Mad Scientist Laboratory

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of  The Convergence podcast, featuring General Gary M. Brito, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), discussing synchronizing modernization across the Army, critical aspects of modernization that are crucial to shaping the fighting force, and how changes in the Operational Environment affect this process — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

General Gary M. Brito assumed duties as the 18th Commanding General, United States Army TRADOC, on September 8, 2022.  He is responsible for building and sustaining a highly trained, disciplined, and fit Army by acquiring the best people, training the most lethal Soldiers, developing the most professional leaders, guiding the Army’s culture, and shaping the future force.

In today’s podcast, General Brito discusses synchronizing modernization across the Army, critical aspects of modernization that are crucial to shaping the fighting force , and how changes in the Operational Environment affect this process.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our discussion with General Brito:

• • • TRADOC is “that first layer of bricks” in building readiness for the Army.  In building this foundation, TRADOC acquires the very best people, trains the most lethal Soldiers, and develops the most professional Leaders. TRADOC also provides that connective tissue that guides Army culture and shapes the future force.

• • • Modernization is more than materiel and the Soldier is the centerpiece. Technology does not replace them, but rather is enabled by them. This scales to the squad, platoon, company, battalion, and beyond, to give the Army the overmatch needed to contest our adversaries.

• • • Integration and synchronization across the entire DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy) spectrum of capabilities is one of TRADOC’s major responsibilities.  Identifying the doctrine associated with a future tank or next generation aircraft has to occur at the earliest stages of acquisition, in coordination with other organizations like the Army Staff, Army Futures Command, FORSCOM, the Joint Force, and others.

• • • It’s vital that TRADOC takes the lessons learned from current conflicts in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and feed them into how we train our Soldiers.  It is also important to measure the impacts of new technology and materiel in a multi-domain operation. All of this new knowledge needs to be infused into the accessions process and Professional Military Education.

• • • Balancing training, readiness, personnel, and modernization is a delicate and difficult balance in which all components need to be synchronized. It’s important to weave Soldier touchpoints into the acquisition process at specific milestones for user feedback. With a good plan and coordination, the Army can modernize and test equipment, while at the same time train and build readiness.

• • • Coordination between TRADOC and the other Army Commands is accomplished through leadership, communication, and transparency.  There is no light between Commanders of the Army Commands –they have a shared understanding of their roles within the larger Army effort. One team, one fight!

• • • While we may not get modernization completely right — and over the last 20 years we’ve gotten some of our assessments wrong — we must have flexibility and versatility built into our processes.  We can adapt to new technology and pivot within our acquisition system, but if we incorrectly develop our Leaders, it will take years to recover.

 

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence on 23 March 2023!

 

If you enjoyed this post, mark your calendars now to watch General Brito’s “Fireside Chat” with Lieutenant General(R) Leslie Smith on “Synchronizing Army Modernization” at the AUSA Global Force Symposium in Huntsville, AL, on 28 March 2023 at 1300 CDT / 1400 EDT — for more information, click here.

In the meantime, check out the following related content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

“Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel , by Ian Sullivan

Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts, with Brent L. Sterling, and associated podcast

Then and Now: Using the Past to Secure the Future by Warrant Officer Class 2 Paul Barnes, British Army

Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with COL John Antal (USA-Ret.) and its associated podcast

New Skills Required to Compete & Win in the Future Operational Environment 

The Future of Learning: Personalized, Continuous, and Accelerated

TRADOC 2028

Setting the Army for the Future (Parts II and III)

Future Jobs and Skillsets

U.S. Demographics, 2020-2028: Serving Generations and Service Propensity

The Inexorable Role of Demographics by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth

The Future of Talent and Soldiers  and associated podcast, with MAJ Delaney Brown, CPT Jay Long, and 1LT Richard Kuzma

The Trouble with Talent: Why We’re Struggling to Recruit and Retain Our Workforce by Sarah L. Sladek

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist welcomes back returning guest blogger COL Stefan J. Banach (USA-Ret.) with today’s post, exploring how the evolution and synthesis of technologies and culture have converged to realize new, disparate societies of global netizens.  This convergence enables our adversaries to target each of us, transforming our homes and offices into a new non-kinetic war battle space.  COL Banach codifies this brave new world of non-kinetic war and proposes a whole-of-nation way ahead for fighting and winning this unfamiliar warfare.  “Control of the global non-kinetic terrain is the decisive operation, as it affects all things in the physical kinetic battle space” — Read on!]

This paper provides insights into the undermining of democracy, repression, and coercion that is noted in the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), through the lens of non-kinetic war.  It also proposes a method for the development of doctrine and a strategy to counter non-kinetic war threats.  The recommendation is that the U.S. Army problem frame include non-kinetic war, kinetic war, and counter insurgency operations.  The rationale is based on the change in the character of war over the past 40 years, and the directed task noted below in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).  Decades of global entanglement, assured connectivity, persistent technical surveillance, and the effects of converging technologies have set the conditions for non-kinetic systems warfare on a global scale.

The aforementioned dynamics have reframed long standing epistemological norms that guide our thinking and understanding.  The theory of cognition and knowledge has significantly changed for humans who are connected via the World Wide Web (WWW).  People are exposed to new data, knowledge structures, and technology capabilities, which have made sense-making difficult today.  These phenomena have also altered human ontology – our theory of being and the essence of things as we once perceived them.  Technological advancements have created a multitude of traceable and targetable individual virtual avatars and a deceptive sense of being.  Human identity and our DNA are increasingly becoming both biological and digital, out of necessity, and as a result of converging systems.¹   Digital disintermediation has dethroned hierarchical governance, as people can obtain required information and make decisions without institutional approval.²   The degradation of data veracity and efficacy has irreversibly changed the theory of values and truth through the proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and “fake news” that is promulgated by humans and bot virtual armies by nation state and non-nation state entities to achieve economic, political or ideological objectives.³   These variables, and many more, are having a profound impact on U.S. Army readiness and the ability to recruit and sustain an all-volunteer force.

From a system thinking perspective, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and Information Advantage (IA) are supporting constructs that fit within the strategic non-kinetic war rubric.  The precis of the U.S. Army’s MDO concepts presents a technical solution to a complex adaptive system of problems, which have not been fully framed and named.  The current MDO and IA concepts are a good start, but do not capture the order of magnitude strategic non-kinetic war threats that are confronting the US and the world today.  Controlling the global non-kinetic terrain is the decisive operation, as it affects all things in physical space.  Expanding the cognitive aperture to frame and name non-kinetic war would be a positive step forward towards maintaining a competitive advantage in the global security environment, as directed in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The United States is engaged in a global non-kinetic war that has not been framed or named.  Non-kinetic war is a strategic form of maneuver that is dividing populations and disrupting cultures, around the world in a historic manner.  This non-physical approach to war produces opaque affects that are not known to the targeted entity initially, and potentially will go unnoticed for months and even years.  We have witnessed instances of this new type of war against U.S. Government agencies during repeated hacks of the Office of Personnel Management.⁴   These types of attacks also occurred in corporate America involving the Solar Winds and the Colonial Pipeline companies.⁵

Threat entities to the United States are using non-kinetic relational dialectic strategies to divide populations.  Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT) is an interpersonal communication theory about relationships that highlights the tensions, struggles, and interplay between social groups, political parties, and religions, et al.  The theory, proposed by Leslie Baxter and Barbara Montgomery, defines communication patterns between relationship partners as the result of endemic dialectical tensions.⁶   Non-kinetic war heuristics provide adversaries to the United States with a new means to exploit dialectical relational tensions to divide our country.  Semiotic exploitation maneuvers have further attacked the signs and symbols of nation-states around the world, to sow discord among various cultures, governments, and economic classes in a given society.  Nation state and non-nation state entities have adopted and weaponized a new body of theory.  These entities are indirectly attacking the West, and specifically the United States, using non-kinetic instruments of war whereby war is not perceived as war.  All of this is intentional, repressive, and represents a risk to the United States, if it is left unchecked.

The U.S. military is standing astride an historic warfare fault-line.  A new form of global power has surfaced and is disrupting the previous kinetic warfighting schema.  New language is required to describe the emergent security phenomena that is increasing in pervasiveness and power.  Leadership and personal mastery over modern war, contemporary mental models, learning archetypes, process systems, and the ability to create a relevant shared vision within compressed timelines is now a challenge and liability for leaders.⁷

New threat non-kinetic war innovations are being masked with legacy language, mental models, physical warfighting systems, and doctrine, from a previous warfighting paradigm.

The U.S. Army, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Government writ large are struggling to see non-kinetic war through a new lens.  Historically, the “Great Captains of War” have routinely missed the new war.  We saw this happen with the French in 1940, the U.S. Military in 2003 in Iraq, and we are seeing it happen now with non-kinetic war.  The 9/11 Commission Report’s significant finding was, “The most important failure was the lack of imagination.”⁸

In times of exponential change, one must change exponentially.  An anticipatory leadership ilk, and a healthy professional skepticism, are required to expand the operational art, discover a new range of theory, and to identify the emergence of new types of war.  Imagining new forms of non-kinetic maneuver and seeing the patterns for the weaponization of new technologies against cultures and armies in novel ways, are critical modern war leadership imperatives.

Non-kinetic war is a byproduct of the convergence, which is the evolution and the synthesis of technology, education, economic, finance, social, governance, and other foundational cultural systems.  This convergence has produced a new reality that is not recognized by many people, to include U.S. Army service members.  The momentum and exponential power of the convergence has transformed connected citizens into a new species:  the global netizen.⁹   Millions of human beings today have unwittingly become netizens, through algorithmic warfare attacks, attention distraction techniques, pervasive change technologies, and bot-driven reflexive control operations by nation-state and non-nation state actors.  Taken together, these trends have created a state of liminality and non-kinetic war blindness for many of the global commons.

Technology Transformation.  This transformation is explained by Paul Virilio who opined that, “Every new technology carries its own negativity, which is invented at the same time as the technical progress.”  For example, when the train was invented, the train wreck was also created.  When the airplane was invented, the plane crash was also created, etc.  That is the case for the convergence of technologies, which were created and used across an array of systems throughout the four industrial revolutions since 1765.  When we created the WWW and the new palette of technologies that we have at our fingertips today, we also weaponized global learning system, invented non-kinetic war, conceived the new global netizen life form, and created the “Instrumentarian” – a new species of power that Shoshan Zuboff notes in her book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.

The convergence also ushered in a Revolution in Human Affairs, where Soldiers and Civilians are now both combatants in non-kinetic war.  We saw this with Elon Musk maneuvering satellites over the Ukraine, a sovereign nation state, which was engaged in war with Russia, a nuclear capable nation-state.¹⁰   The group Anonymous attacked the Russian communication systems, and hacktivists attacked the Belarus train station to slow the Russian deployment of its forces prior to the start of the Ukraine War.  Today, our homes, offices, and all places in between are non-kinetic war battle space.  The principal non-kinetic weapon systems are carried in our hands, on our wrists, or sit on our desks.  How should U.S, Army leaders adjust behavior to see this new front that draws its power from the decisive non-kinetic terrain?

Non-Kinetic War Learning Systems. The learning system is the weapon system.  A military’s learning system, for time immemorial, has been the primary and most important weapon system in war.  Learning faster than our adversaries is critical.  Controlling what our adversaries learn, when they learn it, and how they learn it is now possible and can lead to the perception of a multi-reality environment.  That is what we are witnessing today.  The activity of non-kinetic war has weaponized the global learning system.  The global learning system is the aggregation of a multitude of capabilities that people use every day to communicate, live, prosper, and to wage war. The principal objective of non-kinetic war is to deny the productive range of learning to a given adversary or culture, to degrade decision-making competencies.

The global learning system has been weaponized with the advent of the: World Wide Web, cyber, social media, artificial intelligence, machine learning, robotics, nanotechnologies, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, space operations, behavioral science, synthetic bio-medical developments, attention distraction heuristics, and pervasive change technologies.  Going forward, this group of technology capabilities, and theory, will be referred to as the “Technology Palette.”

DoD and Joint Force learning system growth and alignment are critical to achieving success on current and future battlefields. The DoD and the Joint Force currently use a process operating system, as the foundation for learning, and to maintain and sustain a competitive advantage. Theoretically, and practically, this is unsustainable as processes are not created for complex adaptive problem situations, which is the problem typology that is most prevalent today.  Processes are optimized for technical problem solving and management.¹¹   The process operating system represents only 33% of the learning system capability that is required to win a war today.  In other words, the DoD and the Joint Force lack 67% of the operating system capabilities, which are required to drive the learning that is necessary to win the Nation’s wars.  The DoD and the Joint Force require a big data operating system and a design operating system, in conjunction with a new updated process operating system, to remain relevant.

The U.S. military requires the three operating systems noted above, and new non-kinetic principles of war and warfighting functions, to ensure survivability on a battlefield.  The longstanding hierarchical learning system and its attendant decision-making zeitgeist is collapsing before our eyes, given exponential technological change.¹²   Developing a leadership acumen in the U.S. Army which is capable of leading adaptive work and learning across enterprise boundaries is important, in terms of naming and framing non-kinetic war heuristics.¹³   The need for big data-enabled decision-making capabilities and autonomous leadership has never been greater within the DoD to increase anti-fragility across the force.

Anti-Fragility.  Nassim Taleb suggests that achieving an elevated level of Anti-Fragility, the ability to gain strength from disorder, is an essential leadership and cultural imperative.¹⁴   Anti-Fragility will be required, as we move on from a big data paradigm to a quantum sensing, communication, encryption, decryption, and computing reality in the 2030s.  When realized, these technological advancements will assist in ushering in a post-human era that will fundamentally change every aspect of our lives.¹⁵   Societal ruptures will occur throughout the world, as a new world order emerges.¹⁶   Is the U.S. military prepared for the systemic shock that will accompany the radical change in technological power, and a quantum-driven world?¹⁷   The realpolitik of the United States and the West writ large, would do well to embrace this looming reality now by making the required investments to secure our future.

Asymmetry.  The U.S. military should be prepared to fight any and all forms of war that emerge in the global security milieu.  Non-kinetic war and counter-insurgency operations (COIN) have been the dominant and new conventional war over the past 32 years.  Kinetic war has become the new irregular war given its intermittent use over the same timeframe.  This is not a binary issue.  The point is that the US has traversed a warfare inflection point over the past three decades, which has flipped the global warfare script.  United States expenditures for defense do not align with this global warfare paradigm shift.  The DoD is projected to receive approximately 817 billion dollars in its 2024 budget.  The overwhelming majority of the DoD budget will be spent on kinetic warfighting capabilities.

Non-kinetic war is low cost in terms of human life and funding.  It can be fought, and won, at pennies on the dollar.  This opens the door for a multitude of small nation state entities, terror organizations, and civilian corporations to wield disproportionate power in the global security environment.  Non-kinetic war also produces multiplicative strategic effects, at exponential virtual speed, and can create enduring systemic shock across continents, as we have seen with the coup d’états on the African continent.  Pervasive global reach, unrelenting virtual munitions by way of IT robot (bot) armies, and decentralized indirect attacks underpin non-kinetic war.  Controlling information efficacy, momentum, speed, volume, and achieving time-space compression, are new elements of the operational art that could degrade adversary cognition and decision space.

Synthetic Force Protection.  All technology devices emit targetable signatures that form virtual avatars for both man and machine.  The digital emissions allow for the transmission of locations and behavior patterns that are manipulated in every way imaginable for private sector profit, and military advantage.  Multiple levels of synthetic protective measures are required to cloak a growing number of virtual avatars that compromise the netizen and the service members’ location, and activities in non-kinetic battlespace, that includes CONUS activities.  Various levels of synthetic body armor are required to ensure survivability of man and machine on a modern battle that includes traditional kinetic battlefields, as well as, our homes, offices, and all points in between.

Every netizen, U.S. service member, and warfighting system are engaged in an unrelenting non-kinetic war that leverages all connected segments of technology for exploitation.  Each of these entities, require synthetic immunity akin to the three levels of biological immunity in the form of a new Synthetic Threat Intrusion Defense System (STIDS).  For example, Synthetic Innate Immunity could be a universal baseline capability that all DoD service members receive upon entry into the military for all their personal and military devices.  Synthetic Adaptive Immunity could be a set of capabilities that are drawn from a host entity over time, to keep pace with technology advancements.  Synthetic Barrowed Immunity packages could be dynamically generated protective technologies that are tailored to a specific threat capability or region of the world.  These synthetic enhancements are required to protect every connected human being and machine in non-kinetic battlespace, to prevent loses in the kinetic battle space.  Synthetic Stealth by way of IP “Frequency Hopping” and spoofing technologies will increase life expectancies in modern war.  Synthetic Sensing, the corollary to the five biological senses, could also be created to ensure survivability on a modern battlefield.  The creation of Joint Non-Kinetic Maneuver Training Centers, the corollary to the kinetic NTC/JRTC training centers, could immeasurably enhance the readiness of the U.S. Army and Joint Force.

Cognition.  The threat environment has changed.  U.S. service members cannot think as fast as the machines which are targeting them today.  Technology has changed significantly.  However, the human brain has not changed enough to address the increased cognitive demands inherent in non-kinetic war.  Decision-making at the individual level will require synthetic assistance to ensure survivability on a kinetic battlefield.  The fusion of biological and machine intelligence is required to sustain human life on a non-kinetic and kinetic battlefield.¹⁸   Left unchecked, this non-kinetic battlespace problem will increase in complexity and will lead to survivability being measured in minutes and seconds while engaged in kinetic combat.

The Non-Kinetic War Frame.  The non-kinetic war phenomena is far more powerful than the four Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) combined effects, which have occurred over the past 124 years.¹⁹   Non-kinetic war consists of the following 21 forms of warfare:  Virtual Warfare, Cognitive Warfare, Information Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Cyber Warfare, China’s “Lawfare,” Irregular Warfare, Political Warfare, Economic Warfare, Financial Warfare, Culture Warfare, Social Warfare, Digital Warfare, Space Warfare, Systems Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Hyper Warfare, Gray Zone Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Multi-Reality Warfare, and Quantum Warfare.²⁰  None of these forms of warfare can be dismissed, as they are all valid threats to the American way of war.  All of these forms of warfare present the U.S. Army with a complex system of problems that require adaptive work.  These warfare systems also present a number of asymmetric opportunities that the U.S. military has yet to realize.  Embracing the recommendations in this essay could change that fact.

This arrangement of warfare systems highlights the need to address technical problem-solving processes and technical work.  It also requires the development of a complex adaptive problem-solving culture, new mental models, and the development of an adaptive work acumen across Army, Joint Service, and Inter-agency boundaries—to synthesize these 21 forms of warfare and the attendant technologies into a new strategic form of maneuver that can win wars now.  This adaptive work could begin with the recognition of the Four Elements of Non-Kinetic War which are the backbone for Six Non-Kinetic Principles of War, and Five Non-Kinetic Warfighting Functions.  Controlling these three new constructs are the start to defeating non-kinetic war maneuver strategies.

Four Elements of Non-Kinetic War:  Technological structures, technological capabilities, the flow of data, and the timing for when data appears in the virtual environment are the four elements of non-kinetic war.  These elements form the backbone of the global learning system that includes technology, education, economic, social, finance, governance, and a multitude of other systems.

Six Non-Kinetic Principles of War:  Non-kinetic war is underpinned by six new principles that includes the global entanglement of all the systems that are used today.  The global entanglement phenomenon enables assured connectivity with the global commons.  This sets the conditions for persistent technical surveillance of all netizens and pervasive systems warfare on a global scale.  Virtual colonization and social control are the final two principles which underpin non-kinetic war.

Five Non-Kinetic Warfighting Functions:  Includes the infiltration of individual, organizational, corporate, or nation-state governance systems.  After the system infiltration is complete, there is an orientation period in a “Perch” posture.  After being orientated, the threat actor then makes adaptations to what the compromised system presents and then proceeds with data extraction and data exploitation for continued surveillance, profit, or positional advantage in the global commercial marketplace or in the security environment.

The Strategic Imperative.  There is a need to create the corollary to the Manhattan Project to overcome our Non-Kinetic War challenge.²¹  This opportunity would require a broad range of strategic sponsors, U.S. Government agencies, Joint and Army Headquarters, and civilian subject matter experts, who could comprise an enterprise-wide design team to address the adaptive work and complex system of problems inherent in the ongoing global non-kinetic war.  Forming an inclusive whole-of-nation design team that is capable synthesizing the 21 forms of non-kinetic warfare and the 4^th Industrial Revolution technology palette that underpins non-kinetic war is critical.

The U.S. Army masterfully synthesized the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Aviation, Intelligence, Air Defense, Engineer, and Command & Control Systems into an unmatched kinetic combined arms maneuver construct in the 20^th Century.  The United States needs to do the same for non-kinetic war and shape our future where we can win through the synthesis of 4th Industrial Revolution technology palette.  The new non-kinetic way of war strategy will cut across existing barriers and will be significantly different than any archetypes used in the past.  This task requires strategic sponsorship, adaptive leadership, innovation, and imagination to take the next step in the right direction — to win the Nation’s wars and ensure the preservation of our Republic.

U.S. Army Mission Essential Non-Kinetic War End State Tasks.

1. 1. 1. The corollary doctrinal schema for what is seen in kinetic war needs to be created for non-kinetic war.
      2. Synthesis of the 4th Industrial Revolution technology palette is required to create a new non-kinetic strategic maneuver strategy.
      3. Control of the global non-kinetic terrain is the decisive operation, as it affects all things in the physical kinetic battle space.
      4. Identify a broad range of political sponsors, U.S. Government agencies, Joint and Army Headquarters, civilian Subject Matter Experts to form an enterprise design team to address the adaptive work and complex system of problems inherent in the ongoing global non-kinetic war.

Winning.  Redefining what “Winning” a war means to the American people is critical.  Holistically addressing kinetic war, counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, and non-kinetic war as the current U.S. Army war problem frame is the starting point to winning wars.  Had the U.S. Army conducted an enterprise-wide After-Action Review (AAR) after the losses sustained in the  Afghanistan and Iraq wars, U.S. leaders may have acknowledged all three types of war that should comprise the U.S. war problem frame.  As in the past, the U.S. Army has experienced changes in the character of war.  Non-kinetic war impacts kinetic war and COIN operations every day.  Of note, the United States is actively engaged in a global COIN war on six of the seven continents in the world, to include North America.  The US is also engaged in a global non-kinetic war.  The non-kinetic war knowledge gap that exists today between U.S. law enforcement and DoD technology subject matters relative to a conventional U.S. Army service member presents tremendous risk to the force and to the mission.  This capability gap should be addressed by teaching the range of theory inherent in the technology palate that is addressed in this paper using the Civilian Education System (CES) and in Professional Military Education (PME).

Codifying and communicating success Limits of Tolerance within specific Zones of Acceptability over time, when engaged in each of the three forms of war noted above, is critical to defining and understanding what “Winning” means.  Activities which occur in the non-kinetic battle space that necessitate reprisal in the kinetic battle space or in a COIN operation requires further clarification for the American people.  The inability of the U.S. Government to strategically communicate an all-inclusive U.S. war problem frame to U.S. citizens due to national security reasons is eroding the will of the American people.  It is also impacting the ability to mobilize an increasingly compromised U.S. national industrial base.  This is the end game of the threat non-kinetic war strategy.  Sun Tzu’s idiom, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” is now feasible by way of non-kinetic war.  Are adversaries to the U.S. military on the cusp of winning, without firing a kinetic munition?

Risk of Not Acting.  The non-kinetic threat that is before the United States requires a new logic, form, functions, culture, laws, and authorities to sustain a U.S. Constitution-driven American way of life.  Non-kinetic war goes well beyond the boundaries of the U.S. Army and the DoD, and our adversaries are aware of that.  Threats to the United States have kept the world’s most powerful military off the non-kinetic battlefield through the use of the “lawfare” practice of block and diversion, which presents conflict with U.S. laws, authorities, and military regulations.  The risk of not acting on this recommendation is the loss of our freedom as ascribed in the United States Constitution.

If you enjoyed this post, check out COL Stefan J. Banach‘s previous posts and podcasts:

The Light on the Hill: America and Non-Terrestrial War, its associated podcast, and its companion essay The “Convergence” and Non-Terrestrial War

Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare, and associated podcast

Virtual War – A Revolution in Human Affairs (Parts I and II)

… as well as the following related content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

Speed, Scope, and Convergence Trends

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security and Is Ours a Nation at War? U.S. National Security in an Evolved — and Evolving — Operational Environment, by Dr. Russell Glenn

Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare and associated podcast, with Dr. David Kilcullen

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success, by CW4 Charles Davis

The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Raechel Melling

A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat, by 1LT Carlin Keally

The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far… and Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events

About the Author:  COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.) served with distinction in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 2010. He is a Distinguished Member of the 75th Ranger Regiment and served in that special operations organization for nine years, culminating with command of the 3rd Ranger Battalion from 2001-2003. He led U.S. Army Rangers during a historic night combat parachute assault into Afghanistan on October 19, 2001, as the “spearhead” for the Global War on Terror. Steve subsequently led U.S. Army Rangers in a second combat parachute assault into Al Anbar Province in western Iraq in 2003. He also served as the Director, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS); Director, Army Management Staff College; and is now the TRADOC G2 Non-Kinetic War Design Officer. He also earned a certificate in Leadership in Crisis: Preparation and Performance, from the JFK School of Government at Harvard University.  

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

¹ Eric Schimdt, The New Digital Age, John Murray Publisher, Paperback 2014, Page 40.

² Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings, LikeWar:  The Weaponization of Social Media, 2018, Eamon Dolan Book, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Page 55.

³ Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brookings, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, Page 34.

⁴ Office of Personnel Management Hacks,  2015, OPM announced two separate but related cybersecurity incidents.

⁵ Solar Winds and the Colonial Pipeline companies.  Congressional Bipartisan Cyber Reporting Bill.  The hack of IT management firm SolarWinds, which resulted in the compromise of hundreds of federal agencies and private companies, and the May 2021 ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline, which halted pipeline operations temporarily and resulted in fuel shortages along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, as well as a recent onslaught of ransomware attacks affecting thousands of public and private entities.

⁶ Leslie Baxter, 2014 University of Oklahoma Relational Dialectics Theory (RDT) Seminar.  In person RDT dialogue with Dr. Baxter post-seminar.

⁷ Peter Senge, 5^th Discipline, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1022948013380, June 1998, Abstract.

⁸ The 9/11 Commission Report.  Published July 22, 2004

⁹ https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/netizen

¹⁰ Elon Musk, News about Elon Musk Star Link Satellites To Ukraine, bing.com/news, 2022

¹¹ Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, Harvard University Press, 2000, Page 100.

¹² Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, 2019, Page 35.

¹³ Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, Page 115.

¹⁴ Nassim Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, 2014, Page 10

¹⁵ Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near:  When Humans Transcend Biology, Penguin Books, Page 194.

¹⁶ Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, 2001. Page 14.

¹⁷ Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near:  When Humans Transcend Biology, Page 15 – “the merger of Technology and Human Intelligence.

¹⁸ Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near:  When Humans Transcend Biology, Page 16.

¹⁹ Anthony Cordesman, The Real Revolution in Military Affairs, https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-revolution-military-affairs, 2014

²⁰ Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinese-legal-warfare, 2012

²¹ Manhattan Project, https://www.history.com/…/the-manhattan-project, 2017

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist is pleased to present our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, featuring Dr. Joanna Siekiera — an international lawyer specializing in Pacific law, maritime law, and the law of armed conflict — discussing the legal aspects of Multi-Domain Operations and the protection of civilians, what we can learn from the on-going war in Ukraine as it pertains to U.S. policy and legal implications, and her concerns about security and policy in the Indo-Pacific — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Joanna Siekiera is an international lawyer and Doctor of Social Sciences in public policy sciences. She studied under a New Zealand Government scholarship at the Victoria University in Wellington. Her specialization is legal and political relations in the South Pacific, and the law of armed conflict. She is prodigious author, having written a book, co-authored three monographs, over 90 scientific publications in several languages, and over 40 legal analyses.

In today’s podcast, we explore the legal aspects of Multi-Domain Operations and the protection of civilians, what we can learn from the on-going war in Ukraine as it pertains to U.S. policy and legal implications, and her concerns about security and policy in the Indo-Pacific.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview:

• • • Dr. Siekiera’s goal is to advise commanders on how to lawfully accomplish their military aims by understanding legal possibilities.

• • • Law is important, both as a discipline and within the context of society.  Societal and cultural context help us to accurately analyze a conflict and understand the initial ideas and values that send countries to war, in order to respond appropriately and proportionally.

• • • There are no ethics in international law – one country’s system of values may not translate to another, creating differences in approaches to the law of armed conflict.  Context and history can teach us why countries may see things differently and help to predict further actions.

• • • Dr. Siekiera uses the terms “East” and “West” not to divide but to make people aware that the two are not the same.  Assuming that an adversary shares your cultural values is a dangerous and misleading bias —  mirror-imaging — that threatens security.  Alliances between nations are maintained when a shared identity is fostered.

• • • The legal aspects of Multi-Domain Operations and the protection of civilians are not being treated with the requisite importance.  Although international laws exist to protect civilians in armed conflicts, a nation that does not hold the same values cannot be relied upon to comply with these otherwise widely accepted humanitarian laws.  This must be recognized when planning all aspects  of military operations.

• • • China – the biggest threat not only to western civilization but to NATO – slowly influences economic and societal changes in surrounding nations, quietly creating a military threat decades before it is recognized.  Although NATO falls outside the Indo-Pacific region, China is still a threat through its influence in nearby nations.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence on 9 March 2023 when we’ll discuss synchronizing modernization efforts across the U.S. Army with  GEN Gary Brito, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)!

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related TRADOC G-2 and Mad Scientist content:

China Landing Zone content on the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise public facing page — including the BiteSize China weekly topics, ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and more!

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

How China Fights and associated podcast

Your Adversary is Rational, Just Not the Way You Want Them to Be  by LTC Nathan Colvin

Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts, with Brent L. Sterling, and associated podcast

Then and Now: Using the Past to Secure the Future by Warrant Officer Class 2 Paul Barnes, British Army

China: Building Regional Hegemony and China 2049: The Flight of a Particle Board Dragon, the comprehensive report from which this post was excerpted

The Most Consequential Adversaries and associated podcast, with GEN Charles A. Flynn

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post and podcast do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

 

[Editor’s Note:  As long term readers of the Mad Scientist Laboratory know, a contemporary U.S. Army maneuver Brigade Combat Team (BCT) has over 2,500 pieces of equipment dependent on space-based assets for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). This number of dependent systems will only increase as emerging technology on Earth demands increased bandwidth, new orbital infrastructure, niche satellite capabilities, and advanced robotics.  But what if we are denied our long-standing dominance in the Space Domain, losing our heretofore omnipresent Global Positioning System (GPS) capability?  Per the Defense Intelligence Agency‘s Challenges to Security in Space 2022: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion — “China has … developed and probably will continue to develop weapons for use against satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.”

Today’s submission by guest blogger CPT Matthew R. Bigelow addresses the ramifications of GPS as a “single point of failure” — creating “friction in our kill chain systems, with wide-ranging effects from sensor to decision-maker to shooter.”  CPT Bigelow explores three possible alternative capabilities to GPS that could help ensure continued PNT for the U.S. and its allies and partners on the battlefield of 2040.  Read on to learn how this “navigation PACE plan” could preserve U.S. options for succeeding in future competition and conflict!]

Introduction

The battlefield of today and beyond involves space, a domain that includes a sophisticated orbiting system connected to the current changes in the character of war. These changes include hypersonic and anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, artificial intelligence (AI), self-aware machine learning, robotics, biotechnology, three-dimensional printing, and quantum computing. The increased significance of this geographic or physical domain is due to our adversaries’ modernization efforts and our shift in focus from counterinsurgency operations to Multi-Domain Operations.  In addition, over the last two decades, our adversaries have demonstrated  kinetic strike and non-kinetic ground-based interference capabilities targeting our orbiting systems, specifically against the Global Positioning System (GPS). Examples include the Chinese fractional orbital bombardment system demonstration in 2021 and the Russian electronic interference with Norwegian GPS in 2017.¹  Without the Space Domain, there are breaks or friction in our kill chain systems, with  wide-ranging effects from sensor to decision-maker to shooter.

Recent conflicts highlight the importance and utility of space systems with loitering munitions and drones. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the proxy wars in Libya and Syria, as well as the current war in Ukraine are recent examples of space reliance for delivery of specific system effects. Dependence on space will continue to increase in the decades to come due changes in the character of war. Combat operations, mission command, and visualization of the battlefield are hindered without space-enabled capabilities and their efficacy. This is especially true with GPS disconnection through various forms of adversarial obstruction efforts:  downlink / uplink interference, an ASAT strike, or cyber-attacks. With future systems developing and expectations to fight arrayed in a dispersed and disaggregated contested environment, GPS becomes more important on the battlefield of 2040 and beyond.

U.S. Army force structure, design, and modernization efforts should address these challenges. At the minimum, GPS deserves further discourse amongst strategists and planners for preparation of future conflicts and changes to the character of war. This paper argues the importance of hardening the defenses and protecting our GPS system, building a “PACE” (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency) plan for navigational continuity during Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), and increasing our awareness of the space domain.

Problem & Threats

GPS is essential during LSCO. However, there is risk to the complete reliance on the current space architecture and orbiting constellation system. The US has relied on this capability since the Gulf War with demonstrations of precision strike and beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) communications against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. GPS enabled quick victories in both conflicts. Unfortunately, the US no longer maintains overmatch in space. Adversaries studied the enablers of U.S. battlefield success and devoted more attention to space with incorporation into their defensive plans, specific to anti-access / aerial denial and protection against regime collapse. The US has come to rely on persistent and encrypted GPS connectivity since the end of the Cold War.  Robert Hoffman, Chief, Space Operations Training Division, Space and Missile Defense School explains it best:  “The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to focus its efforts on modernizing the way it delivers positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). Without a fundamental shift away from GPS, the DoD will not be competitive in near-peer conflicts.”²  This is a challenge to national security and the American way of war:  offensive combined arms maneuver with Joint and allied / partner integration and reliance on advanced systems and capabilities for overmatch.

Historical Analogy

The historical equivalent of GPS utility and dependence are the Japanese use of wireless telegraphy against Russia in 1904 and German incorporation of the radio within their 1940 Blitzkrieg of France. These capabilities, changes in the character of war in the early twentieth century, enabled Japan and Germany with battlefield advantage against their opponents, granting them the ability to disperse forces, maintain communication, and execute mission command. Russia and France possessed wireless telegraphy and the radio; however, Japan and Germany adapted faster during inter-war periods and utilized these capabilities synchronously and efficiently in combat with protection.³  The lesson learned:  navigation capabilities, like telegraphy and the radio, is paramount for successful battlefield outcomes. The party that adapts to the changes in the character of war the fastest may have battlefield advantage. Protection of GPS and navigation capabilities will continue to give the US an advantage in combat.

GPS Background – A Single Point of Failure and an Attractive Target 

The genesis of GPS dates to the 1970s during the third industrial revolution that focused on innovation of industrial systems, automation, and technology. Due to competition with the Soviet Union and fear of nuclear war, the DoD started experimenting with finding a reliable and precise means of navigation. Existing systems did not meet military purposes and there were concerns of vulnerabilities. The current GPS system architecture consists of 24 satellites with spares in medium-earth orbit, managed by the DoD. Since the 1980s, GPS is available for commercial use, which poses a vulnerability due to global economics and private sector reliance.⁴  From 1991 on, the US has not shifted to a new system less vulnerable to current great power competitors and changes to the character of war.

Competitors have engineered their own navigation systems, as well as tested capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, for counter-space operations. Russia and China have their own respective navigation systems, GLONASS and BeiDou-2, which are part of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS); U.S. GPS is also part of the GNSS. In addition, our adversaries have proven the capability of striking orbiting sensors in space through destruction or disruption means. Western military theorist Clausewitz noted, “The aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy.”⁵ In addition, Eastern military theorist, Sun Tzu noted, “Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.”⁶ Our adversaries will strike in space, as they are aware of our GPS dependence and system connections. Future wars will extend into space; it is inevitable, especially for adversarial regimes’ survival and defensive measures against our combined arms maneuver.

ASAT missiles, regardless of payload, and space debris are concerns or threats to the current GPS orbital architecture. An ASAT missile with a nuclear payload can cause an electromagnetic pulse, a deliberate burst of energy that ends the utility of electronics in orbit and on the ground. In 2008, China launched a non-nuclear ASAT missile against one of their own defunct satellites, which created thousands of pieces of space debris. More recently, Russia demonstrated their capability by striking a defunct orbiting satellite in 2021. Again, this demonstration created added debris that threatens current orbiting satellites and manned missions, including the International Space Station. Debris travels at approximately 17,500 miles per hour in orbit and has the potential of unleashing the Kessler Effect, which is an exponential increase in fragments caused by collisions from other materials in orbit. A Kessler Effect can affect all other satellites in an orbit that support LSCO: communications, sensors, and imagery. In other words, the world goes “dark” and rewinds back to the economic period of pre-GPS due to space debris congestion.

A System and Center of Gravity

GPS supplies extremely accurate PNT data connected to a larger system supporting other digital and mechanical means. Space and GPS reliance enhances military roles, responsibilities, our common operating picture, as well as command and control, specifically with targeting, precision munitions, BLOS communications, intelligence collection, imagery, and the Internet of Things. A system is groups or combinations of interrelated, interdependent, or interacting elements forming collective entities.⁷ For the US, GPS is a center of gravity, a physical entity that serves as a primary component of strength.⁸  If an adversary interfered with GPS signaling or destroyed a satellite, navigation efforts could slow or cease. In addition, GPS supports defensive standoff; in current Eastern Europe, for example, Russia has exhausted their precision munitions and thus must use dummy rounds for strike, which risks their air assets against Ukrainian defenses.

Without GPS, our military receivers, which are paramount for precision fires and maneuver, become inoperable. Loitering munitions and other types of drones depend on GPS for precision fires and navigation; in the absence of GPS, those machines lose the relative advantage they provide, or effects delivered. Without GPS, expeditionary capabilities and forward deployment from power projection platforms could be disrupted; transportation relies on GPS. Machine learning and AI may experience degradation, disruption, or curtailment because of the system connection between GPS and the Internet of Things. The Bretton-Woods economic system of today, which includes finance, energy, agriculture, and commercial transportation sectors all rely on GPS and PNT capabilities. If GPS goes offline, further friction arises in the Strategic Support Area, specifically limited access to finance, digital applications, logistics, emergency services, and agriculture. Failure of GPS protection equates to added fog and friction, both in the homeland and on the battlefield.

Solution One: Long-Range Navigation (LORAN)

LORAN is World War II technology that is still used for commercial transportation,  relying on radio pulse transmissions via radar stations for navigation. Updated versions of LORAN were born after World War II to enhance positional accuracy; GPS nearly made it obsolete. The latest version, enhanced LORAN (eLORAN), serves as a backup for GPS in providing PNT and may be a capability to consider for future battle.⁹  As part of a GPS PACE plan, the Army could initiate eLORAN “re-trans” teams that would establish radio pulses for navigation. In essence, we could build a network that is resilient and enables units to continue executing their missions in a GPS-contested environment with known location, distance, and direction. The current version emits a signal over a million times stronger than GPS, making is difficult to disrupt electronically. In addition, eLORAN is clock-based and performs the same timing functions as GPS, which is essential for encrypted communications.¹⁰

Solution Two: Quantum Compass

Quantum Compass is another potential capability offering PNT resilience. This tool is an instrument that measures velocity over time using a starting point. It does not rely on external signals like GPS and thus lacks its vulnerability to interference and disruption. In addition, this tool can calculate known locations, which offers precision. The capability allows navigation without synchronizing GPS satellites. Although in its infancy and still theoretical, this tool could supplement current handheld navigation devices. It would measure velocity against one’s starting point for precise location, with the potential for computing distance, direction, and installing waypoints.¹¹ Current military handheld navigation devices and receivers are susceptible to enemy electronic interference;  however, there is no known law of physics that could disrupt Quantum Time, Navigation, and Sensing (TNS) technologies.

Solution Three: Inertial Navigation Systems (INS)

Another capability is an expansion of INS. This technology exists in our military aviation, artillery, armor, and deep-sea assets as a redundant capability in case of GPS degradation or disruption. However, it is not available for all ground combat assets. INS is a self-contained, non-radiating, non-interference, dead reckoning system.¹²  It is capable of detecting accelerations and angular velocities and then transforming those into a current position and orientation.¹³  In case of GPS interference, we could incorporate this system in our modernization efforts and equipment for all ground combat assets as an augmentative tool for GPS interference mitigation.

Conclusion

We need to consider options for navigation for the battlefield of 2040. GPS has served as a reliable capability since 1991 for military operations. However, we can no longer count on its continued reliability, given a contested Space Domain. Adversaries are modernizing, especially in capabilities that will disrupt or neutralize our assured PNT. A method of preparedness for space conflict is through a navigation “PACE” plan. These are solutions proposed to overcome kinetic and non-kinetic actions during LSCO. Some solutions are available now (eLORAN / INS) while some remain theoretical (Quantum Compass). We must not be slow to innovate and acquire what we need for the defense of space, especially with a focus on strengthening our GPS architecture and kill chain network. In the battlefield of 2040 and beyond, denied PNT means machine learning, autonomous systems, and the Internet of Things could be severely degraded or entirely unavailable.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

Space: Challenges and Opportunities

Star Wars 2050 and The Final Frontier: Directed Energy Applications in Outer Space, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Marie Murphy

Beyond Space and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Kara Cunzeman

Space 2035: A Surplus of Uncertainty and a Deficit of Trust, by Maj Rachel Reynolds

Table of Future Technologies: A 360 Degree View Based on Anticipated Availability, by Richard Buchter

… as well as the Dr. Moriba Jah on What Does the Future Hold for the US Military in Space? podcast hosted by our colleagues at Modern War Institute.

About the Author:  CPT Matthew R. Bigelow is currently a Force Manager at United States Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, and recently served as a Small Group Leader for the United States Army Military Police School Captains Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His previous assignment was as a Company Commander for the 591^st Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

¹ Mark Episkopos “Russia Jammed GPS Signals During a NATO Military Exercise. That’s a Really Big Deal. And Moscow is perfecting its very own GPS system,” The National Interest, December 01, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-jammed-gps-signals-during-nato-military-exercise-thats-really-big-deal-37682.

² Robert Hoffman, “Lost on The Next Battlefield: The Need to Replace GPS”, U.S. Army War College, January 21, 2022, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/lost/.

³ Captain John K. Vintar, “The Blitzkrieg Legend-The 1940 Campaign in the West”, The Blitzkrieg Legend-The 1940 Campaign in the West, Karl-Heinz Frieser, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 9, 2 (2006): 133-136; Rear Admiral Kazuo Itoh, “Battle of Tsushima was Real Network Centric Warfare”, https://www.e-nsr.com/data_files/view/9.

⁴ Claudette Roulo “What on Earth is the Global Positioning System”, U.S. Department of Defense, December 26, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1674004/what-on-earth-is-the-global-positioning-system/.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997), 8.

⁶ Sun Tzu, Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 69

⁷ Arnold D. Ross and John P. Wade, “A Definition of Systems Thinking: A Systems Approach”, Procedia Computer Science, 44 (2015): 675.

⁸ Dr. Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 1996), 3, 12.

⁹ Matteo Lucio, “The Return of Loran”, xyHt, November 06, 2020, https://www.xyht.com/gnsslocation-tech/the-return-of-loran/.

¹⁰ Greg Milner, Pinpoint: How GPS is Changing Technology, Culture, and Our Minds (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 166.

¹¹ Hayley Dunning, Thomas Angus, and Martin Sayers, “Quantum ‘Compass’ could allow navigation without relying on satellites”, Imperial College London, November 09, 2018, https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/188973/quantum-compass-could-allow-navigation-without/.

¹² B. Barshan and H.F. Durrant-Whyte, “An Inertial Navigation System for a Mobile Robot”, 1^st IFAC International Workshop on Intelligent Autonomous Vehicles, Hampshire, UK, 18-21 April, Vol. 26, 1 (April 1993): 54.

¹³ Kevin J. Walchko, Michael Nechbya, Eric Schwartz, and Antonio Arroyo, “Embedded Low Cost Inertial Navigation System” (paper presented at the Florida Conference on Recent Advances in Robotics, Florida Atlantic University, May 8-9 , 2003, 1.

[Editor’s Note:  The Mad Scientist Laboratory introduces our new Bit series, exploring a finite but key component of the greater Operational Environment in a succinct post.  Today’s post by returning guest blogger Kate Kilgore explores how video games and their streaming platforms are the newest front in the on-going battle for Information Dominance — Enjoy!]

Video games and video game streaming platforms have emerged as an unprecedented element of the information fight surrounding Russia’s war in Ukraine.  Online gaming communities driven by shared interests present a unique tool in the war for perception, which Ukrainian military and government officials as well as civilians have leveraged to grow support for Ukraine both within and outside of the country. Often, these games are military-themed or involve tactical gameplay and range from tank and flight simulators featuring vintage and modern military systems to dystopian first-person shooters. While gaming provides unique opportunities due to its role in enhancing global connectivity, these communities may also pose threats to both personal and institutional security.

Online gaming forums and streaming sites enable information operations to reach broad audiences, both domestically and internationally.  The Ukrainian developers of the video game series S.T.A.L.K.E.R. used advertising for its upcoming installment to fundraise for the Ukrainian military. International fans of individual Ukrainian streamers like Escape From Tarkov player “Bobi” have gathered their efforts to send these streamers information which enabled their escape from the country. The Polish developers of This War of Mine integrated immersive technology with their 2014 game to create an experience in which gamers take the role of civilians in a war zone designed to resemble modern Ukraine and explain the nation’s experience to international audiences.

International influencers are increasingly using sites like the Amazon-owned live streaming service Twitch to raise relief funds and report on conflict.  Many Ukrainian streamers broadcast live photos and videos of their wartime experiences to inform Russian audiences of the conflict’s realities.  Popular Western Twitch creators often cover the war in Ukraine, both informing their audiences about the conflict while firmly curating the conversation topics. Most streaming services also include real-time chat functions which allow viewers to interact with the content in real-time and can range from genuine questions to accusations of spreading misinformation. Twitch also slashed Russian streamers’ revenues and banned Russian state media from broadcasting on the platform.

Some countries may ban video games or gaming forums to exert greater control over their domestic information spaces.  Russia recently issued bans on many internationally-renowned games, stating they contain content which “violates legislation” and could influence people to “[carry] out socially dangerous acts.” The Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly shot and killed three men in Voronzeh whom it claimed were a “clandestine cell of supporters of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology.” While these men were likely dressed in tactical gear and carrying airsoft rifles to roleplay as characters from the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. games, the game features a faction which shares the name Svoboda with a Ukrainian ultranationalist political party and online fan forums have devoted significant efforts to curate pro-Ukrainian information and sentiment.

Trends connecting video gaming communities and real-life militaries which predate Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have also reemerged.  In 2020, the systems-based game War Thunder partnered with the Systems Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense to host a gaming tournament featuring Chinese and Russian tanks. Starting in 2021, however, War Thunder players have repeatedly shared restricted or classified documents about military equipment and technology from the U.K., France, China, and the U.S. to win community arguments and lobby for more realistic gameplay. World of Tanks, which features Twentieth Century armored combat, has nearly twice the number of Russian players than Western players and has had similar issues with document leaks.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates how online communities can be a powerful tool in generating support and fighting for national and international information dominance.  Video games and online streaming allow individuals to access and interact with information from sources from around the globe and provide a personalized way to combat misinformation. The casual and accessible nature of gaming communities, however, also poses a challenge to protecting sensitive information from dissemination and exploitation in both competition and conflict.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

What the Joint Force can learn from K-Pop “Stans” by Matthew Ader

LET’S TWEET, GRANDMA – Weaponizing the Social to Create Information Security, by CDR Sean M. Sullivan

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage by Ian Sullivan, along with the comprehensive paper from which it was excerpted

Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success, by CW4 Charles Davis

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events, and all of this series’ associated content and videos 

About the Author:   Kate Kilgore is a TRADOC G-2 Intern and a graduate of Indiana University, where she studied Law and Public Policy, Comparative International Politics, Soviet History, and Russian and Eastern European Studies. Kate has been greatly influenced by her father’s Army career, and she grew up all over the United States and in Germany, which influenced her passion for Eastern European history. Much of her undergraduate research focused on analyzing the path dependence and modern social implications of Soviet laws and in the former Eastern Bloc, with a focus on Hungary. When she’s not reading about culture and politics of the former Warsaw Pact States, she enjoys baking and antiquing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).