[Editor’s Note: The Mad Scientist Laboratory welcomes returning guest blogger Ethan Sah with another insightful submission exploring how Iran’s Axis of Resistance and its constituent Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) are changing the character of warfare in the Twenty-first Century. Democratized battlefield automation — including unmanned aerial, naval, and ground systems — is granting lesser powers and non-state actors the ability to “punch above their weight,” enabling them to engage nations with more robust and exquisite air, sea, and land domain capabilities.
The proliferation of these inexpensive systems, combined with tactics, techniques, and procedures observed / learned from Russia’s ongoing “Special Military Operation” (SMO) in Ukraine, are empowering VEOs to create complex dilemmas — integrating strikes across multiple domains with information warfare and even economic coercion. Today’s post is most timely, given this past weekend’s strikes on Houthi targets by the United States and this week’s breakdown of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The implications are especially significant for the U.S. Army as we move to secure the Homeland’s southern border from sophisticated cartels who are increasingly willing to engage us kinetically on our own doorstep — Read on!]
Since the beginning of Israel’s fight with various components of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” following the October 7, 2023 attacks, media analysis of the conflict has often focused on the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF’s) urban engagements with Hamas or the growing importance of UAVs to VEOs, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. These are some of the conflict’s most immediately striking features — but taking a wider view of the tactics used by different groups in the region reveals a much broader, truly multiple domain campaign to pressure Israel via military attacks, information warfare, and even economic coercion. These activities highlight how some VEOs in Iran’s orbit have begun to conduct asymmetric multiple domain operations in pursuit of their political goals, changing the nature of the threats they are able to pose.
The Houthis have proven to be some of Iran’s most capable partners, menacing commercial shipping in the Red Sea and striking Tel Aviv with an Iranian-supplied long-range UAV last year. The UAV was modified to cover even larger distances and took a circuitous route from Yemen to Tel Aviv, approaching the city from the west. It “blended in” with regular air traffic by flying along commercial flight paths, attracting little attention from Israeli air defenses.1 Rather than the Houthi craft, Israel’s focus was on a simultaneous UAV attack launched from the east in Iraq. Although the IDF claimed the two attacks were not coordinated, the outcome highlights the difficulties of defending against future complex strikes.2 These strikes may become a reality as the Houthis also leveraged their ballistic missile capability to launch attacks towards other areas in Israel.3 All these factors demonstrate the increasing sophistication of the Houthis’ air operations, even as the group’s seaborne capabilities improve as well. U.S. CENTCOM reported in February 2024 that it had launched strikes against Houthi unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs) and an unmanned surface vessel (USV).4 Deployed with UAVs or missiles, UUVs and USVs provide the Houthis with a form of sea power to complement their airborne unmanned systems.
While the Houthis have displayed impressive capabilities, Hezbollah in Lebanon has also exerted direct pressure on Israel. The deadly strike on a Golan Heights soccer field underscored how the IDF struggled to mount an effective defense against Hezbollah’s near-constant cross-border attacks, ultimately leading to an Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon to confront the group directly. Hoping to deter such an operation, Hezbollah released three separate UAV surveillance videos of cities and military bases throughout Israel.5 Referring to these videos, a Hezbollah official asserted that “The importance stems from demonstrating our technical and technological capabilities in the field of surveillance and obtaining necessary information we need in times of war.”6 Regardless of the videos’ actual wartime utility, they served as propaganda pieces for Hezbollah to discredit Israeli air defenses and suggest an ability to reach targets far from the border. UAV flyovers are a relatively low-risk way for Hezbollah to gather information and support their already considerable use of kinetic force.
A more recent development in the region is the emergence of Saraya al Ashtar, yet another Iran-backed militia. Based in Bahrain, the group claimed to have launched a UAV attack on an Israeli logistics and transportation firm last April. Although similar in some ways to the Houthis’ later strike on Tel Aviv, Saraya al Ashtar’s relatively low-profile target reveals that its true objective was economic rather than military in nature. The claimed attack against an overland shipping company came as maritime shipping bound for Israel declined in response to Houthi aggression. Both attacks are part of a larger Iranian strategy to isolate Israel economically by affecting its trade relationships.7 Saraya al Ashtar, the Houthis, and other VEOs lack the ability to impose traditional measures such as sanctions on Israel, so they are turning to military means to achieve their economic ends. Making trade with Israel seem riskier to potential partners may inhibit Israel’s efforts to establish ties with other states in the region and beyond. These large-scale economic efforts suggest that VEOs are making a bid to compete in the greater diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) space, a framework that typically refers to the instruments of national power.8 In this way, the unorthodox application of force offers VEOs the ability to pursue goals far beyond the scope of what their physical arsenals would seem to allow.
The expansion of asymmetric warfare into multiple domains is an ongoing process and will continue to take different forms as VEOs improve their capabilities. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive multiple domain effort from any of Iran’s proxies remains Hamas’s October 7th attack — combining land, air, cyber, and information warfare.9 VEOs with state sponsors, including those within Iran’s regional network, are likely to continue exhibiting state-like behavior both in terms of their military operations and overall objectives. The level of force coordination exhibited on October 7th may become more commonplace as the advantages of unmanned systems are realized on and under the water, and eventually on land. Relatively established instruments of asymmetric warfare will find new uses, such as employing UAVs to produce propaganda or impose economic blockades. As our VEO adversaries test innovative combinations of complex strikes across multiple domains and extend their reach into new areas of DIME, conventional defensive military capabilities may be challenged to adapt. The same strengths that make unmanned systems attractive vehicles for launching asymmetric attacks—relatively low costs and limited exposure for their operators—could also make them ideal defensive options for the Army.
Restoring deterrence against increasingly confrontational enemies may call for a greater reliance on proactive measures, sending stronger signals but potentially raising risks of escalation. To balance these risks, new training will likely be required to understand enemy doctrine and decision-making in different scenarios. While understanding China’s approach to LSCO is a major priority for the Army, similar initiatives may also be required as new non-state adversaries use multiple domains to directly engage the United States — abroad and in the Homeland — on ever-larger scales.
If you enjoyed this post, see Ethan Sah‘s previous post — Redefining Asymmetric Warfare
Check out TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:
Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, BiteSize China weekly topics, People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide, and our thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning about the Operational Environment from Russia’s war against Ukraine (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this last link).
Our Russia Landing Zone, including the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.
Our Iran Landing Zone, including the latest Iran OE Watch articles, as well as the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).
Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE. Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the 2QFY24, 3QFY24, 4QFY24, and 1QFY25 OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs).
Then review the following related TRADOC G-2 and Mad Scientist Laboratory content:
Ukraine Conflict UAV Evolution, by Colin Christopher
Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace
Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS
The Operational Environment’s Increased Lethality
Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and associated podcast, with proclaimed Mad Scientist COL John Antal (USA-Ret.)
Learning from LSCO: Applying Lessons to Irregular Conflict, by Ian Sullivan and Kate Kilgore
>>>>Reminder: Army Mad Scientist wants to crowdsource your thoughts on Great Power Competition & Conflict — check out the flyer describing our latest writing contest.
All entries must address one of the following writing prompts:
How are the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa shaping how the U.S. Army may need to fight in 2035?
What role can the U.S. Army play in helping the U.S. counter Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence across the Global South?
How can the U.S. Army counter growing Russian/Chinese collusion in the Arctic, and China’s growing presence in the Antarctic?
What emergent technology(ies) or convergences of technologies could disrupt Great Power dominance in 2035? In 2050?
We are accepting three types of submissions:
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Anyone can participate (Soldiers, Government Civilians, and all global citizens) — Multiple submissions are encouraged!
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>>>>Announcement 1: The Army Civilian Journal’s Call for Papers on Advancing Professional Knowledge, Capabilities, and Leadership of the Army Civilian Corps — Check out the associated flyer for more information (S: 01APR25 for the inaugural issue of this new journal; but note that they are also accepting later submissions for subsequent editions).
>>>>Announcement 2: The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), in partnership with the Joint Staff J5’s Office of Strategic Stability and the National Defense University Foundation, invite you to its Disruptive Weapons and Future Warfare hybrid conference on 29MAY25 — Check out the associated flyer for more information (S: Register to participate NLT 02APR25).
>>>>Announcement 3: The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) is partnering with U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and the Army’s Catalyst Pathfinder Program to deliver the xTechPacific 2025 competition — for more information about this small business opportunity, click here. If you’d like to participate as judge for this competition, register here.
About the Author: Ethan Sah e-interned with Army Mad Scientist during the summer of 2024. Studying International Relations at The College of William and Mary, Mr. Sah also served as Research Officer for the John Quincy Adams Society (JQAS), synthesizing information from a range of sources and perspectives in preparing presentations on prominent geopolitical issues. Additionally, Mr. Sah served as Peer Reviewer for the James Blair Historical Review undergraduate historical journal — participating in the journal’s scholarly publishing seminar and obtaining insights regarding the publishing process and editing best practices.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
1 Peled, Anat., Lieber, Don. (2024). ‘A Rubik’s Cube in the Sky’: Israel Struggles to Defend Against Drones. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-rubiks-cube-in-the-sky-israel-struggles-to-defend-against-drones-14062f76
2 Campa, Kelly et al. (2024). Iran Update, July 22, 2024. ISW Press. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024
3 Fabian, Emanuel. (2024). Apparent Houthi ballistic missile fired at Eilat downed by Arrow system — IDF. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/apparent-houthi-ballistic-missile-fired-at-eilat-downed-by-arrow-system-idf/
4 Sutton, H.I. (2024). Houthi Lethal Underwater Drones Adds New Threat to Red Sea. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2024/02/19/houthi-lethal-underwater-drones-adds-new-threat-to-red-sea
5 Parry, Andie et al. (2024). Iran Update, July 24, 2024. ISW Press. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024
6 Choukeir, Jana. (2024). Hezbollah releases video it says shows surveillance of Israeli-occupied Golan. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-releases-video-it-says-shows-surveillance-israeli-occupied-golan-2024-07-09/
7 Tyson, Kathryn et al. (2024). Iran Update, May 2, 2024. ISW Press. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-2-2024
8 Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy. (2018). Joint Force Development. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf
9 Sullivan, Ian., Kilgore, Kate. (2023). Learning from LSCO: Applying Lessons to Irregular Conflict. Army Mad Scientist. https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/465-learning-from-lsco-applying-lessons-to-irregular-conflict/#_edn12
