526. Tactical Tech: How Smartphones are Countering Jamming in Ukraine

“The hope is that we can begin to profile what the capabilities of the jammer are that we’re seeing out in the field with enough measurements from enough devices”

[Editor’s Note:  In last week’s post, Sherman L. Barto posited a fictional intelligence (FICINT) scenario detailing China’s swift victory over Taiwan and the United States — achieved in part by the People’s Liberation Army’s use of

“… jam-resistant swarms utiliz[ing] permissioned blockchain encryption and … onboard AI adjust[ing] Software Defined Radio (SDR) receivers in real time to ignore interference that does not transmit with proper encryption and authentication.  The loss of GNSS satellite navigation was assumed by PLA military planners and is replaced with a ship-based Long Range Navigation (LORAN) system providing the location of the three PLAN aircraft carriers to UAVs which is then paired with UAV computer vision trained on detailed maps of Taiwan to recognize where they are.  Each UAV transmits a location tag every second to each adjacent node in the swarm, enabling precision location within 20 meters.  The one pulse per second geolocation tags perform double duty as a network timing protocol, ensuring all PLA networks remain in synch despite the loss of GNSS timing.”

A U.S. Army maneuver Brigade Combat Team (BCT) has over 2,500 pieces of equipment dependent on space-based assets for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) — precision strikes and the convergence of massed fires depend on accurate and resilient PNT data.  However, as we’ve seen in Russia’s on-going war in Ukraine, access to this PNT data is increasingly being disrupted or spoofed by Electronic Warfare (EW) jammers.

Today’s The Convergence podcast welcomes Dr. Sean Gorman, CEO and co-founder of Zephr.xyz, to discuss how his company is “crowdsourcing [GPS] measurements across a bunch of phones to get a better version of reality by looking at more satellites and getting more measurements.”  Zephr is also harnessing this capability as a counter-EW jamming capability, turning everyone with a cellphone into a sensor to detect, identify, catalog, and locate these emitters.  These capabilities, conceptually proven in Ukraine, may soon be tested in Taiwan against our most capable adversary — the People’s Liberation Army — Enjoy!]


[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Sean Gorman is the CEO and co-founder of Zephr.xyz, a developer of next-gen networked positioning technologies.  Gorman has a more than 20-year background as a researcher, entrepreneur, academic, and subject matter expert in the field of geospatial data science and its national security implications.  He is the former engineering manager for Snap’s Map team, former Chief Strategist for ESRI’s DC Development Center, founder of Pixel8earth, GeoIQ, and Timbr.io, and held other senior positions at Maxar and iXOL.  Gorman served as a subject matter expert for the Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Task Force and Homeland Security Advisory Council, and he’s been awarded eight patents.  He is also a former research professor at George Mason University.

In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientist sits down with Dr. Sean Gorman to discuss countering Russian Electronic Warfare (EW) jammers, how he came to work with the Ukrainian military, and commercial solutions in a Global Positioning System (GPS)-denied environment.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation.

      • Zephr builds Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) technologies to improve and enhance Precision, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) accuracy and resiliency, while also providing countermeasure capabilities to help detect adversarial GNSS jamming/spoofing and locate their emitters.  Their concept utilizes ensemble optimization — taking measurements from geographically dispersed devices, such as mobile phones, pinging their GPS measurements to satellites, then using a software server to calculate error corrections, which are then sent back to the phones and used to improve each device’s positioning accuracy — to locally determine positioning.  This capability provides a democratized, inexpensive method to mitigate EW jamming of PNT.  
      • Citing their challenges in executing battlefield medical evacuation and logistics operations in a GPS-denied environment, a group of Ukrainian soldiers contacted Zephr directly for assistance in mitigating Russian jamming.  Using a few Android devices to begin collecting data, additional phones provided further resiliency to positioning, the ability to map the jammed area, and the possibility of calculating the signals’ angles of arrival to determine the emitter’s location.
      • The Pole-21E is a Russian electronic counter-measure system designed to protect strategic assets and infrastructure from cruise missiles, guided bombs, and UAVs reliant on GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and Beidou for navigation and guidance. The system consists of jammers that can be placed on cell towers/masts, integrated with a transmit antenna station R-340RP, and pooled into a single network jamming the satellite navigation signal in large areas. / Source: TRADOC G-2‘s OE Data Integration Network (ODIN) Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

        In the future, the intent is to profile the capabilities of distinct jammer types based on collected data.  Starting with data collected from Ukrainian jammers, the group calibrates and profiles signals to determine what the area of effect will look like for each emitter type, then consolidates the data into baseline calibration data.  They hope to use this concept to compare this data to Russian jammers’ capabilities — enabling them to calculate the distance from the emitter and determine what kind of signal and disruption effects they’re getting.

      • China’s Y-8CB (High New 1) Chinese Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Aircraft  / Source: TRADOC G-2‘s ODIN WEG

        This capability uses off-the-shelf Android devices, but any GNSS-receiving device could be used.  Android devices were easy to test because of their ubiquity and the ease with which they can be delivered around the world.  This will make further testing in INDOPACOM with our Taiwanese partners possible — the idea is to turn every phone across the island into a sensor that can detect EW events.

      • “The TAK ecosystem includes ATAK for Android, iTAK for iOS, WinTAK for Windows, and a growing number of servers, plugins, and tools to extend functionality — allowing Soldiers to view and share geospatial information, like friendly and enemy positions, danger areas, casualties, etc.” / Source:  Image and quote from “The TAK Ecosystem: Military Coordination Goes Open Source,” Hackaday, 08SEP22

        One of the keys to succeeding in an alt-PNT environment is a layered approach, as the integration of GNSS with commercial and military capabilities is critical.  The Ukrainians struggled to gain independencefrom GPS.  Zephr is currently working with Air Force Research Labs to provide this capability in the Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) ecosystem.

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next episode of The Convergence on 27 Mar 2025, when Army Mad Scientist sits down with returning guest Dr. Billy Barry to discuss his latest invention — an AI-enabled digital wargame!  We tested this capability with two of the most experienced TRADOC G-2 wargamers and get their thoughts on how it performed.

If you enjoyed this post, check out TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations, laying out the 12 LSCO Conditions and 5 LSCO Implications of the Operational Environment, several of which expand on aspects of this podcast and blog post (e.g., Transparent Battlefield and Mass vs. Precision).

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access), containing our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content addressing PNT, EW, and the transparent battlefield:

LSCO, PNT, and the Space Domain, by CPT Matthew R. Bigelow

Space: Challenges and Opportunities

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

Operation Northeast Monsoon: The Reunification of Taiwan

China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare

Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target

Warfare in the Parallel Cambrian Age, by Chris O’Connor

>>>>ANNOUNCEMENT:  Army Mad Scientist wants to crowdsource your thoughts on Great Power Competition & Conflict — check out the flyer describing our latest writing contest.

All entries must address one of the following writing prompts:

How are the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa shaping how the U.S. Army may need to fight in 2035?

What role can the U.S. Army play in helping the U.S. counter Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence across the Global South?

How can the U.S. Army counter growing Russian/Chinese collusion in the Arctic, and China’s growing presence in the Antarctic?

What emergent technology(ies) or convergences of technologies could disrupt Great Power dominance in 2035?  In 2050?  

We are accepting three types of submissions:

      • 1500-word Non-Fiction Essay
      • 1500-word Fictional Intelligence (FICINT) Story
      • Hybrid 1500-word submission incorporating a short FICINT vignette, with a Non-Fiction Essay expounding on the threat capabilities described in the vignette

Anyone can participate (Soldiers, Government Civilians, and all global citizens) — Multiple submissions are encouraged!

All entries are due NLT 11:59 pm Eastern on May 30, 2025 at:  madscitradoc@gmail.com

Click here for additional information on this contest — we look forward to your participation!

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

525. Operation Northeast Monsoon: The Reunification of Taiwan

[Editor’s Note:  Crowdsourcing remains one of Army Mad Scientist’s most effective tools for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping us to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions about the Operational Environment.

A year ago, we launched our Operational Environment Wicked Problems Writing Contest, seeking to explore how Twenty-first Century warfighting could evolve, given contemporary convergences of battlefield transparency, autonomous systems, and massed and precision fires that have resulted in an increasingly lethal Operational Environment.  We asked our readers to address the following topic using either a non-fiction essay, a fictional intelligence (FICINT) story, or a submission incorporating a short FICINT vignette with an accompanying non-fiction essay expounding on the threat capabilities described in the vignette:

How have innovations in asymmetric warfare impacted modern large scale and other combat operations, and what further evolutions could take place, both within the next 10 years and on towards mid-century?

Today’s post by Sherman L. Barto was the second runner up in our contest.  His submission provides us with a fascinating FICINT scenario exploring how China could successfully reintegrate Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China in a four-phased assault — dominating operations in the Sea, Land, Air, and Cyber Domains, while ceding the Space Domain’s Precision, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) for a terrestrial-based and un-jammable alternative for its autonomous swarms.  Read on to learn how the day after tomorrow’s China could integrate Information Warfare, Battlefield Autonomy, and Mass to achieve a swift (3-month) victory — Enjoy!]

December 31st, 2027:  The year passes without significant conflict in the Taiwan Strait to much acclaim for the U.S. and Allied nations’ deterrence of Chinese aggression.  The U.S. political machine summarily forgets Taiwan as a geopolitical priority.

Phase 0:  Gathering Forces

The Fujian Class (Type 003 Class) Chinese Aircraft Carrier is China’s first indigenously designed carrier, and its first capable of catapult-assisted take-offs (CATOBAR). / Source: TRADOC G-2‘s OE Data Integration Network (ODIN) Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

November 2029:  Large scale deployment for Joint service exercises of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) forces in the Taiwan and Luzon Strait begin.  This is the first large-scale Joint exercise incorporating all three PLAN aircraft carriers, supporting surface and subsurface vessels, and full complements of personnel and military weapons and hardware.  Multiple amphibious assault exercises accompanied by hundreds of sorties of PLAAF fighters, bombers, and Airborne Command and Control (C2) systems commence.

March 2030:  The PLAN fleet encircles Taiwan, taking up positions 14 nautical miles from shore – at the edge of international waters – to cap off month’s long exercises.

Phase 1:  Seizing the Initiative

An offensive cyberspace operation spreading a deepfake video of an “Official Message from the President of the United States” across social media and streaming video services internationally states all official and unofficial ties with Taiwan are immediately suspended, and that the U.S. would recognize the CCP as the only governing body when dealing with the island.  Traditional media outlets pick up and run the story without fact checking the release.  The Executive Branch begins damage control and attempts to regain the narrative that the message was fraudulent, and the U.S. and its Allies should support Taiwan.

China’s ARK 40 UAV is an octocopter designed for short-to-middle range end delivery missions. Its payload volume is more than 50L, which makes it suitable for many cargo delivery scenarios. / Source:  TRADOC G-2‘s ODIN WEG

PLAN ships launch a swarm of agricultural style octocopter Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), each with a 20-gallon payload of Infrared (IR) marking solution.  Flying low over the water with an obscured radar cross section (RCS), these UAVs evade early warning radars and air defense systems.   Once over land, the UAVs are uncontested — given the fear that engaging them would cause civilian casualties and provide the CCP with an information warfare advantage.  They begin spraying military positions, government offices, and essential services locations and personnel.  The IR marking, once illuminated with IR imaging devices, remains detectable for up to 45 days.  Taiwan defense forces engage the UAVs as they depart the island,  wasting fuel and ammunition on expendable systems.  The remaining drones are left to crash as their batteries die, mission complete.

Phase 2:  Attack Taiwan Defense Forces and Deter U.S. Intervention

China’s Lynx 4×4 Amphibious Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) is a medium-sized UGV. / Source:  TRADOC G-2‘s ODIN WEG

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) launched from the PLAN fleet ferry Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) to the shore.  The UGVs land on Taiwan, establishing self-healing mesh networks with adjacent systems – building an ad hoc swarm – and begin the first wave assault.   Each system, outfitted with an IR imaging capability, attacks everything marked by the IR marking solution.  The large language models used to train the UGVs’ onboard AI reduced learning time and targeting errors by designating valid targets by IR marking instead of positive identification of specific equipment, uniforms, or facilities.  Five waves of UGV deployments are launched with each wave bringing to shore one thousand assault UGVs.  The indiscriminate marking of the spray leads to civilian casualties on an order of magnitude unheard of in living memory.

China’s Loong 5 UAV is a small fixed-wing vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAV featuring two independent power systems (one each for cruise flight and VTOL operations). The manufacturer characterizes the UAV as being capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and attack missions. / Source:  TRADOC G-2‘s ODIN WEG

The PLAN deploys the air net swarm.  Thousands of cheap UAVs deploy as a protective net around the surface ships.  The sheer mass of the swarm, coupled with solid-state batteries allowing for substantially increased loiter time once airborne, prove fatal to the first few aircraft that attempt to counterattack.  The air net swarms only purpose is to cause catastrophic damage to the attacking airframe through collision.  Aircraft that pull away from the net avoid damage but open themselves to attack from waiting PLAAF 5th generation fighters.

Tianjin University’s Haiyan (Petrel II HUG) Autonomous Underwater Glider (AUG) is a UUV that uses the latest hybrid propulsion technology and can work continuously for about 30 days. / Source:  TRADOC G-2‘s ODIN WEG

PLAN submarines deploy the sea net swarm.  Each subsurface vessel deploys two dozen torpedo-sized autonomous UUVs — each with a 60lb warhead — to hold station 30 nautical miles off the capital ships arrayed against Taiwan.  Each UUV communicates with its adjacent nodes via Extreme Low Frequency (ELF) pings.  Once an object passes through the net, causing a minimum of two missed pings, the affected UUVs swarm towards the break and attach themselves to the intruding object.  A single UUV might not be catastrophic, but two or more could prove fatal.  Each deployment of the net is monitored by a submarine acting as mothership and second line defense.

The U.S. Executive Branch regains positive control of cabinet-level messaging, addressing world leaders and the population.  The order for the DoD to rapidly deploy to and aid Taiwan is issued.  The Pacific fleet and Marine forces rapidly deploy in support.  The Army and Air Force begin deployment from South Korea and Japan.

Phase 3:  Defeat Remaining Taiwan Defense Forces and Secure the Area of Operations

Soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division. / Source: DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley / Released

The second wave of the amphibious assault consists of PLA logisticians and maintainers.  Their sole purpose is to recharge, repair, and replenish the ammunition magazines of the UGV assault force.  The third wave sets up manned security positions and solidifies the CCP foothold.  The fourth wave brings combat equipment, and the fifth wave sees the first human C2 elements of the operation set foot on Taiwan.

April 2030:  The Taiwan Defense Forces are reduced to 30% combat power.  The CCP suffers the loss of a brigade-sized element across all forces — from mishaps, human error, and faulty targeting of autonomous systems.  U.S. and Allied forces begin combat operations.

Phase 4:  Stability Operations

PLA soldier engages in mounted combined arms maneuver at a base in Shenyang, China. Source:  Modified image adding UAV wingmen to a DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

The PLA begins “stabilization” operations with the deployment of forces across the island in “transparent” armored combat systems.  Armored personnel carriers, tanks, and combat support vehicles lack the soft skin vulnerabilities of materials such as glass.  Vehicle-borne sensors in combination with UAV and UGV wingmen provide the driver and vehicle commander a view of their surroundings through an augmented reality “windshield.”

A PLA ZTD-05 (VN-16) Amphibious Light Tank — designed for beach assault missions and to accompany infantry as ground forces move inland. / Source: TRADOC G-2‘s ODIN WEG

Vehicle crew members don headsets providing relevant sensor data to their assigned role.  Gunners and weaponeers see terrain and target information, while SIGINT and EW personnel see an electromagnetic spectrum overlay.  Infantry see map overlays showing their location, friendly units nearby, obstacles, and objectives in near real time and radio operators see nodes and links across the entire battlespace to ensure orders are issued and received.  Supporting UGV and UAV systems ensure an integrated and near real time common operating picture is shared from the tactical to strategic level.

U.S. and Allied naval forces suffer losses to China’s sea net swarms and are forced to remain offshore, farther away from the contested areas than expected.  Navy and Marine air power is limited by the air net swarms but achieve a modicum of success with standoff engagements against air and sea targets.  EW achieves effects against manned systems and counter-space capabilities eliminate China’s use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).  The PLA’s uncrewed systems mostly ignore the EW and GNSS disruptions — to U.S. and Allied forces chagrin.

The jam-resistant swarms utilize permissioned blockchain encryption and the onboard AI adjusts Software Defined Radio (SDR) receivers in real time to ignore interference that does not transmit with proper encryption and authentication.  The loss of GNSS satellite navigation was assumed by PLA military planners and is replaced with a ship-based Long Range Navigation (LORAN) system providing the location of the three PLAN aircraft carriers to UAVs which is then paired with UAV computer vision trained on detailed maps of Taiwan to recognize where they are.  Each UAV transmits a location tag every second to each adjacent node in the swarm, enabling precision location within 20 meters.  The one pulse per second geolocation tags perform double duty as a network timing protocol, ensuring all PLA networks remain in synch despite the loss of GNSS timing.

May 2030:  U.S. and Allied forces are repelled at every turn and the cost in lives and materiel proves too high a cost for a polarized and partisan bureaucracy.  The U.S. President acknowledges the loss of Taiwan and implements harsh sanctions on the CCP.  Allied nations retreat as well.

Taiwan Defense Forces officially surrender following the loss of allied assistance, ending the democratic nation of Taiwan and expanding the CCP foothold beyond the mainland.  The UN releases casualty estimates of 13 million people, mostly civilian.

The CCP achieves reunification.  The loses include an aircraft carrier and three submarines, three quarters of their manned aircraft, 30,000 personnel, and an untold number of drones litter the island and the seas around it.

ENDEX:  While all of the systems and capabilities described above are fictious, most technologies and concepts are not.  Lessons learned from the Russian-Ukraine War from UAVs, autonomy, swarms, and information warfare aimed at our populations and elected leadership will shape all future conflict.  Expensive and exquisite military systems will always have a place in war; however, expendable unmanned systems and the defense thereof will shape the conduct and evolution of warfare from this point forward.  The most dangerous evolution will be human-off-the-loop autonomy for unmanned systems and the associated advancements in autonomous lethality that follow.

If you enjoyed this post, check out TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations, laying out the 12 LSCO Conditions and 5 LSCO Implications of the Operational Environment, several of which are addressed in Mr. Barto’s submission.

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access), containing our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content addressing China, our pacing threat, and relevant aspects of the Operational Environment:

“No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, Three Dates, Three Windows, and All of DOTMLPF-P, China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, and Seven Reflections of a “Red Commander” — Lessons Learned Playing the Adversary in DoD Wargames, by Ian Sullivan

The Most Consequential Adversaries and associated podcast, with GEN Charles A. Flynn (USA-Ret.)

Volatility in the Pacific: China, Resilience, and the Human Dimension and associated podcast, with General Robert Brown (USA-Ret.)

How China Fights and associated podcast

Flash-Mob Warfare: Whispers in the Digital Sandstorm (Parts 1 and 2), by Dr. Robert E. Smith

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training

A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations

China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare

The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

China: Building Regional Hegemony

The U.S. Joint Force’s Defeat before Conflict, by CPT Anjanay Kumar

Intelligentization and the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, by Col (s) Dorian Hatcher 

“Intelligentization” and a Chinese Vision of Future War

Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace

Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS

Death From Above! The Evolution of sUAS Technology and associated podcast, with COL Bill Edwards (USA-Ret.)

Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown

Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events, as well as all of the associated webinar content (presenter biographies, slide decks, and notes) and associated videos

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

The Operational Environment’s Increased Lethality

About the Author:  Sheman L. Barto retired from the U.S. Army in December 2020, having served as an Air Defense Artillery crewman, SATCOM and Network Operations team lead, and Division CEMA NCOIC for multiple divisions.  After the Army, he went on to serve as a CUAS program manager for the Department of State, instructor for the EW Integration course at 1st IO Command, and is currently supporting the USFK Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cell at Camp Humphries, South Korea.

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

524. Weapons on Demand: How 3D Printing Will Revolutionize Military Sustainment

[Editor’s Note:  Crowdsourcing remains one of Army Mad Scientist’s most effective tools for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping us to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions about the Operational Environment.

A year ago, we launched our Operational Environment Wicked Problems Writing Contest, seeking to explore how Twenty-first Century warfighting could evolve, given contemporary convergences of battlefield transparency, autonomous systems, and massed and precision fires that have resulted in an increasingly lethal Operational Environment.  We asked our readers to address the following topic using either a non-fiction essay, a fictional intelligence (FICINT) story, or a submission incorporating a short FICINT vignette with an accompanying non-fiction essay expounding on the threat capabilities described in the vignette:

How have innovations in asymmetric warfare impacted modern large scale and other combat operations, and what further evolutions could take place, both within the next 10 years and on towards mid-century?

Today’s post by Scott Pettigrew was the first runner up in this contest, addressing how 3D printing / additive manufacturing is transforming how non-state actors, like the Rohingya and the Houthis, are equipping their forces with weapons.  Since the submission of this post, we’ve seen insurgents in Myanmar use 3D printing to produce Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the munitions dropped by them.  This capability is also being scaled up to help mitigate supply chain and logistics challenges faced by Ukraine, Russia, China, and the United States and NATO, with the potential of sustaining combat forces at or near the forward edge of battle.  “One possible strategy for militaries, even those with robust supply chains, is to employ a hybrid approach, keeping an inventory of the most highly demanded components while using digital records and forward-positioned additive manufacturing equipment to fulfill the remaining needs.” — Read on!]

As the sun set, the dense jungle in northern Rakhine grew increasingly still, the silence broken by the “tree-tree-tree-tree” call of the Asian Green Bee-eater.  A group of Rohingya insurgents, their faces hidden and eyes determined, waited patiently.  They had received information about a Myanmar army unit approaching, a group of soldiers who had oppressed their people for years and driven many into refugee camps in Bangladesh.  As the enemy patrol closed in, Jaivet, a young man of 19 and a former law school student, peered down the barrel of his plastic rifle.  The ambush sprung with their foe mere feet away; the thick brush burst open with automatic weapon fire.  Desperate Myanmar soldiers scrambled for cover.  Some slipped away, but many were not so lucky. As the dust cleared, Jaivet and his fellow Rohingya stepped out on the trail to assess the carnage, gathering up discarded guns, ammunition, and anything else of value they could salvage.

A silhouetted Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army fighter against the rebel group’s flag. / Source:  YouTube via Asia Times

The battle you just read is fiction, but the war is real.  A coup in Myanmar in 2021 threw the country’s newly elected prime minister in prison.  Her arrest and incarceration reignited a long-simmering insurgency against the government.  The Rohingya are one of more than 250 ethnic groups challenging the Myanmar junta’s oppression.  With a nearly complete ban on the private ownership of firearms, rebel groups in Myanmar rely on smuggling, theft, and scavenging the detritus of battle to arm themselves.1  However, in recent years, the off-again-on-again resistance has found a new source of military equipment and weapons:  additive manufacturing, more commonly called 3D (three-dimensional) printing.

Still from YouTube video entitled “This War Is Being Fought With 3D Pr**ted Guns,” by PSR

Acquiring the needed firepower to resist has been difficult for the Rohingya and other insurgent groups.  However, technological advancements have offered a solution, as some Myanmar rebels have begun printing polymer guns to fill the shortfall.  One of their favorite 3D-printed firearms is the FGC-92, a semiautomatic pistol that can also adapted to take a 16-inch barrel, both chambered for the 9×19 mm cartridge.3  The FGC-9 print code is widely available across the internet, and the firearm intentionally does not require any parts subject to international firearm controls.  Instead of a factory-manufactured gun barrel, the FGC-9 uses hardened 16mm hydraulic tubing.4 The FGC-9 displays admirable durability for a firearm made from polymers and costs a mere $200.5  One example seized by European authorities fired 2,000 rounds before exhibiting reduced performance.6

Traditional manufacturing starts with larger pieces of material such as metal or plastic and removes sections or bends segments until the final shape is revealed.  In additive manufacturing, the process begins with nothing and adds material in minute layers that build the final shape over time.  Computer-aided design (CAD) software or 3D scanners create a “map” that tells the 3D printer where to add or “print” each layer, forming a precise three-dimensional shape.7  First-generation 3D printers use polymers as feedstock, but today’s advanced 3D printers can also use a variety of metals such as aluminum, titanium, and stainless steel.8

The Rohingya use firearms made from polymer due to cost, simplicity, and accessibility, but metal guns deliver superior performance.  3D-printed metal firearms first appeared over a decade ago.  The first was built by an American company and was modeled after the M1911, the standard .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol adopted by the U.S. Army before WWI.9  The first metal-printed gun used a high-powered laser to fuse layers of small powdered particles of stainless steel and nickel-chromium alloy using selective laser sintering (SLS).10  Using metal instead of polymer is significant because it provides greater performance and durability but at a cost.  Entry-level additive manufacturing metal printers are 50 times more expensive than polymer, with machines starting at $10,000 and quickly rising to six figures.11

Larger caliber and high-use weapons need more strength and durability. Barrels that fail to dissipate heat lead to poor accuracy, damage to the barrel, and the possibility for a round to “cook-off,” potentially injuring the crew.  To mitigate these issues, U.S. Army Scientists at the Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center invented a method for manufacturing gun barrels using cold spray and wire arc additive manufacturing (WAAM) processes.12  The technique involves applying multiple cobalt superalloy, ceramic, and metal coatings, which increases thermal performance and reduces wear.13

Myanmar rebels are not the only non-state actors resorting to 3D printing. In 2023, the Israel Defense Forces found eight 3D printers in West Bank settlements, along with 3D-printed semiautomatic handguns, short-barreled semiautomatic rifles, and spare parts.14  In Yemen, Houthi rebels use 3D printing for drone production and the missiles being fired into Israel and used to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea.15

Throughout history, non-state forces have armed themselves through alternative means.  Unlike nation-state armies with large-scale industrial foundries and factories, rebels, insurgents, and freedom fighters have often depended on donations from sympathetic countries, purchased weapons on the black market, captured hardware from the enemy in battle, or attacked government-run armories to secure the firepower needed to fight.  Before 3D printing, creating a weapons manufacturing capability was expensive and time-consuming, requiring ample factory floor space, specialized equipment, and engineering expertise.  With the rise of additive manufacturing, producing entire weapons systems and spare parts has become more accessible and affordable, requiring only a limited budget and average technical knowledge.

Additive manufacturing also benefits the largest militaries in the world, including the United States, China, and Russia.  These militaries use 3D printing to shorten supply chains, increase sustainment flexibility, and automate manufacturing.  In Russia, engineers have developed a 3D printer that performs 90% of drone production, freeing up workers for other tasks that are difficult to automate, like final assembly.16

Countries such as Ukraine have militaries that resemble a first world national army in size and composition but lack a robust military-industrial complex to support them.  Due to Ukraine’s legacy as a former Soviet Republic and recent donations from many Western countries, its army operates over 40 armored vehicle models and fields nearly 30 different types of artillery in six different calibers.17  Maintaining sufficient repair parts for all models is costly and burdensome.  As a partial solution, Ukraine has turned to 3D printing.  Shortly after the Russian invasion in February 2022, private companies in Poland sped 3D printers to Ukraine capable of producing medical equipment and drone components.18  Australia also donated three additive manufacturing machines to Ukraine that can produce the metal parts and tools needed to keep its diverse fleet of combat systems operational.19

The Ukraine experience has shown that quickly getting 3D printers to where they are needed is crucial.  A U.S. startup, Firestorm Labs, recognized the need for rapidly deployable 3D printing technology to manufacture drone components and other critical parts in combat zones.20  Backed by investors like Lockheed Martin, Firestorm Labs’ drone factory fits inside a standard shipping container and can build a complete “Tempest” drone (minus powerplant and flight controls) in nine hours.  The Tempest has a seven-foot wingspan, carries a 10 lb payload, and can travel up to 200 miles from the operator.21

The FC-31 Gyrfalcon is a Chinese single-seat, twin-engine light fighter aircraft with multirole capability, high maneuverability, and a large combat radius. The FC-31 has comparable fifth-generation fighter aircraft features. / Source:  Source: TRADOC G-2‘s OE Data Integration Network (ODIN) Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

Additive manufacturing can also solve issues such as physical weak points that sometimes occur in traditional manufacturing.22  Compared to conventional industrial methods that use rivets or welding to connect parts, 3D printing creates an integrated part with higher structural strength and longer service life.  China uses advanced 3D printing to build more robust components for its 5th generation multi-role stealth fighter jet, the FC-31, increasing aircraft reliability and reducing maintenance costs.23 Rostec, a Russian state-owned conglomerate, uses additive manufacturing to strengthen MiG-31 engine components, improving performance and durability.24

The American military’s recent combat history identified an increased need for blast-resistant vehicles.  A hull made from welded or bolted-together components creates inherent weak points.  To build a vehicle body that’s both stronger and lighter, the U.S. Army’s Jointless Hull Project commissioned the largest 3D printer in the world, capable of producing seamless objects up to 30 feet long, 20 feet wide, and 12 feet high.25  The new machine is expected to improve production speeds, lower costs, and reduce vehicle weight, improving performance and increased survivability.

China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning (Hull 16) steams in the western Pacific. The aircraft carrier Liaoning (Hull 16), several guided-missile destroyers, frigates and dozens of aircraft attached to the Navy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army took part in a combat exercise at an unidentified area east of the Bashi Channel in the western Pacific / Photo by Zhang Lei via Flickr

In addition to producing stronger parts, advanced militaries have recognized additive manufacturing’s ability to shorten supply lines.  China’s growing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is driving a need for more seaborne logistics support.  To fill some of the demand, many Chinese warships carry additive manufacturing machines to produce metal parts needed to repair most systems onboard, while underway.  Although ships traditionally carry ample spare parts, the ability to manufacture needed components lessens their reliance on distant supply chains.26  As Ren Yalun, a PLAN Officer, put it, “We have benefited from the use of (onboard) 3D printing technology.  The 3D printer is like a miniature processing and manufacturing workshop that is able to quickly mend or produce parts, even nonstandard components.”27

Pentagon leaders are optimistic that additive manufacturing can improve long-standing supply chain challenges, particularly in war zones.  In 1942, American forces in the Philippines were struggling to survive against an overwhelming Japanese onslaught.  The Army made significant efforts to resupply its forces, but the U.S. Navy could not pierce the Japanese blockade. The War Department resorted to privateer blockade runners in a desperate attempt to deliver supplies to besieged GIs, but at least 16 of their craft were sunk.28  A few American submarines managed to reach the remaining Allied strongholds on the Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor, but it was too little, too late.  The Pacific Theater was not the only region with contested logistics — In the Atlantic Ocean, German U-boats sunk nearly 3,000 Allied ships, most of them commercial merchant vessels.29  While 3D printing could not have solved the American Soldiers’ ammunition, food, and fuel shortages, a deployed additive manufacturing capability could have reduced some of the need for over-the-shore logistics support.

The PLA’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities are robust within the First Island Chain (shown here in blue), and China seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean (the Second Island Chain is shown here in red).

Not since World War II has America fought an opponent with a robust air and sea threat.  However, a 21st-century war in the Indo-Pacific region could challenge American air and naval dominance.  The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) flies over 2,500 combat aircraft, and extensive air defense systems will be difficult to penetrate.30  The PLAN is the largest in the world, floating over 370 vessels and growing rapidly.31  A war in the Indo-Pacific region could provide the U.S. with similar or even more significant supply challenges as WWII.

Additive manufacturing only works if the object you want to print has a corresponding digital file or a digital record representing a three-dimensional shape.  The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense lists over one million spare parts, but most lack digital records.32  Of the spare parts with a digital record, many are not in the proper format for 3D printing.  Recognizing the scale of the problem, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created a digital repository that allows NATO member nations to store, request, and share technical data packages of 3D printable parts.33

Due to speed, quality, and cost-effectiveness, traditional manufacturing will remain the preferred method for large production runs.  However, for small-volume production, the high upfront costs of traditional factories make additive manufacturing an attractive option.  Smaller nation-states lacking defense-focused plants may also prefer 3D printing as a secondary source of repair parts.  One possible strategy for militaries, even those with robust supply chains, is to employ a hybrid approach, keeping an inventory of the most highly demanded components while using digital records and forward-positioned additive manufacturing equipment to fulfill the remaining needs. This tactic provides maximum flexibility while also reducing supply chain strain.

USMC Sgt. Adrian J. Willis, a computer technician with 7th Communications Battalion, pictured here aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Hansen in Okinawa, Japan, is one of the Marines that utilize 3D printing technology to expand capabilities within the unit. / Photo by United States Marine Corps Cpl. George Melendez.

Additive manufacturing has become a common tool used by non-state actors and large traditional armies.  The benefits include the production of hard-to-acquire weapons, shortening supply lines and repair times, and advanced techniques that increase strength and durability.  As the technology proliferates, the capability will expand across all forms of conflict, increasing manufacturing and maintenance capability to small, underfunded armies.  Large industrial countries like the United States will benefit from employing additive manufacturing capability at home-based factories, within combat theaters, onboard ships, and at remote, isolated outposts.  The next significant advancement in 3D printing technology is hard to predict, but what is certain is that future battlefields will be need to be sustained, with additive manufacturing playing a pivotal role.

If you enjoyed this post, check out TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access), containing our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content addressing the role of 3D printing / additive manufacturing in sustainment:

Sinews of War: Innovating the Future of Sustainment by then MSG Donald R. Cullen, MSG Timothy D. Roberts, MSG Jessica Cho, and MSG Johanny Ortega

The 4th Industrial Revolution, Additive Manufacturing, and the Operational Environment by Jeremy McLain

The Hard Part of Fighting a War: Contested Logistics

About the Author:  Scott Pettigrew is an intelligence specialist with TRADOC G-2, where his focus area is China’s People’s Liberation Army, developing doctrine and analytical products to support the Warfighter in training and future operations.  Over a 23-year career in the U.S. Army, Scott served in infantry and intelligence assignments at every echelon from Platoon through Army, including a stint with the National Security Agency.

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).


1 RFA Burmese. 2023. Myanmar enacts Weapons Law aimed at keeping guns away from resistance. May 18. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/junta-weapons-law-05182023164647.html.

2 Pike, Travis. 2022. “Guns Are Being 3D Printed in Myanmar.” The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/guns-are-being-3d-printed-myanmar-199401.

3 DEFCAD. n.d. FGC-9 Mk2 9mm Pistol. https://defcad.com/library/6dfa19fc-f290-4869-959f-04cc1b206006/.

4 Jenzen-Jones, N.R., and Patrick Senft. 2022. FGC-9 3D-printed firearm seized in Western Australia. June 22. https://armamentresearch.com/fgc-9-3d-printed-firearm-seized-in-western-australia/#:~:text=Further%2C%20in%20forensic%20tests%20with,failure%E2%80%94albeit%20with%20deteriorating%20accuracy.

5 Schneider, Ari. 2021. 3D-Printed Guns Are Getting More Capable and Accessible. February 16. https://slate.com/technology/2021/02/3d-printed-semi-automatic-rifle-fgc-9.html.

6 Jenzen-Jones, N.R., and Patrick Senft. 2022. FGC-9 3D-printed firearm seized in Western Australia. June 22. https://armamentresearch.com/fgc-9-3d-printed-firearm-seized-in-western-australia/#:~:text=Further%2C%20in%20forensic%20tests%20with,failure%E2%80%94albeit%20with%20deteriorating%20accuracy.

7 GE. 2023. Additive Manufacturing. https://www.ge.com/additive/additive-manufacturing.

8 Additive Manufacturing. 2024. Additive Manufacturing Materials. https://www.additivemanufacturing.media/kc/what-is-additive-manufacturing/am-materials.

9 Bryant, Ross. 2013. World’s first 3D-printed metal gun successfully fired. November 8. https://www.dezeen.com/2013/11/08/worlds-first-3d-printed-metal-gun-manufactured-by-solid-concepts/.

10 Plafke, James. 2013. The world’s first 3D printed metal gun is a beautiful .45 caliber M1911 pistol. November 7. https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170574-the-worlds-first-3d-printed-metal-gun-is-a-beautiful-45-caliber-m1911-pistol

11 Kauppila, Ile. 2024. The Best Metal 3D Printers in 2024. April 16. https://all3dp.com/1/3d-metal-3d-printer-metal-3d-printing/.

12 Champagne, Victor, Adam Jacob, Frank Dindl, Aaron Nardi, and Michael Klecka. 2019. Cold Spray and WAAM Methods for Manufacturing Gun Barrels. United States of America Patent US 10,281,227 B1. May 7. https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/f2/44/25/6b78246301fbf4/US10281227.pdf

13 Ibid.

14 IDF Editorial Team. 2023. 3D Printed Weapons Found in Judea and Samaria. https://www.idf.il/en/articles/2023/3d-printed-weapons-found-in-judea-and-samaria/.

15 Horton, Michael. 2023. Yemen’s drone doom loop: A model of instability for fragile states. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/yemen-houthis-drones/.

16 TASS. 2023. Russia creates 3D printer for industrial production of drones. August 1. https://tass.com/defense/1655075.

17 Global Data. 2024. 3D battlefield printing in Ukraine. January 15. https://www.verdict.co.uk/3d-printing-ukraine-battlefield/?cf-view.

18 Feldman, Amy. 2022. Putting 3D Printers To Work In Ukraine’s War Zone. March 31. https://www.forbes.com/sites/amyfeldman/2022/03/31/putting-3d-printers-to-work-in-ukraines-war-zone/?sh=223703645015.

19 Domingo, Juster. 2023. Australian Company Supplies 3D Printers to Ukraine Frontlines. October 3. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/10/03/australian-3d-printers-ukraine/.

20 McFadden, Christopher. 2024. US aids shipping container-size 3D-printing drone factories for Ukraine. March 11. https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/startup-develops-3d-printing-drone-factories.

21 Tegler, Eric. 2023. UAS Startup Firestorm’s Ambition To Crank Out Combat Drones Fast, Cheap And En Masse Is A Lesson For DoD. April 27. https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2023/04/27/uas-startup-firestorms-ambition-to-crank-out-combat-drones-fast-cheap-and-en-masse-is-a-lesson-for-dod/?sh=530ea11d1409.

22 Holmes, Larry R. 2023. Additive Technology Revolutionizes Defense Manufacturing. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/6/additive-technology-revolutionizes-defense-manufacturing.

23 Hanaphy, Paul. 2022. 3D Printing Being “Widely Used” in the Production of New Chinese Fighter Jets. December 5. Accessed April 27, 2024. https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/3d-printing-being-widely-used-in-the-production-of-new-chinese-fighter-jets-218192/

24 Hanaphy, Paul. 2022. How 3D Printing Enhanced MIG 31s. February 22. https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/how-3d-printing-enhanced-mig-31s-permit-russia-to-threaten-deployment-of-hypersonic-weapons-over-ukraine-conflict-and-how-to-stop-them-204776/

25 Manufactur3D. 2022. ASTRO America to manage U.S. Army’s new Jointless Hull Project and deliver a hull-scale tool using Metal 3D Printing. June 24. https://manufactur3dmag.com/astro-america-jointless-hull-project-metal-3d-printing/.

26 Metal AM. 2015. Chinese Navy installs Additive Manufacturing systems on warships. January 12. https://www.metal-am.com/chinese-navy-installs-additive-manufacturing-systems-on-warships/.

27 Ibid.

28 Director of the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division War Department General Staff. 1993. Logistics in World War II – Final Report of the Armed Service Forces. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History.

29 Crocker, H.W. 2006. Don’t Tread on Me. New York: Crown Forum. https://archive.org/details/donttreadonme40000croc/page/310/mode/2up.

30 The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2023. The Military Balance 2023. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003400226/military-balance-2023-international-institute-strategic-studies-iiss.

31 U.S. Department of Defense. 2023. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Annual Report to Congress, Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense.

32 Davies, Sam. 2024. Additive manufacturing in defence – 5 things we learnt from the 2024 AMADS Conference. March 6. https://www.tctmagazine.com/additive-manufacturing-3d-printing-industry-insights/latest-additive-manufacturing-3d-printing-industry-insights/the-state-of-play-additive-manufacturing-defence/.

33 Ibid.

523. Generative AI: The New Ammunition in the Data Arms Race

“It is a perfect use case there for Gen AI to plug into these systems and augment the processes that already exist.”

[Editor’s Note:  Today’s The Convergence podcast welcomes back Ben Van Roo, recent author of our Unlocking TRADOC’s Potential with GenAI: Opportunities and Challenges blog post, to continue our exploration of the transformative potential of Generative Artificial Intelligence (Gen AI) — specifically its ability to democratize access across the U.S. Army to the vast reservoirs of Operational Environment information.  In ingesting all of the OE Data Integration Network’s (ODIN) content — including the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and accompanying Force Structures, the Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 7-100 series, and the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series — Gen AI offers the potential to respond to conversational queries from individual Soldiers with the TRADOC G-2’s aggregated and authoritative OE knowledge.  Operationally, Gen AI could also help accelerate the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) loop, the intelligence cycle, and even kill chains — powerful stuff, indeed…. Read on!]


[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Ben Van Roo is the Co-Founder and CEO of Yurts, a generative AI company partnering with the U.S. Department of Defense to advance mission-critical systems.  He holds a PhD in Operations Research and has significant experience developing AI solutions for defense and national security applications.

In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientist sits down with Ben Van Roo to discuss Generative Artificial Intelligence (Gen AI) models, how they can be  integrated into secure networks, and how TRADOC can use them to enhance Army training.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation.

      • Classic AI models could provide rudimentary identification abilities, whereas Gen AI is a newer class of models with the capability to produce long form documents, generate and critique ideas, and create new images, video, and music.
      • The technology enabling Gen AI is moving at a rapid pace.  As soon as a new model is available, competitors and adversaries will use that newer model to upgrade their own, fostering a rapid learning and adaptation cycle.  When thinking about the geopolitical implications and competition, there is a very tight timeline of advantage between open-source communities, proprietary model vendors, and the U.S. and other countries.
      • Where Gen AI is useful today is plugging into pre-existing systems and augmenting the processes that already exist.  TRADOC’s mission of preparing the Warfighter in basic aspects of readiness, for different environments (e.g.,  Decisive Action Training Environment [DATE]),  understanding our adversaries’ materiel capabilities in the Worldwide Equipment Guide, and much more is a perfect use case for employing the current state of Gen AI technology.
      • While DoD is experimenting with Gen AI in aspects such as computer vision or Course of Action development, it is more suited to bridge the gap between the technology vendors and the Warfighters.  The Government lacks what a large venture-backed company with a sole focus on writing Gen AI software can provide.
      • For large organizations like the DoD, within the next 2 to 3 years, the fundamental focus will be on how to bring Gen AI into productionhow it’s integrated, where it shouldn’t be, and how management, costs, and analytics will be conducted.  In the commercial technology space, generative AI technology will be ubiquitous in 7-10 years.
      • Using Gen AI, the Army has the potential opportunity to rapidly learn and understand the conditions of an evolving Operational Environment by querying a digital subject matter expert – e.g., the TRADOC G-2’s OE Data Integration Network (ODIN) authoritative digital resource — to access and process TRADOC’s corpus of relevant Army Techniques Publications (ATPs) and training circulars (7-100 series), insights, and intelligence reports – via plain language queries.
      • In an operational setting, Gen AI could help accelerate the pace of our OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act), shortening the cycles between Observation and taking Action – affecting everything from the intelligence cycle to the kill chain itself.

If you enjoyed this post, check out Ben Van Roo‘s previous Mad Scientist Laboratory post — Unlocking TRADOC’s Potential with GenAI: Opportunities and Challenges

Read TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access), containing our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content exploring the transformative power of AI — spanning the gamut of potential applications:

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Trends

Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield and associated information paper

Artificial Intelligence: An Emerging Game-changer

Artificial Intelligence: Shaping the Future of Biological-Chemical Warfare, by Jared Kite

Training Transformed: AI and the Future Soldier, by proclaimed Mad Scientist SGM Kyle J. Kramer

The AI Study Buddy at the Army War College (Part 1) and associated podcast, with LtCol Joe Buffamante, USMC

Hybrid Intelligence: Sustaining Adversary Overmatch and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry and LTC Blair Wilcox

Rise of Artificial Intelligence: Implications to the Fielded Force, by John W. Mabes III

Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas

“Own the Night” and the associated Modern War Institute podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Bob Work

Bringing AI to the Joint Force and associated podcast, with Jacqueline Tame, Alka Patel, and Dr. Jane Pinelis

Thoughts on AI and Ethics… from the Chaplain Corps

The AI Study Buddy at the Army War College (Part 2) and associated podcast, with  Dr. Billy Barry, USAWC

Gen Z is Likely to Build Trusting Relationships with AI, by COL Derek Baird

Hey, ChatGPT, Help Me Win this Contract! and associated podcast, with LTC Robert Solano

Chatty Cathy, Open the Pod Bay Doors: An Interview with ChatGPT and associated podcast

The Future of Learning: Personalized, Continuous, and Accelerated

The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Brady Moore and Chris Sauceda

AI Enhancing EI in War, by MAJ Vincent Dueñas

The Human Targeting Solution: An AI Story, by CW3 Jesse R. Crifasi

Bias and Machine Learning

An Appropriate Level of Trust…

How does the Army – as part of the Joint force – Build and Employ Teams to Compete, Penetrate, Disintegrate, and Exploit our Adversaries in the Future?

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

 

522. Drones and Biotechnological Weaponry: Emerging Risks, Strategic Threats, and Viable Readiness

[Editor’s Note:  Recently, we’ve seen the proliferation of UAVs granting dismounted infantry the ability to reach out and strike their enemies with both precision and enhanced lethality, far deeper than ever before; enabling lesser powers with asymmetrical advantage in the Air Domain; and empowering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) with the ability to “punch above their weight class.”  We’ve also seen UAVs employed  in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), with Russia and Ukraine wrapping up their third year of conflict — characterized by rapid cycles of innovation in both UAV development and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS).

Simultaneously, we’ve witnessed the resurgent scourge of chemical weapons and explored the emergent potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in shaping the future of biological and chemical warfare.  Perhaps most disturbingly, we’ve seen the repeated use of chemical weapons on the battlefields of Ukraine by Russian forces — as of 18 January 2025, the Ukrainian General Staff reported “that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.”  As observed in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034 Large-Scale Combat Operations:

Adversaries view weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as an asymmetric advantage that has an outsized impact on U.S. operations and will likely seek to employ WMD in LSCO.

Today’s submission — co-authored by frequent contributor and proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano and returning contributor Dr. Diane DiEuliis — addresses the “nexus of drones and bioweapons” in Twenty-first century conflict, exploring how “drone technology, synthetic biology, and gene-editing pose a formidable challenge to global security.”  This convergent challenge demands we “invest in fostering interagency and international collaboration, advanced surveillance systems, and develop robust countermeasures to mitigate the risks associated with these technologies” — Read on!]

The United States National Drone Association (USNDA) recently announced its sponsorship of the inaugural, international U.S. Military Drone Crucible Drone Championship to provide a venue for exercising U.S. and allied military drone training, advanced piloting, operational utility, and counter-measures’ capability.  The relevance – and importance – of such incentives and initiatives is clear in light of iterative development, availability, and utilization of drone technology in military operations, and potential manifestations of envisioned large-scale drone employment in kinetic and non-kinetic engagements.  As the National Defense Strategy warned, advances in such emerging technology not only changes the nature of conflict, but can also be used to disrupt day-to-day U.S. supply chains, logistics, and economic stability.  As readily evidenced by the Ukraine war, the use of drones in combat scenarios is being tested in real time; and the United States’ acute threat – Russia – is amassing significant experience with their battlefield deployment.  Such experience can certainly be used to further develop drone capability and defenses in response.

Indeed, drones — ranging from commercially available systems to custom-engineered platforms — can be effectively and efficiently committed in a variety of battlescape scenarios.  Their small size, affordability, and versatility make them attractive tools for adversaries seeking to leverage asymmetrical advantage.  Key attributes of drones include:

      • Ease of Modification:  Commercial drones can be developed and/or modified to deliver a variety of types and volumes of payloads.
      • Stealth and Precision:  Drones can evade radar and air defense systems, enabling covert operations in urban or rural environments.
      • Range and Scalability:  Advanced drones can operate over long distances and be deployed either individually (for granular, precision-engagements) or in swarms, fortifying their operational impact and value.
Click here to access a larger version of this graphic.

The accessibility of drones provides cost-efficient means of payload delivery in state-vs-state engagements and lowers the barrier to entry for non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and criminal networks; thereby creating a dispersed and decentralized threat that is challenging to monitor and mitigate.

The convergence of advanced drone technology with novel biotechnological tools, such as synthetic biology and gene editing, poses a further – and escalating – risk to global security.  As the sophistication and accessibility of these technologies increase, so does their potential misuse by state and non-state actors for malicious purposes.

Synthetic biology and gene editing technologies, such as CRISPR-Cas systems, represent transformative tools with vast potential in precision medicine, agriculture, and industrial processes.  However, these same technologies have dual-use potential, and may be repurposed to develop biological agents capable of targeting select individuals, particular populations, ecosystems, and/or critical resources.

Key capabilities of these bio-scientific and technological tools include:

      • Pathogen Enhancement:  Modifying existing pathogens to increase virulence, transmissibility, escape diagnostics, or confer resistance to medical countermeasures.
      • Precision Bioengineering:  Designing pathogens to target specific genetic markers within populations, enabling selective effects.
      • Environmental Disruption:  Engineering microorganisms to degrade infrastructure materials or disrupt ecosystems, creating widespread collateral damage.

The Nexus of Drones and Bioweapons:  Capabilities and Counters

When combined with the deployment capabilities of drones, these biotechnological innovations pose an unprecedented challenge to traditional security frameworks.  Such synergy amplifies the threat of bioweapons. Possible scenarios that illustrate the operational potential of this nexus include:

      • Targeted Attacks:  Drones equipped with aerosol dispersal mechanisms can release bioengineered agents in specific locations, targeting critical infrastructure or densely populated areas.
      • Bio-Terrorism:  State and non-state actors could exploit drones to execute high-profile attacks, creating psychological, economic, and political disruption.
      • Diversion of Commercial Drones for Malicious Purposes:  Drones that enable precision agriculture, frequently sourced from adversary nations such as China, can be compromised or diverted to disrupt food/agricultural security.
      • Assassination and Sabotage:  Precision bioengineering can enable the creation of agents designed to target specific individuals or groups based on genetic profiles, delivered by drones to precise locations.

To be sure, this convergence creates tactical and strategic challenges for military forces tasked with deterrence, defense, and response.  The increasing sophistication of drone-based bioweapons necessitates a reevaluation of existing military doctrines and operational paradigms.  We opine that critical implications emerge in four principal domains:

1. Detection and Prevention:  Current surveillance systems must evolve to detect drones and biotechnological threats effectively. This includes:

Drone Detection:  Developing advanced radar, acoustic, and visual systems capable of identifying drones, particularly those designed for stealth operations.

Bio-surveillance:  Enhanced capabilities to monitor environmental and public health indicators for early detection of bioweapon deployment.

2. Countermeasure Development:  Defensive measures must include:

Counter-Drone Systems:  Deploying technologies such as jamming, directed-energy weapons, and drone swarms to neutralize hostile drones.

Bio-defense Research:  Enabling early warning and enhanced bio-detection, particularly in the environment, and, accelerating the development of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostic tools to counter novel biological agents.

3. Training and Preparedness:  Military personnel must be trained to operate in environments where biotechnological weapons may be used. This includes:

Augmented Training:  Expanding chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) training to include scenarios involving drone-delivered biological (and other unconventional) weapons.

Interagency Coordination:  Strengthening collaboration between military, intelligence, public health, and law enforcement agencies to create a unified assessment and response framework.

4. Intelligence and Risk Assessment:  Enhanced intelligence capabilities are essential for identifying peer-competitor and potential adversaries’ use of drones, and developing and implementing technological advancements necessary to identify, track, and deter such threats. This includes:

Threat Profiling:  Monitoring state and non-state actors known to have access to both drone and biotechnological technologies.

Supply Chain Monitoring:  Identifying and disrupting the flow of materials and knowledge required to develop bioweapons.

Ethical and Legal Considerations

The use of drones to deliver biotechnological weapons raises profound ethical and legal challenges. These include:

Attribution:  Identifying the perpetrators of drone-based bioweapon attacks can be difficult, particularly if and when (a) the drone is destroyed in executing the mission; and/or (b) non-state actors or proxy forces are involved.

Accountability:  Ensuring that states adhere to international norms, such as the Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention, and regulations for drone deployment can be irrelevant if drones are clandestinely or covertly used (see above), and if state or non-state actors exploit legal loopholes.

Proportionality:  Developing response protocols that balance the need for decisive action with the potential for escalation and collateral damage (e.g., can/should a drone-based engagement be countered with non-drone, conventional weapon, and/or human actor response?)

As drones and biotechnology are iteratively developed and advanced, it will be crucial for the U.S. and its allies to monitor, navigate, and address these complexities while upholding established principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality in response.

The Future of the Threat – and Response – Landscape

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into both drone and biotechnological platforms represents a next phase of this threat evolution. AI-driven systems coupled to open-source biotechnology platforms lowers the barriers for adversaries to develop and deploy bioweapons, and the use of AI could enable increasingly autonomous decision-making, swarm coordination, and precision targeting of drones; which when taken either separately or in combination, further complicates defensive efforts.

To address this evolving threat, we propose a proactive and forward-looking, multi-focal approach, to entail:

Technology Foresight:  To anticipate capabilities of emerging technologies and their potential misuse.

Scenario Planning:  Toward developing and assessing response protocols for a range of plausible threat scenarios.

International Collaboration:  So as to engage allies, international organizations, and the private sector to share knowledge, develop standards, and build collective resilience and coordinated response protocols and parameters.

Conclusion

The convergence of drone technology, synthetic biology, and gene-editing represents a formidable challenge to global security.  As history often demonstrates, the misuse of innovative technologies often outpaces an ability to expediently respond.  We posit that vigilance, foresight, and preparedness will be vital to address these challenges and protect against the exploitation of emerging technology for malicious purposes.  For military forces, this emerging threat necessitates a paradigm shift in the detection, mitigation, and prevention of drone-based attacks.  Indeed, the military’s role in this endeavor is critical—not only as a defensive force but also as a leader in shaping the ethical and legal frameworks that govern the use of emerging technologies.  With the new administration, it will be important to invest in fostering interagency and international collaboration, advanced surveillance systems, and developing robust countermeasures to mitigate the risks associated with these technologies while preserving strategic and operational stability.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related TRADOC G-2 and Mad Scientist Laboratory content on UAVs:

Ukraine Conflict UAV Evolution, by Colin Christopher

Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace

Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS

The Operational Environment’s Increased Lethality

Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist COL John Antal (USA-Ret.)

Redefining Asymmetric Warfare, by Ethan Sah

… and Biological-Chemical Warfare:

Artificial Intelligence: Shaping the Future of Biological-Chemical Warfare by Jared Kite

CRISPR Convergence, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Howard R. Simkin

Designer Genes: Made in China? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano and Joseph DeFranco

WMD Threat: Now and in the Future

The Resurgent Scourge of Chemical Weapons, by Ian Sullivan

A New Age of Terror: New Mass Casualty Terrorism Threat and A New Age of Terror: The Future of CBRN Terrorism by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zak Kallenborn

Dead Deer, and Mad Cows, and Humans (?) … Oh My! by proclaimed Mad Scientists LtCol Jennifer Snow and Dr. James Giordano, and Joseph DeFranco

Read our TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Then explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access), containing our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

About the Authors:

Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano is Director of the Center for Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, DC; and is Professor Emeritus in the Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC.

Dr. Diane DiEuliis is a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University, where she researches the impacts of emerging technologies on biodefense, biosecurity

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and/or those institutions and organizations that provide support for the authors’ work.