Mad Scientist Laboratory

[Editor’s Note:   Regular readers of the Mad Scientist Laboratory know that we regularly explore how our sole pacing threat — China — could attempt to re-unify Taiwan with the mainland under the mantel of the Chinese Communist Party.  As Ian Sullivan observed in his seminal Three Dates, Three Windows, and All of DOTMLPF-P:

“A year [and a half] ago, CIA Director William Burns stated “that the United States knew ‘as a matter of intelligence’ that Xi had ordered his military to be ready to conduct an invasion of self-governed Taiwan by 2027.” Director Burns elaborated, “Now, that does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027, or any other year, but it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.”

Today’s post by returning guest blogger Dr. Stewart Bentley builds upon his previous insightful submission — Tyranny of Time & Distance: Logistics & Contested Deployment in LSCO — by weaving a compelling vignette in which China exploits and amplifies conditions (both natural and man-made) to successfully execute a “fait accompli” attack to secure their control of the  island of Formosa.

The purpose of this post is not to suggest that all or any of these conditions could or would occur — rather, it is to illustrate each of the “challenges that the U.S. military could face when called upon to mobilize and deploy from a contested homeland and stage into a potentially hostile area.”  Perhaps most importantly, Dr. Bentley reminds us that — as in all military operations — Mother Nature always gets a vote, and our adversaries stand ready to exploit the resulting conditions…. Read on!]

The Chinese commander of the invasion task force leaned back in his chair at the conference table, staring intently at the split screen television monitors on the wall.  One monitor was streaming the weather reports about the strengthening hurricane off the American East Coast.  It was expected to strengthen to a Category 4 and make landfall at Charleston in three days.  In addition, it was expected to linger and only slowly make its way North along the coast.  Mandatory evacuations for the South Carolina Low Country from Charleston North to Wilmington were underway.  The local state governments had already implemented their reverse lane plans on the interstates —  facilitating evacuation but shutting down eastbound traffic into Charleston and Wilmington.  The state governors had declared states of emergency and mobilized the National Guard to respond.  Port closures were already expected, significantly impacting maritime traffic.

The other monitor broadcast images of Los Angeles, where a massive earthquake had brought the city — and more importantly for the Chinese — the Port of Los Angeles to a grinding halt.

A flashing “Breaking News” ribbon began to roll across the screens.  A large cargo ship had lost power and slammed into the Sabine Lake causeway bridge at Port Arthur, Texas, causing a partial bridge collapse and halting maritime traffic in and out of the port facilities at Beaumont.

These simultaneous events were the pre-conditions the Chinese had been waiting and planning for.  The environment would now exist to impede, but not stop, any American military response during their movement from the bases to major maritime ports.  The commander turned to his intelligence chief and nodded his head.  The intelligence chief picked up a phone on the conference table and punched in a number, spoke for a few minutes, and then hung up.

Several hours later, Western media began reporting that electrical power substations, primarily on the East Coast and in central Texas, had been seriously damaged or destroyed using some form of explosives — causing massive outages and hampering hurricane evacuation operations along the East Coast.  In addition, cyber-attacks were disrupting cellular communications networks across the United States.

The task force commander convened a conference of his senior leaders and staff.  He informed them that now that the invasion pre-conditions had been met, the operation could commence.  The Americans would be seriously slowed in their mobilization and deployment from the ports of Charleston, Wilmington, Beaumont, and the Port of Los Angeles.  Movement on the southeastern interstates would be hindered, potentially even halted if inland flooding approached the same levels seen during Hurricane Joaquin in 2015.

The island invasion timeline only needed 96 hours of unimpeded movement for Chinese airborne troops to conduct airfield and port seizures to establish and expand the lodgments for follow on forces and logistical support.  Minimal firepower would be expended to capture the island intact and maintain its infrastructure to support gaining control of the island.

Just prior to the operation, the Chinese ambassador to the United States would hand deliver a carefully crafted letter to the American Secretary of State outlining Chinese intentions to “re-unify” China and their desire to avoid open conflict with the United States.  The Chinese were counting on the rising sense of isolationism in American society and reluctance to become involved in foreign disputes with open ended commitments for unclear goals.

Following the delivery of that letter, the National Security Council convened in the White House Situation Room.  After a full intelligence briefing on what was known about the People’s Liberation Army goals and intentions, the President issued a partial mobilization order to the Department of Defense.  INDOPACOM was immediately designated as the combatant command for the military response.

At the National Military Command Center (aka the “Tank”) in the Pentagon, several major challenges were immediately apparent to the planners in response to the impending invasion.  In addition to the port closures on the East Coast and the Port Arthur causeway bridge collapse, the interstate closures on I-95, I-26, and I-40 in the Carolinas were going to seriously impede military movement from Fort Bragg to Charleston and Wilmington. The causeway bridge collapse meant that Fort Hood units would need a different port to deploy from.  While the 82nd Airborne Division’s Ready Brigade could deploy via airlift within 18 hours of notification, the flow of follow-on forces was going to be seriously delayed.  Further, planners at XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters were uncertain where the paratroopers would be able to land:  Was it going to be on Taiwan proper?  If Chinese forces held the airport in force, the All-Americans would be quickly outnumbered and overwhelmed. The southernmost Okinawan Island of Ishigaki had only a small airport.  Its facilities would not facilitate a massive influx of Air Force and Army units.

In addition, the 9,000 soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to the southern border at Fort Bliss were going to have to be redeployed to Fort Hood to begin mobilization and deployment procedures.

As situation reports came into the “Tank” from XVIII Airborne Corps and III Armored Corps, there was a clear issue with communications.  Cellular coverage was either diminished or non-existent.  In addition, electrical outages around Fayetteville combined with the outer bands of rain were wreaking havoc on the mobilization of the 82nd Division’s Ready Brigade.  As the winds picked up, the Air Force was reporting that their airlift might not be able to lift off.

INDOPACOM’s crisis plan called for the deployment of the III Marine Expeditionary Force based on Okinawa and the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to conduct landings on Taiwan to reinforce the Republic of China Armed Forces of some 150,000 active duty service members and up to 1.6M reservists.  The question now was whether it would be a permissive, semi-permissive or non-permissive operational environment.  As the combatant commander, the Commander, INDOPACOM, was worried about the ability of the Army and the Marines to bring in follow-on forces.  The other issue was that both initial response forces were light infantry units — without significant armored support.  That would come from III Armored Corps at Ft. Hood.

INDOPACOM also needed to secure an intermediate staging base because of the uncertainty of the operational environment.  The Commander, INDOPACOM, was concerned about the transit time of maritime lift from Okinawa to Taiwan of between sixteen to nineteen hours.  Convoys would be vulnerable during this time and the loss of personnel and equipment could be devastating.

These are the challenges that the U.S. military could face when called upon to mobilize and deploy from a contested homeland and stage into a potentially hostile area:

• • A confluence of natural disasters which impact airfields, ports, highways and other deployment infrastructure for extended periods of time.
  • Manmade incidents or accidents which cause the same types of impediments.
  • A vulnerable communications network, which, if interrupted, could cause military units to seek alternative means, including analog.
  • Other deployments or commitments of units, which would require significant lead time to re-deploy to home-station and begin the deployment process again.
  • An inadequate Intermediate Staging Base for responding forces to combat load and prepare for operations.

If you enjoyed this post, review the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, BiteSize China weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide.

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.

Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then read the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content:

Tyranny of Time & Distance: Logistics & Contested Deployment in LSCO, by Stewart Bentley

The Hard Part of Fighting a War: Contested Logistics

In the Crosshairs: U.S. Homeland Infrastructure Threats

Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette

Three Dates, Three Windows, and All of DOTMLPF-P, China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan

Flash-Mob Warfare: Whispers in the Digital Sandstorm (Parts 1 and 2) and 50 Shades of JIFCO, by Dr. Robert E. Smith

Fait Accompli: China’s Non-War Military Operations (NWMO) and Taiwan, by SGT Michael A. Cappelli II

Operation Northeast Monsoon: The Reunification of Taiwan, by Sherman Barto

The Most Consequential Adversaries and associated podcast, with GEN Charles A. Flynn

Volatility in the Pacific: China, Resilience, and the Human Dimension and associated podcast, with General Robert Brown (USA-Ret.)

How China Fights and associated podcast

China’s PLA Modernization through the DOTMLPF-P Lens, by Dr. Jacob Barton

China: Building Regional Hegemony and China 2049: The Flight of a Particle Board Dragon, the comprehensive report from which this post was excerpted

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

About the Author:  Dr. Stewart Bentley is a military analyst studying Army deployment trends at the Deployment Process Modernization Office, CASCOM TRADOC.  He is a prior service Infantry and Military Intelligence officer with a Masters in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University.

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

 

 

 

[Editor’s Note:  The Army’s Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to feature the next in a series of posts excerpting findings from Team Axis Insight 2035‘s Project Deterrence Final Report.  This Integrated Research Project documents the findings from the group’s United States Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Research Requirement portion of the Master of Strategic Studies degree program that occurred over the academic year (from November 2024 to April 2025).

Team Axis Insight 2035 consisted of COL Byron N. Cadiz, COL T. Marc Skinner, LTC Robert W. Mayhue, LTC Lori L. Perkins, and LTC Shun Y. Yu — all U.S. Army Officers and now proclaimed Army Mad Scientists!  Team Axis Insight 2035‘s Project Deterrence Final Report documents their collective response to the following question posed by Ian Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command:

How are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea likely to respond to U.S.-led deterrence efforts by 2035?

To date, the Mad Scientist Laboratory has excerpted Team Axis Insight 2035‘s findings regarding “an entangled future of situational cooperation and transactional inter-dependence among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea” in Project Deterrence — An Entangled Future; and how our adversaries are likely to integrate “four future capabilities … to create an environment where U.S. deterrence is neutralized:  quantum warfare, swarm supremacy, hypersonic strike, and metamaterials” in Project Deterrence – Disruptive Technologies.

In today’s post, we excerpt Team Axis Insight 2035‘s finding exploring how our adversaries are employing gray zone activities to “saturate the competition continuum below the level of armed conflict” — what proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. David Kilcullen described as liminal warfare — to achieve a state of persistent coercion.  These efforts “are innovating in the seams between peace and war,” seeking to “challenge U.S. strategic posture and alliance cohesion.”  China, our pacing threat, is proving especially adept at tweaking the reins of persistent coercion to, in the words of Sun Tzu, “subdue the enemy without fighting” —  Read on!]

Threat Vector #3:  Persistent Coercion

By 2035, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are highly likely^* to intensify their strategic use of persistent coercion tactics to expand geopolitical influence and undermine U.S. and allied interests globally.  This will create time and space to pursue their national interests.  Examples of persistent coercion tactics include lawfare, international peacekeeping missions, Digital Silk Road initiatives, or attacks to critical infrastructure.  These tactics saturate the competition continuum below the level of armed conflict and cross multiple time horizons, with intended effects both immediately and into the indefinite future.  Regardless of the form it takes, persistent coercion challenges U.S.
strategic posture and alliance cohesion.

Expansion of Persistent Coercion Activities

China is rapidly enhancing its capabilities within the gray zone.  This activity is increasingly prominent in sensitive areas such as the Arctic, where critical U.S. infrastructure, including undersea communications cables, remains vulnerable (see figures to the right and below).  Employing military-civil fusion strategies, China and Russia use commercial maritime assets and infrastructure projects as covert sabotage platforms, exploiting plausible deniability and complicating attribution.  By subtly disrupting critical networks, adversaries impose
asymmetric costs and test Western response thresholds, identifying vulnerabilities without provoking direct military retaliation.

Employment of Lawfare and Information Dominance

China will highly likely^* leverage lawfare through the weaponized use of international law to legitimize geopolitical claims and reshape global norms, often in coordination with Russia.  Promoting alternative interpretations of sovereignty and territorial rights, notably regarding the South China Sea and Taiwan, China neutralizes Western diplomatic efforts (see figure to the left).  Concurrently, sophisticated disinformation campaigns via mainstream and social media undermine U.S. and allied credibility, positioning China as a responsible international actor.  These narrative controls effectively erode Western diplomatic influence, gradually shifting international perceptions and norms in China’s favor, particularly in the absence of a cohesive U.S.-led counter-lawfare response.

Deployment of Military Forces

China will highly likely^* use United Nations peacekeeping operations to expand its military and diplomatic influence worldwide.  China contributes the most troops of all five countries on the United Nations’ Security Council (see figure below).  These missions align with China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative, safeguarding economic interests abroad while embedding Chinese military forces under the mantle of international legitimacy.  China also uses Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response missions and foreign military engagements to further leverage its military in pursuit of its diplomatic and economic goals. Collectively, these deployments facilitate the development of logistical and force-projection capabilities beyond traditional Chinese influence zones, diminishing U.S. soft power and diplomatic leverage, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia.  This visible presence enhances China’s global reputation as a responsible stakeholder, creating opportunities for increased political influence and economic integration, thereby challenging U.S. global leadership and strategic interests.

Pivot to Digital Silk Road

Due to demographic pressures such as an aging population and shrinking workforce, China will likely^* shift focus from large-scale global infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative to regional digital infrastructure development via the Digital Silk Road (see figure below).  Prioritizing investments in 5G networks, artificial intelligence, and green energy predominantly in southeast and central Asia, China seeks to consolidate regional influence.  This shift enables China to embed its technologies deeply within partner nations’ digital ecosystems, fostering technological dependencies and influencing global digital standards.  By controlling technological standards and protocols, China is almost certain^* to assert long-term geopolitical influence through increased participation and leadership in international standard-setting organizations.

Infrastructure Attacks

It is highly likely^* that by 2035 China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea will attempt to leverage attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure to slow or paralyze its response capabilities prior to or during a conflict scenario.  Due to the increasing development and integration of counterspace capabilities, cyber warfare tactics, and the demonstrated willingness to target critical infrastructure, potential adversaries have the capability to hold U.S. critical infrastructure at risk (see figure below).  Despite the risks of escalation and international condemnation associated with such actions, the perceived strategic benefits of gaining a temporary advantage by disrupting U.S. power projection and decision-making processes will likely^* incentivize these nations to employ such tactics.

All roads go through China.  Taken together, these findings point to a comprehensive Chinese strategy to reshape the global order by 2035 through non-kinetic, legal, technological, and persistent coercion operations.  China is creating the conditions to win future conflicts before they begin, blinding, dividing, and weakening the United States and its allies through persistent, low-threshold actions.  While the U.S. retains conventional military dominance now, our adversaries are innovating in the seams between peace and war seeking technological overmatch in the very near future.

* Kesselman List of Estimative Words:

If you enjoyed this post, check out Axis Insight 2035‘s comprehensive Project Deterrence Final Report here.

Review the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, BiteSize China weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide.

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.

Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then read the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content:

Fait Accompli: China’s Non-War Military Operations (NWMO) and Taiwan, by SGT Michael A. Cappelli II

Operation Northeast Monsoon: The Reunification of Taiwan, by Sherman Barto

Flash-Mob Warfare: Whispers in the Digital Sandstorm (Parts 1 and 2) and 50 Shades of JIFCO, by Dr. Robert E. Smith

China: Building Regional Hegemony and China 2049: The Flight of a Particle Board Dragon, the comprehensive report from which this post was excerpted

Competition and Conflict in the Next Decade

Disrupting the “Chinese Dream” – Eight Insights on how to win the Competition with China

Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security, by Dr. Russell Glenn

Non-Kinetic War, Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare and associated podcast, with COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.)

Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare and associated podcast, with Dr. David Kilcullen

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events, and all of this series’ associated content and videos [access via a non-DoD network]

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

“Every step of the way we have always been focused on bringing in the right technology to augment the work that the IC and the DoD have been doing.”

[Editor’s Note:  Regular readers of the Mad Scientist Laboratory understand the transformative potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) have on the character of warfare — for a comprehensive list of previously published blog posts and podcasts exploring the potential application of these technologies across the Operational Environment, scroll to the bottom of this post and explore the content associated with each of the associated links.

Today’s The Convergence podcast features two senior leaders from In-Q-Tel (IQT) discussing how their not-for-profit company is accelerating the introduction of groundbreaking technologies to facilitate innovation within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), enhancing the national security and prosperity of the United States and its Allies — Enjoy!]

[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast.]

Murali Kannan leads Enterprise Technologies at In-Q-Tel (IQT) as Vice President and Practice Lead, where he directs investment strategy for enterprise data infrastructure, generative AI applications, and AI-enabled vertical solutions. Working closely with venture partners and government stakeholders, he identifies and invests in innovative startups addressing critical national security challenges for the U.S. and allied intelligence and national security communities.

Prior to joining IQT, Murali built his expertise at Accenture, Mythics, and GDIT, where he spearheaded teams delivering transformative data analytics initiatives across commercial and government sectors. His educational background combines business acumen with technical expertise, including an MBA from MIT Sloan, a Master’s from Northeastern, specialized certifications from Georgetown and Columbia, and leadership training from Harvard Business School.

Coley Lewis’ career at IQT spans over 10 years and he has served in various capacities over his tenure. He currently serves as Vice President of Growth Partnerships, where he leads a team responsible for the identification, development, and execution of new partnerships within the national security community. Coley sets the growth strategy for IQT and works across IQT teams to successfully onboard new partners and maximize impact to mission.

Prior to joining IQT, Coley was the Senior Policy & Management Analyst for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (USDC-MOED), where he led data analytics for the Clerk’s Office, particularly the collection, analysis, and reporting of judicial business.  Lewis holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Truman State University and a master’s degree in public administration from Saint Louis University.

In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientist sits down with Messrs. Kannan and Lewis to discuss IQT’s mission and history, explore how it is helping the Government foster innovation, and obtain their insights regarding the boom of LLMs permeating the Federal Government.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation.

• • • In-Q-Tel fills a critical gap by investing in start-up companies that develop cutting-edge AI technology tailored for public-sector use cases. Public-private partnerships are critical to the DoD’s ability to fully utilize emerging technologies.   

• • • AI is improving at an incredible rate. The time between research and implementation of new AI products and techniques is now measured in the space of months as opposed to years. This increasing tempo of innovation poses a challenge for the DoD’s ability to adapt and keep pace with new technology. Progress in AI is a compounding phenomenon, and the farther the DoD falls behind, the harder it will be to catch up.  

• • • The focus of AI-development remains squarely on assisting, not replacing, human analysis. The key challenge is to identify areas where humans must be positioned as ‘in-the-loop’ decision-makers in the context of a fast-paced and machine-augmented analytical production process.  

• • • Integrating AI into the DoD and IC represents a unique challenge, because these institutions handle sensitive and often classified data. This requirement requires specially tailored AI models that are as secure as current accredited networks. By presenting these kinds of problem sets to private companies, entities such as In-Q-Tel can deliver tailored solutions that will facilitate faster AI-integration throughout the military and intelligence spheres.    

• • • AI presents a disruptive challenge in multiple areas, including exacerbating the threat of UAV warfare by fostering innovations such as drone swarms and facilitating a ‘democratization’ of technological knowledge that lowers the bar for lone wolves and weaker adversaries to engage in activities such as cyberattacks. Working in close collaboration with private partners, the DoD and IC can continue to meet and counter these emerging challenges.  

 

Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for future insightful episodes of The Convergence.

 

 

If you enjoyed this post, review the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, BiteSize China weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide.

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.

Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then read the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content addressing the transformative power of AI — spanning the gamut of potential applications:

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Trends

Takeaways Learned about the Future of the AI Battlefield and associated information paper

Artificial Intelligence: An Emerging Game-changer

Battle Tested: Revolutionizing Wargaming with AI and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry

Unlocking TRADOC’s Potential with GenAI: Opportunities and Challenges and Generative AI: The New Ammunition in the Data Arms Race and associated podcast, with Ben Van Roo

Artificial Intelligence: Shaping the Future of Biological-Chemical Warfare, by Jared Kite

Training Transformed: AI and the Future Soldier, by proclaimed Mad Scientist SGM Kyle J. Kramer

The AI Study Buddy at the Army War College (Part 1) and associated podcast, with LtCol Joe Buffamante, USMC

The AI Study Buddy at the Army War College (Part 2) and associated podcast, with  Dr. Billy Barry, USAWC

Hybrid Intelligence: Sustaining Adversary Overmatch and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry and LTC Blair Wilcox

Rise of Artificial Intelligence: Implications to the Fielded Force, by John W. Mabes III

Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas

“Own the Night” and the associated Modern War Institute podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Bob Work

Bringing AI to the Joint Force and associated podcast, with Jacqueline Tame, Alka Patel, and Dr. Jane Pinelis

Thoughts on AI and Ethics… from the Chaplain Corps

Gen Z is Likely to Build Trusting Relationships with AI, by COL Derek Baird

Hey, ChatGPT, Help Me Win this Contract! and associated podcast, with LTC Robert Solano

Chatty Cathy, Open the Pod Bay Doors: An Interview with ChatGPT and associated podcast

The Guy Behind the Guy: AI as the Indispensable Marshal, by Brady Moore and Chris Sauceda

AI Enhancing EI in War, by MAJ Vincent Dueñas

The Human Targeting Solution: An AI Story, by CW3 Jesse R. Crifasi

Bias and Machine Learning

An Appropriate Level of Trust…

How does the Army – as part of the Joint force – Build and Employ Teams to Compete, Penetrate, Disintegrate, and Exploit our Adversaries in the Future?

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[Editor’s Note:  The Army’s Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to feature the next in a series of posts excerpting findings from Team Axis Insight 2035‘s Project Deterrence Final Report.  This Integrated Research Project documents the findings from the group’s United States Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Research Requirement portion of the Master of Strategic Studies degree program that occurred over the academic year (from November 2024 to April 2025).

Team Axis Insight 2035 consisted of COL Byron N. Cadiz, COL T. Marc Skinner, LTC Robert W. Mayhue, LTC Lori L. Perkins, and LTC Shun Y. Yu — all U.S. Army Officers and now proclaimed Army Mad Scientists!  Team Axis Insight 2035‘s Project Deterrence Final Report documents their collective response to the following question posed by Ian Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command:

How are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea likely to respond to U.S.-led deterrence efforts by 2035?

Last month, the Mad Scientist Laboratory excerpted Team Axis Insight 2035‘s finding regarding “an entangled future of situational cooperation and transactional inter-dependence among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea” in Project Deterrence — An Entangled Future.  In today’s post, we excerpt their finding addressing how our adversaries are exploiting emergent disruptive technologies in their quest to achieve battlefield overmatch — Read on!]

Threat Vector #2:  Disruptive Technologies

China is driving the development and integration of nearly all disruptive technologies, which include quantum warfare, drone swarms, hypersonic missiles, and metamaterial stealth, with Russia advancing primarily in hypersonic weapons.  North Korea and Iran remain marginal players, contributing little to innovation but potentially exploiting regional instability enabled by Chinese and Russian breakthroughs.

By 2035, China and Russia are almost certain^* to exploit integrated disruptive technologies to initiate rapid, theater-specific campaigns that challenge U.S. deterrence and compress response timelines.  China will likely^* attempt to seize Taiwan under the cover of quantum-enabled command and control and multi-domain disruption, while Russia is likely^* to target NATO’s eastern flank.  Iran and North Korea may opportunistically escalate in their regions, though with lower confidence and at more limited scale, aiming to test U.S. bandwidth and regional influence during a crisis.

Emerging technologies will highly likely^* degrade U.S. and allies’ advantages in sensing, speed, and decision-making while compressing escalation timelines across all domains.  Forward-deployed assets will likely^* become increasingly vulnerable to first-strike operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) blind spots are likely^* to emerge across key theaters, leading to decision paralysis during early-phase conflict scenarios.  Adversary integration of four future capabilities is likely^* to create an environment where U.S. deterrence is neutralized:  quantum warfare, swarm supremacy, hypersonic strike, and metamaterials.

Quantum Warfare

China is almost certain^* to exploit breakthroughs in quantum communications and decryption to disrupt allied decision superiority by 2035.  The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has operationalized the Micius quantum satellite and invested over $15.3 billion in national quantum research and development, which enables secure internal networks and quantum key distribution resistant to cyberattack.

These capabilities are almost certain^* to compromise encryption, intercept ISR feeds, and fragment alliance coordination through denial and deception (see figure to the right).  As early warning networks are corrupted, the speed and reliability of U.S. command and control are almost certain^* to degrade.  In response to a perceived window of strategic distraction around 2035, such as a U.S. domestic crisis or simultaneous regional escalation, China is almost certain^* to exploit its quantum advantage to disable allied communications in the opening phase of a cross-strait conflict.  The PLA is almost certain^* to use quantum-secured command and control networks to blind ISR systems, degrade early warning, and fragment alliance coordination through denial and deception.  This is highly likely^* to occur in the Indo-Pacific, centered on Taiwan and surrounding maritime terrain, where rapid action can achieve strategic objectives before full U.S. and allied mobilization.  By masking the origin of data disruption and exploiting ambiguity, Beijing is almost certain^* to operate beneath traditional deterrence thresholds, achieving key military objectives without triggering an immediate and unified U.S. response.

Swarm Supremacy

By 2035, China is likely^* to achieve carrier-based and littoral air superiority through artificial intelligence-enabled drone swarm deployments operating from Type-076 amphibious ships and other swarm-capable platforms.  These systems enable massed attacks exceeding 100 drones per sortie, are likely^* to be able to neutralize high-value targets such as the F-35C and E-2D through saturation tactics and electronic warfare payloads.  U.S. naval assets operating near Taiwan or the South China Sea are almost certain^* to be persistently exposed to unmanned precision strikes coordinated by artificial intelligence and BeiDou satellite networks.  As a result, U.S. denial-based deterrence anchored in carrier strike groups and forward presence will likely^* lose its coercive leverage.  China is likely^* to employ drone swarms to enforce air and sea exclusion zones, overwhelm early-warning systems, and constrain U.S. ability to deploy strike assets into contested zones, asserting regional control through unmanned dominance before escalation occurs.

Hypersonic Strike

China and Russia are almost certain^* to use hypersonic weapons to constrain U.S. and allied decision-making windows below conflict thresholds by 2035. PLA hypersonic missiles, like the DF-ZF and JF-22 testbed, and Russian Avangard and Tsirkon missiles travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5, executing unpredictable trajectories and evading missile defenses (see figure above).  These weapons are likely^* to allow adversaries to hold critical infrastructure, airfields, and command and control nodes at risk with sub-six-minute strike timelines.  Forward bases in Guam, Okinawa, and Eastern Europe are likely^* to become indefensible.  In this environment, Russia and China are almost certain^* to integrate hypersonic missiles into preemptive options designed to delay or disable allied responses before they materialize.  U.S. extended deterrence credibility is likely^* to erode as adversaries assess that decision paralysis will prevent timely retaliation, allowing gains to be secured in the opening minutes of a campaign.

Metamaterials

By 2035, China is highly likely^* to field metamaterial-based platforms that evade ISR detection across radar, thermal, and acoustic spectrums (see figure to the right). These materials have already been patented and field-tested, reduce radar cross-sections by up to 50%, and improve platform survivability by decreasing weight and signature.  Once fielded, the PLA will operate stealth fighters, drones, and hypersonic systems across the Western Pacific without triggering ISR alarms.  These effects eliminate the preparatory indicators U.S. planners use to identify imminent offensive action.  As warning time is removed from the deterrence equation, China is highly likely^* to reposition missile systems, stage amphibious forces, and maneuver unmanned assets under ISR blackout conditions.  Beijing is almost certain^* to assess that metamaterials offer the operational cover needed to delay allied response, invalidate pre-crisis detection frameworks, and seize initiative without presenting early signs of aggression, neutralizing deterrence before conflict formally begins.

If you enjoyed this post, check out Axis Insight 2035‘s comprehensive Project Deterrence Final Report here.

Review the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, BiteSize China weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide.

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.

Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then read the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content addressing each of these emergent disruptive technologies:

Quantum Warfare:

Quantum Surprise on the Battlefield? by proclaimed Mad Scientist Elsa Kania

Quantum Conundrum: Multi-domain Threats, Convergent Technology & Hybrid Strategy, by Robert McCreight

Swarm Supremacy:

Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown

Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS

The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training

Hypersonic Strike:

The Need for Speed (and Maneuverability), by Seth Gnesin

The Hard Part of Fighting a War: Contested Logistics

Metamaterials:

Metamaterial Magic: Demystifying the Science of Cloaking and associated podcast, with Dr. Andrea Alù 

Disruptive Technologies and the Operational Environment:

Winning the Future: The U.S. Military’s Need for Technological Dominance and Defined Strategic Vision, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano and Elise Annett

Emergent Global Trends Impacting on the Future Operational Environment

Imagining the Future Fight through Emerging Technology and associated podcast, with Jenny McArdle, Cmdr. Paul Grøstad, and Whitney McNamara

Table of Future Technologies: A 360 Degree View Based on Anticipated Availability, by Richard Buchter

* Kesselman List of Estimative Words:

Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

 

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist teamed with the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (SGM-A) at Ft. Bliss, Texas, in executing their annual writing contest for the sixth year in a row.  As in years past, we received a number of insightful essays from our senior NCOs on topics spanning the breadth of the Operational Environment.

Today, we are pleased to feature the SGM-A Class 75’s winning submission by soon to be SGM Jeffrey A. Wittenhagen.  In a previously published submission entitled The Future of War is Cyber, CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley eloquently defined the cyber challenge facing this nation:

“The future of war will be defined by the cyber fight.  Combatants, both proxy and conscripted, will be coders, programmers, and system developers that either will act on their own accord, be influenced by social media popularity, or execute based on the highest paying state or non-state actor.“

In order to prepare for and decisively win this cyber fight, SGM Wittenhagen‘s submission makes the cogent and convincing case for establishing a dedicated and unified U.S. Cyber Force — “to address vulnerabilities in national security, public infrastructure, and military cyber capabilities.”  He contends “a new Cyber Force would bring together disparate resources, training, and doctrine, ensuring a unified approach and rapid response to the complex challenges of cyber warfare, thereby reinforcing the U.S.’s strategic defense capabilities in the cyberspace era” — Read on!]

As the cyber domain rapidly evolves into a primary battlefield, the absence of a unified Cyber Force leaves critical vulnerabilities across military and national infrastructure.  This evolution necessitates an urgent and integrated approach to safeguard U.S. interests.  What was once just a theoretical idea is quickly becoming a more feasible reality as near-peer competitors leverage advanced technologies to compromise critical infrastructures and challenge our national defenses.  Historically, wars were often fought over territory or populations; adversaries sought resources and projected influence beyond borders, with their aims requiring international cooperation to achieve cyber peacekeeping.  At first, the United States latched onto cyber operations as a stop-gap measure, contending with the whirlwind pace of evolution in a technological domain.  However, a specialized cyber force must address vulnerabilities in national security, public infrastructure, and military cyber capabilities.  The evolution of the technological battle space in the near-peer adversary environment creates difficulties unifying national security, public infrastructure, and U.S. military branches’ cyber capabilities, making the creation of a dedicated cyber branch a necessity.

Showcasing Significant Cyber Vulnerabilities

The dependency on digital infrastructure increases vulnerabilities.  For instance, the 2017 Equifax data breach compromised sensitive information of 147 million people, caused by unpatched software and weak security protocols, highlighting the importance of strong measures and vigilance (Kabanov & Madnick, 2020).  There was also a worldwide semiconductor chip shortage, which led to interruptions in the automotive and mobile phone industries, highlighting the interdependence of vital technologies and potentially exposing them to exploitation in the face of adversity (Mohammad, Elomri, & Kerbache, 2022).

National security is not spared, either, with mission-critical systems exposed to enemies due to their dependence on technology. This exposure could include disruptive impacts on communication systems or power grids, paralyzing military mobilization, and public infrastructure.  These early indicators can help serve as inflection points when the end-state picture requires it, such as Ford’s shift to military production during World War II (Vergun, 2020).  Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, such as New York’s power grid or Washington, D.C.’s water supply, could cause communities to destabilize and disrupt military preparedness, without firing a single shot (Jackson & Templeman, 2016; Leggat, 2020). These examples show the need for safeguards, redundancy, and strategic foresight to prevent the cascading risks of cyber vulnerabilities in a technology-dependent society.  Exacerbating these vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and national security is the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which offers transformative options and opens new avenues for exploitation by adversaries, while raising the stakes in manipulation and disruption in an increasingly interconnected and technology-dependent society.

AI Creates Further Vulnerabilities

AI streamlines endeavors such as writing and editing in a work process, while also transforming content creation (Wu et al., 2023).  However, the U.S. government cannot overlook the potential for our enemies to misuse this technology and endanger national security.  Hostile entities might deploy AI to compromise critical infrastructure, sway public opinion, or conduct disinformation operations, highlighting the urgent need for effective countermeasures.

These trends pose risks to nations that do not act to address them, especially if threats like adversaries get ahead of preparedness.  Besides security, AI raises ethical questions in other areas, such as human rights suppression and access to information (Leggat, 2020).  Mitigating misuse while advancing the ethical development of AI requires proactive engagement from policymakers, technologists, and society.  It is in this spirit of collective responsibility that we must balance AI’s innovative potential with necessary controls.

Given the ethical and security challenges posed by AI, implementing proactive strategies to mitigate risk must extend beyond policy and development to include protecting critical infrastructure.  Ensuring compliance with the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) in AI-driven operations requires human oversight to validate targeting decisions, mitigating the risk of unintended civilian casualties, as mandated by DoD Directive 3000.09 on Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Department of Defense, 2017).  The new paradigm of the digital battlefield requires a marriage of conventional military capabilities with advanced, integrated threats embodied by cyber defense to protect the U.S. military in the future.

How to Transform and Protect the Future U.S. Military

The expanding digital battlefield supports much of what is done in traditional military services, and how essential it is to maintain superiority and deter adversaries through the convergence of conventional and cyber artistry. Critical infrastructure, such as energy grids and communication networks, provides a foundation for national security and society and is an attractive target for adversaries.  This foundation is essential to ensuring the continuity of crisis operations and preventing destabilization (DOD, 2020).  For instance, good cybersecurity can protect operations and public trust, even during attacks.

In addition, showing military strength in terms of cyberweapons is a deterrent against hostile nations.  A clear willingness to respond to threats and advanced cyber capabilities can indicate a nation’s preparedness.  Precision kinetic strikes can sometimes target the infrastructure enabling hostile capabilities, thereby disabling them.  Aggressive operations against high-value delivery systems, including cyber, should be layered in defense and optimized for adjustment.  With the growing complexity of the modern battlefield, particularly the U.S. Army’s transition to multidomain operations (MDO), it is necessary to integrate cyber capabilities with conventional military capabilities.  This transformation can counter both kinetic and non-kinetic threats, as well as recognize evolving hybrid threats, adversary approaches, and tactics.

United States Army and Multidomain Operations

The U.S. Army transitioning from counterinsurgency to an MDO concept combines all domains to address the nature of complex, modern hybrid threats (Department of the Army [DA], 2019).  MDO may improve organizations’ adaptability, but it often presumes adversaries will try to overcome them with kinetic capabilities.  At the same time, many powerful competitors will instead employ cyber operations, information warfare, and other non-kinetic capabilities.  Furthermore, adversaries can use methods short of confrontation, including economic subversion or disinformation campaigns, to destabilize, which highlights the ongoing process of constantly reevaluating evolving threats.

According to FM 3-12, Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare, cyberspace operations are essential for achieving freedom of action in the information environment and must be seamlessly integrated across all domains to ensure mission success (Department of the Army, 2021). This doctrinal foundation underscores the urgent need for a unified Cyber Force capable of synchronizing cyberspace activities across the services, preventing fragmentation, and enhancing the military’s ability to respond to emerging threats in the digital battlefield.

Just as a more technologically advanced military will create problems for directly reaching enemies, the Army needs to update its operational emphasis on near-peer competitors to target adversaries in areas of greater threat, such as their infrastructure and logistics, rather than solely focusing on direct engagement (Monaghan, 2018).  For example, hybrid warfare tactics may undermine and contaminate vital resources, making the enemy operations less efficient.  Adopting agile, hit-and-run tactics similar to those employed by Special Forces in decentralized scenarios may be more effective at addressing cyber threats and unconventional combat scenarios (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, n.d.).  Senior NCOs, particularly Sergeant Majors, play a pivotal role in fostering cyber awareness at the operational level, ensuring that Soldiers are trained not only in kinetic warfare but also in cyber resilience and threat recognition.

Timing is everything in this unique environment, as every day spent deliberating allows adversaries to use their leverage and apply strategic pressure more effectively. Evolving cyber operations across the Department of Defense is necessary for the Army to remain a competitive force, capable of addressing both traditional and emerging threats simultaneously.  The Department of Defense must invest in more cyber systems capable of battle networks, where people, processes, technology, and organizational structures work seamlessly together to deliver joint effects to achieve operational outcomes.  The need to reform cyber operations is part of a larger trend that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are already addressing within the context of distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced base operations.

United States Navy and Marine Corps

Looking ahead to potential technological developments, the Navy and Marine Corps provide an illustrative example.  Picture a 2045 scenario where the U.S. Navy launches AI-operated submarines that can adapt spontaneously, gather intelligence, zero in on targets, evade pursuing threats, all while operating persistently within Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) environments.  These submarines use adaptive AI to recalibrate during missions and repair real-time battlefield damage. The Navy’s autonomous submarines, operating within the framework of Operation Silent Tide, coordinated with Marine forces that executed amphibious assaults and advanced bases to sustain tactical updates and provide precision strikes and targeting of enemy command nodes (DOD, 2020).

While the scenario was for training, this AI integration was a part of submarine functions and was a major step forward in military tactics.  For instance, AI-piloted submarines effectively targeted enemy infrastructure by autonomously adapting to countermeasures the enemy took.  It showcases the strategic impact of an integrated U.S. Navy and Marine Corps effort to achieve operational objectives.  It offers an insight into how integrating manned and unmanned systems could create value in warfare in the future. This type of collaborative partnership shows the increasing emphasis on technology and interoperability in contemporary warfare scenarios.  Just as the Navy and Marine Corps have embraced AI advances in their warfighting endeavors, so has the U.S. Air Force adopted unmanned aerial systems (UAS) with potential AI enhancements as a gamechanger, both because of the possible operational advantages provided by autonomous systems and the accompanying ethical responsibility to grapple with the use of autonomous systems in a robust legal, ethical, and moral framework.

United States Air Force and Unmanned Aerial Systems

The introduction of UAS by the U.S. Air Force is a compelling case study that illustrates the promise and perils of automation in the modern warfare landscape. In the 2005 movie Stealth, the deployment of MQ-9 Reaper drones used advanced algorithms for real-time data processing, intelligence targeting, and precision strikes, in line with Air Force ambitions to familiarize itself with autonomous systems and develop better operational capabilities (Kelsey, 2021).  However, the movie also raises ethical questions, including when a rogue drone strays from the mission parameters and kills civilians, which captures the dangers of an over-automated world.

The Department of Defense follows suit in its cybersecurity strategy, highlighting the importance of AI and machine learning for defending national infrastructure from malicious actors (DOD, 2020).  The issue is where to draw the line between automation and human oversight, as unchecked autonomy can lead to unintended consequences.  Striking this balance is essential when utilizing advanced technologies responsibly while protecting against possible abuses.  The focus on striking a balance between automation and human supervision in cybersecurity parallels the approach used by the United States Space Force (USSF) in leveraging advanced space capabilities.  The blend of advanced systems and the smart utilization of partnerships unite to protect space-based assets while augmenting national security capabilities.

United States Space Force – The Model for a New Domain-Specific Force

The USSF has satellite technologies that could be applied to gain a decisive edge in intelligence collection and secure communications.  It monitors data transmissions and geolocates communication stations, which enhances national security through advanced surveillance and threat anticipation capabilities.  Its Commercial Space Strategy implies prioritizing partnerships with industry to defend space-based enterprise and sustain the advantage against emerging threats (U.S. Space Force, 2024).

Beyond adding additional security, the USSF is also looking into AI-piloted spacecraft to assist with colonization efforts in outer space.  By imagining sustainable off-world habitats, they appeal to overpopulation and environmental issues (Sanchez, 2024).  They secure present desires while preparing for future growth as space operations ascend to the forefront of strategic importance to protect national and global interests.  The USSF is the service that focuses more on developing space operations and preparing for future challenges.  Given that creating a long-term operational focus and continuity to integrate emerging technologies must be a priority for the U.S. military to maintain its inevitable strategic advantage over adversaries, it is time to shape cyber warfare.

The Need to Evolve the Way We Shape the Force

The U.S. military’s attitude toward technological warfare is a stark departure from that of its adversaries, who have insisted on long-term operational focus and often held onto goals for decades.  Such sustained commitment allows them to adapt to modern technologies more effectively.  In contrast, U.S. military personnel typically rotate every two to three years, which prevents the development of true mission expertise and operational continuity (Scharre, 2024).  For example, while U.S. forces develop exceptional technical skills, the constant retraining cycle limits the opportunity to establish mission-specific proficiency, especially for technologically intensive jobs.

These challenges call for strategic investment in capabilities such as creating a distinctive Cyber Force.  In the DOD’s fiscal year 2025 budget, $14.5 billion is allocated for cyberspace operations, underscoring the necessity for operational, command, and resource unity in the cyber domain (DOD, 2024). Providing such funding enhances coordination and operational effectiveness, allowing us to compete with adversaries who have superior cyber experience.

One potential adaptation that may be more effective is to modify existing operational constructs, creating a new domain-specific force that learns to adapt to technological advancements. Creating a Cyber Force would enable concentrated expertise to ensure U.S. competitiveness within the changing adversarial landscape, and the Department of Defense needs unified cyber efforts across all domains. Such centralization of cyber operations would correct the fragmentation in standards and efficiencies, promote cohesion, and ensure a common strategy and approach across all services. While some argue that creating a new branch of service risks duplicating existing cyber efforts, a unified Cyber Force would streamline operations, eliminate redundancy, and establish standardized doctrine across all services, enhancing overall efficiency.

The Argument for Creating a Cyber Force Branch

Though the DOD has established branches for land, sea, air, and space operations, it refuses to recognize a unified Cyber Force to tackle the unique challenges posed by the cyber domain.  Each military has distinct branches that operate their cyber missions to support their specific needs, causing a loss of efficiency.  Exacerbating this need for synchronicity, the growing complexity of cyber warfare has sparked the demand for specialized training and a unified doctrine.  Developing a Cyber Force would allow for more customized training programs combined with cross-branch collaboration to help train personnel for an ever-changing technological environment.  Recent proposals, including the DOD’s fiscal 2024 request of $58.5 billion for IT and cybersecurity, further reinforced the strategic importance of cyber capabilities as part of national defense (Mitchell, 2023).  These steps reflect the increasing acknowledgement that cyberspace is a contested domain.

The formation of the Space Force provides a template for establishing a Cyber Force.   It illustrates how identifying a unique domain can help streamline operations and respond to new dangers.  An illustrative example of a way forward may be the cross-branching of Space Force with the Air Force, which can leverage common roles across branches (U.S. Air Force Academy, n.d.).  This synchronicity forges these disparate efforts, ensuring integrated operations and aligned strategies by creating a dedicated Cyber Force.

A new Cyber Force would bring together disparate resources, training, and doctrine, ensuring a unified approach and rapid response to the complex challenges of cyber warfare, thereby reinforcing the U.S.’s strategic defense capabilities in the cyberspace era.  As we move toward establishing a Cyber Force, we can follow the model established by the Space Force to unify these diverse strands of effort, which will lead to efficiencies of scale and address the critical vulnerabilities of our near-peer adversaries.

Conclusion

The fast pace of technological evolution, especially when considering near-peer adversaries, demonstrates notable overlaps and vulnerabilities across national security, public infrastructure, and the cyber capabilities of U.S. military branches, showcasing the need for a dedicated cyber branch.  These challenges require paradigm-shifting changes in the Department of Defense (DOD) to respond to ongoing cyber threats.  Establishing a dedicated Cyber Force would unify efforts and protect our operational effectiveness.  By consolidating cyber approaches as one force under a unified command, the U.S. can limit vulnerabilities, maximize the efficiency of resources, and improve preparedness against enemies who are ever more sophisticated.  Such a standard ensures that technologies remain competitive and guarantees the nation’s defense posture during periods of technologically advanced threats.

If you enjoyed today’s post, check out several of the previous years’ winning submissions from the Mad Scientist / SGM-A Writing Contest:

Training Transformed: AI and the Future Soldier, by SGM Kyle J. Kramer

Universal Soldier, by SGM Greg A. McGowan

The Dawn of the Loitering Munitions Era by SGM Daniel S. Nasereddine

Review the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations

Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:

Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, BiteSize China weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide.

Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.

Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).

Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.

Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).

Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content:

The Future of War is Cyber! by CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley

China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan

Gaming Information Dominance and Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success, by CW4 Charles Davis

Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette and Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events, and all of this series’ associated content and videos 

The Classified Mind – The Cyber Pearl Harbor of 2034, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Jan Kallberg

In the Crosshairs: U.S. Homeland Infrastructure Threats

Hybrid Threats and Liminal Warfare and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. David Kilcullen

Warfare in the Parallel Cambrian Age, by Chris O’Connor

Military Implications of Smart Cities, by Alexander Braszko, Jr.

Army Installations: A Whole Flock of Pink Flamingos, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Richard G. Kidd IV, et al.

Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare, by Dr. Richard Nabors

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

References:

Department of Defense. (2017). DoD Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in weapon systems. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf

Department of Defense. (2020). Department of Defense cyber strategy. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2020-Cyber-Strategy-Summary.pdf

Department of Defense. (2024). Fiscal year 2025 budget estimates: United States cyber command. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/CYBERCOM_OP-5.pdf

Department of the Army. (2019). Operations. (ADP 3-0). https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18010-ADP_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

Department of the Army. (2021). FM 3-12: Cyberspace operations and electronic warfare. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33127-FM_3-12-000-WEB-1.pdf

Jackson, C., & Templeman, R. (2016). The third offset and a fifth domain? Balancing game-changing innovation and cyber risk mitigation. ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07982

Kabanov, I., & Madnick, S. E. (2020). A systematic study of the control failures in the Equifax cybersecurity incident. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3957272

Kelsey, D. (2021, October 7). The role of unmanned aerial systems in modern warfare. Air Force Magazine. https://www.airforcemag.com/unmanned-aerial-systems-modern-warfare

Leggat, H. (2020). Cyber warfare: An inquiry into the applicability of national law to cyberspace. IGI Global. https://www.igi-global.com/gateway/article/257517

Mitchell, B. (2023, May 24). Pentagon wants $58.5B in 2024 for IT and cyber activities. DefenseScoop. https://defensescoop.com/2023/05/24/pentagon-wants-58-5b-in-2024-for-it-and-cyber-activities/

Mohammad, W., Elomri, A., & Kerbache, L. (2022). The global semiconductor chip shortage: Causes, implications, and potential remedies. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 55(10), 476–483. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405896322017293

Monaghan, S. (2018). Countering hybrid warfare: So what for the future joint force? PRISM, 8(2), 1–15. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Monaghan.pdf

Sanchez, J. (2024, July 12). NASA study advances potential for Mars habitation. United States Space Force. https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3836358/nasa-study-advances-potential-for-mars-habitation/

Scharre, P. (2024, March 12). Preserving U.S. military advantage amid rapid technological change. Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/preserving-u-s-military-advantage-amid-rapid-technological-change

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (n.d.). SOF imperatives. United States Army. Retrieved December 26, 2024, from https://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/SOFImperatives.html

U.S. Air Force Academy. (n.d.). Azimuth space program. United States Air Force academy. Retrieved December 26, 2024, from https://www.usafa.edu/military/azimuth-space-program/

U.S. Space Force. (2024, April 10). USSF releases commercial space strategy to increase competitive advantage. https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3736616/ussf-releases-commercial-space-strategy-to-increase-competitive-advantage/

Vergun, D. (2020, March 27). During WWII, industries transitioned from peacetime to wartime production. DOD News. https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/2128446/during-wwii-industries-transitioned-from-peacetime-to-wartime-production/

Wu, J., Gan, W., Chen, Z., Wan, S., & Lin, H. (2023). AI-generated content (AIGC): A survey. ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.06632