megacity – Mad Scientist Laboratory

January 3, 2019January 2, 2019

109. Classic Planning Holism as a Basis for Megacity Strategy

[Editor’s Note: Recent operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to liberate Mosul illustrate the challenges of warfighting in urban environments. In The Army Vision, GEN Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary of the Army, state that the U.S. Army must “Focus training on high-intensity conflict, with emphasis on operating in dense urban terrain…” Returning Mad Scientist Laboratory guest blogger Dr. Nir Buras leverages his expertise as an urban planner to propose a holistic approach to military operations in Megacities — Enjoy!]

A recent study identified 34 megacities, defined as having populations of over 10 million inhabitants.¹ The scale, complexity, and dense populations of megacities, and their need for security, energy, water conservation, resource distribution, waste management, disaster management, construction, and transportation make them a challenging security environment.²

With urban warfare experience from Stalingrad to Gaza, it is clear that a doctrinal shift must take place.

Urban terrain, the “great equalizer,” diminishes an attacker’s advantages in firepower and mobility.”³ Recent experiences in Baghdad, Mosul, and Aleppo, as well as historically in Aachen, Seoul, Hue, and Ramadi, shift the perspective from problem solving to critical holistic thinking skills and decision-making required in ambiguous environments.⁴ For an Army, rule number one is to stay out of cities. If that is not possible, the second rule of warfare is to manipulate the environment.

The Strategic Studies Group finds that a megacity is the most challenging environment for a land force to operate in.⁵ But currently, the U.S. Army is incapable of operating within the megacity.⁶ The intellectual center of gravity is open to those who choose to seize it, because it does not exist.⁷

Cities are holistic entities, but holism is not about brown food and Birkenstocks. Holism is a discipline managing whole systems which are more than a sum of their parts. Where problem-solving methodology drags the problem with it, resulting in negative synergies (new problems); the holistic methodology works from aspiration and results in positive synergies, many of which are unforeseen. The aspiration for megacity operations is control, not conquest. The cure must not be worse than the disease.

The holistic approach to combat, to fight the urban context, not the enemy, means reconfiguring the environment for operational purposes. Its goal of reforming antagonism to U.S. interests by controlling and reforming the city to become self-ruling and long-term sustainable, would facilitate urban, political, and economical homeostasis in alignment with U.S. interests and bequeath a homeostatic urban balance legacy — “Pax Americana.”⁸ Paradoxically, it may be the most cost-effective approach.

Megacities are inherently unsustainable and need to be fixed, war or not. Classic planning for megacities would break them down into environmentally controllable chunks of human scaled, walkable areas of 30,000, 120,000, and 500,000 persons by means of swathes of countryside. A continuous network of rural, agricultural, and natural areas, it would be at least 1-mile deep, and be the place where transport, major infrastructure, highways, campuses, large-scale sports venues, waste dumps, and even mines, might be located.

This is naturally ongoing in Detroit, is historically documented to have happened in Rome, and can be witnessed in Angkor Wat. While the greatest beneficiaries of this long-term would be the populace, its military benefits are obvious. The Army would simply accelerate the process.

The idea is to radically change the fighting environment while bolstering the population and its institutions to sympathize with U.S. goals. “Divide and conquer” followed by a sustainable legacy. Notably, operations within a megacity requires an understanding of a city’s normal procedures and daily operations beforehand.⁹ The proposed framework for this is the long-term classic planning of cities.

The application of classic planning to megacity operations follows four steps: Disrupt, Control, Stabilize, and Transfer.

1. DISRUPT urban fabric with swathes of country at least a mile wide containing a continuous network of rural, agricultural, natural, and water areas at least 1-mile deep, where transport, major infrastructure, highways, campuses, large-scale sports venues, etc., are located. In urban fabric, structures would be removed to virgin ground, and agriculture and nature reinstated there. Solutions for the debris will need to be developed, as well as for buried infrastructure. The block layout may remain in whole or part for agricultural and forest access. Soil bacteria may be used to rapidly consume toxic and hazardous materials. This has to be thoroughly planned in advance of a conflict.

2. CONTAIN urban fabric to a 1 hour walk (2 hours max), 2-4 miles from edge to edge, both in existing fabric and in new settlements for relocated persons.

3. STABILIZE neighborhoods, quarters, and city centers hierarchically, and densify them, up to 6-8 floors tall, according to the classic planning model of standard fabric buildings. Buildings taller than 6 or 8 stories may be placed on the periphery, if they are necessary at all. Blocks, streets, plazas, and parks are laid out in appropriate dimensions. Proven, traditional designs are used for buildings at least 85% of the time. Stabilize communities through leadership, mentoring, the establishment of markets, industry, sources of income, and community institutions.

4. TRANSFER displaced communities to new urban fabric built on classic planning principles as developed after the Haiti Earthquake; and transfer air rights from land reclaimed for country to urban fabric centers (midrise densification) and peripheries (taller buildings as necessary). Transfer community management back to residents as soon as possible (1 year). Transfer loyalty; build community; develop education, mentoring, and training; and use civilian commercial work according to specifically developed management models for construction, economic, and urban management.¹⁰

To adopt a holistic approach to the megacity, the U.S. Army must engage in a comprehensive understanding of the environment prior to the arrival of forces, and plan the shaping of the environment, focusing on its physical attributes for both the benefit of the city and the Army. This holistic approach may generate outcomes similar to the type of synergies stimulated by the Marshall Plan after World War II.

If you enjoyed this post, please listen to:

– Tomorrow’s Urban Battlefield podcast with Dr. Russell Glenn, hosted by our colleagues at the Modern War Institute.

… and also read the following:

– Mad Scientist Megacities and Dense Urban Areas Initiative in 2025 and Beyond Conference Final Report

– Where none have gone before: Operational and Strategic Perspectives on Multi-Domain Operations in Mega Cities Conference Proceedings

– My City is Smarter than Yours!

Nir Buras is a PhD architect and planner with over 30 years of in-depth experience in strategic planning, architecture, and transportation design, as well as teaching and lecturing. His planning, design and construction experience includes East Side Access at Grand Central Terminal, New York; International Terminal D, Dallas-Fort-Worth; the Washington DC Dulles Metro line; work on the US Capitol and the Senate and House Office Buildings in Washington. Projects he has worked on have been published in the New York Times, the Washington Post, local newspapers, and trade magazines. Buras, whose original degree was Architect and Town planner, learned his first lesson in urbanism while planning military bases in the Negev Desert in Israel. Engaged in numerous projects since then, Buras has watched first-hand how urban planning impacted architecture. After the last decade of applying in practice the classical method that Buras learned in post-doctoral studies, his book, *The Art of Classic Planning* (Harvard University Press, 2019), presents the urban design and planning method of Classic Planning as a path forward for homeostatic, durable urbanism.

¹ Demographia World Urban Areas 11th Annual Edition 2015,” Demographia, 2-20, September 18, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf. 67% of large urban areas (500,000 and higher) located in Asia and Africa.

² Jack A. Goldstone, “The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World,” Foreign Affairs, (January/February 2010) 38-39; National Intelligence Council, Global trends 2030 Report: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012), 1. Quoted in Kaune.

³ ARCIC, Unified Quest Executive Report 2014 (Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Capabilities Integration Center, 2014), 1. Quoted in Kaune.

⁴ Harris et al., Megacities and the US Army, 22. Louis A. Dimarco, Concrete Hell Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2012) 214-215. Quoted in Kaune.

⁵ Harris et al., Megacities and the US Army, 21.

⁶ Kaune.

⁷ David Betz, “Peering into the Past and Future of Urban Warfare in Israel,” War on the Rocks, December 17, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/peering-into-the-past-and-future-of-urban-warfare-in-israel/. Quoted in Kaune.

⁸ Tom R. Przybelski, “Hybrid War: The Gap in the Range of Military Operations” (Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department), iii.

⁹ Kaune.

¹⁰ Michael Evans, “The Case Against Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1, (Spring 2015): 36. Quoted in Kaune.

March 29, 2018March 28, 2018

40. Megacities: The Time is Nigh

(Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to present the following guest blog post by Dr. Russell Glenn, Director, Plans and Policy, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, addressing how the United States must be prepared to fight across multiple domains in megacities.)

The time is at hand for America’s armed forces – or, more appropriately, its government at large – to act on the likelihood that America’s men and women and those of partner nations and organizations will be committed to domestic or international, natural or manmade disasters in the world’s largest urban areas. The U.S. Army supported local officials during the 1992 Los Angeles riots; U.S. armed forces assisted Japan during the 2011 Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster threat to Tokyo. Future operations might well require lines of communication from airports or sea ports through a megacity. America’s armed forces need to prepare for and practice for these contingencies now.

Such preparation calls for innovation. History can only help so much. Our World War II and Korea experiences with what are now megacities (Manila and Seoul, respectively) came when each had but a million or so population. Seoul’s population had increased to over ten million by 1996; the megacity exceeds 24 million individuals today. Geographic spread has accompanied this population expansion.

Seoul in 1953 (left) and 1996 (right)

Our planet’s largest urban areas are preponderantly in Asia, increasingly in Africa, and littoral in nature. The last point in particular has significant implications. Littoral urban areas tend to be considerably more prone to natural disasters than cities in geographical interiors. Many are located along the “arc of fire” earthquake zone that traces the rim of the Pacific Ocean. Vulnerability to typhoons or hurricanes is evident as one looks back on recent events in Manila and New York, among other coastal cities.

World City Populations: 1950-2030 (courtesy of Duncan Smith)

We need to avoid current oversimplifications as we innovate. Viewing a megacity by its popular definition of urban areas over ten million in population implies these conglomerations differ from others only in terms of resident numbers. Untrue. Most have additional characteristics that are essential to consider in planning and conducting military operations (or, far more preferably, comprehensive approach operations that effectively orchestrate military, other government, multinational, nongovernmental, inter-governmental, and commercial capabilities).

The interdependencies that link the world’s most vital urban areas must be incorporated in planning and ever kept in mind during execution. A set number of residents does not distinguish global importance; other factors are at least as significant and generally more so. Some urban areas of over ten million have little worldwide reach; others of far less population are crucial to commerce, economic health, and other concerns that span multiple continents. Singapore comes to mind. Better, then, that we view a megacity as:

“an urban area of extraordinary population size, geographic spread, physical and social complexity, interconnectedness, and similarly exceptional characteristics, to include influence with at least national and broader regional scope.”

Panoramic view of Tokyo

The implied scope of responsibilities inherent in megacity operations makes it apparent that an armed force might well find itself better placed in a supporting rather than lead role, particularly if a host nation government is in-place and functioning effectively. Winning on an urban battlefield will only be the starting point when operations include combat; recovery-related tasks should begin during the fighting and will all but inevitably continue long after Western soldiers and their leaders have departed. The complexity, dynamism, and wicked problems confronted will require thoughtful assessment of situations and highly-trained men and women comfortable with the dictates of mission command. Decentralized decision-making will be the norm.

The influence of megacities will increase in the decades to come. Ours must be governments prepared to not only succeed at missions therein anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. They must also be ready to do so simultaneously at many points on that continuum and in partnership with others who heretofore largely remain strangers.

The TRADOC G-2, in partnership with U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and the Australian Army, is facilitating the Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) in Megacities Conference on April 3-4, 2018 at Fort Hamilton, New York. This conference’s three objectives are to:

• Identify MDB operational and strategic level implications of operations in megacities

• Identify best practices for coordination with intergovernmental and other organizations during megacity operations

• Identify specific U.S. Army Pacific, Australian Army, and TRADOC G-2 primary urban operations concerns/challenges in preparation for later events in this series

While attendance at this conference is by-invitation only, it will be live streamed here, starting at 0830 EDT on Tuesday, April 3, 2018.

For additional insights regarding combat in urban terrain, please listen to the following podcasts, hosted by our colleagues at Modern War Institute:

• The Battle for Mosul, with Col. Pat Work

• The Future Urban Battlefield, with Dr. Russell Glenn

Also see the TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise (OEE) Red Diamond Threats Newsletter, Volume 9, Issue 1, January-February 2018, pages 18-21, for Manila: An Exemplar of Dense Urban Terrain. This article “illustrates the complex political and civil-military challenges that would impact potential operations or activities in megacities.”

Please also see Jeremy D. McLain’s article (submitted in response to our Soldier 2050 Call for Ideas) entitled, Full-Auto Teddy Bear: Non-Lethal Automatons and Lethal Human Teaming to Increase Overall ‘Lethality’ in Complex Urban Environments, published by our colleagues at Small Wars Journal.

Dr. Russell Glenn, is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, and has earned four Masters degrees from the University of Southern California (MS, Systems Management), Stanford University (MS, Civil Engineering and MS, Operations Research), and the School of Advanced Military Studies (Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his PhD in American history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military history and political science. Past research includes published studies on counterinsurgency, urban operations, military and police training, and intelligence operations. He is currently the Director, Plans and Policy, TRADOC G-2.

February 12, 2018February 9, 2018

28. My City is Smarter than Yours!

(Editor’s Note: The Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to present the following post by returning guest blogger Mr. Pat Filbert)

Megacities will cause far more issues with conflict resolution than is currently understood and should be approached from a more holistic understanding when it comes to planning for urban fighting.

The “collateral damage” aspect of leveling city blocks adds to the burden of rebuilding a smart megacity to provide a measure of security and resumption of the “way of life” to which its citizens have grown accustomed. The assumption of instant information at one’s fingertips specifies, and implies, that there is something feeding that information flow to whatever the user is accessing; specifically, embedded fiber optic networks moving information drawn from a variety of sensors built into the city structure that provide not just citizens, but also local and city leaders, the statuses they “can’t do without.”

Friendly forces will have to ensure their operations in megacities consider advanced city infrastructure attributes in their Intelligence Preparation of the Urban Battlespace.

• Preservation of fiber optic networks and repair requirements after kinetic or non-kinetic attacks, including use by attacking and defending forces and insurgents

• Active broadband infrastructure to support information flow to friendly forces from locals; also when to interrupt it while supporting open source teams to combat “fake news” while locals tweet information and requests for help

• Defeating enemy hackers infiltrating friendly networks via megacity infrastructure

The decision point to take down a megacity’s information network must consider what is there that friendly forces can use to support their efforts and how the health and welfare of the citizens will be affected. Cities are now experimenting with smart community technology that enables law enforcement to pinpoint and identify where gunshots are coming from using audio technology, similar to what is being used in the military, along with wireless power broadcasting providing citizens with ever-increasing levels of comfort and necessity that a conflict will interrupt (no food storage or refrigeration or fast medical response equals how will friendly forces fix this?).

Other attributes for consideration are the use by the adversary, as well as insurgent forces, of existing unmanned ground systems in a megacity that were being used to support mass transit. Is that automated shuttle coming at you full of explosives or citizens fleeing the fight? How do you get it to stop if there isn’t a driver on board, only scared families who can’t stop the vehicle? Current procedures have troops demanding the vehicle stop or they will open fire—without a driver, then what?

When ground troops move forward, they must understand it’s not just Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) that could be transmitting data and information to an adversary.

• Smart crosswalk sensors that used to provide data to traffic centers to decrease accidents and now provide the adversary with in-place, unattended ground sensors

• GPS systems that once reported real-time accidents co-opted to integrate adversary tracking of friendly force heavy vehicles

• Data systems providing predictions of situations where traffic jams and accidents might occur being used to predict where friendly forces can be ambushed

• Adversaries turning on the lights (i.e., illuminating not just with streetlights but in-place multi-spectral systems) to put friendly forces “on the spot” has to be considered and countered

Being able to compromise those systems, like the “loop a security camera” trick spies do in the movies, without the adversary noticing is counter-detection technology friendly forces must have; preferably without such technology being known before conflict.

Once the battle is won, how will our forces get things back on-line? Future generations will demand a return to their “way of life before we showed up” — fast and incessantly.

• Lack of support to keep what wasn’t destroyed safe for use while not enabling enemy propaganda

• Repair of power supply technology from solar, wind, nuclear production and supporting power lines to the wireless power broadcasting infrastructure

• Civilians not hearing “that’s not my job” for conflict caused damages and military not being under-resourced due to a lack of planning and upper echelon military/political leadership failure to resource pre- and post-conflict requirements before initiating a conflict

See Smart city technology aims to make communities more secure, but does it encroach on privacy? for background information on smart community technology integration in Las Vegas. For additional information on wireless power transmission, see Wireless Power.

Mad Scientist co-sponsored the Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Conference with Arizona State University on 21-22 April 2016. For more information on the ramifications of Future Warfare in Megacities see:

Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond Final Report

YouTube Playlist — Mad Scientist: Megacities and Dense Urban Areas in 2025 and Beyond

The Future Urban Battlefield with Dr. Russell Glenn podcast, hosted by the Modern War Institute

If you were intrigued by this post, please note that Mad Scientist is currently sponsoring a Call for Ideas writing contest. Contributors are asked to consider how future Army installations will operate and project force in the Operational Environment (OE) of 2050, and submit either a Research Topic or A Soldier’s Letter Home from Garrison. Suspense for submissions is 15 March 2018.

Pat Filbert is retired Army (24 years, Armor/MI); now a contractor with the Digital Integration for Combat Engagement (DICE) effort developing training for USAF DCGS personnel. He has experience with UAS/ISR, Joint Testing, Intelligence analysis/planning, and JCIDS. He has previously posted on robotics at the Mad Scientist Laboratory.