[Editor’s Note: As stated previously here in the Mad Scientist Laboratory, the nature of war remains inherently humanistic in the Future Operational Environment. Today’s post by guest blogger COL James K. Greer (USA-Ret.) calls on us to stop envisioning Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a separate and distinct end state (oftentimes in competition with humanity) and to instead focus on preparing for future connected competitions and wars.]
The possibilities and challenges for future security, military operations, and warfare associated with advancements in AI are proposed and discussed with ever-increasing frequency, both within formal defense establishments and informally among national security professionals and stakeholders. One is confronted with a myriad of alternative futures, including everything from a humanity-killing variation of Terminator’s SkyNet to uncontrolled warfare ala WarGames to Deep Learning used to enhance existing military processes and operations. And of course legal and ethical issues surrounding the military use of AI abound.
Yet in most discussions of the military applications of AI and its use in warfare, we have a blind spot in our thinking about technological progress toward the future. That blind spot is that we think about AI largely as disconnected from humans and the human brain. Rather than thinking about AI-enabled systems as connected to humans, we think about them as parallel processes. We talk about human-in-the loop or human-on-the-loop largely in terms of the control over autonomous systems, rather than comprehensive connection to and interaction with those systems.
But even while significant progress is being made in the development of AI, almost no attention is paid to the military implications of advances in human connectivity. Experiments have already been conducted connecting the human brain directly to the internet, which of course connects the human mind not only to the Internet of Things (IoT), but potentially to every computer 
and AI device in the world. Such connections will be enabled by a chip in the brain that provides connectivity while enabling humans to perform all normal functions, including all those associated with warfare (as envisioned by John Scalzi’s BrainPal in “Old Man’s War”).
Moreover, experiments in connecting human brains to each other are ongoing. Brain-to-brain connectivity has occurred in a controlled setting enabled by an internet connection. And, in experiments conducted to date, the brain of one human can be used to direct the weapons firing of another human, demonstrating applicability to future warfare. While experimentation in brain-to-internet and brain-to-brain connectivity is not as advanced as the development of AI, it is easy to see that the potential benefits, desirability, and frankly, market forces are likely to accelerate the human side of connectivity development past the AI side.
So, when contemplating the future of human activity, of which warfare is unfortunately a central component, we cannot and must not think of AI development and human development as separate, but rather as interconnected. Future warfare will be connected warfare, with implications we must now begin to consider. How would such connected warfare be conducted? How would mission command be exercised between man and machine? What are the leadership implications of the human leader’s brain being connected to those of their subordinates? How will humans manage information for decision-making without being completely overloaded and paralyzed by overwhelming amounts of data? What are the moral, ethical, and legal implications of connected humans in combat, as well as responsibility for the actions of machines to which they are connected? These and thousands of other questions and implications related to policy and operation must be considered.
The power of AI resides not just in that of the individual computer, but in the connection of each computer to literally millions, if not billions, of sensors, servers, computers, and smart devices employing thousands, if not millions, of software programs and apps. The consensus is that at some point the computing and analytic power of AI will surpass that of the individual. And therein lies a major flaw in our thinking about the future. The power of AI may surpass that of a human being, but it won’t surpass the learning, thinking, and decision-making power of connected human beings. When a future human is connected to the internet, that human will have access to the computing power of all AI. But, when that same human is connected to several (in a platoon), or hundreds (on a ship) or thousands (in multiple headquarters) of other humans, then the power of AI will be exceeded by multiple orders of magnitude. The challenge of course is being able to think effectively under those circumstances, with your brain connected to all those sensors, computers, and other humans. This is what Ray Kurzwell terms “hybrid thinking.” Imagine how that is going to change every facet of human life, to include every aspect of warfare, and how everyone in our future defense establishment, uniformed or not, will have to be capable of hybrid thinking.
So, what will the military human bring to warfare that the AI-empowered computer won’t? Certainly, one of the major challenges with AI thus far has been its inability to demonstrate human intuition. AI can replicate some derivative tasks with intuition using what is now called “Artificial Intuition.” These tasks are primarily the intuitive decisions that result from experience: AI generates this experience through some large number of iterations, which is how Goggle’s AlphaGo was able to beat the human world Go champion. Still, this is only a small part of the capacity of humans in terms not only of intuition, but of “insight,” what we call the “light bulb moment”. Humans will also bring emotional intelligence to connected warfare. Emotional intelligence, including aspects such as empathy, loyalty, and courage, are critical in the crucible of war and are not capabilities that machines can provide the Force, not today and perhaps not ever.
Warfare in the future is not going to be conducted by machines, no matter how far AI advances. Warfare will instead be connected human to human, human to internet, and internet to machine in complex, global networks. We cannot know today how such warfare will be conducted or what characteristics and capabilities of future forces will be necessary for victory. What we can do is cease developing AI as if it were something separate and distinct from, and often envisioned in competition with, humanity and instead focus our endeavors and investments in preparing for future connected competitions and wars.
If you enjoyed this post, please read the following Mad Scientist Laboratory blog posts:
- Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield
- AI Enhancing EI in War
- Ethical Dilemmas of Future Warfare
… and watch Dr. Alexander Kott‘s presentation The Network is the Robot, presented at the Mad Scientist Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, & Autonomy: Visioning Multi Domain Battle in 2030-2050 Conference, at the Georgia Tech Research Institute, 8-9 March 2017, in Atlanta, Georgia.
COL James K. Greer (USA-Ret.) is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Integrator at the Combined Arms Command. A former cavalry officer, he served thirty years in the US Army, commanding at all levels from platoon through Brigade. Jim served in operational units in CONUS, Germany, the Balkans and the Middle East. He served in US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), primarily focused on leader, capabilities and doctrine development. He has significant concept development experience, co-writing concepts for Force XXI, Army After Next and Army Transformation. Jim was the Army representative to OSD-Net assessment 20XX Wargame Series developing concepts OSD and the Joint Staff. He is a former Director of the Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and instructor in tactics at West Point. Jim is a veteran of six combat tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, including serving as Chief of Staff of the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). Since leaving active duty, Jim has led the conduct of research for the Army Research Institute (ARI) and designed, developed and delivered instruction in leadership, strategic foresight, design, and strategic and operational planning. Dr. Greer holds a Doctorate in Education, with his dissertation subject as US Army leader self-development. A graduate of the United States Military Academy, he has a Master’s Degree in Education, with a concentration in Psychological Counseling: as well as Masters Degrees in National Security from the National War College and Operational Planning from the School of Advanced Military Studies.
The U.S. defense industry routinely analyzes emerging and potentially 
According to Paul Scharre‘s preface to Elsa Kania‘s paper on
unintentionally follows the
For example, quantum computation uses the quantum analog of a bit, called a quantum bit, existing in multiple states due to
This post sees QAI as a different element of the taxonomy and not a subset of classical AI. “Quantum physics is based on information theory and probability theory” according to Andreas Wichert, author of 
amount of information where N=6 because the possible alternatives are six. Instead of “N” (number of alternatives), scientists measure information in terms of quantity deemed “S” after Shannon. Rovelli also states information is finite in nature based on quantum mechanical properties. New or “relevant” information cancels out “irrelevant” information in a physical system, therefore systems can always obtain new information from other systems. *This point is important for later.
This specific interpretation is based on Hugh Everett’s relative state or many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and information
• Relevant information cancels out irrelevant information in a physical system, therefore systems can always obtain new information from other systems
One interpretation of AI is
vice versa (alternate histories and futures). Physicist David Deutsch, a proponent of the MWI, believes MWI will be testable through
Humans are susceptible to cognitive biases and these biases sometimes result in catastrophic outcomes, particularly in the high stress environment of war-time decision-making. Artificial Intelligence (AI) offers the possibility of mitigating the susceptibility of negative outcomes in the commander’s decision-making process by enhancing the collective Emotional Intelligence (EI) of the commander and his/her staff. AI will continue to become more prevalent in combat and as such, should be integrated in a way that advances 
the EI capacity of our commanders. An interactive AI that feels like one is communicating with a staff officer, which has human-compatible principles, can support decision-making in high-stakes, time-critical situations with ambiguous or incomplete information.
The mission command philosophy necessitates improved EI. EI is defined as the capacity to be aware of, control, and express one’s emotions, and to handle interpersonal relationships judiciously and empathetically, at much quicker speeds in order seize the initiative in war.
The advent of machine-learning algorithms that could be applied to autonomous lethal weapons systems has so far resulted in a general predilection towards ensuring humans remain in the decision-making loop with respect to all aspects of warfare.
The Battalion is a good example organization to visualize this framework. A machine-learning software system could be connected into different staff systems to analyze data produced by the section as they execute their warfighting functions. This machine-learning software system would also assess the human-in-the-loop decisions against statistical outcomes and aggregate important data to support the commander’s 
assessments. Over time, this EI-based machine-learning software system could rank the quality of the staff officers’ judgements. The commander can then consider the value of the staff officers’ assessments against the officers’ track-record of reliability and the raw data provided by the staff sections’ systems. The Bridgewater financial firm employs this very type of human decision-making assessment algorithm in order to assess the 
“believability” of their employees’ judgements before making high-stakes, and sometimes time-critical, international financial decisions.
Stuart Russell offers a construct of limitations that should be coded into AI in order to make it most useful to humanity and prevent conclusions that result in an AI turning on humanity. These three concepts are: 1) principle of altruism towards the human race (and not itself), 2) maximizing uncertainty by making it follow only human objectives, but not explaining what those are, and 3) making it learn by exposing it to everything and all types of humans.
The potential opportunities and pitfalls are abundant for the employment of AI in decision-making. Apart from the obvious danger of this type of system being hacked, the possibility of the AI machine-learning algorithms harboring biased coding inconsistent with the values of the unit employing it are real.
The commander’s primary goal is to achieve the mission. The future includes AI, and commanders will need to trust and integrate AI assessments into their natural decision-making process and make it part of their intuitive calculus. In this way, they will have ready access to objective analyses of their units’ potential biases, enhancing their own EI, and be able overcome them to accomplish their mission.
[Editor’s Note: On 8-9 August 2018, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) co-hosted the Mad Scientist Learning in 2050 Conference with Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies in Washington, DC. Leading scientists, innovators, and scholars from academia, industry, and the government gathered to address future learning techniques and technologies that are critical in preparing for Army operations in the mid-21st century against adversaries in rapidly evolving battlespaces. Today’s post is extracted from this conference’s final report (more of which is addressed at the bottom of this post).]
The U.S. Army currently has more than 150
Training eighty thousand new Recruits a year on existing MOSs is a colossal undertaking. A great expansion in the jobs and skillsets needed to field a highly capable future Army, replete with modified or new MOSs, adds a considerable burden to the Army’s learning systems and institutions. These new requirements, however, will almost certainly present an opportunity for the Army to capitalize on intelligent tutors, personalized learning, and immersive learning to lessen costs and save time in Soldier and Leader development.
Marc Prensky, educational writer and speaker who coined the term digital native, asserts this “
variety of intrinsic skills that Recruits will have prior to entering the Army. Just like we no longer train Soldiers on how to use a computer, games like Fortnite, with no formal relationship with the military, will provide players with militarily-useful skills such as communications, resource management, foraging, force structure management, and fortification and structure building, all while attempting to survive against persistent attack. Due to these trends, Recruits may come into the Army with fundamental technical skills and baseline military thinking attributes that flatten the learning curve for Initial Entry Training (IET).
Due to the high demand for these skillsets, the Army will have to compete for talent with private industry, battling them on compensation, benefits, perks, and a less restrictive work environment – limited to no dress code, flexible schedule, and freedom of action. In light of this, the Army may have to consider adjusting or relaxing its current recruitment processes, business practices, and force structuring to ensure it is able to attract and retain expertise. It also may have to reconsider how it adapts and utilizes its civilian workforce to undertake these types of tasks in new and creative ways.
The Army is already exploring this avenue of approach through the formation of an
A recent study identified 34
Hue, and Ramadi, shift the perspective from problem solving to critical holistic thinking skills and decision-making required in ambiguous environments.
The
become self-ruling and long-term sustainable, would facilitate urban, political, and economical homeostasis in alignment with U.S. interests and bequeath a homeostatic urban balance legacy — “Pax Americana.”
This is naturally ongoing in Detroit, is historically documented to have happened in Rome, and can be witnessed in Angkor Wat. While the greatest beneficiaries of this long-term would be the populace, its military benefits are obvious. The Army would simply accelerate the process.
Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to provide for your holiday reading pleasure our
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Success in the future OE relies on many key assumptions. One such assumption is that the innovation cycle has flipped. Where the DoD used to drive technological innovation in this country, we now see private industry (namely Silicon Valley) as the driving force with the Army consuming products and transitioning technology for military use. If this system is to work, as the assumption implies, the Army must be able to work easily with the country’s leading technology companies. Microsoft’s President Brad Smith stated recently that his company will “provide the U.S. military with access to the best technology … all the technology we create. Full stop.”
The retail superpower Walmart is employing hundreds of robots in stores across the country, starting next month. These floor-scrubbing janitor robots will keep the stores’ floors immaculate using autonomous navigation that will be able to sense both people and obstacles.
Russia, and Africa. This rise of global science fiction challenges how we think about the evolution of the genre. Historically, our occidental bias led us to believe that sci-fi was spreading from Western centers out to the rest of the world, blinding us to the fact that other regions also have rich histories of sci-fi depicting future possibilities from their cultural perspectives. Chinese science fiction has boomed in recent years, with standout books like Cixin Liu’s 
A significant barrier to the modeling and simulation of dense urban environments has been the complexity of these areas in terms of building, vehicle, pedestrian, and foliage density.
In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, it is clear that coders are not morally superior to other people and that voluntary, unenforceable Codes and Oaths are inadequate.
After 200 years of the technology tail wagging the humanity dog, it is apparent now that we are replaying history – and don’t know it. Most human cultures have been intensively engaged with technology since before the Iron Age 3,000 years ago. We have been keenly aware of technology’s collateral effects mostly since the Industrial Revolution, but have not yet created general rules for how we want machines to impact individuals and society. The blurring of reality and virtuality that AI brings to the table might prompt us to do so.
When virtuality offers experiences that humans perceive as real, the outcomes are the responsibility of the creators and distributors, no less than tobacco companies selling cigarettes, or pharmaceutical companies and cartels selling addictive drugs. Individuals do not have the right to risk the well-being of others to satisfy their need for complying with clichés such as “innovation,” and “disruption.”
1. All material transformations and human transactions are to be conducted by humans.
Machines are here to help and advise humans, not replace them, and humans may exhibit a spectrum of responses to them. Some may ignore a robot’s advice and put others at risk. Some may follow recommendations to the point of becoming a zombie. But either way, Man-Machine Rules are based on and meant to support free, individual human choices.
Political and military actions directed at adversely impacting or defeating an opponent often entail clandestine operations which can be articulated across a spectrum that ranges from overt warfare to subtle “engagements.” Routinely, the United States, along with its allies (and adversaries), has employed clandestine tactics and operations across the kinetic and non-kinetic domains of warfare. Arguably, the execution of clandestine kinetic operations is employed more readily as these collective activities often occur after the initiation of conflict (i.e., “Right of Bang”), and their effects may be observed (to various degrees) and/or measured. Given that clandestine non-kinetic activities are less visible and insidious, they may be particularly (or more) effective because often they are unrecognized and occur “Left of Bang.” Other nations, especially adversaries, understand the relative economy of force that non-kinetic engagements enable and increasingly are focused upon developing and articulating advanced methods for operations.
Much has been written about the fog of war. Non-kinetic engagements can create unique uncertainties prior to and/or outside of traditional warfare, precisely because they have qualitatively and quantitatively “fuzzy boundaries” as blatant acts of war. The “intentionally induced ambiguity” of non-kinetic engagements can establish plus-sum advantages for the executor(s) and zero-sum dilemmas for the target(s). For example, a limited scale non-kinetic action, which exerts demonstrably significant effects but does not meet defined criteria for an act of war, places the targeted recipient(s) at a disadvantage: First, in that the criteria for response (and proportionality) are vague and therefore any response could be seen as questionable; and second, in that if the targeted recipient(s) responds with bellicose action(s), there is considerable likelihood that they may be viewed as (or provoked to be) the aggressor(s) (and therefore susceptible to some form of retribution that may be regarded as sanctionable).
Nominally, non-kinetic engagements often utilize non-military means to expand the effect-space beyond the conventional battlefield. The Department of Defense and Joint Staff do not have a well agreed-upon lexicon to define and to express the full spectrum of current and potential activities that constitute non-kinetic engagements. It is unfamiliar – and can be politically uncomfortable – to use non-military terms and means to describe non-kinetic engagements. As previously noted, it can be politically difficult – if not precarious– to militarily define and respond to non-kinetic activities.
Non-kinetic engagements are best employed to incur disruptive effects in and across various dimensions of effect (e.g., biological, psychological, social) that can lead to intermediate to long-term destructive manifestations (in a number of possible domains, ranging from the economic to the geo-political). The latent disruptive and destructive effects should be framed and regarded as “Grand Strategy” approaches that evoke outcomes in a “long engagement/long war” context rather than merely in more short-term tactical situations.
Thus, non-kinetic operations must be seen and regarded as “tools of mass disruption,” incurring “rippling results” that can evoke both direct and indirect de-stabilizing effects. These effects can occur and spread: 1) from the cellular (e.g., affecting physiological function of a targeted individual) to the socio-political scales (e.g., to manifest effects in response to threats, burdens and harms incurred by individual and/or groups); and 2) from the personal (e.g., affecting a specific individual or particular group of individuals) to the public dimensions in effect and outcome (e.g., by incurring broad scale reactions and responses to key non-kinetic events).
Given the increasing global stature, capabilities, and postures of Asian nations, it becomes increasingly important to pay attention to aspects of classical Eastern thought (e.g., Sun Tzu) relevant to bellicose engagement. Of equal importance is the recognition of various nations’ dedicated enterprises in developing methods of non-kinetic operations (e.g., China; Russia), and to understand that such endeavors may not comport with the ethical systems, principles, and restrictions adhered to by the United States and its allies.
These differing 
Table 1
Of key interest are the present viability and current potential value of the
As recent incidents (e.g., “Havana Syndrome”; use of novichok; infiltration of foreign-produced synthetic opioids to US markets) have demonstrated, the brain sciences and technologies have utility to affect “minds and hearts” in (kinetic and non-kinetic) ways that elicit biological, psychological, socio-economic, and political effects which can be clandestine, covert, or attributional, and which evoke multi-dimensional ripple effects in particular contexts (as previously discussed). Moreover, apropos current events, the use of
and/or selectively alter human susceptibility to disease
Further, we opine that a coordinated enterprise of this magnitude will necessitate a Whole of Nations approach so as to mobilize the organizations, resources, and personnel required to meet other nations’ synergistic triple helix capabilities to develop and non-kinetically engage ETT.
“CAITT, let’s re-run the targeting solution for tomorrow’s engagement… again,” asked Chief Warrant Officer Five Robert Menendez, in a not altogether annoyed tone of voice. Considering this was the fifth time he had asked, the tone of control Bob was exercising was nothing short of heroic for those knew him well. Fortunately, CAITT, short for Commander’s Artificially Intelligent Targeting Tool, did not seem to notice. Bob quietly thanked the nameless software engineer who had not programmed it to recognize the sarcasm and vitriol that he felt when he made the request.
It was 0400 hours, and the entire Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was preparing to defend along its forward boundary. This after an exhausting three-day rapid deployment from their forward staging bases in Germany had everyone already on edge. In short, nothing had gone as expected or as planned for in the Operations Plan (OPLAN).
The UBRA’s, short for Unified Belorussian Russian Alliance’s, 323rd Tank Division was a mere 68 kilometers from the BCT’s Forward Line of Troops or FLOT. They would be in the BCT’s primary engagement area in six hours. Between 1EU DIV and the EU’s Expeditionary Air Force’s efforts, nothing was slowing UBRA’s advance towards the critical seaport city of Gdansk, Poland.
All the assumptions about air supremacy and cyber domination went out the window after the first UBRA tactical Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapon detonated over Vilnius, Lithuania, 48 hours prior. A brilliant strategic move, the EMP fried every unshielded computer networked system the Allied Forces possessed. The Coalition AI Partner Network, so heavily relied on to execute the OPLAN, was inaccessible, as was every weapon system that linked to it. Right about now, Bob wished that CAITT was one of those systems.
“CAITT, that makes no sense!” Bob stated exasperatedly. “The 323rd has approximately 250 T-90 MBTs — even if they expend all their fuel and munitions in that 18 hours, they will still overrun our defensive positions in less than six. We only have a single armored battalion with 35 FMC LAV3s. Even if they meet 3-1 K-kill ratios, we will not be able to hold our position. If they dislodge the LAVs, the dismounted infantrymen won’t stand a chance. We need to target the C2 nodes of their lead tank regiment now with
the M56s. If we can neutralize their centralized command and control and delay their rate of march, it may give the EUAF enough time to get us those CAS and AI sorties they promised,” replied Bob. “That’s the right play, space for time.”
now, airspace coordination is proceeding, and Colonel Ducalis is receiving his Commander’s Intervention Brief now. Pending his override there is nothing you can do.” CAITTs response almost sounded condescending to Bob; but then again, he remembered a time when human staff officers made recommendations to the boss, not smart-ass video game consoles.
Bob entered the camo shield behind the JLTV constructing his argument to the boss in his mind. Colonel Ducalis had no time to entertain lengthy debate, this Bob knew. The fight was moving just too fast. Information is the currency of decision-making, and he would at best get about twenty seconds to make his case before something else grabbed the boss’s attention. CAITT would already be running the targeting solution straight to the boss via his Commanders Oculatory Device, jokingly called “COD,” referencing the old bawdy medieval term. Colonel Ducalis, already wearing the COD when Bob came in, was oblivious to everything else around him. Designed to construct a virtual and interactive battlefield environment, the COD worked almost 
too well. Even as Bob came in, CAITT was constructing the virtual battlefield, displaying missile aimpoints, HIMARs firing positions, airspace coordination measures, and detailed damage predictions for the target areas.
“Sir, that is not correct,” Bob said speaking hurriedly. “We have a serious problem. CAITT’s targeting solution is completely wrong. The variables and assumptions were all predicated on the EUAF having air and cyber superiority. Those plans went out the window the second that EMP detonated. With all those aircraft down for CPU hardware replacement and software re-installs, those data points are now irrelevant. CAITT doesn’t know how long that will take because it is delinked from the Coalition’s AI Partner Network. I managed to get a low-frequency transmission established with Colonel Collins in Warsaw, and he thinks they can get us some sorties in the next six hours. 
CAITTs solution is ignoring the time versus space dynamic and going with a simple comparison of forces mathematical model. I’m betting it thinks that our casualties will be within acceptable limits after the 373rd expends all of its pre-staged consumable fuel and ammo. It thinks that we can hold our position if we cut off their re-supply. It may be right, but our losses will render us combat ineffective and unable to hold while 1EU DIV reconsolidates behind us.
“We need to implement this High Payoff Target List and Attack Guidance immediately disrupting and attriting their lead maneuver formations. Sir, we need to play for time and space,” Bob explained, hoping the sports analogy resonated while simultaneously accessing his Fires Forearm Display or FFaD, transmitting the data to Duke’s COD with a wave of his hand.
Bob, realizing where this was going, took a knee next to Duke. He was clearly as tired as everyone else. Bob leaned in to speak while Duke started to review the new battlespace geometries and combat projections in his COD. “Duke,” Bob said in a low tone of voice so Major Atlee could not easily overhear him, “We’ve been friends a long time, I’ve never given you a bad recommendation. Please, override CAITT. LTC Givens can reposition his HIMARS battalion, but he has to start doing it now. This is our only chance; once those missiles are gone, we won’t get them back.”
Larry, get a hold of 1EU DIV and tell them we can hold our positions for 24 hours. After that, we may have to withdraw, but we will live to fight another day. Right now, trading time for space may not be the optimal strategy, but it is the human one. Let’s Go!”