225. The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory”

[Editor’s Note: Today’s post is excerpted from last month’s (March 2020) edition of the OE Watch, which in turn analyzes two articles from Jiefangjun Bao (the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] Daily), published earlier this year

The first article explores how China, our emergent pacing threat, proposes to counter a stronger “informatized” enemy possessing more advanced technology (a not-so-veiled reference to the United States). Offering a three-phased prescription, this article’s authors describe how the PLA could initially employ “flexible deception” and swift, coordinated, and violent assaults by small units via multiple axes of attack; followed by close entanglement and encirclement; culminating in a concentration of forces and deep fires to annihilate the enemy.

The second article explores one aspect of battlefield intelligentization (i.e., the Chinese concept of applying Artificial Intelligence’s machine speed and processing power to military planning, operational command, and decision support) —  specifically, how Chinese smart drone swarms could “destroy the enemy’s cross-domain joint capabilities and achieve combat objectives at a relatively small cost.

Taken together, these articles provide valuable insights into how China’s PLA is thinking about countering the U.S. Army’s current force, the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)-Capable Force in 2028, and the MDO-Ready Force in 2035 — Read on!]

Considering “The Ground Battlefield Under Informatized Conditions”

Soldiers with People’s Liberation Army at Shenyang training base in China (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)
Soldiers with People’s Liberation Army at Shenyang training base in China / Source: DOD by D. Myles Cullen via National Defense University Press

Strategies and tactics in warfare change as new technologies emerge. China has been striving to maintain pace with the modern world by developing strategies and tactics that complement these ongoing changes. One discipline that has been undergoing dramatic change is that of close-range combat due to the “informatization” of the battlefield. In the accompanying article, published in Jiefangjun Bao, two Chinese scholars discuss a close combat situation where China is the weaker military force, facing a stronger enemy that possesses advanced (informatized) technology. In the scenario, advanced technology allows China’s adversary to detect and acquire targets at long range, execute precise attacks from beyond line of sight, and conceal combat intent, posing a real challenge to Chinese forces trying to close their distance with the enemy to destroy it.

According to the article, there are three phases of “close combat” in the information age. Phase one combines various methods to get close to the enemy in planning. Phase two is the entanglement phase in which the fight is brought to close quarters. Phase three is the annihilation and destruction of enemy forces.

Small groups of PLA soldiers approach from various routes, attacking “quickly and violently.” / Source: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, mil.ru, via Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

The article describes various measures that, coupled with having an intimate understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both the enemy and friendly sides “as a foundation,” would be effective in closing the distance with the adversary with a reduced chance of detection. These measures include, for example, capitalizing on factors such as weather and geographical elements, which might degrade the capability of enemy reconnaissance devices and weapons platforms. The authors describe scenes in which small groups of soldiers approach from various routes, attacking “quickly and violently,” and networks of air defense firepower attack from varying altitudes and ranges. Another measure suggested is the use of “flexible deception,” such as putting out false intelligence to mislead the enemy.

Massed People’s Liberation Army troops prepare for a parade in September 2017 commemorating the PLA’s 90th anniversary / Source: Defense Intelligence Agency 2019 China Military Power report

In phase two (entanglement) of “close combat,” the article explains that non-contact combat constitutes a major threat to the weaker side. The authors argue that in order to be victorious, it is essential to not only get closer, but to also employ a number of measures, be flexible in the employment of tactics, become “closely entangled” with the enemy, create an interlocked pattern of engagement with the enemy, and lessen the threat of attack by the enemy’s long-range firepower. They go on to describe various aggressive, multi-pronged and joint attack approaches, ensuring fighting takes place at close quarters, while also disrupting the enemy’s plans and patterns, and using integrated strength to wipe out key enemy targets while Chinese forces encircle the enemy. It is worth noting that the Chinese concept of “entanglement” is nothing new, but reflects their experience in the Korean War, where they would negate American airpower and artillery by “hugging” the American ground forces. The Americans would not call in artillery and air power on their own positions – except in extremis.

PLA forces on the attack in an exercise demonstration for former CJCS GEN Joseph F. Dunford Jr., at a base in Shenyang, China, 16 Aug. 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

In the third phase (annihilation), the more superior the enemy is in information technology, the more they are likely to resort to asymmetric attack measures. Therefore, “take aim at the weak points of the strong enemy’s informatized platforms and combat arrangements…” Prioritize a selection of targets in the event not all targets can be destroyed. Concentrate superior forces. Finally, conduct both distant and close-in battle simultaneously.

The authors argue that despite the rise of informatized warfare, “close combat” has not gone away and in fact, “combat at short range may even be the main form of combat.End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)

“The less the enemy is able to fight close combat, the more
we [China] should step up our research of the issue of close combat on the informatized battlefield, and thereby firmly grasp the initiative.”

“With the rapid development of new and high technology with information technology as the core, the ground battlefield under informatized conditions is no longer restricted to the battlefield in the geographical sense.”

Source: Ye Huabin and Ai Zhengson, “信息时代如何“近敌”作战 (How to Conduct ‘Close Combat’ in the Information Age),” Jiefangjun Bao, 16 January 2020.

PLA track commander, during attack exercise at a base in Shenyang, China, Aug. 16, 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

“Close combat,” as the name says, is combat operations against an enemy conducted at short range. With the rapid development of new and high technology with information technology as the core, the ground battlefield under informatized conditions is no longer restricted to the battlefield in the geographical sense. Profound change has occurred in the intention and extension [semantics; the formal definition and the further range of applicability] of the concept of the battlefield. Thus the methods of closing with the enemy to destroy him face new challenges. To accurately explore and understand how to fight close combat on the land battlefield under informatized conditions is important in terms of both theory and practice.

Of first importance in the conduct of close combat is to solve the problem of how to get close to the enemy…The strong enemy can detect and acquire targets at long range, execute precise attacks from beyond line of sight, conceal his combat intent, and make closing with the enemy to destroy him increasingly difficult. Thus with a full understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and friendly sides as a foundation, integrate the use of measures of various kinds. First of all is many ways of evasion.… A second element is firepower as cover… A final element is flexible deception.

Two Z-9 attack helicopters attached to an army aviation brigade of the PLA Xinjiang Military Command lift off simultaneously for a coordinated flight training exercise at the foot of Tianshan Mountains on January 31, 2018. / Source: eng.chinamil.com.cn, via Flickr, Public domain photo by Wu Shike

Combine forces and firepower, get entangled with the enemy and fight at close quarters… faced with a strong enemy, if you hope to be victorious you must not only solve the problems of “getting close,” you must also take various measures, employ tactics flexibly, get closely entangled with the enemy, create an interlocked pattern of engagement with the enemy, and lessen the threat of attack from the strong enemy’s long-range firepower and weapon platforms.

Annihilation and destruction aiding each other, put an end to the enemy in precise release of energy. The more superiority a side has in information technology, the more that side fears an opponent using “asymmetric” attack measures.

…The less the enemy is able to fight close combat, the more we should step up our research of the issue of close combat on the informatized battlefield, and thereby firmly grasp the initiative.

The “Blade of Victory”: A Chinese Perspective on Drone Swarms

PLA soldiers prepare an attack exercise at a base in Shenyang, China, Aug. 16, 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

Chinese military strategists and academics have been focusing on artificial intelligence (AI) and how it will reshape the future battlefield. The application of AI’s capabilities to military planning, operations, and decision support even has its own Chinese buzzword: “intelligentized” warfare. The growing number of articles and studies describing different aspects of “intelligentized” warfare are a clear indication of where China is heading. One such article, published in Jiefangjun Bao, the Central Military Commission’s official newspaper, offers an in-depth look at the use of drone swarms on the future battlefield. The article focuses on the advantages and potential operations in which drone swarms can be used.

The authors envision drone swarms as the “advance guard” and a force that “will likely become the ‘blade of victory’ in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.” Drone swarm operations offer six “exceptional advantages,” according to the article. They have greater autonomy, possess more functional capabilities, are more resilient, have a more rapid response time, are more economical, and are less dependent on logistics and outside support. They can be used to implement multi-domain attacks. The authors explain that a drone swarm platform can even be used to carry a large number of individual drones in a multi-domain attack scenario. Swarm attacks can be carried out across all domains – on land, at sea, in the air, in space, along the electromagnetic spectrum, and in cyberspace. Multi-faceted attacks carried out simultaneously across multiple domains “will destroy the enemy’s cross-domain joint capabilities and achieve combat objectives at a relatively small cost.

Drone swarms can also be used to conduct tactical deception and interference, reconnaissance, and “smart coordination.” For example, they can act as decoys to trigger enemy radar and air defense weapons to react and therefore expose their positions. This strategy can be likened to one of China’s 36 ancient stratagems, “Beat the grass to startle the snake,” an idiom that suggests taking just enough action to prompt the enemy to act and give away his strategy or position.

Finally, the authors describe ways that drone swarms can carry out reconnaissance to obtain enemy intelligence, and “smart coordination” in which drones “lead in battlefield reconnaissance and the elimination of targets.” However, the authors argue that drone swarm operations cannot operate completely independent of man. In situations deemed more risky to lives, due to their lower cost and versatility, a large number of drones can be used in front-line operations while a manned platform can provide “command and control of the drone swarms from the rear, guiding the swarms to strike targets in complex, high-risk areas.End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)

“Drone swarms will likely become the “blade of victory” in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.”

Source: Xu Weiwei and Li Huan, “无人机集群作战的主要样式 (The Main Types of Drone Swarm Warfare),” Jiefangjun Bao, 23 January 2020.

The Main Types of Drone Swarm Warfare

…Drone swarm operations are emerging as an important form of intelligentized warfare. In the future, drone operations will become the “advance guard” in a battle between two armies. Drone swarms will likely become the “blade of victory” in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.

…From their inception, drone swarm operations have always had many exceptional advantages over conventional operations. (1) …Drone swarms can be flexibly organized into different units. They can adapt to different environments, possess different functions, and perform different tasks… (2) … After equipping drones with different combat modules, a drone swarm formation can have multiple functions, such as reconnaissance and surveillance, soft and hard strikes, and combat assessment… (3) …Drone swarm operations can quickly transmit battlefield information and accurately implement commanders’ intentions… (4) …An individual drone has several advantages, such as being a small target, the ability to withstand impact, large overload capacity, maintaining flight under silent mode, and effective concealment on the battlefield, etc… (5) …A drone swarm operation eliminates the limitations of human-operated machines. There is no need to install complex safety systems and protective facilities to ensure safety of personnel… (6) In the course of drone swarm operations, an individual drone’s dependence on logistics and support is low…

…The basic method of multi-domain attacks is to use a drone swarm platform to carry a large number of individual drones. During the battle, the drones are launched or deployed through the platform as battle groups to achieve data sharing, flight control, situational awareness, and intelligentized decision-making, so that the drones can flexibly respond to battlefield contingencies and conduct various combat missions, such as swarm reconnaissance, fighting, and attacks. The domains in which attacks by a swarm operation take place will be across all domains: on land, at sea, in the air, in space, along the electromagnetic spectrum, and in cyberspace. …

…Based on mission needs, a drone swarm can be flexibly configured with various modules, such as modules for reconnaissance, information processing, and missile firepower, thereby forming a composite formation with reconnaissance, interference, and strike capabilities. Alternatively, several drone swarms can each be configured with reconnaissance and firepower modules, forming a large assault formation that penetrates deep into enemy territory and conducts real-time reconnaissance and strikes on key or high-risk targets, thereby achieving strategic operational goals.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following:

OE Watch, March 2020 issue, by the TRADOC G-2’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), featuring the two aforementioned articles, along with a host of other items of interest.

Competition in 2035: Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments

Newer Is Not Better, Better is Better, by Gary Phillips

Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown.

China’s Drive for Innovation Dominance and Quantum Surprise on the Battlefield?, by Elsa Kania

A Closer Look at China’s Strategies for Innovation: Questioning True Intent, by Cindy Hurst

Critical Projection: Insights from China’s Science Fiction, by Lt Col Dave Calder

220. Extremism on the Horizon: The Challenges of VEO Innovation

[Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to publish today’s post by guest bloggers Colonel Montgomery Erfourth and Dr. Aaron Bazin, addressing prospective patterns of emerging technology used in the 2020-2027 timeframe by Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), as seen through the lens of the National Security Strategy and the Special Operations mission. This timely submission addresses the challenges and opportunities these technological advances will pose to both the Army’s General Purpose Forces and our Special Operations Forces (SOF) as they seek to protect and advance U.S. national interests abroad — Enjoy!]

Transnational threat groups, from jihadist terrorists to transnational criminal organizations, are actively trying to harm Americans. While these challenges differ in nature and magnitude, they are fundamentally contests between those who value human dignity and freedom and those who oppress individuals and enforce uniformity.

To maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will prioritize emerging technologies critical to economic growth and security…

U.S. National Security Strategy, 2017

Global innovation, the ability to share information quickly, rapidly advancing technology, and distributed knowledge have created new opportunities for politically hostile groups. Lower barriers to employ new technologies offer super-empowered individuals and VEOs a range of tools across the physical, virtual, and cognitive environments to pursue their malign objectives.1 Arguably, technology is now advancing at such a velocity that a structured framework helps prioritize threats and resources. Diamandis and Kotler’s “Six Ds” of exponential technology is one such framework to determine the impact and pace of growth for potential technologies, based on how far the technology has progressed. They argue that technology progresses along the following consecutive phases:

    • Digitized: Once people digitize a physical commodity or service (represented in ones and zeros), it embarks on the first step of the exponential growth curve. This type of digital information is easy to access, share, and distribute.
    • Deceptive: During the next phase of growth, the technology does not appear to expand quickly or make an impact. This period is often deceptively slow due to the nature of exponential change.
    • Disruptive: The technology becomes disruptive once it outperforms other technologies in effectiveness and cost.
    • Demonetized: In this phase, the technology becomes cheaper, and in some cases free, further reducing barriers for its use by actors with limited resources.
    • Dematerialized: When advancements in technologies significantly reduce the size of the physical element of the technology and/or it is absorbed into other products (e.g., maps, radio, camera in mobile phone), it is considered dematerialized.
    • Democratized: In the final stage of the exponential growth curve, the digitization, reduced cost, and dematerialization of the technology’s original form result in the increasingly public access to the new technology 2

This paper uses the Six D’s to evaluate the threats of six emerging technologies that VEOs could use: additive manufacturing, cryptocurrency, genome editing and synthetic DNA, robotics, and Commercial off the Shelf Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (COTS ISR). This list does not represent a comprehensive account of all technologies that VEOs may leverage in the future. Instead, this list includes the top six technologies that either have reached the democratization stage or will reach it by 2027 and pose a threat to U.S. national interests.

Figure 1 – Anticipated technological developments across the “Six D’s” of technology growth interpreted for the malicious use of emerging technology posed by VEOs.

Additive Manufacturing:  Although scientists developed additive manufacturing or three dimensional (3D) printing in the 1980s, 3D printing reached the democratization phase in the 2010s.3 The internet allows the maker communities to create 3D designs through free software, share data and expertise through tutorial videos, and create 3D objects. Today, countless companies offer 3D printing services with a click of a button. The democratization of this technology is of particular interest to VEOs as it affords them the potential to create unconventional weapons at scale.4 SOF can anticipate that VEOs will leverage the accessibility of this technology to design and print unconventional fit-for-purpose weapons. Further, the next iteration of 3D printed weapons on the horizon is 3D printed explosives. While it is unlikely that this technology is yet in the hands of VEOs, they could gain this capability in the next seven years.5

3D printed drone / Source: DoD News

Given these technological advancements, it is highly likely that VEOs will use additive manufacturing capabilities to 3D print weapons, design custom projectiles, and innovate with creative accessories. VEOs may seek to print 3D printed guns and share digital “weapon files” with likeminded individuals, bypassing arms control mechanisms and making attacks difficult to anticipate or prevent.

Cryptocurrency: A VEO’s ability to recruit, self-organize, conduct attacks, and develop capabilities relies on funding. The secure blockchain platforms upon which cryptocurrencies operate have made illicit finance more difficult to track, stop, and prevent. At present, extremist organizations use cryptocurrencies to receive, manage, transfer, and spend money. Cryptocurrencies are transitioning from the deceptive phase of growth to the disruptive phase; as they gain traction in the mainstream, their use will also become more pervasive amongst VEOs.6 Given the above, it is highly likely that VEOs will continue to leverage the anonymity of cryptocurrency to fund raise, launder money, and pay for goods and services while bypassing the regulated international financial system. This will allow VEOs the financial freedom of movement they require to operate in the shadows.

Genome Editing and Synthetic DNA: In the future, VEOs may continue to seek biological weapons and viruses as a means to attack the homeland.7 Advancements in genome editing and synthetic DNA (e.g., synthetic viruses that can infect large populations, agro-terrorism that can irreversibly destroy crops, and gene-drive editing which perpetually alters the evolution of the organism edited with unpredictable effects8) have increased the potential threat of these types of weapons. While specialists in the genomics field are demonetizing and dematerializing this technology through inexpensive kits and DNA editing software, such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR), its use still requires a high level of expertise.9 Considering these factors, it is very likely that VEOs will seek to acquire synthetic biology capabilities for malicious use. However, their ability to do so within the next seven years will be limited by the high technical skill needed to use the technology and weaponize it effectively. There is a low probability (but high risk) that a VEO could recruit an expert in this field who could overcome these challenges.

Robotics: VEOs are adept at employing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), or “drones,” on the battlefield. Initially, VEOs used Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) drones for reconnaissance and surveillance, later attaching explosive devices to deliver lethal effects. Currently, VEOs use them as a management tool to enable drone pilots to coordinate and assign vehicles to locations to commit coordinated suicide attacks. The VEOs then leverage the video footage of these attacks for propaganda purposes.10 Looking ahead, the character of conflict may change as VEOs develop ways to embed chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear (CBRN) substances into drone payloads. In the coming years, as VEOs gain access to Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), they could explore their use to strike vulnerable U.S. maritime targets.11 Given these advances, it is highly likely that VEOs will continue to experiment with UAVs for surveillance and kinetic force application purposes in the operating environment. They may attempt to use swarms of drones to create confusion in the battlefield, allowing them windows of advantage to conduct follow-on attacks. It is very likely that if VEOs could obtain CBRN material, they would use drones as a delivery vehicle. This scenario is low probability but high risk. While initially VEOs may use UAVs for surveillance or trafficking goods, they could eventually progress to offensive attacks on friendly targets.

COTS ISR:  Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and the ubiquity of video surveillance have given rise to gait recognition technology.12 Some systems “can identify people from up to 50 meters (165 feet) away, even with their back turned or face covered.”13 As the network of the Internet of Things (IoT) becomes more pervasive in public and private spaces, passive reconnaissance of movement will become more accessible. Researchers have developed a silent reconnaissance technology that uses radio frequency (RF) signals emitted by Wi-Fi devices to monitor individuals passively inside rooms and buildings.14 This technology is publicly available and people may soon democratize it.15 Considering the above, it is highly likely that VEOs may seek to leverage COTS ISR-related technology. An increasingly digitally connected world with sensors gathering sound, video, and signals will challenge SOF operators.

Compounded Cyber Threats: IoT, AI, and DeepFakes: In the future, one can expect that VEOs will seek to combine multiple cyber capabilities into further misleading or false narratives, targeting the U.S. and partner populations by creating content with DeepFake, IoT, and AI capabilities, and amplifying their messaging with social media. Friendly use of these capabilities has contributed to the development of smart infrastructure across industries (energy, agriculture, finance, health, transportation, etc.), the commercial reliance on digital infrastructure, and the digitization of homes with IoT. Together, these trends result in a growing number of digital and physical assets that VEOs can attack remotely. AI has already begun to change the character of these cyber threats.16 As these technologies evolve, they will become more accessible. Arguably, VEOs may seek to use them to automate, accelerate, and further spread their cyber offensive actions.

With this in mind, it is highly likely that VEOs will seek to use DeepFakes, AI, and the IoT as a cognitive attack vector to sow doubt and confusion among their adversaries to advance their interests and narratives. If SOF lacks the capability to track and address these technologies, it may affect overall mission success.

If you enjoyed this blog post, check out the entire article posted on the Mad Scientist All Partners Access Network (APAN) page to see Colonel Erfouth‘s and Dr. Bazin‘s recommendations to the SOF Enterprise on how to mitigate the challenges that VEOs may present as they seek the innovation advantage on the battlefield of the future…

… and also read the following related blog posts:

Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette and The Information Environment: Competition and Conflict Mad Scientist Anthology

Dead Deer, and Mad Cows, and Humans (?) … Oh My! by proclaimed Mad Scientists LtCol Jennifer Snow and Dr. James Giordano, and Joseph DeFranco

CRISPR Convergence by Howard R. Simkin

A New Age of Terror: New Mass Casualty Terrorism Threats and A New Age of Terror: The Future of CBRN Terrorism by Zachary Kallenborn

Prototype Warfare

Colonel Montgomery Erfourth is currently the Integration Division Chief with the J5 at U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. He has over 25 years of professional military and civilian experience in the areas of leadership, planning, strategy, research, transportation, supply chain management, marketing, budget, and financial management. Monte has worked closely with U.S. Ambassadors, highest level of military leadership, and policy makers and performed duties in over 25 countries, several of which were in non-permissive environments.

Dr. Aaron Bazin adds value to organizations by helping them explore the possibilities of the future and develop unique, visionary strategies. He is a skilled researcher, facilitator, presenter, and writer. Aaron is currently the Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group, U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. His team acts as catalyst for change and innovation across the Joint SOF enterprise to improve its ability to further national interests globally.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command, or the Training and Doctrine Command.


1 Adam Elkus, A. and Burke, C., (2010), WikiLeaks, Media, and Policy: A Question of Super- Empowerment, Retrieved from: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/558-elkus.pdf

2 The 6 Ds of Exponential Growth, from the book Bold by Peter Diamandis and Steven Kotler. https://singularityhub.com/2017/12/29/what-are-the-6-ds-of-exponential-organizations/

3 3D Printing Industry (2019). History of 3D Printing. https://3dprintingindustry.com/3d- printing-basics-free-beginners-guide#02-history

4 Dearden, L. (2019). Use of 3D printed guns in German synagogue shooting must act as warning to security services, experts say. Independent UK. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/3d-gun-print-germany-synagogue-shooting-stephan-balliet-neo-nazi-a9152746.html

5 Los Alamos National Laboratory (2016). Explosiv3Design. https://www.lanl.gov/discover/publications/1663/2016-march/explosive-3d-design.php

6 Schoeberl, Richard. (2018). Gene Drives – An Emerging Terrorist Threat. Domestic Preparedness. https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/gene-drives-an-emerging-terrorist-threat/

7 Memri (2018). Pro-ISIS Media Outlet Circulates Video Calling for Biological Attacks in the West. Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project.

8 Schoeberl, Richard. (2018). Gene Drives – An Emerging Terrorist Threat. Domestic Preparedness. https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/gene-drives-an-emerging-terrorist-threat/

9 Sneed, Annie. (2017). Mail-Order CRISPR Kits Allow Absolutely Anyone to Hack DNA. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/mail-order-crispr-kits-allow-absolutely-anyone-to-hack-dna/

10 Balkan, Serkan. (2017). DAESH’s Drone Strategy: Technology and the Rise of Innovative Terrorism. SETA. https://www.setav.org/en/daeshs-drone-strategy-technology-and-the-rise-of-innovative-terrorism/

11 Suguna, VS. Rahman, Faizal. (2018). Aquatic drone terror attacks a growing possibility. Today Online. https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/aquatic-drone-terror-attacks-growing-possibility

12 Giles, Jim. (2012). Cameras know you by your walk. New Scientist. https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528835-600-cameras-know-you-by-your-walk/

13 Kang, Dake. (2018). Chinese ‘gait recognition’ tech IDs people by how they walk. AP News. https://www.apnews.com/bf75dd1c26c947b7826d270a16e2658a

14 Yanzi Zhu, Zhujun Xiao, Yuxin Chen, Zhijing Li, Max Liu, Ben Y. Zhao, Haitao Zheng. (2019). Et Tu Alexa? When Commodity WiFi Devices Turn into Adversarial Motion Sensors. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.10109.pdf

15 Vincent, James. (2019). New AI deepfake app creates nude images of women in seconds. The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/27/18760896/deepfake-nude-ai-app-women-deepnude-non-consensual-pornography

16 Warner, Bernhard. (2019). Artificial Intelligence Is About to Make Ransomware Hack Attacks Even Scarier. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2019/06/21/ai-ransomeware-hack-attacks/

209. Takeaways from the Mad Scientist Global Perspectives in the Operational Environment Virtual Conference

[Editor’s Note: Mad Scientist would like to thank everyone who participated in the Mad Scientist Global Perspectives in the Operational Environment Virtual Conference on 29 January 2020 — from our co-hosts at the Army Futures Command (AFC) and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) International Army Programs Directorate (IAPD); to TRADOC’s Foreign Liaison Officer community and the U.S. Army liaison officers overseas who helped us identify and coordinate with international subject matter experts; to each of the briefers who presented their respective nations’ insightful perspectives on a diverse array of topics affecting the Operational Environment (OE); to our audience who attended virtually via the TRADOC Watch page’s interactive chat room and asked penetrating questions that significantly helped broaden our aperture on the OE and the changing character of warfare. Today’s post documents the key takeaways Mad Scientist captured from the conference — Enjoy!]

Our first Mad Scientist Virtual Conference focused on global perspectives of the operational environment. While our presenters represented only a small part of the globe, these countries do account for a significant percentage of global defense expenditures and have international defense related engagements and responsibilities.

As expected, we heard many similarities between the Operational Environment described by the United States Army and the presenters from France, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Canada, and our NATO Panel. We also identified some interesting nuances in how potential challenges and threats are described and which ones are emphasized.

Here are a few takeaways from the conference — if they pique your interest, check out this conference’s Mad Scientist APAN (All Partners Access Network) page for the associated slides and video presentations (to be posted)!

1) Interoperability is key but increasingly difficult with uneven modernization and different policies for emerging technologies. Each country emphasized the future of coalition operations, but they also described interoperability in different ways. This ranged from the classic definition of interoperability of radios, firing data, and common operating pictures to tactical integration with a country’s units inside another country’s formations. Emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) add another level of difficulty to interoperability. Each country will develop their own AI policies outlining legal levels of autonomy and coding standards for identifying biases and ensuring transparency. How these different AI capabilities will interact in fast pace machine-to-machine collaboration is not clear.

2) Asymmetry of Ethics is a Pink Flamingo (known challenge without program to address it) Each country mentioned the developing and differing standards for AI. It was commonly understood that competition and conflict is speeding up but there is no clear consensus on what the tactical and operational advantages could be for an adversary that chooses to integrate AI in a more permissive manner than accepted by western armed forces. Also, lagging policy, regulations, and laws in the West create a possibility for overmatch by these potential adversaries. This is an area where experimentation with differing AI policies and approaches might identify the risks of strategic and technological surprise.

3) Weaponization of information to attack societies and their armed forces is the #1 described threat and it wasn’t even close. This is understandable as our European allies are closer geographically to the persistent Russian competition activities. The emphasis of this threat differs from the United States Army where we have focused and experimented around the idea of a return to high intensity conflict with a near–peer competitor. While each presenter discussed ongoing organizational, doctrinal, and capability changes to address the information environment, it was widely understood that this is a military problem without a military solution.

4) Climate change and mass migration are the conflict drivers of most concern. Human migration as a consequence of climate change will create new security concerns for impacted countries as well as neighboring regions and, due to European geography, seemed to be of greater concern than our focus on great power conflict.

5) Virtual training is increasingly important for Armies with decreasing defense budgets and the demand to improve training proficiencies. As realistic synthetic training becomes a reality, we can more readily transition troops trained for a host of contingencies in the virtual world to the rigors of diverse operations in the physical world. This Synthetic Training Environment may also facilitate Joint and inter-coalition training of geographically-disparate assets and formations, with the concomitant issue of interoperability to conduct combined training events in the future.

6) As society evolves and changes, so does warfare. Our presenters described several pressures on their societies that are not part of or are only tangentially mentioned in the U.S. Army’s operational narrative:

    • Declining demographics in western nations pose potential recruitment and reconstitution challenges.
    • Nationalism is rising and could result in an erosion of rules-based international order. If these systems break down, smaller nations will be challenged.
    • Authoritarian systems are rising and exporting technology to support other authoritarian governments. At the same time democratic systems are weakening.
    • Aging populations and slow growth economies are seeing a global shift of economic strength from the West to the East.

In the future, we will host another global perspectives conference that will include presenters from Asia and South America to further broaden our perspectives and identify potential blind spots from these regions. For now, we encourage the international community to continue to share their ideas by taking our Global Perspectives Survey. Preliminary findings were presented at this conference. Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory as we will publish the results of this survey in a series of assessments, starting in March…

… don’t forget to enter The Operational Environment in 2035 Mad Scientist Writing Contest and share your unique insights on the future of warfighting — click here to learn more (deadline for submission is 1 March 2020!)…

… and a quick reminder that the U.S. Army Mission Command Battle Lab Futures Branch is also conducting its Command Post of the Future – 2040-2050 Writing Contest. Click here to learn more about suggested contest writing prompts, rules, and how to submit your entry — deadline for their writing contest is also 1 March 2020!

200. Broadening our Aperture on the Operational Environment

[Editor’s Note: Like many of our readers, Mad Scientist Laboratory is starting off the new year with a bit of introspection…. As we continue to focus on the Operational Environment (OE) and the changing character of warfare, we find ourselves wondering if we aren’t getting a little too comfortable and complacent with what we think we know and understand. Are we falling victim to our own confirmation biases, risking total surprise by something lurking just over the horizon, beyond our line of sight? To mitigate this, Mad Scientist has resolved to broaden our aperture on the OE this year. Today’s post describes several near term initiatives that will help expand our understanding of the full extent of OE possibilities to preclude our being sucker-punched. Help Mad Scientist by participating — share your ideas, pass on these opportunities to your colleagues, and actively engage in these events and activities! Happy 2020!]

Global Perspectives in the Operational Environment
The U.S. Army’s Mad Scientist Initiative will co-host our first conference this year with the Army Futures Command (AFC) and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) International Army Programs Directorate (IAPD) on 29 January 2020. Leveraging TRADOC’s Foreign Liaison Officer community to coordinate presentations by subject matter experts from their respective nations, this virtual, on-line conference will provide international perspectives on a diverse array of topics affecting the OE. Mark your calendar now to livestream this conference at www.tradoc.army.mil/watch, starting at 0830 EST (note that this link is not live until the conference).

Global Perspectives Conference Survey
In conjunction with the aforementioned conference, Mad Scientist is conducting an on-line survey querying your thoughts about the OE. We want your input, so take ~5 minutes to complete our short survey here. We will brief back our interim findings during the conference, then publish a blog post documenting the comprehensive survey results in February.  Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory to learn what insights we will have gleaned from the international community regarding potential OE trends, challenges, technologies, and disruptors.

Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS)
Seeking insights into a younger demographic’s perspectives on the OE, Mad Scientist will livestream presentations by fellows from The College of William and Mary in Virginia‘s PIPS Program on 21 February 2020. This program is designed to bridge the gap between the academic and foreign policy communities in the area of undergraduate education. PIPS research fellows identify emerging international security issues and develop original policy recommendations to address those challenges. Undergraduate fellows have the chance to work with practitioners in the military and intelligence communities, and present their work to policy officials and scholars at a year-end symposium in Washington, DC. Topic areas presented at the Mad Scientist livestream event will include weaponized information, artificial intelligence, and bio convergence — representing a year’s worth of research by each of the fellows.

The Operational Environment in 2035 Mad Scientist Writing Contest Crowdsourcing is an effective tool for harvesting ideas, thoughts, and concepts from a wide variety of interested individuals, helping to diversify thought and challenge conventional assumptions. Mad Scientist’s latest writing contest seeks to harness diverse intellects to mine new knowledge and imagine the possibilities of the OE in 2035.  This contest is open to everyone around the globe. We are seeking submissions of no more than 2000 words in length — nonfiction only, please!  Topics of interest include:

    • What new skills and talent management techniques will be required by the Army in 2035?
    • What does the information landscape look like in 2035? Infrastructure? Computing? Communication? Media?
    • What can we anticipate in the Competition phase (below armed Conflict) and how do we prepare future Soldiers and Leaders for these challenges?
    • What does strategic, operational, and tactical (relative) surprise look like in 2035?
    • What does Multi-Domain Command and Control look like on the battlefield in 2035?
    • How do we prepare for the second move in a future conflict?
    • Which past battle or conflict best represents the challenges we face in the future and why?
    • What technology or convergence of technologies could provide a U.S. advantage by 2050?

For additional information on this writing contest, click here. Deadline for submission is 1 March 2020, so start outlining your entry today!

By participating in each of these events, you will enhance the Mad Scientist Initiative’s understanding of the OE and help the U.S. Army prepare for an extended array of future possibilities.