[Editor’s Note: Since its inception in November 2017, the Mad Scientist Laboratory has enabled us to expand our reach and engage global innovators from across industry, academia, and the Government regarding emergent disruptive technologies and their individual and convergent impacts on the future of warfare. For perspective, our blog has accrued 106K views by over 57K visitors from around the world!
Our Mad Scientist Community of Action continues to grow — in no small part due to the many guest bloggers who have shared their provocative, insightful, and occasionally disturbing visions of the future. To date, 53% of the blog posts published have been submitted by guest bloggers! We challenge you all to contribute your ideas about warfare and the Future Operational Environment!
In particular, we would like to recognize proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Alexander Kott by re-posting our review of his paper, Ground Warfare in 2050: How It Might Look, original published by the US Army Research Laboratory in August 2018. This paper provides a technological forecast of autonomous intelligent agents and robots and their potential for employment on future battlefields in the year 2050.
Our review of Dr. Kott’s paper generated a record number of visits and views during the past six month period. Consequently, we hereby declare Dr. Kott to be the Mad Scientist Laboratory’s “Maddest” Guest Blogger! for the first and second quarters of FY19. In recognition of this achievement, Dr. Kott will receive much coveted Mad Scientist swag!
Enjoy today’s post as we revisit Dr. Kott’s conclusions with links to our previously published posts supporting his findings.]
Ground Warfare in 2050: How It Might Look
In his paper, Dr. Kott addresses two major trends (currently under way) that will continue to affect combat operations for the foreseeable future. They are:
• The employment of small aerial drones for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) will continue, making concealment difficult and eliminating distance from opposing forces as a means of counter-detection. This will require the development and use of decoy capabilities (also intelligent robotic devices). This counter-reconnaissance fight will feature prominently on future battlefields between autonomous sensors and countermeasures – “a robot-on-robot affair.”
See our related discussions regarding Concealment in the Fundamental Questions Affecting Army Modernization post and Finders vs Hiders in our Timeless Competitions post.
• The continued proliferation of intelligent munitions, operating at greater distances, collaborating in teams to seek out and destroy designated targets, and able to defeat armored and other hardened targets, as well as defiladed and entrenched targets.
See our descriptions of the future recon / strike complex in our Advanced Engagement Battlespace and the “Hyperactive Battlefield” post, and Robotics and Swarms / Semi Autonomous capabilities in our Potential Game Changers post.
These two trends will, in turn, drive the following forecasted developments:
• Increasing reliance on unmanned systems, “with humans becoming a minority within the overall force, being further dispersed across the battlefield.”
See Mr. Jeff Becker’s post on The Multi-Domain “Dragoon” Squad: A Hyper-enabled Combat System, and Mr. Mike Matson’s Demons in the Tall Grass, both of which envision future tactical units employing greater numbers of autonomous combat systems; as well as Mr. Sam Bendett’s post on Russian Ground Battlefield Robots: A Candid Evaluation and Ways Forward, addressing the contemporary hurdles that one of our strategic competitors must address in operationalizing Unmanned Ground Vehicles.
• Intelligent munitions will be neutralized “primarily by missiles and only secondarily by armor and entrenchments. Specialized autonomous protection vehicles will be required that will use their extensive load of antimissiles to defeat the incoming intelligent munitions.”
See our discussion of what warfare at machine-speed looks like in our Advanced Engagement Battlespace and the “Hyperactive Battlefield”.
• Forces will exploit “very complex terrain, such as dense forest and urban environments” for cover and concealment, requiring the development of highly mobile “ground robots with legs and limbs,” able to negotiate this congested landscape.
See our Megacities: Future Challenges and Responses and Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare posts that address future complex operational environments.
• The proliferation of autonomous combat systems on the battlefield will generate an additional required capability — “a significant number of specialized robotic vehicles that will serve as mobile power generation plants and charging stations.”
See our discussion of future Power capabilities on our Potential Game Changers handout.
• “To gain protection from intelligent munitions, extended subterranean tunnels and facilities will become important. This in turn will necessitate the tunnel-digging robotic machines, suitably equipped for battlefield mobility.”
See our discussion of Multi-Domain Swarming in our Black Swans and Pink Flamingos post.
• All of these autonomous, yet simultaneously integrated and networked battlefield systems will be vulnerable to Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA). Consequently, the battle within the Cyber domain will “be fought largely by various autonomous cyber agents that will attack, defend, and manage the overall network of exceptional complexity and dynamics.”
See MAJ Chris Telley’s post addressing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as an Information Operations tool in his Influence at Machine Speed: The Coming of AI-Powered Propaganda.
• The “high volume and velocity of information produced and demanded by the robot-intensive force” will require an increasingly autonomous Command and Control (C2) system, with humans increasingly being on, rather than in, the loop.
See Mr. Ian Sullivan’s discussion of AI vs. AI and how the decisive edge accrues to the combatant with more autonomous decision-action concurrency in his Lessons Learned in Assessing the Operational Environment post.
If you enjoyed reading this post, please watch Dr. Alexander Kott’s presentation, “The Network is the Robot,” from the Mad Scientist Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Autonomy: Visioning Multi-Domain Warfare in 2030-2050 Conference, co-sponsored by the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), in Atlanta, Georgia, 7-8 March 2017.
… and crank up Mr. Roboto by Styx!
Dr. Alexander Kott serves as the ARL’s Chief Scientist. In this role he provides leadership in development of ARL technical strategy, maintaining technical quality of ARL research, and representing ARL to external technical community. He published over 80 technical papers and served as the initiator, co-author and primary editor of over ten books, including most recently Cyber Defense and Situational Awareness (2015) and Cyber Security of SCADA and other Industrial Control Systems (2016), and the forthcoming Cyber Resilience of Systems and Networks (2019).
The
and AI device in the world. Such connections will be enabled by a 
Warfare in the future is not going to be conducted by machines, no matter how far AI advances. Warfare will instead be connected human to human, human to internet, and internet to machine in complex, global networks. We cannot know today how such warfare will be conducted or what characteristics and capabilities of future forces will be necessary for victory. What we can do is cease developing AI as if it were something separate and distinct from, and often envisioned in competition with, humanity and instead focus our endeavors and investments in preparing for future connected competitions and wars.
The U.S. defense industry routinely analyzes emerging and potentially 
According to Paul Scharre‘s preface to Elsa Kania‘s paper on
unintentionally follows the
For example, quantum computation uses the quantum analog of a bit, called a quantum bit, existing in multiple states due to
This post sees QAI as a different element of the taxonomy and not a subset of classical AI. “Quantum physics is based on information theory and probability theory” according to Andreas Wichert, author of 
amount of information where N=6 because the possible alternatives are six. Instead of “N” (number of alternatives), scientists measure information in terms of quantity deemed “S” after Shannon. Rovelli also states information is finite in nature based on quantum mechanical properties. New or “relevant” information cancels out “irrelevant” information in a physical system, therefore systems can always obtain new information from other systems. *This point is important for later.
This specific interpretation is based on Hugh Everett’s relative state or many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and information
• Relevant information cancels out irrelevant information in a physical system, therefore systems can always obtain new information from other systems
One interpretation of AI is
vice versa (alternate histories and futures). Physicist David Deutsch, a proponent of the MWI, believes MWI will be testable through
Humans are susceptible to cognitive biases and these biases sometimes result in catastrophic outcomes, particularly in the high stress environment of war-time decision-making. Artificial Intelligence (AI) offers the possibility of mitigating the susceptibility of negative outcomes in the commander’s decision-making process by enhancing the collective Emotional Intelligence (EI) of the commander and his/her staff. AI will continue to become more prevalent in combat and as such, should be integrated in a way that advances 
the EI capacity of our commanders. An interactive AI that feels like one is communicating with a staff officer, which has human-compatible principles, can support decision-making in high-stakes, time-critical situations with ambiguous or incomplete information.
The mission command philosophy necessitates improved EI. EI is defined as the capacity to be aware of, control, and express one’s emotions, and to handle interpersonal relationships judiciously and empathetically, at much quicker speeds in order seize the initiative in war.
The advent of machine-learning algorithms that could be applied to autonomous lethal weapons systems has so far resulted in a general predilection towards ensuring humans remain in the decision-making loop with respect to all aspects of warfare.
The Battalion is a good example organization to visualize this framework. A machine-learning software system could be connected into different staff systems to analyze data produced by the section as they execute their warfighting functions. This machine-learning software system would also assess the human-in-the-loop decisions against statistical outcomes and aggregate important data to support the commander’s 
assessments. Over time, this EI-based machine-learning software system could rank the quality of the staff officers’ judgements. The commander can then consider the value of the staff officers’ assessments against the officers’ track-record of reliability and the raw data provided by the staff sections’ systems. The Bridgewater financial firm employs this very type of human decision-making assessment algorithm in order to assess the 
“believability” of their employees’ judgements before making high-stakes, and sometimes time-critical, international financial decisions.
Stuart Russell offers a construct of limitations that should be coded into AI in order to make it most useful to humanity and prevent conclusions that result in an AI turning on humanity. These three concepts are: 1) principle of altruism towards the human race (and not itself), 2) maximizing uncertainty by making it follow only human objectives, but not explaining what those are, and 3) making it learn by exposing it to everything and all types of humans.
The potential opportunities and pitfalls are abundant for the employment of AI in decision-making. Apart from the obvious danger of this type of system being hacked, the possibility of the AI machine-learning algorithms harboring biased coding inconsistent with the values of the unit employing it are real.
The commander’s primary goal is to achieve the mission. The future includes AI, and commanders will need to trust and integrate AI assessments into their natural decision-making process and make it part of their intuitive calculus. In this way, they will have ready access to objective analyses of their units’ potential biases, enhancing their own EI, and be able overcome them to accomplish their mission.
[Editor’s Note: On 8-9 August 2018, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) co-hosted the Mad Scientist Learning in 2050 Conference with Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies in Washington, DC. Leading scientists, innovators, and scholars from academia, industry, and the government gathered to address future learning techniques and technologies that are critical in preparing for Army operations in the mid-21st century against adversaries in rapidly evolving battlespaces. Today’s post is extracted from this conference’s final report (more of which is addressed at the bottom of this post).]
The U.S. Army currently has more than 150
Training eighty thousand new Recruits a year on existing MOSs is a colossal undertaking. A great expansion in the jobs and skillsets needed to field a highly capable future Army, replete with modified or new MOSs, adds a considerable burden to the Army’s learning systems and institutions. These new requirements, however, will almost certainly present an opportunity for the Army to capitalize on intelligent tutors, personalized learning, and immersive learning to lessen costs and save time in Soldier and Leader development.
Marc Prensky, educational writer and speaker who coined the term digital native, asserts this “
variety of intrinsic skills that Recruits will have prior to entering the Army. Just like we no longer train Soldiers on how to use a computer, games like Fortnite, with no formal relationship with the military, will provide players with militarily-useful skills such as communications, resource management, foraging, force structure management, and fortification and structure building, all while attempting to survive against persistent attack. Due to these trends, Recruits may come into the Army with fundamental technical skills and baseline military thinking attributes that flatten the learning curve for Initial Entry Training (IET).
Due to the high demand for these skillsets, the Army will have to compete for talent with private industry, battling them on compensation, benefits, perks, and a less restrictive work environment – limited to no dress code, flexible schedule, and freedom of action. In light of this, the Army may have to consider adjusting or relaxing its current recruitment processes, business practices, and force structuring to ensure it is able to attract and retain expertise. It also may have to reconsider how it adapts and utilizes its civilian workforce to undertake these types of tasks in new and creative ways.
The Army is already exploring this avenue of approach through the formation of an
A recent study identified 34
Hue, and Ramadi, shift the perspective from problem solving to critical holistic thinking skills and decision-making required in ambiguous environments.
The
become self-ruling and long-term sustainable, would facilitate urban, political, and economical homeostasis in alignment with U.S. interests and bequeath a homeostatic urban balance legacy — “Pax Americana.”
This is naturally ongoing in Detroit, is historically documented to have happened in Rome, and can be witnessed in Angkor Wat. While the greatest beneficiaries of this long-term would be the populace, its military benefits are obvious. The Army would simply accelerate the process.
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Success in the future OE relies on many key assumptions. One such assumption is that the innovation cycle has flipped. Where the DoD used to drive technological innovation in this country, we now see private industry (namely Silicon Valley) as the driving force with the Army consuming products and transitioning technology for military use. If this system is to work, as the assumption implies, the Army must be able to work easily with the country’s leading technology companies. Microsoft’s President Brad Smith stated recently that his company will “provide the U.S. military with access to the best technology … all the technology we create. Full stop.”
The retail superpower Walmart is employing hundreds of robots in stores across the country, starting next month. These floor-scrubbing janitor robots will keep the stores’ floors immaculate using autonomous navigation that will be able to sense both people and obstacles.
Russia, and Africa. This rise of global science fiction challenges how we think about the evolution of the genre. Historically, our occidental bias led us to believe that sci-fi was spreading from Western centers out to the rest of the world, blinding us to the fact that other regions also have rich histories of sci-fi depicting future possibilities from their cultural perspectives. Chinese science fiction has boomed in recent years, with standout books like Cixin Liu’s 
A significant barrier to the modeling and simulation of dense urban environments has been the complexity of these areas in terms of building, vehicle, pedestrian, and foliage density.
In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, it is clear that coders are not morally superior to other people and that voluntary, unenforceable Codes and Oaths are inadequate.
After 200 years of the technology tail wagging the humanity dog, it is apparent now that we are replaying history – and don’t know it. Most human cultures have been intensively engaged with technology since before the Iron Age 3,000 years ago. We have been keenly aware of technology’s collateral effects mostly since the Industrial Revolution, but have not yet created general rules for how we want machines to impact individuals and society. The blurring of reality and virtuality that AI brings to the table might prompt us to do so.
When virtuality offers experiences that humans perceive as real, the outcomes are the responsibility of the creators and distributors, no less than tobacco companies selling cigarettes, or pharmaceutical companies and cartels selling addictive drugs. Individuals do not have the right to risk the well-being of others to satisfy their need for complying with clichés such as “innovation,” and “disruption.”
1. All material transformations and human transactions are to be conducted by humans.
Machines are here to help and advise humans, not replace them, and humans may exhibit a spectrum of responses to them. Some may ignore a robot’s advice and put others at risk. Some may follow recommendations to the point of becoming a zombie. But either way, Man-Machine Rules are based on and meant to support free, individual human choices.
Political and military actions directed at adversely impacting or defeating an opponent often entail clandestine operations which can be articulated across a spectrum that ranges from overt warfare to subtle “engagements.” Routinely, the United States, along with its allies (and adversaries), has employed clandestine tactics and operations across the kinetic and non-kinetic domains of warfare. Arguably, the execution of clandestine kinetic operations is employed more readily as these collective activities often occur after the initiation of conflict (i.e., “Right of Bang”), and their effects may be observed (to various degrees) and/or measured. Given that clandestine non-kinetic activities are less visible and insidious, they may be particularly (or more) effective because often they are unrecognized and occur “Left of Bang.” Other nations, especially adversaries, understand the relative economy of force that non-kinetic engagements enable and increasingly are focused upon developing and articulating advanced methods for operations.
Much has been written about the fog of war. Non-kinetic engagements can create unique uncertainties prior to and/or outside of traditional warfare, precisely because they have qualitatively and quantitatively “fuzzy boundaries” as blatant acts of war. The “intentionally induced ambiguity” of non-kinetic engagements can establish plus-sum advantages for the executor(s) and zero-sum dilemmas for the target(s). For example, a limited scale non-kinetic action, which exerts demonstrably significant effects but does not meet defined criteria for an act of war, places the targeted recipient(s) at a disadvantage: First, in that the criteria for response (and proportionality) are vague and therefore any response could be seen as questionable; and second, in that if the targeted recipient(s) responds with bellicose action(s), there is considerable likelihood that they may be viewed as (or provoked to be) the aggressor(s) (and therefore susceptible to some form of retribution that may be regarded as sanctionable).
Nominally, non-kinetic engagements often utilize non-military means to expand the effect-space beyond the conventional battlefield. The Department of Defense and Joint Staff do not have a well agreed-upon lexicon to define and to express the full spectrum of current and potential activities that constitute non-kinetic engagements. It is unfamiliar – and can be politically uncomfortable – to use non-military terms and means to describe non-kinetic engagements. As previously noted, it can be politically difficult – if not precarious– to militarily define and respond to non-kinetic activities.
Non-kinetic engagements are best employed to incur disruptive effects in and across various dimensions of effect (e.g., biological, psychological, social) that can lead to intermediate to long-term destructive manifestations (in a number of possible domains, ranging from the economic to the geo-political). The latent disruptive and destructive effects should be framed and regarded as “Grand Strategy” approaches that evoke outcomes in a “long engagement/long war” context rather than merely in more short-term tactical situations.
Thus, non-kinetic operations must be seen and regarded as “tools of mass disruption,” incurring “rippling results” that can evoke both direct and indirect de-stabilizing effects. These effects can occur and spread: 1) from the cellular (e.g., affecting physiological function of a targeted individual) to the socio-political scales (e.g., to manifest effects in response to threats, burdens and harms incurred by individual and/or groups); and 2) from the personal (e.g., affecting a specific individual or particular group of individuals) to the public dimensions in effect and outcome (e.g., by incurring broad scale reactions and responses to key non-kinetic events).
Given the increasing global stature, capabilities, and postures of Asian nations, it becomes increasingly important to pay attention to aspects of classical Eastern thought (e.g., Sun Tzu) relevant to bellicose engagement. Of equal importance is the recognition of various nations’ dedicated enterprises in developing methods of non-kinetic operations (e.g., China; Russia), and to understand that such endeavors may not comport with the ethical systems, principles, and restrictions adhered to by the United States and its allies.
These differing 
Table 1
Of key interest are the present viability and current potential value of the
As recent incidents (e.g., “Havana Syndrome”; use of novichok; infiltration of foreign-produced synthetic opioids to US markets) have demonstrated, the brain sciences and technologies have utility to affect “minds and hearts” in (kinetic and non-kinetic) ways that elicit biological, psychological, socio-economic, and political effects which can be clandestine, covert, or attributional, and which evoke multi-dimensional ripple effects in particular contexts (as previously discussed). Moreover, apropos current events, the use of
and/or selectively alter human susceptibility to disease
Further, we opine that a coordinated enterprise of this magnitude will necessitate a Whole of Nations approach so as to mobilize the organizations, resources, and personnel required to meet other nations’ synergistic triple helix capabilities to develop and non-kinetically engage ETT.