134. On Hype and Hyperwar

[Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to publish today’s post by Collin Meisel and returning guest blogger Dr. Jonathan D. Moyer, both of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures. Eschewing another discussion of disruptive emergent technologies, Mr. Meisel and Dr. Moyer instead focus on persistent global trends that, while perhaps not as sexy as artificial intelligence or quantum computing, are just as relevant to warfighters preparing for competition and conflict with potential adversaries in the Future Operational Environment!]

Too often, discussion of the Future Operational Environment (FOE) is filled with science fiction-inspired speculation of a world driven by the likes of quantum artificial intelligence (AI) and “self-constructing robotic ‘cyburgs’”. While these and similar potential technological developments are entertaining—and even useful to ponder—we should not let them distract us from less sensational but also consequential trends that are sure to transform the FOE in the coming decades, such as persistent demographic and economic shifts among great powers and the developing world. In other words, let’s take the “hype” out of hyperwar (i.e., a possible future where AI calls the shots on the battlefield).

For example, as a common feature of proposed hyperwar scenarios, quantum computing is often portrayed as both a force multiplier and boogeyman of the future despite its well-known fragility, stunted development, and potentially insurmountable limitations. Indeed, predictions of a soon-to-arrive quantum code-cracking menace are pure fiction. Similarly, despite predictions of the AI singularity—the hypothetical moment when AI surpasses human intelligence and subsequent advances presumably occur exponentially—AI, too, has its limitations.

Rather than speculating about what could become of these much-hyped technological developments, a more productive use of time is to consider, for example, the serious threat that more limited versions of quantum computing and AI might still pose in, say, the hands of a declining China. Even as it rises, China is up against long-term, persistent trends—such as a forthcoming shrinking population and the predicament of aging before it gets rich—that are sure to impact geopolitics in East Asia and beyond as the Chinese Communist Party, which in part justifies its one-party rule by continued prosperity, clings to power. Indeed, this is a foreseeable, understandable future—the opposite of hype and speculation.

As another increasingly important geopolitical player, India faces its own set of structural shifts in a direction much different from that of China. With relatively high birth rates and lower death rates compared to China, India’s  population will likely continue to rise—and, in part, drive economic growth—as its counterpart to the northeast begins to wither. While these forecasts are of one possible future, their consistency with trends over the last half-century suggests that policymakers in the United States and elsewhere should be preparing for such a world. And what of other persistent demographic trends? Although we cannot know for certain what Africa’s growth to nearly one-third of the world’s population by 2060 will mean in light of Europe’s simultaneous contraction, we can say with a fair degree of certainty that such a demographic shift is likely to happen given persistent global trends. Again, these are understandable futures; they are what is and has been happening, not hype.

Using the freely-available, open-source International Futures tool, we and our colleagues at the Pardee Center for International Futures are working with the Army Future Studies Group (AFSG) to think about long-term futures by examining these and other persistent trends in areas ranging from material power to natural systems. For example, AFSG fellows are asked to think about the planet’s water systems, impending water shortages across regions like Central and Western Asia and Northern Africa, and what they might mean for regional development and potential conflicts. While study of these less buzz-worthy trends may not tell the Army how it will be fighting wars of the future, it can at least help forecast trends that point to where and with whom.

Demographic transitions and shrinking aquifers may not have the same pizzazz as warfare at the speed of thought and other elements of the AI battlefield, but they possess equal potential to transform the FOE in fundamental ways. More importantly, these less sensational but persistent structural shifts can be considered in combination to develop plausible, understandable future scenarios—not science fiction fantasy. To be clear, hyperwar and its accompanying technologies still deserve attention, so long as those considering them do not get caught up in the hype. The goal of futures studies should be to strive towards a more understandable future—then we can worry about Elon Musk and the impending AI apocalypse.

If you enjoyed reading this post, please also see:

Building Capacity to Think about the Future, by Drs.  Jonathan D. Moyer and Christopher Rice and Mr. Alex Porter.

Long Term Trends and Some Implications of Decreasing Global Interdependence, by Dr. Moyer, presented at the Mad Scientist Strategic Security Environment in 2050 Conference at Georgetown University, 8-9 August 2016.

Extended Trends Impacting the Future Operational Environment, excerpted from the aforementioned Mad Scientist Conference’s final report.

Emergent Global Trends Impacting on the Future Operational Environment, reviewing three additional sources that help us to understand new trends and technologies affecting the FOE.

 Making the Future More Personal: The Oft-Forgotten Human Driver in Future’s Analysis, by Mr. Andrew Sullivan, addressing the paramount disruptor — people and ideas.

… and crank up R.E.M.‘s It’s The End Of The World As We Know It (And I Feel Fine)!

Collin Meisel is a Research Associate at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures and a former U.S. Air Force Security Forces member.

Dr. Jonathan D. Moyer is Assistant Professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures.

130. Trouble in Paradise: The Technological Upheaval of Modern Political and Economic Systems

[Editor’s Note:  Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to publish the following post by returning guest blogger and proclaimed Mad Scientist Ms. Marie Murphy, addressing how advances in various technologies have the potential to upset the international order and empower individuals and non-state actors.  Read on to learn who will be the winners and losers in this technological upheaval!]

Access to new and advanced technologies has the potential to upset the current power dynamic of the world. From the proliferation of smartphones to commercially available software and hardware, individuals and states that were previously discounted as threats now have the potential to launch sophisticated attacks against powerful international players. Power will no longer remain in the upper echelons of society, where it is primarily held by national governments, multinational corporations, and national news services. These groups are losing their information dominance as individuals, local authorities, and other organizations now have the ability to access and distribute unfiltered information at their fingertips.1

A historical example of technology altering the balance of power are cassette tapes. Ayatollah Khomeini used cassette tape recordings to deliver sermons and direct the Iranian Revolution when exiled in Paris, while the United States observed the use of cassette tapes by the USSR in the spreading of communist propaganda.2 A new technology in the hands of empowered individuals and states allowed for events to transpire that otherwise would not have been possible with the same speed and effectiveness. Adaptation of technology created new agency for actors to direct movements from thousands of miles away, forever shaping the course of history. A more contemporary example is the role of smartphones and social media in the Arab Spring. These new disruptive technologies enabled the organizing of protests and the broadcasting of videos in real time, eclipsing traditional journalism’s ability to report.3

Near-term Analysis:

Technologically sophisticated international actors, such as the United States and the European Union, will maintain the capacity to manage the growth and use of technology within their own borders without adversely affecting governance. However, the increased availability of these technologies may strain civil/government relations in both developing countries and authoritarian systems.4 Technologies such as smartphones and the ability to instantly transmit data may force governments to be accountable for their actions, especially if their abuses of power are recorded and distributed globally by personal devices. At the same time however, “smart” devices may also be used by governments as instruments of social control, repression, and misinformation.

Technology also affords non-state actors new methods for recruiting and executing operations.  Technology-enabled platforms have allowed these groups to network near instantaneously across borders and around the world in a manner that would have been impossible prior to the advent of the digital age.5 A well-known example is the use of social media platforms by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS for propaganda and recruitment. These groups and others, such as Hezbollah and the political opposition in Venezuela, have deployed drones for both reconnaissance and as lethal weapons.6 The availability of these information age technologies has enabled these groups to garner more power and control than similar organizations could have done in the past, posing a real threat to major international actors.

Distant Future Analysis:

There is an extremely high chance of future political disruption stemming from technological advancement. There are some who predict a non-polar power balance emerging. In this scenario, the world is dominated by dozens of technologically capable actors with various capabilities. “Hyperconnected,” developed states such as Sweden, Finland, and Israel may become greater international players and brokers of technologically backed global power. “Partially-connected” nations, today’s developing world, will face multiple challenges and could possibly take advantage of new opportunities due to the proliferation of technology. Technologically empowered individuals, groups, or neighboring states may have the ability to question or threaten the legitimacy of an otherwise weak government. However, in these “partially-connected” states, technology will serve to break down social barriers to equalize social discourse among all strata of society. Other predictions suggest the dissolution of national boundaries and the creation of an “interconnected state” comprised of different national laws without borders in a virtual space.7

Democracy itself is evolving due to technological innovation. Increasing concerns about the roles of privacy, big data, internet security, and artificial intelligence in the digital age raise the following questions: how much does technology influence and control the lives of people in democratic countries, and what effect does this have on politics? Algorithms control the advertisements on the internet based on users’ search history, the collection and sale of personal data, and “fake news” which affects the opinions of millions.8  While these technologies provide convenience in the daily lives of internet-connected citizens, such as recommending items for purchase on Amazon and other platforms, they also lead to an erosion of public trust, a pillar upon which democracy is founded. Democracies must remain vigilant regarding how emerging technologies influence and affect their people and how governments use technology to interact with its citizens.

The changing geopolitical dynamics of the world is inextricably linked with economic power, and increasing economic power is positively correlated with technological advancement. Power is becoming more diffused as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (i.e., the BRICS states), the Philippines, Mexico, Turkey, and others develop stronger economies. States with rising economic power may begin to shun traditional global political and economic institutions in favor of regional institutions and bilateral agreements.9 There will be many more emerging markets competing for market share,10 driving up competition and forcing greater innovation and integration to remain relevant.

One of the major factors of the changing economic landscape is the growth of robotics use. Today these technologies are exclusive to world economic leaders but are likely to proliferate as more technological advancements make them cost-effective for a wider range of industries and companies. The adaptation of artificial intelligence will also dictate the future success of businesses in developed and emerging economies. It is important for governments to consider “retraining programs” for those workers laid off by roboticization and AI domination of their career fields.11 Economically dominant countries of the future will be driven by technology and hold the majority of political power in the political arena. These states will harness these technologies and use them to increase their productivity while training their workforce to participate in a technologically aided market.

The Winners and Losers of the Future:

Winners:

  • Countries with stable governments and emerging economies which are able to adapt to the rapid pace of technological innovation without severe political disruption.
  • Current international powers which invest in the development and application of advanced technologies.

Losers:

  • Countries with fragile governments which can be overpowered by citizens, neighbors, or non-state actors armed with technology and authoritarian regimes who use technology as a tool of repression.
  • Traditional international powers which put themselves at risk of losing political and financial leverage if they only work to maintain the status quo. Those systems that do not adapt will struggle to remain relevant in a world dominated by a greater number of powers who fall into the “winners” category.

Conclusion

Modern power players in the world will have to adapt to the changing role of technology, particularly the influence of technology-empowered individuals. Technology will change how democracies and other political systems operate both domestically and on the world stage. The major international players of today will also have to accept that rising economic powers will gain more influence in the global market as they are more technologically enabled. As power becomes more diluted when states gain equalizing technology, the hegemony of the current powers that lead international institutions will begin to lose relevancy if they do not adapt.

If you enjoyed this post, please also see:

… and Ms. Murphy‘s previous posts:

… and crank up Bob Marley and the Wailers Get Up, Stand Up!

Marie Murphy is a junior at The College of William and Mary in Virginia, studying International Relations and Arabic. She is a regular contributor to the Mad Scientist Laboratory; interned at Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with the Mad Scientist Initiative during the Summer of 2018; and is currently a Research Fellow for William and Mary’s Project on International Peace and Security.


1 Laudicina, Paul A, and Erik R Peterson. “Divergence, Disruption, and Innovation: Global Trends 2015–2025.” Strategy, A T Kearney, www.middle-east.atkearney.com/strategy/featured-article/-/asset_publisher/KwarGm4gaWhz/content/global-trends-2015-2025-divergence-disruption-and-innovation/10192?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=http://www.middle-east.atkearney.com/strategy/featured-article?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_KwarGm4gaWhz&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1.

2 Schmidt, Eric, and Jared Cohen. “The Digital Disruption.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 27 Oct. 2010, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-10-16/digital-disruption.

3 Duffy, Matt J. “Smartphones in the Arab Spring.” Academia.edu – Share Research, 2011, www.academia.edu/1911044/Smartphones_in_the_Arab_Spring

4 China is a unique case here because it’s a major developer of technology and counter-technology systems which block the use of certain devices, applications, or programs within their borders. But Chinese people do find loopholes and other points of access in the system, defying the government.

5 Schmidt, Eric, and Jared Cohen. “The Digital Disruption.” www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-10-16/digital-disruption.

6 “Drone Terrorism Is Now a Reality, and We Need a Plan to Counter the Threat.” International Security: Fragility, Violence and Conflict, World Economic Forum, 20 Aug. 2018, www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/drone-terrorism-is-now-a-reality-and-we-need-a-plan-to-counter-the-threat.

7 Schmidt, Eric, and Jared Cohen. “The Digital Disruption.”  www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-10-16/digital-disruption.

8 Unver, Hamid Akin. “Artificial Intelligence, Authoritarianism and the Future of Political Systems.” SSRN, EDAM Research Reports, 2018, 26 Feb. 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3331635.

9 Laudicina, Paul A, and Erik R Peterson. “Divergence, Disruption, and Innovation: Global Trends 2015–2025.”

10 Stowell, Joshua. The Emerging Seven Countries Will Hold Increasing Levels of Global Economic Power by 2050. Global Security Review, 26 Apr. 2018, www.globalsecurityreview.com/will-global-economic-order-2050-look-like/.

11 Laudicina, Paul A, and Erik R Peterson. “Divergence, Disruption, and Innovation: Global Trends 2015–2025.”

97. The Cryptoruble as a Stepping Stone to Digital Sovereignty

“By 2038, there won’t just be one internet — there will be many, split along national lines” — An Xiao Mina, 2038 podcast, Episode 2, New York Magazine Intelligencer, 25 October 2018.

[Editor’s Note:  While the prediction above is drawn from a podcast that posits an emerging tech cold war between China and the U.S., the quest for digital sovereignty and national cryptocurrencies is an emerging global trend that portends the fracturing of the contemporary internet into national intranets.  This trend erodes the prevailing Post-Cold War direction towards globalization.  In today’s post, Mad Scientist Laboratory welcomes back guest blogger Dr. Mica Hall, who addresses Russia’s move to adopt a national cryptocurrency, the cryptoruble, as a means of asserting its digital sovereignty and ensuring national security.  The advent of the cryptoruble will have geopolitical ramifications far beyond Mother Russia’s borders, potentially ushering in an era of economic hegemony over those states that embrace this supranational cryptocurrency. (Note:  Some of the embedded links in this post are best accessed using non-DoD networks.)]

At the nexus of monetary policy, geopolitics, and information control is Russia’s quest to expand its digital sovereignty. At the October 2017 meeting of the Security Council, “the FSB [Federal Security Service] asked the government to develop an independent ‘Internet’ infrastructure for BRICS nations [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa], which would continue to work in the event the global Internet malfunctions.” 1 Security Council members argued the Internet’s threat to national security is due to:

“… the increased capabilities of Western nations to conduct offensive operations in the informational space as well as the increased readiness to exercise these capabilities.”2

This echoes the sentiment of Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s Press Secretary, who stated in 2014,

We all know who the chief administrator of the global Internet is. And due to its volatility, we have to think about how to ensure our national security.”3

At that time, the Ministry of Communications (MinCom) had just tested a Russian back-up to the Internet to support a national “Intranet,” lest Russia be left vulnerable if the global Domain Name Servers (DNS) are attacked. MinCom conducted “a major exercise in which it simulated ‘switching off’ global Internet services,” and in 2017, the Security Council decided to create just such a backup system “which would not be subject to control by international organizations” for use by the BRICS countries.4

While an Internet alternative (or Alternet) may be sold to the Russian public as a way to combat the West’s purported advantage in the information war, curb excessive dependency on global DNS, and protect the country from the foreign puppet masters of the Internet that “pose a serious threat to Russia’s security,”5 numerous experts doubt Russia’s actual ability to realize the plan, given its track record.

Take the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), for example, an international organization comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Belarus. Russia should be able to influence the EAEU even more than the BRICS countries, given its leading role in establishing the group. The EAEU was stood up in January 2016, and by December, “MinCom and other government agencies were given the order to develop and confirm a program for the ‘Digital Economy,’ including plans to develop [it in] the EAEU.”6 As Slavin observes, commercial ventures have already naturally evolved to embrace the actual digital economy: “The digital revolution has already occurred, business long ago switched to electronic interactions,”7 while the state has yet to realize its Digital Economy platform.

Changing the way the government does business has proven more difficult than changing the actual economy. According to Slavin, “The fact that Russia still has not developed a system of digital signatures, that there’s no electronic interaction between government and business or between countries of the EAEU, and that agencies’ information systems are not integrated – all of that is a problem for the withered electronic government that just cannot seem to ripen.”8 The bridge between the state and the actual digital economy is still waiting for “legislation to support it and to recognize the full equality of electronic and paper forms.”9 Consequently, while the idea to create a supranational currency to be used in the EAEU has been floated many times, the countries within the organization have not been able to agree on what that currency would be.

The cryptoruble could be used to affect geopolitical relationships. In addition to wielding untraceable resources, Russia could also leverage this technology to join forces with some countries against others. According to the plan President Putin laid out upon announcing the launch of a cryptoruble, Russia would form a “single payment space” for the member states of the EAEU, based on “the use of new financial technologies, including the technology of distributed registries.”10 Notably, three months after the plan to establish a cryptoruble was announced, Russia’s Central Bank stated the value of working on establishing a supranational currency to be used either across the BRICS countries or across the EAEU, or both, instead of establishing a cryptoruble per se.11

This could significantly affect the balance of power not only in the region, but also in the world. Any country participating in such an economic agreement, however, would subject themselves to being overrun by a new hegemony, that of the supranational currency.

 

As long as the state continues to cloak its digital sovereignty efforts in the mantle of national security – via the cryptoruble or the Yarovaya laws, which increase Internet surveillance – it can continue to constrict the flow of information without compunction. As Peskov stated, “It’s not about disconnecting Russia from the World Wide Web,” but about “protecting it from external influence.”12 After Presidents Putin and Trump met at the G20 Summit in July 2017, MinCom Nikiforov said the two countries would establish a working group “for the control and security of cyberspace,” which the U.S. Secretary of State said would “develop a framework for cybersecurity and a non-interference agreement.”13 Prime Minister Medvedev, however, said digitizing the economy is both “a matter of Russia’s global competitiveness and national security,”14 thus indicating Russia is focused not solely inward, but on a strategic competitive stance. MinCom Nikiforov makes the shortcut even clearer, stating, “In developing the economy, we need digital sovereignty,”15 indicating a need to fully control how the country interacts with the rest of the world in the digital age.

The Kremlin’s main proponent for digital sovereignty, Igor Ashmanov, claims, “Digital sovereignty is the right of the government to independently determine what is happening in their digital sphere. And make its own decisions.” He adds, “Only the Americans have complete digital sovereignty. China is growing its sovereignty. We are too.”16 According to Lebedev, “Various incarnations of digital sovereignty are integral to the public discourse in most countries,” and in recent years, “The idea of reining in global information flows and at least partially subjugating them to the control of certain traditional or not-so-traditional jurisdictions (the European Union, the nation-state, municipal administrations) has become more attractive.”17   In the Russian narrative, which portrays every nation as striving to gain the upper hand on the information battlefield, Ashmanov’s fear that, “The introduction of every new technology is another phase in the digital colonization of our country,”18 does not sound too far-fetched.

The conspiracy theorists to the right of the administration suggest the “global world order” represented by the International Monetary Fund intends to leave Russia out of its new replacement reference currency, saying “Big Brother is coming to blockchain.”19 Meanwhile, wikireality.ru reports the Russian government could limit web access in the name of national security, because the Internet “is a CIA project and the U.S. is using information wars to destroy governments,” using its “cybertroops.”20 As the site notes, the fight against terrorism has been invoked as a basis for establishing a black list of websites available within Russia. Just as U.S. citizens have expressed concerns over the level of surveillance made legal by the Patriot Act, so Russian netizens have expressed concerns over the Yarovaya laws and moves the state has made to facilitate information sovereignty.

According to the Financial Times, “This interest in cryptocurrencies shows Russia’s desire to take over an idea originally created without any government influence. It was like that with the Internet, which the Kremlin has recently learned to tame.”21 Meanwhile, a healthy contingent of Russian language netizens continue to express their lack of faith in the national security argument, preferring to embrace a more classical skepticism, as reflected in comments in response to a 2017 post by msmash called, “From the Never-Say-Never-But-Never Department,” — “In Putin’s Russia, currency encrypts you!”22 To these netizens, the state looks set to continue to ratchet down on Internet traffic: “It’s really descriptive of just how totalitarian the country has become that they’re hard at work out-Chinaing China itself when it comes to control of the Internet,” but “China is actually enforcing those kind of laws against its people. In Russia, on the other hand, the severity of the laws is greatly mitigated by the fact that nobody gives a **** about the law.”23 In addition to suggesting personal security is a fair price to be paid for national security via surveillance and Internet laws, the state appears poised to argue all information about persons in the country, including about their finances, should also be “transparent” to fight terrorism and crime in general.

If you enjoyed reading this post, please also see:

Dr. Mica Hall is a Russian linguist and holds an MA and PhD in Slavic Linguistics and an MPA.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, DoD, or the U.S. Government.


1 Russia to Launch ‘Independent Internet’ for BRICS Nations – Report, 2017, RT.com, https://www.rt.com/politics/411156-russia-to-launch-independent-internet/, 28 November 2017.

2 Russia to Launch.

3 Russia to Launch.

4 Russia to Launch.

5 Russia to Launch.

6 Boris Slavin, 2017, People or Digits: Which One Do We Need More? vedomosti.ru, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2017/01/17/673248-lyudi-tsifri-nuzhnee, 17 January 2017.

7 Slavin, People or Digits.

8 Slavin, People or Digits.

9 Slavin, People or Digits.

10 Kyree Leary, 2017, Vladimir Putin Just Revealed Russia’s Plans for Cryptocurrencies, futurism.com, https://futurism.com/vladimir-putin-just-revealed-russias-plans-for-cryptocurrencies/, 26 October 26017.

11 CB is Discussing Creating a Supranational Cryptocurrency Together With EAEU and BRICS, 2017, vedomosti.ru, https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/2017/12/28/746856-sozdanie-kriptovalyuti-v-ramkah-eaes-i-briks-bank-rossii-v-2018-g, 28 December 2017.

12 Russia to Launch.

13 Russia and the US to Create a Working Group for the Regulation of Cyberspace, 2017, RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/world/20170708/1498126496.html?=inj=1, 8 July 2017.

14 MinComSvyazi: We Need Digital Sovereignty to Develop the Economy, 2017, RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/soceity/20170905/1501809181.html, 5 September 2017.

15 MinComSvyazi: We Need Digital Sovereignty.

16 Irina Besedovala, 2016, The Yarovaya Laws Will Save Us from the CIA, fontanka.ru, http://www.fontanka.ru/2016/10/22/061/, 22 October 2016.

17 Dmitry Lebedev, 2017, Digital Sovereignty à la Russe, opendemocracy.net, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitry-lebedev/digital-sovereignty-a-la-russe, 3 November 2017.

18 Igor Ashmanov, 2017, The Recipe for Digital Sovereignty, Rossijskoe Agentstvo Novostej, http://www.ru-an.info/, 22 August 2017.

19 Global Elites’ Secret Plan for Cryptocurrencies, 2017, pravosudija.net, http://www. pravdosudija.net/article/sekretynyy-plan-globalnyh-elit-otnositelno-kriptovalyut, 5 September 2017.

20 Information Sovereignty, 2017, wikireality.ru, http://www.wikireality.ru/wiki/Информационный_сувернитет, 28 March 2017.

21 FT: Russia Is Looking For A Way to “Cut Off” Cryptocurrencies, 2018, Russian RT, https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2018-01-02/FT-Rossiya-ishhet-sposob-ukrotit, 2 January 2018.

22 msmash, 2017, We’ll Never Legalize Bitcoin, Says Russian Minister, yro.slashdot.org, https://yro.slashdot.org/story/17/11/22/2111216/well-never-legalize-bitcoin-says-russian-minister, 22 November 2017.

23 We’ll Never Legalize Bitcoin.