“We have craft that defy physics as we know it and are moving at speeds that are at least a hundred times faster than anything a human or robot… can produce on the planet.”
[Editor’s Note: Today’s The Convergence podcast welcomes back our very own James Gang — proclaimed Mad Scientists Dr. James Giordano and Dr. James Canton — discussing a topic featured prominently in recent news stories and Congressional testimony: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, or UAPs, now referred to by Drs. Giordano and Canton as Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued a preliminary assessment to Congress several years ago. This assessment documented the findings of the Department of Defense’s UAP Task Force (UAPTF) and the ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation — focusing on reports that involved UAP largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and collected from systems considered to be reliable. These reports described incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021 — 144 reports originated from U.S. Government sources. Of these, 80 reports involved observation with multiple sensors. This preliminary assessment states:
“Most of the UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a majority of UAP were registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared, electro-optical, weapon seekers, and visual observation.”
UAPs represent a currently unknown aspect of the Operational Environment — all the more troubling, given the possibility that they could be foreign adversarial systems, operating freely within U.S. territorial spaces. Drs. Giordano and Canton dismiss the “woo” factor often associated with this topic, describe what we do know about UAPs, and lay out three recommendations to better understand these phenomena — Enjoy!]
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Proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano is Pellegrino Center Professor in the Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry; Chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program; and Chair of the Subprogram in Military Medical Ethics at Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC. Dr. Giordano is a Bioethicist of the Defense Medical Ethics Center at the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences; Distinguished Stockdale Fellow in Science, Technology, and Ethics at the United States Naval Academy; Senior Fellow in Biosecurity, Technology, and Ethics at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI; Senior Science Advisory Fellow of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA), Joint Staff / J-39, The Pentagon; Chair Emeritus of the Neuroethics Project of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Brain Initiative; and serves as Director of the Institute for Biodefense Research, a federally funded Washington, DC, think tank dedicated to addressing emerging issues at the intersection of science, technology and national defense. He previously served as Donovan Group Senior Fellow, U.S. Special Operations Command; member of the Neuroethics, Legal, and Social Issues Advisory Panel of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); and Task Leader of the Working Group on Dual-Use of the EU-Human Brain Project.
Dr. Giordano is the author of 340 peer-reviewed publications, 7 books, and 45 governmental reports on science, technology, and biosecurity, and is an elected member of the European Academy of Science and Arts, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine (UK), and a Fulbright Professorial Fellow. A former U.S. Naval officer, he held designations as an aerospace physiologist and research psychologist, and served with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.
Proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Canton is a global futurist, social scientist, author, and strategic advisor. As a former Apple Computer executive and high-tech entrepreneur, he has been insightfully forecasting the key trends and technologies that have shaped our world, including AI-nano-bio-IT-neuroquantum-
cloud. The Economist recognizes him as one of the leading global futurists. He has advised three White House Administrations, the DoD, Intelligence Community, and over 100 companies over 30 years. Dr. Canton is CEO and Chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a leading think tank he founded in 1990 that advises business and government.
Dr. Canton is the author of Future Smart, The Extreme Future: The Top Trends That Will Reshape the World in the Next Twenty Years, and Technofutures: How Leading-Edge Innovations Will Transform Business in the 21st Century. Dr. Canton has been a lecturer at Stanford University, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, New York University, the U.S. Army and Naval War Colleges, and the Joint Special Operations University. He has held appointments at Singularity University at NASA, the Kellogg School of Management, MIT’s Media Lab, EU, the Potomac Institute, and served on the International Advisory Council, Singapore Economic Development Board, and been an advisor to the National Science and Technology Council and the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Health and Human Services.
In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientist sits down with our “James Gang” — Dr. James Giordano and Dr. James Canton — to discuss Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAPs) and the potential threat they pose. The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation:
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In an open hearing on UAP before the House Intelligence Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Counterproliferation Subcommittee on May 17, 2022, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Mr. Scott Bray shared a video of a U.S. Naval aviator encounter with an unknown object in a fleeting pass. This image is a screen capture of the UAP observed in a video of the flyby captured by the pilot in the cockpit of a Navy fighter jet. Watch the video to see the fleeting image of the UAP flash by, between time hack 0:08 and 0:09. / Source: U.S. Navy photo and video via DVIDS What were once called Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, or UAPs, are now referred to as Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena as they have been witnessed in multiple dimensions and domains, including the sea. They operate at speeds that seem to defy known physics, and their origins and attribution are currently unknown.
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- There is an abundance of evidence to support the UAP claims, much of which comes from highly credentialed individuals in the Department of Defense and Government at-large. The corroboration of these accounts further cements the veracity that “something” is encroaching on sovereign spaces, but what that “something” is – and what its intent is – remains a mystery.
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- There are various potential explanations for these phenomena – ranging from the plausible to the absurd. More sober possibilities include field tests by our own Government or friendly governments that haven’t been made public, adversaries or industry showcasing new technology, or experimentation by rogue actors.
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- Regardless of the owner – whether that be Nation State, Government, industry, or rogue actor – the capabilities of these phenomena represent a critical and potential threat to our national security. The craft are able to maneuver in ways that significantly outpace our own technology and capabilities – as well as those of our allies and partners – and have been witnessed around critical national security assets.
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- Preparing for these potential threats is difficult, due to the lack of information surrounding them. Drs. Giordano and Canton provide three recommendations to help address the nature of these phenomena:
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1) The appointment of a subject matter expert on the dimensionality of these events. This individual should be able to work within a whole-of-government approach that extends internationally.
2) Increased transparency of any and all information (excluding classified information) that are relevant to public health and safety.
3) The creation of a multi-disciplinary committee that sustains oversight on actionable information acquisition, analysis, and provision of a strengthened relationship between the “boots on the ground” investigators and whole-of-nation assets – to include being read on with national security clearances.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the following previous blog posts and podcasts from our Mad Scientist “James Gang”:
Threat #49: I Think There’s Trouble Brewin’ and associated podcast
One Brain Chip, Please! Neuro-AI with two of the Maddest Scientists and associated podcast
Review our TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:
Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).
Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.
Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).
Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access), containing our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
In an era where complexity defines the battlefield, TRADOC sits at the center of the U.S. Army’s effort to shape the fielded force. Tasked with responsibilities ranging from training Soldiers to crafting doctrine, TRADOC’s mission is both expansive and urgent. Operational environments (OEs) have never been more multifaceted, encompassing political, military, economic, and social domains, all while presenting commanders with incomplete or conflicting data. It’s a daunting challenge, but also one that aligns perfectly with the strengths of generative AI (GenAI) and large language models (LLMs).
GenAI
insights in minutes. It’s not just about speed; it’s about clarity and focus. Soldiers can engage with these models conversationally, asking natural-language questions like, “What are the key political and military risks in this region?” or “Explain how this terrain impacts our logistics.” This transforms a sprawling, overwhelming dataset into a navigable, interactive resource.
valuable time. LLMs can rapidly organize and synthesize vast amounts of information, identifying patterns and constructing plausible OOBs in minutes. This efficiency frees planners to focus on strategic decision-making rather than being bogged down by data collection. However, it’s critical to recognize that LLMs are not perfect reasoning engines. They excel at organizing information and summarizing patterns, but lack the nuanced judgment and deep strategic insights that come from years of military experience. OOB creation, like most aspects of military planning, will continue to require a mix of tools, from simulations and optimization models to human expertise.
this process. It can draft detailed training scenarios, generate comprehensive analyses, and even suggest predictive questions for planners to consider. For example, in preparing for operations in a fictional conflict zone, an LLM could produce adversary profiles, environmental challenges, and even strategic contingencies. This allows human experts to shift their focus to higher-order thinking and decision-making.
intricacies of OEs, and the precision required for military planning make this a daunting task. Still, the stakes couldn’t be higher. In a world where 
“... are choosing to sidestep U.S. conventional dominance…. seek[ing] to compete in fields cheaper to cultivate and maintain — 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
which it operates. That includes, but is not limited to, societal characteristics, political systems, economic conditions, offensive capabilities, and technological development. An effort as widespread as this will rely on numerous sources of information and multiple collection efforts.
Verification of intelligence is crucial, and it can come from a portion of the collection effort different from the part that generated the lead. To properly vet new information, an intelligence collection effort must be put in place long before a threat gets in motion. Establishing sources during periods of peace also provides time to determine which ones are reliable and drop those which are not.
Practitioners of active defense should leverage existing entities that are already a problem for a belligerent regime. Creating opposition groups in the adversary’s territory is difficult, and can be traced back to its sponsors. Shaping the conflict environment naturally, by exploiting organic entities and ongoing frictions, can help keep an active defense program hidden.
Active defense uses the full spectrum of intelligence collection, from satellite imagery to paid informants. When practitioners lack high-tech capabilities, they may have to rely more heavily on human sources. These contacts can be found or created using techniques both new and old. For example, covert operatives can recruit members of an opponent’s government as informants or trick them into divulging secrets. Disgruntled employees and disenchanted supporters are exploitable weak spots in otherwise sound security systems.
Paid informants are a prime source of early warning, even when they have no direct link to the adversary regime. Some everyday citizens know the difference between routine military maneuvers and preparations for an attack. While a single individual sending a warning may not be actionable, developing a network of human sources can help confirm or disqualify that alert.
can reduce an opponent’s ability to strike. Factions are also prime sources of intelligence because of their intimate knowledge of a regime and motivation to share information harmful to it.
social media is available, use it to raise awareness of the faction and broadcast its argument. In places where news and the Internet are restricted, learn how opinions are covertly expressed. Identify the channels of dissenting opinion that have gained the public’s attention in the past, and utilize them.
Be careful not to promote a dissident group that is more extreme than the current regime. With that said, encouraging factions can distract an opponent’s leadership and even open the way for a more peaceful government.
Disrupt logistics: Even when a hostile party appears to be self-sustaining, there is always something they get from somewhere else. It may be a service, such as processing a resource they can’t refine. It may be technological, in the form of products or expertise from a third party. Close examination of supply chains can point out key flaws such as a single source for crucial items, funding for a large part of the budget, or a fragile chain of handlers passing vital materials.
disrupting the supply lines and raise a public outcry against their misdeeds. Threaten their access to the electronic money transfer system to complicate payments and convince legitimate suppliers to stop supporting them.
Sway public opinion among the adversary’s constituents. If the regime forces its people to live in austerity while funding military needs, popular disapproval should already exist. The intelligence assessment of the society inside the hostile party’s borders should indicate which means (social media, word of mouth, or some other method) can be used to fan this discontent. Base this approach in the truth, but don’t forget there is a role for satire as well. Regimes that rule by fear are greatly threatened by public ridicule.
the factors that influence it, active defense provides crucial information and insights on an adversary. By degrading an aggressor’s ability to attack, it alters the operational landscape. By promoting dissenting voices, it offers an alternative to a hostile regime.
designed and primarily employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel and materiel. The Joint Immediate Force Capabilities Office (JIFCO) oversees the 
Captain Lin Wei stood resolutely on the bridge of the Taiwan Coast Guard vessel “Resolute,” his eyes scanning the choppy waters around the Kinmen Islands. The wind whipped his face, bringing the salty tang of the Taiwan Strait, and the tension in the air was palpable. Reports had come in of two Chinese Coast Guard ships deploying floating barriers into the restricted waters surrounding Kinmen, a territory hotly contested by Taiwan and China. His orders were crystal clear: deter their advance without escalating to lethal force.
mechanism developed after winning an Army
