Mad Scientist Laboratory

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, with the next installment of our series on How They Fight.  This episode features Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the TRADOC G-2, Blue Path Labs, Center for New American Security (CNAS), CNA, and VAST-OSINT discussing How China Fights, exploring how our pacing threat conducts intelligentized warfare, maneuver, fires, information operations, cyber, and more!  China’s global ambitions and increasing assertiveness, combined with its warfighting modernization efforts spanning materiel, organization, training, and personnel capabilities will enable them to contest us across all domains in Competition, Crisis, and Conflict.  Read on (and listen!) to learn how our most technologically sophisticated adversary fights!]

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Over the past two decades, China has transformed its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through a holistic approach — modernizing its weaponry, force structure, and approaches to warfare, to include operations in the cyber and space domains, while improving its professional military education. Although Russia remains a near-peer threat, China has ascended to become the United States’ lone pacing threat. The PLA’s momentous progress in warfighting capabilities and concepts, coupled with its whole-of-nation approach to competition, crisis, and conflict, enables it to challenge the United States across all domains and the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic spheres.

Army Mad Scientist interviewed the seven world-class SMEs regarding our near peer threat to learn How China Fights:

Ian Sullivan serves as the Senior Advisor for Analysis and ISR to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC G2). He is responsible for the analysis that defines and the narrative that explains the Army’s Operational Environment, which supports integration across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.  Mr. Sullivan is a frequent and valued contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory, including the previous episode in this series, How Russia Fights.

Peter Wood is a program manager and defense analyst at Blue Path Labs, a strategic advisory firm. He previously edited China Brief, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. He has an M.A. from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies (HNC) and a B.A. in Political Science from Texas Tech University. He is proficient in Chinese.

Elsa B. Kania  is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS. Her research focuses on Chinese military strategy, military innovation, and emerging technologies. Her book, Fighting to Innovate, should be forthcoming with the Naval Institute Press in 2022.  At CNAS, Ms. Kania has contributed to the Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Initiative and the “Securing Our 5G Future” program, while acting as a member of the Digital Freedom Forum and the research team for the Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and National Security.  Ms. Kania is a Ph.D. candidate in Harvard University’s Department of Government. She is also a graduate of Harvard College and has received a Master of Arts in Government from Harvard University. Ms. Kania was a Boren Scholar in Beijing, China, and she maintains professional proficiency in Mandarin Chinese. She is a proclaimed Mad Scientist and valued contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory.

Kevin Pollpeter is a research scientist in the CNA China Studies Division. He is an internationally recognized expert on China’s space program and is widely published on Chinese national security issues, focusing on Chinese military modernization, China’s defense industry, and Chinese views on information warfare. His publications include China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States; Planning for Innovation: Understanding China’s Plans for Technological, Energy, Industrial, and Defense Development; and “Chinese Writings on Cyberwarfare and Coercion,” in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in international policy studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and is currently enrolled in a Ph.D. program at King’s College London.

Dr. Amanda Kerrigan is a Research Scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at CNA, where her research has focused on Chinese developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and Chinese media responses to U.S. military operations and activities worldwide. Dr. Kerrigan holds a Ph.D. in China Studies from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a Master’s degree in Chinese Politics and Diplomacy from Fudan University in Shanghai, and a Bachelor’s degree in Asian Studies from Georgetown University. She was a Fulbright Fellow in China from 2015-2016, studying protest and violence in China’s health care system. Fluent in Chinese, she spent four years living between mainland China and Taiwan. Her previous professional experiences include working in the China Practice at the Albright Stonebridge Group and with Johns Hopkins Medicine International.

Doowan Lee is CEO and co-founder of VAST-OSINT, an AI startup.  He builds data analytic tools to expose and analyze the provenance of disinformation and adversarial information operations by enriching and visualizing cyber data for content authentication.  He is also a senior advisor to the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) and adjunct professor of politics at the University of San Francisco.  He leverages emerging AI technologies to empower open society and support national security.   He specializes in disinformation analysis and great power competition in the Information Environment.  Before founding VAST-OSINT, he taught at the Naval Postgraduate School for more than eleven years as a faculty member and principal investigator. He was also featured in a previous podcast episode, Disinformation, Revisionism, and China.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS. She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, authoritarianism and threats to democracy, and the state of the Transatlantic alliance. Prior to joining CNAS, Ms. Kendall-Taylor served for eight years as a senior intelligence officer. From 2015 to 2018, she was Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the ODNI.  Prior to joining the NIC, Ms. Kendall-Taylor was a senior analyst at the CIA where she worked on Russia and Eurasia, the political dynamics of autocracies, and democratic decline.  Ms. Kendall-Taylor is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.  Ms. Kendall-Taylor was also featured in the previous episode, How Russia Fights.

In our interview with the aforementioned SMEs, we explore How China Fights, to include intelligentized warfare, maneuver, fires, information operations, cyber, and more!  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Beginning in 2004, China’s PLA undertook a major modernization effort to reinvent itself as a rival to the United States. It invested in extensive technology development, undertook major force restructuring, and created new, specialized units for advanced warfare. Though the PLA lacks combat experience, it has become progressively more assertive in competition.

• • • China has completed extensive research and development in artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems. Specifically, China will use this technology to support drones across all military operations, including combat and logistical support. China is now the United States’ most technologically sophisticated adversary, though its concentration on this “science” of warfare may be at the expense of the “art” of battle, or the focus on training creative, resilient human forces.

• • • China will also leverage its AI proficiency in “intelligent warfare,” integrating machines in military decision making. This strategy will shift warfare to the key cyber and space domains and increase its emphasis on obtaining high-quality military data.

• • • 

      In its modernization campaign, China created a Strategic Support Force  (SSF) for information warfare, space operations, and cyber activities. The consolidation of these capabilities demonstrates China’s perception that these will be the decisive domains in future warfare. Further, documentation demonstrates that China sees information operations as a regular, rather than irregular, warfare technique.

• • • 

      China has also sought to fully integrate itself into the global economy and digital infrastructure through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This effort increased the strength and resilience of its economy, portrayed China as a willing and capable development partner, and provided itself with increased access to operation spaces for future systems confrontations.

• • • 

      Though China’s relationship with Russia is limited and transactional, the rate of cooperation between the two nations has increased in recent years. They are increasingly aligned on policy goals such as countering U.S. influence and democracy promotion, and seek to combine Chinese capital with Russian talent to fully advance their respective international standings.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence podcast “Through Soldiers’ Eyes: The Future of Ground Combat,” featuring subject matter experts — military analysts, combat veterans, and combat reporters — discussing their experiences in modern warfare at the “bleeding edge” of battle, the future of conflict, and the requirements and challenges facing future ground warfighters.

Learn more about China as our Pacing Threat in the following TRADOC G-2 content:

ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics; People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide; China Trifold; the China products page; and information on PLA weapon systems accessed via the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) on the OE Data Integration Network (ODIN).

… explore the following Mad Scientist Laboratory China content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

“Intelligentization” and a Chinese Vision of Future War

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Disinformation, Revisionism, and China with Doowan Lee and associated podcast

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training

A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations

China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare

The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

… and check out the following additional content on China:

China’s Military Civil Fusion Strategy:  A View from Chinese Strategists, by Alex Stone and Peter Wood

People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition by Kevin McCauley

THE PLA BEYOND BORDERS Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context, edited by Joel Wuthnow, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang

Deciphering the PLA’s New Joint Doctrine: A Conversation with Dr. David Finkelstein, a podcast by our colleagues at the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

>>> REMINDER:  Army Mad Scientist Fall / Winter Writing Contest: Crowdsourcing is an effective tool for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions. Army Mad Scientist seeks to crowdsource the intellect of the Nation (You!) with our Fall / Winter Writing Contest’s two themes — Back to the Future and Divergence – check out the associated writing prompts in the contest flyer and announcement, then get busy crafting your submissions — entries will be accepted in two formats:

Written essay (no more than 1500 words, please!)

Tweet @ArmyMadSci, using either #MadSciBacktotheFuture or #MadSciDivergence

We will pick a winner from each of these two formats!

Contest Winners will be proclaimed official Mad Scientists and be featured in the Mad Scientist Laboratory.  Semi-finalists of merit will also be published!

DEADLINE: All entries are due NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on January 10, 2022!

Any questions? Don’t hesitate to reach out to us — send us an eMail at: madscitradoc@gmail.com

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  With Congress’ passage and President Biden signing the bi-partisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act last month, Army Mad Scientist is training its sights on infrastructure vulnerabilities that could be targeted by our adversaries.   The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the proliferation of autonomy means a plethora of ever-smaller wireless internet and cellular antennae, paired with smaller and more prolific sensors, are embedded across public and industrial infrastructure.  This web of networked sensors has, per Chris O’Connor in his superlative post Warfare in the Parallel Cambrian Age, created “an interface between the physical and cyber domains of warfare” that is ripe for exploitation. Our adversaries now present a hemispheric threat, capable of exploiting this broad attack surface across the U.S. homeland, with potentially catastrophic kinetic effects, all the while maintaining plausible deniability.  Read on to learn more about this threat!]

Russia and China present a hemispheric threat to the U.S., having invested heavily in offensive cyber capabilities to gain an outsized advantage against U.S. military, civil, and economic targets in the homeland with limited attribution.

SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems are computer-based networked systems that gather and analyze real-time data to monitor and control infrastructure-related critical and time-sensitive processes and events. U.S. SCADA systems — controlling electrical grids, water and sewage supply and treatment facilities, mass transit and rail, traffic controls, telecom and IT networks and systems, and more — lack appropriate cybersecurity protocols and defense capabilities to fend off threats from extraction tools, arbitrary code attacks (RCE), and denial of service (DoS) attacks.

As U.S. cities (and installations) become increasingly “smart” and hyper connected, their threat surface grows exponentially. Power grids, pipelines, water distribution systems, and traffic control systems that are operated and monitored by advanced, automated systems (e.g., NOLAlytics in New Orleans, Metro21 Project in Pittsburgh) require increased connectivity and data storage capacity and capabilities – often relying on cloud services – which provides an opening for malignant cyber actors (Russia and China).

Hospitals and medical centers are especially vulnerable to ransomware and cyber-attacks that compromise sensitive patient data, critical life support systems, and operating capabilities.

Russia has been identified by the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as the most prominent global malicious state cyber actor. Russia’s 2017 NotPetya cyber-attack on Ukraine spilled beyond its target to inflict massive economic damage worldwide, crippling international shipping giant Maersk and causing an estimated $10 billion in economic damage. Russia had launched similar attacks previously — against Estonia in 2007 and Ukraine in 2015.

Russia also sanctions, or at least condones, cyber-attacks and ransomware operations by cybercrime and hacking groups that originate in the Russian Federation. NOBELIUM, a state-connected hacking group, responsible for the massive SolarWinds hack, is assessed to be conducting a broad, large-scale attack campaign against global supply chains, IT networks, and DoD systems. While Russia does not appear to have sponsored the cybercrime group DarkSide’s ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline, it makes no effort to prevent or deter the operations of such groups in its territory.

While China has been far less brazen and confrontational in its cyber approach than Russia, the PRC poses a significant and complex long-term cyber threat to the U.S. and its infrastructure. Beijing has largely used its cyber prowess and capabilities for espionage and technology theft.

China continues to build up a substantial cyber-attack capability with a whole-of-nation approach that includes hacking and attack groups across the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), civilian government, and even “private” student groups. China is mapping and targeting networks across a variety of U.S. industries and organizations – healthcare, financial services, defense industrial base, energy sector, government facilities, chemical plants, critical manufacturing, communications, international trade, education, legal, and even video gaming – in preparation for a possible future “zero-day” attack.

According to an assessment from the President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council, current U.S. government and military cyber defense capabilities are disconnected and scattered across a wide swath of agencies, departments, and sub-units in a complicated labyrinth that is extremely challenging to coordinate and navigate.

 

Kinetic threats to infrastructure are still extremely concerning, not only from state actors, but from non-state actors and proxy forces, as evidenced by Houthi drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil industry in March 2021 and Abha airport in August and September 2021.

Attacks on or sabotage of supply chains can have adverse effects on the homeland in a similar way to a ransomware attack on hospital can (time = death). China and Russia have ample opportunity to either disrupt the supply chain through cyber-attacks or, more covertly, poison the supply chain with routing manipulation or compromised goods that will either fail or act as sensors.

Our adversaries can target the Nation at the granular level (citizens and Soldiers alike) via the ubiquity of social media and much improved deepfake (voice and video) AI technology, exploiting our inherent biases and eroding our trust in national institutions, elected leaders, commanders, and comrades-in-arms. This is an easily democratized threat vector — anyone (great and lesser powers, non-state actors, multinational corporations, and super-empowered individuals) can develop and employ them. Due to our anchoring and confirmation biases, these technologies are particularly effective components of much larger Information Operations.

For much of its history, the U.S. homeland has been blessed by the protective spans of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with our key infrastructure largely out of reach from our adversaries.  No longer!  The Internet of Everything with ever expanding hyper-connectivity continues to broaden our nation’s attack surface, providing a tempting “Achilles heel” for all potential adversaries seeking to “punch above their weight.”  Investing in infrastructure hardening, building national cyber resiliency, and clearly delineating the consequences for attacks on U.S. homeland infrastructure are warranted courses of action.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

The Future of War is Cyber! by CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley; Blurring Lines Between Competition and Conflict; Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security, by Dr. Russell Glenn; The Convergence: Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare with Dr. David Kilcullen; and the associated podcast

Warfare in the Parallel Cambrian Age, by Chris O’Connor; Military Implications of Smart Cities, by Alexander Braszko, Jr.; Army Installations: A Whole Flock of Pink Flamingos, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Richard G. Kidd IV, et al.; and Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare, by Dr. Richard Nabors

Russia: Our Current Pacing Threat, The Bear is Still There: Four Insights on Competition with Russia, How Russia Fights, and the associated podcast; Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade and China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare; and China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events, this series’ associated content and videos, Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette, and Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes

How Big of a Deal are Drone Swarms? and A New Age of Terror: New Mass Casualty Terrorism Threats by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachary Kallenborn

A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat, by 1LT Carlin Keally; The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling; and The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella

>>> REMINDER:  Army Mad Scientist Fall / Winter Writing Contest: Crowdsourcing is an effective tool for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions. Army Mad Scientist seeks to crowdsource the intellect of the Nation (You!) with our Fall / Winter Writing Contest’s two themes — Back to the Future and Divergence – check out the associated writing prompts in the contest flyer and announcement, then get busy crafting your submissions — entries will be accepted in two formats:

Written essay (no more than 1500 words, please!)

Tweet @ArmyMadSci, using either #MadSciBacktotheFuture or #MadSciDivergence

We will pick a winner from each of these two formats!

Contest Winners will be proclaimed official Mad Scientists and be featured in the Mad Scientist Laboratory.  Semi-finalists of merit will also be published!

DEADLINE: All entries are due NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on January 10, 2022!

Any questions? Don’t hesitate to reach out to us — send us an eMail at: madscitradoc@gmail.com

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist is pleased to support the Army and its Army People Synchronization Conference in January 2022.  To that end, we’re announcing the associated writing contest — not to be confused with our on-going Army Mad Scientist Fall / Winter Writing Contest — in support of this critical endeavor prioritizing the Army Team (Soldiers, Department of the Army Civilians, their dependents, and Soldiers for Life).  Check out the details below — we will feature the winning submission and author in a future Mad Scientist Laboratory blog post.  Additionally, we will compile it, along with other submissions of merit, and provide copies to Senior Army Leadership attending the Army People Synchronization Conference.  So get cracking on your submissions!]

The Chief of Staff for the Army placed “People First” among the Army’s priorities.

By prioritizing people first, the Army is signaling that investing resources in our people initiatives is the most effective way to accomplish our constant mission – to deploy, fight, and win our nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.

Army “personnel” are means to an end:  mission accomplishment. “Individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.” (JP 1-0).  Army “People” initiatives recognize this relationship, but it may also include a reframing, which considers our human element as an end unto itself.

If the Army’s human dimension meets the mission but does not also meet the needs of people, then the Army is not successful. This requires the broader People approach integrating holistic health and fitness, cohesive teams, removing unnecessary systematic barriers to individual success, and providing resources for Soldiers to meet their maximum potential. In doing so, we live up to our Army’s and Nation’s values, while ensuring mission success.

Identifying solutions to existing individual, team, and social challenges while also maximizing performance is difficult today. The battle between human nature and desired human behavior requires constant engagement and anticipation of emergent threats and opportunities. As the Army transitions to the needs of MDO:

• • • What does it mean to put People first in the 2035 time frame? How do advances in technology and society provide more opportunities and challenges?

• • • What are the social and political implications of emerging technologies?

• • • With the emergence of new cyber and psychological means, are civilians and families larger targets that the Army must protect?

• • • What are the implications on civil-military relations based on the emergence of new technologies?

The Army wants to crowdsource your thoughts on one or more of these aforementioned writing prompts — craft a 500 word composition over the Holiday Season and submit it via email with “APSC” in the subject line NLT 1700 EDT on Monday, 03 January 22, to:  madscitradoc@gmail.com 

Army Mad Scientist will feature the winning submission and author in a future Mad Scientist Laboratory blog post.  Additionally, we will compile it, along with other submissions of merit, and provide copies to Senior Army Leadership attending the Army People Synchronization Conference in January 2022!

[Editor’s Note:  One of Army Mad Scientists’ missions is to harness its community of action to help the Army imagine future possibilities.  Today’s post by guest blogger LTC Steve Speece effectively accomplishes this with a series of five illustrated vignettes, peering into the mid-twenty-first century and exploring what the Operational Environment (OE) could hold for future conflicts.  Deftly weaving compelling narrative and awesome graphics with evocative themes — attrition warfare and stalemate in the space domain; commercial letters of marque and a return to high seas privateering; great power competition via proxy warfare in distant lands; the role of integrated sensors in dense urban environments; and enhanced longevity via genetic engineering versus immortality via artificial intelligence avatars — LTC Speece provides our readers with provocative insights into deep future OE possibilities.  Read on!]

Kourou Space Centre, French Guiana
October 2049

The rapid payload integration center crew watched as the three reusable rocket boosters landed nearly simultaneously across from the refurbish-assembly building.  Fantails of chemical foam erupted from un-manned ground vehicles and a mobile recovery crane lurched toward the scene. The launch operations center director, Alex, rubbed the temples of his balding head. This was a record fast turnaround for reusable boosters for them. Brussels was asking his team to repeat this feat two more times.

Why the urgency? A serial of networked Chinese satellites was drifting towards a protected communications satellite, one of the few the European Union had in operation. It was a high value asset. Alex has been launching autonomous blocking satellites to interdict the potential threats. He stepped out of the franticly busy refurbishment bay for a breath of fresh air. A rooster clucked as it walked by.

This was a key wartime effort. The conflict in space began about six years ago among the expected belligerents. No one seemed surprised that it started. What surprised everyone is how tediously slow it unfolded and that it is still dragging on six years later. War in space was not the decisive catastrophe of Kessler Syndrome debris the world expected. It was an expensive war of attrition.

It had more in common with the positional trench warfare of the First World War than 20^th century science fiction. One of Alex’s ancestors fought in World War I, and now he serves as an officer in the French Space Force.  Alex sees satellites launched to block other satellites to block other satellites in seemingly infinite recursion. Some orbital regimes were now so densely occupied that some of Alex’s handiwork was visible from Earth. In the late evening he could already see the milky band across the sky that was the geo belt. 

It all reminded him of the 1914 Race to the Sea, culminating in years of trench warfare he learned about in school.

He knew this kind of warfare would have no winners. In the distance he saw a large autonomous merchant vessel pull into Port Kourou to unload shipping containers full of satellite hardware for him to integrate into payload racks.

 

100 Nautical Miles South of Seychelles, Indian Ocean
June 2050

The low-profile semi-submersibles slipped out of the well deck of the converted bulk cargo ship under cloud cover and sliced through white caps towards the shipping lane. The Chinese task force charged with this zone was stretched thin, attempting to counter privateers, “flying circus” air raids from Australia, and policing embargo violations from the Americas. Darren piloted the lead semi-submersible in the small privateer wolfpack of six boats. They will rely on speed and stealth to make it to and from the target area while avoiding detection. Soon the wolfpack came into primary sensor range of two massive autonomous merchant vessels heading outbound from East Africa towards Indochina. Darren launched a small, expendable, multi-rotor drone from a tube into the sky and the display in front of him opened up a video feed.

He captured still images of the vessel names. “We have positive identification,” he said. The wolfpack split into two formations, one of which peeled away to the Southeast. Once on their target marks, each semi-submersible deployed their large slow-moving torpedo mines. The wolfpack then dispersed to make their way back to their mothership independently to confound post-strike analysis by the Artificial Intelligences which would certainly begin hunting for their signatures. If detained, they will be charged with piracy, and very possibly executed. Some of the privateers have embraced the pirate identity, despite the danger.

One after another, explosions ripped through the hulls of the two autonomous merchant vessels and the northernmost one began to list. Sinking commercial ships of these tonnages could take hours or even days, but that was not necessarily the objective of the raid. Darren’s wolfpack was not targeting the ships themselves, or even the rare earth metal ores they were carrying.

The objective was the thousands of containers now toppling into the Indian Ocean as the ships capsized. Depriving Beijing of these containers would wreak havoc on supply chains and holding up transport of everything passing through intermodal facilities on the maritime silk road.  Of course, it would be easy to build more shipping containers but that would take time at great opportunity cost, all the while Darren’s wolfpack would continue its campaign financed by a nameless oligarch with a bottomless bank account.

On the deck of the second damaged and listing merchant, a blue container opened its roof hatch to reveal a concealed bank of cruise missiles. Two missile canisters began raising to their launch positions but before they could fire, the container slipped off the listing ship and plunged into the ocean. Darren was fortunate. He started doing the math in his head. His synthetic-stock in the cryptographic letter-of-marque to be redeemed by his private security broker should be enough for him to finally pay off his mortgage.

 

Madang, Papua New Guinea
September 2051

John pressed up against the fence to watch the two unmanned refuelers taxi down the runway and quickly pull into makeshift hardened aircraft shelters on the apron. The great powers are fighting a regional proxy war to the west. Chinese-backed separatists are fighting an insurgency against the Western-supported Jakarta government.  Beijing has imposed a no-fly-zone over much of the Indonesian archipelago to give sanctuary to insurgents in Borneo and Sulawesi.

John occasionally sees the sleek silhouettes of Chinese fighters and surveillance drones in the sky from the boat harbor. The Royal Australian Air Force and its allies did not have the numbers to challenge China’s air power everywhere. Instead they mass their few exquisite capabilities in time and space to dominate a specific area for a while before Chinese forces can respond decisively. The Australians called the forces deployed in asymmetric strategy the “Flying Circus” after the historic predecessor. When the Flying Circus came to town, it put on a significant event for the locals. They brought more than aircraft and missiles; they brought containers full of cargo.

Advanced allied strike aircraft would land in short order, quickly rearm, refuel, and sortie on mission. They would attack enemy aircraft, insurgent missile batteries, and merchant ships full of shipping containers. Those containers would occasionally wash ashore or be towed in by fishing boats to be plundered.

John’s ancestors worshipped cargo. During the Second World War, his people witnessed cargo airdropped off course and took it for blessings from the gods. Now, of course, most people know exactly where cargo comes from. But the cargo faith is about more than just shipping containers. The return of the importance of cargo to the lives of people in his community has led to a renaissance of the folk religion. Like their ancestors before them, the people in John’s community built makeshift airfields inland from the real one. They built life-size replicas of advanced American fighters out of bamboo, scrap metal, and fiberglass siding. Maybe this was partly a sincere religious tradition and partly a practical matter to convince the Flying Circus it was safe to return.

When the composite squadron of fighters and drones finally sortied loaded with missiles, John left the area near the airfield. He knew it was not safe yet.  He made his way to the top of a large hill overlooking Madang. It was evening and he saw the faint glowing tail of a satellite burning up on reentry in the distance.  This one was strange; it kept glowing and turned in a wide arc. This was in fact a hypersonic glide vehicle and it began to leave a thick vapor trail behind it as it turned and plunged toward the earth– detonating on the ritual replica airfield.

 

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
March 2052

The massive armored vehicle rolled to a stop and the rear hatch opened to a dark and quiet neighborhood.  Feng is a PLA Soldier on a four-month rotation to Tanzania. There is fighting and violence, but little of that for him to do. Feng spends most of his time maintaining the expansive network of sensor and communications towers in the sprawling urban area. Satellite communication was no longer cost effective or reliable in this part of the world. The towers which combine public data services, security monitoring, and secure networking for unmanned combat vehicles have proven an effective and lethal counter to the New Islamic State.

The problem is that NIS combatants have begun to take the towers offline faster than Feng and his unit can repair them. He looked up at the 100-meter tower bristling with polygonal antennas and began walking towards the gated perimeter warning lights. The air smelled of burnt plastic and raw sewage. Feng’s section chief remained in the vehicle to provide security.  He extended the armored vehicle’s sensor mast and began scanning rooflines, looking for indicators that they were being watched. There were at least three insurgent groups active in this area.

Feng did not make it to the gate before the explosives detonated in a carefully hidden tunnel under one of the tower’s massive steel legs. Upheaved earth surged into the air and landed in a cloud of debris. The structure groaned and began to topple, slowly at first and then rapidly– collapsing to the ground.

The Chinese Soldier quickly grabbed his bag of tools and ran back to the waiting armored vehicle. There in the vehicle he jumped into the remote weapons station and assured his chief he was okay.

The all-domain combat vehicle had a suite of defensive measures to protect them against missiles, remotely piloted aircraft, or even directed energy weapons. However, without connectivity to the secure area network they could only rely on their own vehicle’s sensors.  A crowd of civilians began to gather near the toppled tower, maybe a threat, or maybe just looters looking for scrap. The rare earth metals in those antennas alone were probably worth several times what the locals earned in a year. Ironically, much of it was mined just a few kilometers inland, shipped across the Indian Ocean to be refined and manufactured into electronics and shipped back to Tanzania.

The situational awareness display showed several icons representing autonomous combat vehicles in motion. “Let’s go,” said the Chief, and the vehicle’s electric motors began to whine into action. Feng swiveled the sensor ball around to watch the growing crowd of armed civilians as they drove away. An older man and a boy unraveled the unmistakable banner of the New Islamic State.

 

Beijing, People’s Republic of China
June 2053

In two days, the President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission would celebrate his 100^th birthday. He is showing no signs of slowing down.

The Chairman kept the specific protocol of his longevity treatments a guarded state secret, but it was obvious his therapy treatments were state-of-the-art. Most of the Chinese Communist Party senior leaders expected him to remain alive and in office for at least another fifty years and few expected to outlive him. Beijing has now officially banned superlongevity treatments within China, but the Chairman and other Chinese elites continue to seek it out surreptitiously. Publicly, Beijing authorities express grave concern about superlongevity technology from the West which allows the wealthy to accumulate even larger fortunes over multiple natural human lifetimes.

The Chairman has now for decades perceived the rise of private wealth among the world’s semi-stateless trillionaire oligarchs as a competing center of power. Beijing has not seen a peaceful transfer of power in over 40 years.  Over the decades, the Chairman had accumulated enemies big and small and carries with him the diplomatic baggage of failed foreign policies and broken promises.

The Central Military Commission members sat around an elegant circular wooden conference table. They all began their rehearsed performance for the videographer/historian from the state-controlled media, the committee listening intently to the Chairman’s lecture. The scene was captured and the videographer left the committee to its real work– the operation to kill the so-called Caliph of the New Islamic State.

The New Islamic State was notoriously responsible for the port explosion that killed over 10,000 in Shanghai. Much like the old Islamic State, for some Wahhabi Muslims, the mere existence of a credible Caliph with formal control over territory activated tenets of Islamic Law which lay dormant for hundreds of years.

Beijing’s strategic manhunt aimed to eliminate the Caliph and revert the ideology of that demographic back to its peaceful state. The human who was the physical Caliph was killed ten years ago outside a religious school in Pakistan.

The Caliph speaking in the video clip in front of them today was an artificial intelligence trained on the writings and speeches of the original. It was an avatar, a replica, and maybe to some– a hoax. But to enough people this Caliph was real. Beijing just simultaneously struck three data centers in Indonesia and Africa and killed software developers believed to be critical vulnerabilities to the operation of the AI.

Despite operational reports claiming success, the Caliph has returned once again.

There he was on the screen calling for new attacks. He is effectively immortal.

 

 

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following content on the future OE:

The Future Operational Environment: The Four Worlds of 2035-2050, the complete AFC Pamphlet 525-2, Future Operational Environment: Forging the Future in an Uncertain World 2035-2050, and associated video

Weighing Effort in the Future Strategic Environment 2028-2035, by MAJ James P. Micciche and CW3 Nick Rife

… as well as the following related content:

Space: Challenges and Opportunities; Star Wars 2050, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Marie Murphy; and Space 2035: A Surplus of Uncertainty and a Deficit of Trust, by Maj Rachel Reynolds

Unleash the Privateers! by Colonel Mark Cancian (USMC-Ret.) and Brandon Schwartz, in our colleagues’ at the USNI journal Proceedings; Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events; Pattern Detected! Masking by Injecting Randomness, by Chris Butler; Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China; and Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

For a discussion on exquisite capabilities, see “Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel, by Ian Sullivan.  For more on battlefield transparency, masking, and deception, see Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, its associated podcast, Nowhere to Hide: Information Exploitation and Sanitization, and War Laid Bare, by Matthew Ader

New Skills Required to Compete & Win in the Future Operational Environment; Warfare in the Parallel Cambrian Age, by Chris O’Connor; Character of Warfare 2035; The Future of War is Cyber! by CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley; Military Implications of Smart Cities, by Alexander Braszko, Jr.; and Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare, by Dr. Richard Nabors

Designer Genes: Made in China? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano and Joseph DeFranco; The Technological Information Landscape: Realities on the Horizon, by Dr. Lydia Kostopoulos; The Death of Authenticity: New Era Information Warfare; Influence at Machine Speed: The Coming of AI-Powered Propaganda, by MAJ Chris Telley; The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling; and Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events 

… and see CPT Katherine Hathaway‘s winning entry to last Summer’s  CALLING ALL CREATORS ~ An Army Mad Scientist Multi-Media Contest, entitled Kryptós, showcasing her ideas about future OE possibilities in an imaginative, alternative way. 

>>> REMINDER:  Army Mad Scientist Fall / Winter Writing Contest: Crowdsourcing is an effective tool for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions. Army Mad Scientist seeks to crowdsource the intellect of the Nation (You!) with our Fall / Winter Writing Contest’s two themes — Back to the Future and Divergence – check out the associated writing prompts in the contest flyer and announcement, then get busy crafting your submissions — entries will be accepted in two formats:

Written essay (no more than 1500 words, please!)

Tweet @ArmyMadSci, using either #MadSciBacktotheFuture or #MadSciDivergence

We will pick a winner from each of these two formats!

Contest Winners will be proclaimed official Mad Scientists and be featured in the Mad Scientist Laboratory.  Semi-finalists of merit will also be published!

DEADLINE: All entries are due NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on January 10, 2022!

Any questions? Don’t hesitate to reach out to us — send us an eMail at: madscitradoc@gmail.com

Steve Speece is an active duty U.S. Army officer currently assigned to the Joint Staff J2 as an Executive Intelligence Briefer to the Chairman’s Special Staff.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Last month, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) carried out a successful flight test of a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft deploying several drones, and more importantly, successfully recovering one while in flight.  In today’s post, returning guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Zak Kallenborn explores what the advent of drone motherships portends for the future battlefield and examines the potential ramifications they have for multi-domain drone swarm operations — Read on!]

When I was young, around 16 or so, I loved the video game StarCraft. For those unfamiliar, StarCraft is a real-time strategy game where futuristic armies battle for territorial supremacy. My favorite unit was always the Protoss Carrier — a 25^th century dirigible-looking aircraft that spits out four little robot planes (eight if you have the upgrade). I loved to build like ten Carriers and watch all the pixelated drones swarm all over the battlefield and destroy everything in sight. The tough part was I built my whole strategy around the Carrier; as soon as they were destroyed, so was I.

The imaginary Protoss Carrier illustrates important lessons around using drone swarms in a real 21^st century battlefield. Particularly, the Protoss Carrier shows the importance of mothership-like concepts to support drone swarm deployment, rearmament, and repair. The challenge for the United States and other militaries is how best to defend the mothership and integrate it with other weapons platforms.

The Mothership Concept

A drone swarm mothership is an unmanned or manned system that transports the swarm to the battlefield. If a military wishes to bring thousands or even millions of drones to the battlefield, a mothership is almost certainly necessary. So many drones take up a lot of space. Millions of drones cannot fit in the bay of an F-35 or even the hold of a destroyer (unless they are super small.) Each drone may need to be refueled, repaired, and rearmed. Where will they recharge? Who will repair them? How?

A mothership can serve all of those functions. A mothership is a single platform to provide transport and other services to maintain the drone swarm. For example, the French ECA Group built a ship that deploys and supports various surface and subsurface vehicles for mine counter-measure operations (the vehicles do not form true swarms, but they could). Motherships may also be networked together to enable coordination between the drones to ensure drones from one carrier do not interfere with the operations of another. In the near-term, a mothership is likely to be manned, at least minimally, with humans carrying out basic maintenance tasks.

Protecting the Mothership

In evaluating threats and friendly applications for increasingly large drone swarms, the military must consider how best to protect and target motherships.  For all the advantages motherships provide in deploying and using swarms, they are also an obvious point of failure. If the mothership is destroyed, all the drones it contains and supports will be destroyed too. A drone swarm mothership operating on land, in the air, at sea, under the sea, or in space presents essentially the same challenge as an aircraft carrier at lower scale: how do you protect a big, valuable platform?

Drone motherships must necessarily be significantly larger than the component drones to carry all of them. And likely, the mothership must be significantly larger to support transportation, energy generation, and any other capabilities. Thus, protecting the mothership is functionally equivalent to protecting any large platform. The mothership may have stealth capabilities, such as camouflage or reduced radar profiles. Stealth details would naturally depend on the domain of operation: desert camouflage patterns are obviously not useful for an aerial mothership. As with an aircraft carrier battle group, the mothership might also be incorporated into larger groups of manned and unmanned systems that can provide support, such as air and missile defenses.

An important question is whether the mothership can or should deploy drones capable of countering potential threats. This will depend on the type of drones, their payloads, and how quickly they can be deployed and used. A ground-based mothership may worry about tanks, and so may incorporate anti-tank drones within the swarm. Drone swarms can, and already do, operate across multiple domains, which complexifies the challenge. A drone swarm operating in multiple domains would need to worry about potential threats across the full range of the swarm’s operations.

Regardless of concept, electronic and cyber-attack are likely to be key vulnerabilities. Motherships must have some way of communicating with the drones under its command. At the bare minimum, the mothership must emit some form of signal — passive or active — so the drones within the swarm know where to return to. An adversary may seek to disrupt the signal or provide fake signals to separate the swarm from the carrier. Likewise, any autonomous or other control systems within the mothership may be disabled, manipulated, or otherwise corrupted.

Policy Recommendations

To the degree that drone swarms are important parts of the future battlefield, mothership concepts are likely to become increasingly prevalent to manage the complexity. The United States military should explore different concepts of motherships, varying both the nature of the platform and the type of drones included. This should especially emphasize exploring differing combinations of manned vs. unmanned systems and how motherships may support existing systems. In addition, the military should include electronic and cyber defense as a critical aspect of mothership research and development and acquisition. The military should also think critically about the best approaches to defeat adversary motherships, including electronic and cyber attack. This does not need to be fancy: a simple anti-vehicle mine may be deadly against even the most sophisticated ground-based mothership.

If you enjoyed this post, check out Zak Kallenborn‘s previous Mad Scientist Laboratory blog posts:

How Big of a Deal are Drone Swarms?

A New Age of Terror: The Future of CBRN Terrorism

A New Age of Terror: New Mass Casualty Terrorism Threats

… and explore how drones and drone swarms could be employed across all domains on the future battlefield in the following posts:

Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events post and the associated webinar content (presenter biographies, slide decks, and notes) and videos

Ground Warfare in 2050: How It Might Look and “The Convergence” — Episode 6: The Intelligent Battlefield of the Future and podcast, featuring proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Alexander Kott

Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown

“Own the Night” and the associated Modern War Institute podcast with proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Bob Work

Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and associated podcast

Insights from the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 2020 and Insights from the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 2020 (Part II)

“Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel, by Ian Sullivan

Major Trends in Russian Military Unmanned Systems Development for the Next Decade, Autonomous Robotic Systems in the Russian Ground Forces, and Russian Ground Battlefield Robots: A Candid Evaluation and Ways Forward, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Sam Bendett

The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training

A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations

China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare

The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

Autonomy Threat Trends

Creating a Convergence of Technologies to Defeat the Deadly Fast Inshore Attack Craft Threat Before 2050, by proclaimed Mad Scientist CAPT George Galdorisi, (U.S. Navy–Ret.)

The Democratization of Dual Use Technology

Star Wars 2050, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Marie Murphy

>>>> REMINDER:  Army Mad Scientist Fall / Winter Writing Contest: Crowdsourcing is an effective tool for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions. Army Mad Scientist seeks to crowdsource the intellect of the Nation (You!) with our Fall / Winter Writing Contest’s two themes — Back to the Future and Divergence – check out the associated writing prompts in the contest flyer and announcement, then get busy crafting your submissions — entries will be accepted in two formats:

Written essay (no more than 1500 words, please!)

Tweet @ArmyMadSci, using either #MadSciBacktotheFuture or #MadSciDivergence

We will pick a winner from each of these two formats!

Contest Winners will be proclaimed official Mad Scientists and be featured in the Mad Scientist Laboratory.  Semi-finalists of merit will also be published!

DEADLINE: All entries are due NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on January 10, 2022!

Any questions? Don’t hesitate to reach out to us — send us an eMail at: madscitradoc@gmail.com

Zachary Kallenborn is a national / homeland security consultant with expertise in unmanned systems, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and WMD terrorism. His work has been published in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, the Nonproliferation Review, War on the Rocks, the Modern War Institute at West Point, DefenseOne, and various other outlets. His research has been written about in Forbes, Popular Mechanics, Homeland Security Today, the National Interest, and Yahoo News. His most recent study examines whether drone swarms could be considered weapons of mass destruction.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Cyber Institute, the U.S. Military Academy, Army Futures Command (AFC), or U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).