225. The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

[Editor’s Note: Today’s post is excerpted from last month’s (March 2020) edition of the OE Watch, which in turn analyzes two articles from Jiefangjun Bao (the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] Daily), published earlier this year

The first article explores how China, our emergent pacing threat, proposes to counter a stronger “informatized” enemy possessing more advanced technology (a not-so-veiled reference to the United States). Offering a three-phased prescription, this article’s authors describe how the PLA could initially employ “flexible deception” and swift, coordinated, and violent assaults by small units via multiple axes of attack; followed by close entanglement and encirclement; culminating in a concentration of forces and deep fires to annihilate the enemy.

The second article explores one aspect of battlefield intelligentization (i.e., the Chinese concept of applying Artificial Intelligence’s machine speed and processing power to military planning, operational command, and decision support) —  specifically, how Chinese smart drone swarms could “destroy the enemy’s cross-domain joint capabilities and achieve combat objectives at a relatively small cost.

Taken together, these articles provide valuable insights into how China’s PLA is thinking about countering the U.S. Army’s current force, the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)-Capable Force in 2028, and the MDO-Ready Force in 2035 — Read on!]

Considering “The Ground Battlefield Under Informatized Conditions”

Soldiers with People’s Liberation Army at Shenyang training base in China (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)
Soldiers with People’s Liberation Army at Shenyang training base in China / Source: DOD by D. Myles Cullen via National Defense University Press

Strategies and tactics in warfare change as new technologies emerge. China has been striving to maintain pace with the modern world by developing strategies and tactics that complement these ongoing changes. One discipline that has been undergoing dramatic change is that of close-range combat due to the “informatization” of the battlefield. In the accompanying article, published in Jiefangjun Bao, two Chinese scholars discuss a close combat situation where China is the weaker military force, facing a stronger enemy that possesses advanced (informatized) technology. In the scenario, advanced technology allows China’s adversary to detect and acquire targets at long range, execute precise attacks from beyond line of sight, and conceal combat intent, posing a real challenge to Chinese forces trying to close their distance with the enemy to destroy it.

According to the article, there are three phases of “close combat” in the information age. Phase one combines various methods to get close to the enemy in planning. Phase two is the entanglement phase in which the fight is brought to close quarters. Phase three is the annihilation and destruction of enemy forces.

Small groups of PLA soldiers approach from various routes, attacking “quickly and violently.” / Source: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, mil.ru, via Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

The article describes various measures that, coupled with having an intimate understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both the enemy and friendly sides “as a foundation,” would be effective in closing the distance with the adversary with a reduced chance of detection. These measures include, for example, capitalizing on factors such as weather and geographical elements, which might degrade the capability of enemy reconnaissance devices and weapons platforms. The authors describe scenes in which small groups of soldiers approach from various routes, attacking “quickly and violently,” and networks of air defense firepower attack from varying altitudes and ranges. Another measure suggested is the use of “flexible deception,” such as putting out false intelligence to mislead the enemy.

Massed People’s Liberation Army troops prepare for a parade in September 2017 commemorating the PLA’s 90th anniversary / Source: Defense Intelligence Agency 2019 China Military Power report

In phase two (entanglement) of “close combat,” the article explains that non-contact combat constitutes a major threat to the weaker side. The authors argue that in order to be victorious, it is essential to not only get closer, but to also employ a number of measures, be flexible in the employment of tactics, become “closely entangled” with the enemy, create an interlocked pattern of engagement with the enemy, and lessen the threat of attack by the enemy’s long-range firepower. They go on to describe various aggressive, multi-pronged and joint attack approaches, ensuring fighting takes place at close quarters, while also disrupting the enemy’s plans and patterns, and using integrated strength to wipe out key enemy targets while Chinese forces encircle the enemy. It is worth noting that the Chinese concept of “entanglement” is nothing new, but reflects their experience in the Korean War, where they would negate American airpower and artillery by “hugging” the American ground forces. The Americans would not call in artillery and air power on their own positions – except in extremis.

PLA forces on the attack in an exercise demonstration for former CJCS GEN Joseph F. Dunford Jr., at a base in Shenyang, China, 16 Aug. 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

In the third phase (annihilation), the more superior the enemy is in information technology, the more they are likely to resort to asymmetric attack measures. Therefore, “take aim at the weak points of the strong enemy’s informatized platforms and combat arrangements…” Prioritize a selection of targets in the event not all targets can be destroyed. Concentrate superior forces. Finally, conduct both distant and close-in battle simultaneously.

The authors argue that despite the rise of informatized warfare, “close combat” has not gone away and in fact, “combat at short range may even be the main form of combat.End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)

“The less the enemy is able to fight close combat, the more
we [China] should step up our research of the issue of close combat on the informatized battlefield, and thereby firmly grasp the initiative.”

“With the rapid development of new and high technology with information technology as the core, the ground battlefield under informatized conditions is no longer restricted to the battlefield in the geographical sense.”

Source: Ye Huabin and Ai Zhengson, “信息时代如何“近敌”作战 (How to Conduct ‘Close Combat’ in the Information Age),” Jiefangjun Bao, 16 January 2020.

PLA track commander, during attack exercise at a base in Shenyang, China, Aug. 16, 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

“Close combat,” as the name says, is combat operations against an enemy conducted at short range. With the rapid development of new and high technology with information technology as the core, the ground battlefield under informatized conditions is no longer restricted to the battlefield in the geographical sense. Profound change has occurred in the intention and extension [semantics; the formal definition and the further range of applicability] of the concept of the battlefield. Thus the methods of closing with the enemy to destroy him face new challenges. To accurately explore and understand how to fight close combat on the land battlefield under informatized conditions is important in terms of both theory and practice.

Of first importance in the conduct of close combat is to solve the problem of how to get close to the enemy…The strong enemy can detect and acquire targets at long range, execute precise attacks from beyond line of sight, conceal his combat intent, and make closing with the enemy to destroy him increasingly difficult. Thus with a full understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and friendly sides as a foundation, integrate the use of measures of various kinds. First of all is many ways of evasion.… A second element is firepower as cover… A final element is flexible deception.

Two Z-9 attack helicopters attached to an army aviation brigade of the PLA Xinjiang Military Command lift off simultaneously for a coordinated flight training exercise at the foot of Tianshan Mountains on January 31, 2018. / Source: eng.chinamil.com.cn, via Flickr, Public domain photo by Wu Shike

Combine forces and firepower, get entangled with the enemy and fight at close quarters… faced with a strong enemy, if you hope to be victorious you must not only solve the problems of “getting close,” you must also take various measures, employ tactics flexibly, get closely entangled with the enemy, create an interlocked pattern of engagement with the enemy, and lessen the threat of attack from the strong enemy’s long-range firepower and weapon platforms.

Annihilation and destruction aiding each other, put an end to the enemy in precise release of energy. The more superiority a side has in information technology, the more that side fears an opponent using “asymmetric” attack measures.

…The less the enemy is able to fight close combat, the more we should step up our research of the issue of close combat on the informatized battlefield, and thereby firmly grasp the initiative.

The “Blade of Victory”: A Chinese Perspective on Drone Swarms

PLA soldiers prepare an attack exercise at a base in Shenyang, China, Aug. 16, 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

Chinese military strategists and academics have been focusing on artificial intelligence (AI) and how it will reshape the future battlefield. The application of AI’s capabilities to military planning, operations, and decision support even has its own Chinese buzzword: “intelligentized” warfare. The growing number of articles and studies describing different aspects of “intelligentized” warfare are a clear indication of where China is heading. One such article, published in Jiefangjun Bao, the Central Military Commission’s official newspaper, offers an in-depth look at the use of drone swarms on the future battlefield. The article focuses on the advantages and potential operations in which drone swarms can be used.

The authors envision drone swarms as the “advance guard” and a force that “will likely become the ‘blade of victory’ in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.” Drone swarm operations offer six “exceptional advantages,” according to the article. They have greater autonomy, possess more functional capabilities, are more resilient, have a more rapid response time, are more economical, and are less dependent on logistics and outside support. They can be used to implement multi-domain attacks. The authors explain that a drone swarm platform can even be used to carry a large number of individual drones in a multi-domain attack scenario. Swarm attacks can be carried out across all domains – on land, at sea, in the air, in space, along the electromagnetic spectrum, and in cyberspace. Multi-faceted attacks carried out simultaneously across multiple domains “will destroy the enemy’s cross-domain joint capabilities and achieve combat objectives at a relatively small cost.

Drone swarms can also be used to conduct tactical deception and interference, reconnaissance, and “smart coordination.” For example, they can act as decoys to trigger enemy radar and air defense weapons to react and therefore expose their positions. This strategy can be likened to one of China’s 36 ancient stratagems, “Beat the grass to startle the snake,” an idiom that suggests taking just enough action to prompt the enemy to act and give away his strategy or position.

Finally, the authors describe ways that drone swarms can carry out reconnaissance to obtain enemy intelligence, and “smart coordination” in which drones “lead in battlefield reconnaissance and the elimination of targets.” However, the authors argue that drone swarm operations cannot operate completely independent of man. In situations deemed more risky to lives, due to their lower cost and versatility, a large number of drones can be used in front-line operations while a manned platform can provide “command and control of the drone swarms from the rear, guiding the swarms to strike targets in complex, high-risk areas.End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)

“Drone swarms will likely become the “blade of victory” in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.”

Source: Xu Weiwei and Li Huan, “无人机集群作战的主要样式 (The Main Types of Drone Swarm Warfare),” Jiefangjun Bao, 23 January 2020.

The Main Types of Drone Swarm Warfare

…Drone swarm operations are emerging as an important form of intelligentized warfare. In the future, drone operations will become the “advance guard” in a battle between two armies. Drone swarms will likely become the “blade of victory” in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.

…From their inception, drone swarm operations have always had many exceptional advantages over conventional operations. (1) …Drone swarms can be flexibly organized into different units. They can adapt to different environments, possess different functions, and perform different tasks… (2) … After equipping drones with different combat modules, a drone swarm formation can have multiple functions, such as reconnaissance and surveillance, soft and hard strikes, and combat assessment… (3) …Drone swarm operations can quickly transmit battlefield information and accurately implement commanders’ intentions… (4) …An individual drone has several advantages, such as being a small target, the ability to withstand impact, large overload capacity, maintaining flight under silent mode, and effective concealment on the battlefield, etc… (5) …A drone swarm operation eliminates the limitations of human-operated machines. There is no need to install complex safety systems and protective facilities to ensure safety of personnel… (6) In the course of drone swarm operations, an individual drone’s dependence on logistics and support is low…

…The basic method of multi-domain attacks is to use a drone swarm platform to carry a large number of individual drones. During the battle, the drones are launched or deployed through the platform as battle groups to achieve data sharing, flight control, situational awareness, and intelligentized decision-making, so that the drones can flexibly respond to battlefield contingencies and conduct various combat missions, such as swarm reconnaissance, fighting, and attacks. The domains in which attacks by a swarm operation take place will be across all domains: on land, at sea, in the air, in space, along the electromagnetic spectrum, and in cyberspace. …

…Based on mission needs, a drone swarm can be flexibly configured with various modules, such as modules for reconnaissance, information processing, and missile firepower, thereby forming a composite formation with reconnaissance, interference, and strike capabilities. Alternatively, several drone swarms can each be configured with reconnaissance and firepower modules, forming a large assault formation that penetrates deep into enemy territory and conducts real-time reconnaissance and strikes on key or high-risk targets, thereby achieving strategic operational goals.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following:

OE Watch, March 2020 issue, by the TRADOC G-2’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), featuring the two aforementioned articles, along with a host of other items of interest.

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Newer Is Not Better, Better is Better, by Gary Phillips

Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown.

China’s Drive for Innovation Dominance and Quantum Surprise on the Battlefield?, by Elsa Kania

A Closer Look at China’s Strategies for Innovation: Questioning True Intent, by Cindy Hurst

Critical Projection: Insights from China’s Science Fiction, by Lt Col Dave Calder

199. “Intelligentization” and a Chinese Vision of Future War

[Editor’s Note: While Monday’s post explored a U.S. perspective on Artificial Intelligence (AI) integration to military operations, today’s article, excerpted from this month’s OE Watch, addresses China’s embrace of “Intelligentization.” Intelligentization is the uniquely Chinese concept of applying AI’s machine speed and processing power to military planning, operational command, and decision support. In her testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on Trade, Technology, and Military-Civil Fusion earlier this year, proclaimed Mad Scientist Elsa Kania stated that President Xi Jinping, in his report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, “urged the PLA to ‘Accelerate the development of military intelligentization” (军事智能化)….This authoritative exhortation has elevated the concept of ‘intelligentization’ as a guiding principle for the future of Chinese military modernization.” What is unique about the PLA’s approach to implementing AI in force modernization is that they do not seek to merely integrate AI into existing warfighting functions; rather, they are using it to shape a new, cognitive domain and thus revolutionize their entire approach to warfighting — Read on!]

In today’s world of rapidly developing concepts and technologies, many theories are emerging about what warfare will resemble in the future. Nowhere does this seem truer than in China, where scholars, researchers, and scientists are putting their thoughts to paper, such as the accompanying article, which looks at how “intelligentization” will change the structure and outcome of warfare.

The thought-provoking article (below), which was republished in various journals, such as Jiefangjun Bao, the official newspaper of the People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission, and Qiushi Journal, which falls under the Central Party School and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, looks at how intelligentized warfare, a term commonly used by Chinese scholars, is expected to redraw the boundaries of warfare, restructure combat forces, and reshape the rules of engagement. Some of the more salient points worth pondering are highlighted in the accompanying excerpted passages.

The article claims that the art of combat power will inevitably change because artificial intelligence is rapidly infiltrating military operations. Traditional battlefields and battlefronts will “be hard to reproduce.” The current battle domains in warfare (the physical dimensions of land, sea, air, and space and the informational dimensions of electromagnetic and cyber) will be updated to include a new dimension: the cognitive domain, which would fall under the cognitive dimension.

Intelligentized warfare will see the integration of military and non-military domains; and the boundary between peacetime and wartime will get increasingly blurred. The outcome of a war will not be determined by who destroys whom in a kinetic sense, but rather who gains maximum political benefits. Intelligentized warfare will see the integration of human and machine intelligence. It will reshape warfighting in every dimension and within every realm. Human fighters will eventually stop being the first line of fighting and intelligent systems will prevail. “Human-on-human” warfare will be replaced by “machine-on-human” or “machine-on-machine warfare.”

Combining humans and machines into brain-machine interfaces, external skeletal systems, wearable devices, and gadgets implanted into human bodies will “comprehensively enhance the inherent cognitive and physiological capacity of human fighters and will forge out superman combatants.” Intelligentized warfare will upend traditional rules of military engagement. Cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting in military engagements will become the new normal. Unmanned operations will rewrite the rules of engagement and reshape the support process. Intelligent control will become the center of gravity.

Based on the article, one might surmise that the military tactics of yesterday and today are not likely the area in which the People’s Liberation Army will place too much effort, if any at all. With artificial intelligence and other technologies rapidly gaining ground, China seems keener on leading the curve in the long term than honing tactics in the immediate future. End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)

The cognitive domain will become another battle domain next to the land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, and cyber domains of warfare.”

Yang Wenzhe, “在变与不变中探寻智能 化战争制胜之道 (How to Win Intelligentized Warfare by Analyzing what are Changed and What are Unchanged),” Jiefangjun Bao, 22 October 2019.

Seeking the Way to Win Intelligentized Warfare by Analyzing what are Changed and What are Unchanged

…With AI technology rapidly infiltrating into the military domain, it will inevitably lead to a thorough change in the way combat power manifests itself. … The cognitive domain will become another battle domain next to the land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, and cyber domains of warfare. …the three major warfighting dimensions, that is, the physical dimension, the informational dimension, and the cognitive dimension. The boundaries of war will extend into the deep land, deep sea, deep air, deep cyber, and deep brain domains… Intelligentized warfare will be generalized to all military conflicts and rivalries, giving rise to a more striking feature of integration between military and non-military domains. The scope of warfighting will expand to the extremes. The boundary between peacetime and wartime will get increasingly blurred.

Gaining political benefits is an invariable standard for measuring winning in war.… Military victories must guarantee political predominance.

Human fighters will fade away from the first line of fighting. Intelligent equipment will be brought onto the battlefield in large quantities and as whole units. “Human-on-human” warfare in the traditional sense will be superseded by “machine-on-human” or “machine-on-machine” warfare.

Such means of human-machine combination as brain-machine interfaces, external skeletal systems, wearable devices, gadgets implanted into human bodies will comprehensively enhance the inherent cognitive and physiological capacity of human fighters, and will forge out “superman combatants”…

…operations”. Cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting will become a new normal in military engagements…Unmanned operations, as a prominent hallmark of the new warfighting pattern, will rewrite the rules of engagements and reshape the support processes. Intelligence control will replace spaces control as the center of gravity in war.”

The race is on between the U.S. and its near-peer competitors, China and Russia, to develop and incorporate AI into their respective defense modernization efforts.  As Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in 2017, “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”  China understands this, has embraced it at the national level, and is forging ahead with the intent to dominate the cognitive domain through intelligentization. Per Ms. Kania, the resultant “system of systems consisting of people, weapons equipment, and ways of combat… involve[s] not only intelligent weaponry but also concepts of human-machine integration (人机一体) and intelligence leading (智能主导). In practice, the PLA’s agenda for intelligentization may prove quite expansive, extending across all concepts in which AI might have military relevance in enabling and enhancing war-fighting capabilities, from logistics to early warning and intelligence, military wargaming, and command decision-making.

If you enjoyed this post, please also see:

The AI Titan’s Security Dilemmas, by Ms. Elsa Kania.

China’s Drive for Innovation Dominance, derived from Ms. Kania’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Human-Machine Integration briefing, presented at the Mad Scientist Bio Convergence and Soldier 2050 Conference on 9 March 2018 at SRI International‘s Silicon Valley campus in Menlo Park, California.

A Closer Look at China’s Strategies for Innovation: Questioning True Intent, by Ms. Cindy Hurst.

Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations, by Dr. James Mancillas, exploring AI implementation through an OODA lens.

The OE Watch, December issue, by the TRADOC G-2’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), featuring this piece and other articles of interest.