexible response and an expanded information base, the implications of allowing private citizens access to this battlefield, or even inviting them to join in the conflict via the information domain, creates new nuances for the OE and the changing character of warfare.

Digital Levée en Masse and the Quest for Information Advantage

Digital levée en masse blurs the line between decentralized digital activism and state-sponsored hacking. We are seeing a trend of non-state involvement in the information sphere of conflicts with actors who are oftentimes not formally affiliated with the belligerents.

The term “levée en masse” originated during the French Revolutionary wars at the end of the Eighteenth Century, referring to the conscription process that generated a massive citizen force with a strong national identity to overwhelm opponents in both numbers and resolve. The digital levée en masse, however, is a contemporary phenomenon, largely made up of non-state actors who harness and motivate vast numbers of online users to impact the fight for information advantage. Though the present digital levée en masse has rallied in support of Ukraine, it is important to consider how this virtual phenomenon could yield negative outcomes [from the U.S. perspective] in the future. Private actors are not bound by international rules and norms during a conflict, and have already been seen to engage in efforts and operations that a law-abiding country and its military would be prohibited from doing. This also highlights the fact that outdated international laws governing conflict do not address whether the online actions by civilians abridge their protected noncombatant status. 

The Ukrainian government sponsored the creation of an “IT Army,” consisting of more than 300,000 individuals from all over the world pushing pro-Ukrainian messaging to Russians via geo-targeted ads and malware. Ukraine also set up a Russian-language Telegram page where citizens in Ukraine could post photos and identifying information of killed or captured Russian soldiers.  In an initiative called Ishchi Svoikh (Look For Your Own), the Ukrainian Interior Ministry directed relatives of Russian soldiers to these online platforms where they can search through photos and videos for their family members.  The initiative appears aimed in part at undermining morale and support for the war in Russia.  This effort has been met with Russian censorship, and has generated international discussion about whether this page violates the Geneva Convention’s stipulation that governments must protect prisoners of war from “insults and public curiosity.” Other initiatives that are not formally sponsored by a state government range from professional programmers in Poland and Norway who have organized efforts to email and text Russian citizens about the conflict, to efforts by the hacking group Anonymous to steal and leak Russian government and corporate information. Regardless, individuals with altruistic goals are exhibiting a willingness to take potentially illegal action and assume significant risks to help Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

The Transparent Battlefield — Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide 

As Russia’s war in Ukraine wears on, the role of technology is creating a modern battlefield where there is nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. Not only does technology facilitate militaries gathering information from civilian sources and infrastructures, but it also has facilitated targeting based on advanced imaging.

Ukraine’s quick and competent integration of videos and photos posted to social media or provided by commercial imaging enterprises (e.g., MAXAR’s satellite imagery-rich situation reports) have helped produce a highly transparent battlefield. Both the Ukrainian military and the world have an unprecedented degree of access to the battlefield, presaging future conflicts where every unit’s or even individual soldier’s actions and movements may be detected and broadcast. Ukraine has used social media and satellites to its advantage by crowdsourcing reports of Russian troop movements.  Indeed, Russia has begun jamming cellular networks along its forces’ axes of advance to mask tactical movements, highlighting the effect battlefield transparency has had in Ukraine. The modern battlefield has become so transparent that more than 32 Russian Combined Arms Army, Separate Brigade, and Battalion Tactical Group command posts have been detected, targeted, and destroyed by Ukrainian military strikes.  It is important to recognize both the advantages and threats posed by this unprecedented degree of visibility that the U.S. military and its adversaries alike will be subject to in future conflicts.

Ukraine has incorporated photos and videos of Russian military forces’ movements and conduct posted on social media into its intelligence gathering and targeting operations, supported by information provided by civilian-owned satellites and drones. This allows for greater flexibility and adaptability, but it also creates a potentially overwhelming pool of data to be vetted. Over-reliance on intelligence provided by the public may also increase the potential for mistakes or allow the enemy to flood collections with mis-information. Ukraine may be uniquely willing to assume that risk to maintain its sovereignty in the face of invasion. International investigators are also using social media and facial recognition software to investigate alleged Russian war crimes in Ukraine, and reports with the faces and names of accused Russian soldiers have recently been published. Despite its use against Russian soldiers, this trend may bolster the international expectation that intimate details of all parties in future conflicts will be quickly and publicly available, thus increasing the level of scrutiny of all actors. Ukraine’s recent reports about Russia declaring war on SpaceX Starlink satellites, which provided the Ukrainian military and government with continued communications and internet connectivity throughout the conflict and recently repelled a Russian hacking attempt, further establishes that international law insufficiently addresses the status of civilians and private infrastructure in modern conflict.

Narrative Warfare — Information Operations, Domestic and Abroad

Narratives coming from both Russia and Ukraine are being used in an attempt to influence the information environment both inside and outside of their borders. Does the advantage lie in open communication with the global community to win international support, or is it better to keep the scope of an information campaign limited for greater domestic control?  

While gaining information advantage is important in determining success in the wider OE, the emergence of diametrically opposed information spheres raises concerns about what it really means to compete in the information domain.  Ukraine’s use of social media to garner international support has helped shape the West’s position, while Russia has relied on solidifying domestic support by crafting historic and emotional narratives and largely limited its international efforts to existing allies (Iran), non-aligned nations (India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa), and areas with large ethnic Russian populations. The implications of these two diverging “truths” signals that future adversaries may isolate themselves from the rest of the world. A dual information domain means that the U.S. will have to redefine information advantage and determine whether this means simultaneously working to win in the international public domain while attempting to crack an adversary’s private information control.

Ukraine’s credibility among much of the international community is largely due to its willingness to publicize firsthand accounts of Russia’s invasion over all forms of media. Ukraine’s torrent of success stories and unflinching documentation of Russian misconduct have enabled it to establish trust in its narrative and gain widespread sympathy in countries that value freedom of information. Ukraine’s near-constant information operations addressing the Russian invasion motivated many countries to provide extensive aid, and mobilized the digital levée en masse. In contrast, Russia has effectively focused its information campaign domestically, with limited international appeals catered toward established allies, the ethnic Russian diaspora, and some developing nations. China has publicly echoed Russian talking points claiming U.S. and NATO threats to Russian security forced its invasion of Ukraine, but large-scale Russian efforts to compete with Ukraine’s dominance in the global information space have been largely unseen. Russia is not a society built on freedom of information, and remnants of Soviet-era censorship and state violence have established a general reluctance to dissent against state narratives. Coupled with threats of 15 years in prison for promoting narratives counter to the Russian government’s position on Ukraine, Russia’s approach to influence operations has been primarily focused on establishing and sustaining sizeable domestic support for its “special military operation.”

Russia-Ukraine Conflict:  Questions for the U.S. Army  

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has generated a host of important questions regarding the opportunities and challenges posed by future conflicts that will be transparent, globally connected, and the subject of influence operations. Ukraine has set a precedent where gaining international and public support will likely depend on a military’s willingness to show candor by engaging in an open and transparent battlefield, but is it possible to contain and manage a conflict in an open, online domain where militaries and non-state participants exist in the same space? Ukraine has paved the way for engaging civilian support and actions to influence conflicts through digital participation, but how far can civilian actors go and still be protected as noncombatants per the Geneva Conventions? Answering this may prove challenging for the U.S. Army as it tries to navigate an ambiguous, uncertain battlefield where the lines between combatant and non-combatant are blurred. Can choosing to use the flexibility offered by crowdsourcing intelligence information from civilians and private infrastructure negate their protected status? Nations with little interest in adhering to international law may ignore or leverage their civilians’ digital actions against protected U.S. affiliated individuals and infrastructure. How will the U.S. approach its own citizens who take such actions against an adversary? Can Ukraine’s success in publicizing the minutiae of a conflict to undermine the legitimacy of Russia’s mis-information campaigns be duplicated by the U.S. in future conflicts? Would such an approach mitigate or exacerbate the ability for an adversary to create distrust in the U.S. military by publishing identities and alleging misconduct by Service members on social media?  Russia’s attempts to solidify its State-controlled domestic information sphere may lead to future bad actors taking a similar approach in order to isolate its citizens and maintain domestic support. How can the U.S. Army prepare to compete for information advantage in both an international information domain that prizes freedom of information and in a near-peer’s State-controlled and highly censored information space simultaneously? As the OE continues to develop toward a more highly connected, transparent, and public future, the Army has the opportunity to learn from these sign posts and prepare to successfully compete, deter, and when necessary, fight and win decisively in future conflicts.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

What the Joint Force can learn from K-Pop “Stans” by Matthew Ader; LET’S TWEET, GRANDMA – Weaponizing the Social to Create Information Security, by CDR Sean M. Sullivan; Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success, by CW4 Charles Davis; and China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage by Ian Sullivan, along with the comprehensive paper from which it was excerpted

Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare, by Dr. Richard Nabors; Nowhere to Hide: Information Exploitation and Sanitization; War Laid Bare, by Matthew Ader; Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and associated podcast; and The Future of Ground Warfare, and associated podcast

War in Ukraine: The Urban Fight is Happening Now, and associated podcast; Through Soldiers’ Eyes: The Future of Ground Combat, and associated podcast; Alternet: What Happens When the Internet is No Longer Trusted? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Lt Col Jennifer “JJ” Snow; and Splinternets, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Howard R. Simkin; 

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security, by Dr. Russell Glenn; Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare and associated podcast; The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling; A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat by 1LT Carlin Keally; The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist by Dr. Nick Marsella; Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…; and Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events

About the Author:   Kate Kilgore is a TRADOC G-2 Intern and recent graduate of Indiana University, where she studied Law and Public Policy, Comparative International Politics, Soviet History, and Russian and Eastern European Studies. Kate has been greatly influenced by her father’s Army career, and she grew up all over the United States and in Germany, which influenced her passion for Eastern European history. Much of her undergraduate research focused on analyzing the path dependence and modern social implications of Soviet laws and in the former Eastern Bloc, with a focus on Hungary. When she’s not reading about culture and politics of the former Warsaw Pact States, she enjoys baking and antiquing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring General Charles A. Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), discussing the unique pacing threat posed by China, building interoperability with partner nations, and the future of multi-domain operations in INDOPACOM — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

General Charles A. Flynn assumed command of the United States Army’s largest Service Component Command, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), on June 4, 2021. USARPAC is headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, with portions of the command-forward deployed and based throughout the Indo-Pacific. Gen. Flynn comes to Fort Shafter after serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Operations, Plans, and Training at the Pentagon. Gen. Flynn has served in a variety of command, staff, and leadership positions from platoon leader to division commander.

Gen. Flynn is a native of Middletown, Rhode Island and Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Rhode Island with a BS in Business Management. General Flynn is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses at Fort Benning, GA. He holds two master’s degrees, one in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College in Newport, RI, and one in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy from the National Defense University.

In today’s interview, Gen. Flynn discusses the unique pacing threat posed by China, building interoperability with partner nations, and the future of multi-domain operations in INDOPACOM.  The following bullet points highlight some of the key insights from our interview:

• • • 

      While it is often argued that future conflicts in the Pacific will be fought in the air and at sea, the U.S. Army remains critical in securing our regional interests. The Army continues to build relationships with partners on land, and will likely be the only Service not hindered by China’s Anti-Access /Area Denial (A2/AD) system, which is not designed to find, fix, and destroy land forces. As a result, land power will serve as a counterweight to Chinese aspirations both regionally and globally.

• • • 

      The Army’s Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) integrates live, virtual, and constructive environments, enabling our forces and partners to conduct training via a mobile, regional training center in the Pacific’s Arctic, Jungle, and Archipelago conditions and environments. JPMRC enables the Army to maintain a constant presence in the region, train, and build readiness with our allies and partners.

• • • 

      While training with technology in the region of operation is important, relationships matter.  Building strong relationships between individuals, organizations, and countries is vital for deterrence by denial. We rely on our allies and partners for their understanding of the geography and the human terrain — the cultures, the societies, and the peoples of the region. 

• • • There are three types of interoperability:  human, technical, and procedural. There are also three dimensions:  human, physical, and information. The crossover or intersection between interoperability and dimensions is the human.  By focusing on the human dimension and investing in and building human interoperability with our allies and partners, other vital components of interoperability will follow.

• • • There are four principles for successful network integration. First, it will require an open architecture so Joint forces and mission partners may easily plug into it. Second, there must be a better way to both grant and evaluate the risk of granting authority to operate within these frameworks. Next, the Army needs to be more data-centric. Finally, our forces need to become transport agnostic for our data.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence podcast featuring COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.), Director, Army Management Staff College, returning to discuss non-terrestrial warfare, weapons of mass deception, and the future information environment.

If you enjoyed this post, learn more about China as our Pacing Threat at the TRADOC G-2‘s China Landing Zone 

… check out the wealth of regional training information on the TRADOC G-2‘s DATE World Pacific page 

… explore future conflict possibilities in this region:

“No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan

The U.S. Joint Force’s Defeat before Conflict, by CPT Anjanay Kumar

Guns of August 2035 – “Ferdinand Visits the Kashmir”: A Future Strategic and Operational Environment  by Team RSM3 from the Army Futures Study Group Cohort VI

Shén fēng: Military Use of Weather Modification Technology, by Rory Fedorochko

… and review the following additional Operational Environment content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

How China Fights and associated podcast

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

The Hermit Kingdom in the Digital Era: Implications of the North Korean Problem for the SOF Community, by Colonel Montgomery Erfourth and Dr. Aaron Bazin

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Today’s post by returning guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Howard R. Simkin was a semi-finalist submission to our Army Mad Scientist Fall/Winter Writing Contest.  His intriguing fictional intelligence (FICINT) “narrative within a narrative” — exploring Large Scale Combat Operations in 2040, wrapped within a backcast scenario positing the future of professional military education — helps us to explore how emergent concepts and technologies could be employed and operationalized to enhance future generations of Soldiers’ learning and enable them to win decisively on tomorrow’s battlefields — Read on!]

This vignette takes place against the backdrop of Great Power Conflict.  On 22 June 2040, the country of Donovia, after months of strained relations and covert hostilities, invades the neighboring country of Otsovia. The United States is a close ally of Otsovia and is compelled to intervene due to treaty obligations and historical ties.

21st SESUⁱ  Brigade, Line of Departure – 0700, 14 July 2040 

Dispersed, yet continually in touch through LPI/LPDⁱⁱ  communications which included magnetic induction, optoelectronic, and quantum, the 21^st SESU Brigade was ready to attack with its three maneuver battalions, its IWⁱⁱⁱ  battalion, and other supporting elements. Tactically, technically, and technologically proficient, Colonel Pedro Morales knew how to get the most out of the Soldiers and systems under his command.

The plan was the best that human minds and Artificial Intelligence (AI) could devise, based on literally thousands of battle simulations. Its key was a solid intent to allow Soldiers and systems to maneuver when (not if) communications were degraded.

Morales blinked twice to bring up the status display for his brigade. All battalions were ready, either concealed beneath adaptive camouflage shelters or relying on onboard systems, like the autonomous M1A6’s.

Smiling, Morales thought, “This isn’t my father’s [or mother‘s] M1 Tank.” The M1A6 was fully autonomous, carried a dozen Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and bristled with counter-UAS defenses. Since it had no crew, the turret had been redesigned to lower the tank’s profile. Its metamaterial coating provided adaptive camouflage that reduced the RF and IR signatures of the vehicle, when either stationary or on the move.

In addition to the 120mm hyperglide cannon, it carried three directed energy weapons for all around close-in defense. It also carried enough computing power to run its operations, process the inputs from thousands of sensors, and direct other combat systems in a fight – all without human intervention. Unlike manned tanks, it had no blind spots, thanks to dozens of sensors located at strategic points around the turret and hull, and an AI enabled cloaking device to defeat multi-spectral scans.  In addition, it could network with the other systems and Soldiers in the brigade, forming a formidable kill web.

Morales was struck by how few Soldiers were in the maneuver battalions. They manned the three RASCV^iv  that formed the backbone of each augmented infantry battalion. Essentially an armored computing and communications platform, the RASCV kept humans on the loop, even during fully autonomous operations. It was also a networking node for the dozens of ground and aerial autonomous systems within the battalion that could communicate with LEO satellites as well.

Of course, armored hover carriers took the augmented infantry into battle. Equipped with powered exoskeletons and biologically enhanced, each Soldier controlled a pair of small UAS for reconnaissance, as well as a pair of robotic quadrupeds nicknamed Cheetahs that were a combination of sensor and gun platform – all linked through a Brain Computer Interface (BCI). “How different things are from when I joined up,” Morales mused.

A transmission brought Morales back to the present, “Agile Six, this is Agile Three, Over.”

He replied, “Go ahead Three, Over.”

“Six this is Three, everything is ready.”

“Three this is Six, execute.”

The three M1A6 equipped battalions began their dispersed physical maneuver, with the IW battalion maneuvering in the information space. Initially slow to react, the Donovian units began to respond more effectively. Once the edge mesh networked AI analyzed the enemy reaction, it quickly switched tactics to achieve the commander’s intent.

Slicing through the enemy defenses, the brigade received unseen assistance from SOF and resistance elements in the deep areas. Morales found it gratifying to see enemy icons representing C2 nodes and integrated air defense systems change color to orange and then to wink out of existence.

Morales AI Virtual Assistant spoke up, “Sir, 1^st Battalion has encountered an unanticipated enemy autonomous tank battalion, the latest Donovian model. They do not believe they can simply bypass and meet your intent. They have requested fire support.”

Surveying the situation quickly he asked, “Recommendations?”

“Two hypercannon batteries are available. They should suffice.”

“Approved.” Morales replied.

Within a few seconds, precision guided hypersonic rounds reduced the enemy tanks to so much junk. The advance continued to gain momentum as the units converged and dispersed at machine speeds. The battle was going well.

In Donovian Airspace, 0701, 14 July 2040

Captain Janet “Bo Peep” Johnson’s F-35 flew into Donovian airspace at 30,000 feet, accompanied by two loyal wingman robotic aircraft. Linked electro-optically and coated with advanced metamaterials, the trio was not picked up by the already disrupted Donovian A2AD network.

Spotting a Donovian tank unit uncoiling from a previously undetected laager, Johnson smiled. Using her BCI and retinal implants, she searched through the available integrated fire solutions available. Her personal AI assistant presented the top three options.

Johnson selected an Allied Frigate offshore to strike. With a series of eye movements, she sent what was on her radar screen to the ship’s hypersonic cruise missile system via the mesh-networked CubeSat satellite constellation overhead. With the coordinates locked in, Johnson gave the command to launch.

Onboard the frigate, the missiles roared into life without any human interaction. They streaked toward the Donovian unit at Mach 6, receiving last minute targeting data from the loyal wingmen via electro-optical links. The missiles acquired their targets, covered the last bit of distance, and reduced the Donovia armor to twisted piles of smoking scrap metal.

Satisfied with the results, Johnson sent a battle damage report. “A sensor’s work is never done,” she reflected with a smile before beginning to search for more targets.

Charge of the Autonomous Brigades, 0900 20 September 2050

The vignette concludes in a West Point holographic classroom, in the year 2050. The cadets are studying “The Charge of the Autonomous Brigade.”

Captain Yazmin Achmed watched the four yearlings file into the classroom around the central holographic display. Once all stations were green on her retinal display, Achmed stepped to her station.

“Cadets, you are here to study a battle that changed the way warfare is fought. Before we begin the holo-simulation,” she fixed her eye on the Cadet closest to her on the right, “Cadet Jameson, please provide us with a summary.”

Jameson paused before speaking, “The battle took place on 14 July 2040. It involved the US 1^st Autonomous Brigade versus the 34^th Donovian Mechanized Infantry Division. It led to the almost total elimination of humans from the battlefield.   It was the first time that the US employed a totally autonomous brigade in battle.”

“And…?” The Captain prompted.

“The result was the near annihilation of the Donovian unit without the loss of a single U.S. Soldier.”

“Very well.” Captain Achmed turned to the closest Cadet on her left, “Cadet Chou, why did the battle earn the name, ‘The Charge of the Autonomous Brigade’”?

Chou replied immediately, “It was because the speed of advance resembled a cavalry charge before the Industrial Age. Every decision was made at machine speed. The brigade just flowed through any gap in the enemy defense. It never even slowed down appreciably. They achieved complete decision advantage.”

“Excellent.” The Captain said with a smile. “Can anyone summarize the factors that enabled such a success?”

Cadet Garcia at the end of the display table raised his hand.

“Cadet Garcia.”

“First and foremost, it was the overall design of the brigade. Using a hybrid computing architecture ensured that units in contact could make decisions with minimum latency. Our use of intent to guide our AI as it directed operations was crucial. It was something that an enemy wedded to centralized control simply couldn’t match. Additionally, our AI was superior as we had eliminated most sources of bias. It was also explainable, so our leaders had confidence it could function on its own within ethical and legal boundaries.”

He paused a moment before continuing, “We made good use of older systems, many of them taken from boneyards. Once they were retrofitted with AI, sensors, QComms, and computing power, they became cheap and effective weapons delivery platforms.”

Captain Achmed smiled as she interrupted, “Are you suggesting the brigade was a collection of cast-off junk?”

“No ma’am,” Cadet Garcia shook his head emphatically, “We had plenty of new gear, but the use of older platforms enabled us to field the brigade far sooner than would have been otherwise possible.”

“Very good.” The Captain said with a smile. “It appears you have all been keeping up with your assignments.” She nodded to the Cadet opposite Garcia, “Cadet Khan, please run the historical simulation… with commentary.”

Khan straightened up, “Yes Ma’am.” He made a few gestures over the holo-table and the simulation began to run. “As you can see, the enemy was surprised initially…”

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following insightful posts by Howard R. Simkin: CRISPR Convergence, Splinternets, and Sine Pari

… as well as the following related content:

Realer than Real: Useful Fiction with P.W. Singer and August Cole and associated podcast; Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette; Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes; Two Vignettes: How Might Combat Operations be Different under the Information Joint Function? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Christopher Paul; and Located, Isolated, and Distracted – An Infantry Platoon Leader’s Experience, by proclaimed Mad Scientist COL Scott Shaw

Algorithms of Armageddon with CAPT (Ret.) George Galdorisi and associated podcast; Artificial Intelligence: An Emerging Game-changer; “Own the Night”; How does the Army – as part of the Joint force – Build and Employ Teams to Compete, Penetrate, Disintegrate, and Exploit our Adversaries in the Future?; Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events; Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield; Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas; and The Convergence: Bringing AI to the Joint Force and associated podcast

The Future of Learning: Personalized, Continuous, and Accelerated; TRADOC 2028;  From Legos to Modular Simulation Architectures: Enabling the Power of Future (War) Play, by Jennifer McArdle and Caitlin Dohrman; A New American Way of Training, and associated podcast, with Jennifer McArdle; The Metaverse: Blurring Reality and Digital Lives with Cathy Hackl and associated podcast; and Fight Club Prepares Lt Col Maddie Novák for Cross-Dimension Manoeuvre, by now COL Arnel David, U.S. Army, and Major Aaron Moore, British Army, along with their interview in The Convergence: UK Fight Club – Gaming the Future Army and associated podcast

Cyborg Soldier 2050: Human/Machine Fusion and the Implications for the Future of the DOD and Benefits, Vulnerabilities, and the Ethics of Soldier Enhancement

About the Author:  Howard R. Simkin is a Senior Concept Developer in the DCS, G-9 Concepts, Experimentation and Analysis Directorate, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He has over 40 years of combined military, law enforcement, defense contractor, and government experience. He is a retired Special Forces officer with a wide variety of special operations experience. Within the G9 he analyzes and defines the future operating environment and required capabilities Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in support of future concepts development. His subject matter expertise includes analyzing and evaluating historical, current and emerging technology as well as Combined, Joint, Multi-Service, Army and ARSOF organizational initiatives, trends, and concepts to determine the implications for ARSOF units. Mr. Simkin holds a Masters of Administrative Science from the Johns Hopkins University. He is a proclaimed Mad Scientist as well as a certified Project Management Professional. He has written several articles that have been published in Naval History, Small Wars Journal, and the Army’s Mad Scientist Laboratory.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S, Special Operations Command, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This is a fictional vignette set in the 2040 – 2050 timeframe. Any resemblance of the characters in this vignette to any person, living or dead, is purely coincidental.

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ⁱ System-of-systems Enhanced Small Unit (SESU)

ⁱⁱ Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection (LPI/LPD)

ⁱⁱⁱ Information Warfare (IW)

^iv Robotic Autonomous Systems Coordination Vehicles