[Editor’s Note: The Army Mad Scientist Initiative and William & Mary’s Whole of Government Center of Excellence facilitated our Great Power Competition & Conflict in the Age of Authoritarian Collusion Virtual Event on 27 January 2026. This event sought to explore the Operational Environment (OE) implications of emerging trends gleaned from contemporary conflicts and proxy wars, as well as the expanding adversarial influence and presence in the Global South and polar regions, through the lens of authoritarian collusion.
Collectively, our subject matter expert presenters, moderators, and panelists — along with the 185x individuals participating virtually from across the U.S. Army (e.g., HQDA, T2COM, ARCYBER, AMC, AWC, Army Geospatial Office, ARNG, and USAR), its Sister Services (e.g., USN 2nd Fleet and USAF Futures), Department of War (e.g., SOCOM, DISA, NDU, DLA, Joint Forces Staff College, and JS/J7), Allied and Partner Nations (UK Defence Forum and Army representatives from AUS, ROK, SGP, ITA, DNK, GRC, and BRA), Academia (e.g., UPENN, NYU, UNC, GMU, London School of Economics, Kings College London, OP Jindal Global University – IND, and the International
Islamic University – PAK), and Think Tanks and FFRDCs (e.g., RUSI, RAND, and MITRE) — significantly broadened our understanding of the evolving OE. Today’s blog post captures ten key lessons learned from this insightful and informative event — Read on!]
The character of conflict is changing. From the contested waters of the Arctic to the rapidly growing megacities of the Global South, a new era of strategic competition is unfolding. This was the central
theme of the recent T2COM G-2 Army Mad Scientist Initiative and William & Mary’s Whole of Government Center of Excellence Great Power Competition & Conflict in the Age of Authoritarian Collusion Virtual Event. Experts from across the defense and intelligence communities, academia, industry, and think tanks gathered to dissect the evolving strategies of China and Russia and what they mean for the future.
The scene-setter presentations and panel discussions revealed a reality that is already upon us: a persistent, long-term struggle that occurs below the threshold of traditional warfare, blurring the lines between peace and conflict. Here are the top ten takeaways that highlight the key lessons for navigating this complex new age:
1. The modern battlefield is transparent, lethal, and disaggregated.
The rule of the new battlefield is simple: if you emit, you can be found; if you are found, you can be killed. The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones, combined with persistent surveillance, has eliminated the concept of a safe rear area. This has fundamentally altered maneuver and protection, forcing a shift from platform-centric dominance to a focus on signature management, dispersion, deception, and survival under constant observation.
2. Strategic competition is now waged below the threshold of armed conflict.
The primary arena for great power competition is not direct military confrontation, but a continuous struggle for influence. This competition is
waged through shaping operations, partner alignment, narrative warfare, and economic leverage. In the Global South and the Arctic, China and Russia are working to reshape partner behavior and strategic alignment without firing a shot, seeking to steadily erode U.S. influence.
3. China and Russia employ distinct but complementary models of influence.
Our competitors are not always working in tight coordination, but their approaches are often complementary. China utilizes an Embedded Economic-Informational Model, leveraging infrastructure projects, digital technology, and financial systems to create structural dependence. Russia, in contrast, uses a Coercive Military-Narrative Model, relying on private military companies (PMCs), arms transfers, nuclear energy
power plants, and anti-Western narratives to offer “security with no questions asked.” Together, these models constrain partner choices and weaken U.S. coercive tools.
4. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is no longer a supporting function; it is a strategic center of gravity.
Current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate that expenditure and attrition rates for high-end munitions and systems far exceed peacetime
production assumptions. Competitors view Western dependence on exquisite, hard-to-replace systems as a key vulnerability. Therefore, the DIB must be treated as operational terrain—a warfighting enabler whose capacity and resilience are central to victory in any prolonged conflict.
5. Future conflicts will be protracted, designed to exhaust an adversary’s industrial capacity and political will.
The notion of a swift, decisive victory is increasingly unlikely. Competitors like China are planning for protraction as a core strategy. The goal is to absorb i
nitial blows, grind down advanced Western military systems, exploit stockpile and production mismatches, and ultimately erode an opponent’s will to fight. This requires a Joint Force designed for endurance and adaptability over long periods.
6. The concept of a safe “sanctuary” has collapsed.
The combination of long-range precision fires, pervasive electronic warfare (EW), and stand-in threats means that logistics nodes, airfields, and command
and control centers are now persistently targetable. This has major effects on everything from medevac operations, which can no longer assume a “golden hour,” to command and logistics, which must now operate in disaggregated and contested conditions.
7. Cognitive warfare is an inseparable component of modern operations.
Information operations and narrative competition are powerful force multipliers. Whether it’s Russia exploiting historical grievances or the U.S. using strategic declassification, the cognitive domain is now integral to kinetic operations. Shaping the legitimacy, cohesion, and will to fight among partners, adversaries, and domestic populations is a central objective in this new environment.
8. New strategic arenas are opening in the planet’s most remote regions.
The Arctic is rapidly shifting from a remote operating challenge to a zone of strategic competition. Climate change is creating new access for commerce,
which in turn drives competition over governance, resources, and security. China and Russia are pursuing dual-use “science + infrastructure” projects—such as undersea mapping and research stations—to build a durable advantage that precedes any military presence.
9. Governance, digitalization, and urbanization are the future battlegrounds.
In the Global South, influence will increasingly be determined by who provides the systems, standards, and digital architectures that make the world’s
growing megacities governable. Rapid urban growth will stress policing, service delivery, and data sovereignty. The power that provides the solutions for these challenges will shape long-term political and security alignments for decades to come.
10. Alliances are a decisive advantage, but also a potential vulnerability.
Allies, particularly Arctic-expert nations, provide the U.S. with a key
asymmetric advantage in competence, capability, and legitimacy. However, this is also a vulnerability. Competitors are actively working to exploit any wavering in U.S. or NATO reliability, tempting partners with economic and infrastructure offers that could fray alliance cohesion.
These insights from this virtual event paint a clear picture: the United States and its allies must adapt to an environment of persistent, multi-domain competition. Winning in this new era requires an integrated approach that aligns economic, informational, diplomatic, and security tools for a long-horizon struggle.
If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including:
Our T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1.0, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations
Our China Landing Zone, full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations, T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1.1, How China Fights Against a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team, 10 Things You Didn’t Know About the PLA, and BiteSize China weekly topics.
Our Russia Landing Zone, including T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-2, How Russia Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations and the BiteSize Russia weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P.
Our Iran Landing Zone, including the Iran Quick Reference Guide and the Iran Passive Defense Manual (both require a CAC to access).
Our North Korea Landing Zone, including Resources for Studying North Korea, Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea, and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea.
Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone, including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism (requires a CAC to access).
Our Running Estimates SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE (including Russia’s war in Ukraine war since 2024 and other ongoing competitions and conflicts around the globe). Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment Intelligence Posts.
Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory and T2COM G-2 content…
… on Battlefield Transparency:
15 Layers Deep: Supporting Soldiers with Geospatial Intelligence and associated podcast, with Jason Feser
Nowhere to Hide: Information Exploitation and Sanitization and War Laid Bare, by Matthew Ader
Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target, by Team Sullivan’s Travels
Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare, by Dr. Richard Nabors
The Future of Ground Warfare, and associated podcast
… on Battlefield Automation:
Ukraine Conflict UAV Evolution, by Colin Christopher
Death From Above! The Evolution of sUAS Technology and associated podcast, with COL Bill Edwards (USA-Ret.)
Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown
Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events and associated videos
On the Ground and In the Air in Ukraine, and associated podcast, with Wolfgang Hagarty
Asymmetric Warfare across Multiple Domains, by Ethan Sah
Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace
Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS
The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training
… on Influence Operations and Cognitive Warfare:
Challenging Reality: Chinese Cognitive Warfare and the Fight to Hack Your Brain, by Dr. John Ringquist
In the Cognitive War – The Weapon is You! by Dr. Zac Rogers
AI as a Propaganda Accelerant, by Aldrin Yashko
Influence at Machine Speed: The Coming of AI-Powered Propaganda by MAJ Chris Telley
The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology, by Raechel Melling
Damnatio Memoriae through AI and What is the Threshold? Assessing Kinetic Responses to Cyber-Attacks, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Marie Murphy
China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, by Ian Sullivan
Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success, by CW4 Charles Davis
Gaming Information Dominance and Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1) by Kate Kilgore
Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security and Is Ours a Nation at War? U.S. National Security in an Evolved — and Evolving — Operational Environment, by Dr. Russell Glenn
The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist, by Dr. Nick Marsella
A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat, by 1LT Carlin Keally
Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events, and all of this series’ associated videos
Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette and Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes
LikeWar — The Weaponization of Social Media
The Death of Authenticity: New Era Information Warfare
Active Defense: Shaping the Threat Environment and The Information Disruption Industry and the Operational Environment of the Future, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Vincent H. O’Neil , as well as his associated video presentation from 20 May 2020, part of the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events.
Non-Kinetic War, Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare and associated podcast, with COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.)
… on Competition in the Polar Regions:
On Thin Ice… by Seth Gnesin
The Arctic: An Emergent Zone of Great Power Competition
… on Urban Operations:
A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations
Brian Train on Wargaming Irregular and Urban Combat
TP 525-92-1, The Changing Character of Warfare: The Urban Operational Environment, April 2020.
War in Ukraine: The Urban Fight is Happening Now and its associated podcast, and Ukraine: All Roads Lead to Urban and its associated podcast, with MAJ John Spencer (USA-Ret.)
Current and Future Operations in Megacities Conference: Observations and Recommendations, facilitated in Tokyo on 16-19 July 2019
Megacities: Future Challenges and Responses, documenting key insights from the Multi Domain Battle (MDB) In Megacities Conference, facilitated at Fort Hamilton, New York, on 3-4 April 2018
Dense Urban Environments (DUE): Now through 2050
Dense Urban Hackathon – Virtual Innovation
>>>Reminder: Army Mad Scientist is CALLING ALL CREATORS with our Multi-Media Contest for imaginative thinkers who seek to showcase their ideas about Army Transformation in novel, alternative ways. Check out the contest’s guidelines here, consult your inner muse, unleash your creative talent, get cracking developing your entry, and submit it to ArmyMadSci@gmail.com — Deadline for submission is THIS SATURDAY, 14 February 2026!!!
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of War, Department of the Army, or the U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).


The point about the Defense Industrial Base being treated as operational terrain is especially important. We’re seeing in Ukraine that production timelines, supply chain depth, and surge capacity are as decisive as maneuver units. I’m curious whether the Army is modeling protracted industrial attrition in wargames at scale, particularly in scenarios involving Arctic or Indo-Pacific logistics constraints.